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This monograph, based on newly declassifi ed sources from Western and Russi-
an archives as well as on communist texts about international law and neutrality, 
is the fi rst English-language account of Soviet policy towards neutral yet capi-
talist Austria during the Cold War. In order to make neutrality a model for the 
West, the Kremlin presented the unique Soviet-Austrian relationship as “a good 
example of peaceful coexistence” and a showcase for the benefi ts a Western 
state might reap by declaring neutrality.
This honor, however, had strings attached: The communist doctrine of neutrality 
contained obligations that were expected to make it possible to exploit neutral 
states as instruments of Soviet policy and bring them nearer the socialist bloc. 
While Austrian leaders were careful to avoid these pitfalls, Soviet interventions 
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968 and interference into Austria’s 
interpretation of neutral policy could not but deeply affect Austrian policy and 
the Soviet-Austrian honeymoon. 
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“Royal families formerly used to employ whipping-boys, who had the honor of receiving con-
dign punishment on their profane backs, whenever any of the scions of royalty had committed 
an offense against the rules of good behavior. The modern European political system continues 
this practice, in a certain degree, in the erection of small intermediate States, which have to act 
the scapegoat in any domestic squabble by which the harmony of the ‘balance of power’ may be 
troubled. And in order to enable these smaller States to perform this enviable part with suitable 
dignity, they are, by the common consent of Europe ‘in Congress assembled,’ and with all due so-
lemnity declared ‘neutral.’” Frederick Engels, “Political Position of the Swiss Republic,” [1853], 




In Soviet-Austrian relations, much more than in Austrian dealings with any other 
great power, the year 1955 marked the beginning of a new era. Until then, Soviet 
intentions vis-à-vis the Alpine republic, located at the edge of what was to become 
the Eastern bloc, had been far from clear, and relations between the communist 
superpower and the small state with its roughly seven million inhabitants were gen-
erally strained. It seems that in 1945 Stalin hoped to bring this country, which had 
been liberated from Nazi rule and was occupied by the four Allied powers, gradu-
ally into the Soviet orbit by having a national-front government formed in Vienna 
and establishing close bilateral economic and political ties. With the Austrian com-
munists’ defeat in the general elections of 25 November 1945, the failure of this 
strategy was soon obvious. As a consequence, the Kremlin was not ready to do the 
Austrians any favors: the Allied control over the Austrian government was main-
tained; the former “German assets” in the Soviet zone of Austria were seized; com-
munist tactics to destabilize the Austrian government received Soviet support; and 
the state treaty negotiations for withdrawing the Allied forces were left in limbo as 
long as it seemed useful to the Kremlin to keep troops in both Austria and, by allud-
ing to their right to maintain communication lines, in neighboring Hungary.1 The 
dawning Cold War between the Soviet Union and the West convinced both sides 
that pulling out of Austria was not immediately possible. While the West feared that 
its withdrawal would be followed by a communist attempt to topple the Austrian 
government, Stalin neither wanted to surrender the country entirely to Western in-
fluence nor to give it up as a bargaining chip in his Grand Game over Germany.2 
 1 For a history of the state treaty negotiations, see Gerald Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staats-
vertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945–1955, 5th ed. (Vi-
enna: Böhlau, 2005). Stourzh has provided the most comprehensive history of the negotiations 
to date. On the history of the state treaty and on Austria’s relations with the Allies in the post-
war decade, see also Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), The Austrian 
State Treaty 1955: International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005). Cf. Günter Bischof, Austria in the First 
Cold War, 1945–1955: The Leverage of the Weak (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1999); Manfried Rau-
chensteiner, Stalinplatz 4: Österreich unter alliierter Besatzung (Vienna: Steinbauer, 2005); Rolf 
Steininger, Der Staatsvertrag: Österreich im Schatten von deutscher Frage und Kaltem Krieg, 
1938–1955 (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2005). 
 2 On Soviet policy in Austria in the postwar decade, see Wolfgang Mueller, “Stalin and Austria: 
New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of the Cold War, 1938–1953/55,” in 
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Meanwhile, bilateral relations became increasingly unfriendly. From 1946–47 
on, Soviet propaganda attacked Austrian noncommunist parties and politicians, 
and in 1948 the Soviet deputy high commissioner Aleksei Zheltov, in a conver-
sation with Leopold Figl, called the Christian-social Austrian chancellor “a great 
enemy of the Soviet Union.”3 The harsh Soviet policy proved counterproductive as 
it rendered the Austrian population even more anti-communist than it had already 
been. Notwithstanding these unpromising circumstances, the Soviet authorities in 
Austria, at least until 1953, did not give up their hope of “strengthening Soviet 
influence” in the country and leading Austria towards “people’s democracy” by, 
albeit cautiously, supporting the local communists and trying to cause splits in the 
noncommunist parties. However, the Austrian communists’ scheme to divide Aus-
tria, like the German model, into a communist and a capitalist half was rejected in 
a secret conversation by the Kremlin in February 1948 (most probably in order to 
avoid a new Anschluss of western Austria with West Germany).4
It was only during the “thaw” after Stalin’s death in March 1953 that, in the 
course of the resulting global détente, a significant relaxation in Soviet-Austrian 
relations could be achieved. In response to US president Eisenhower’s call upon 
the Kremlin to prove that it intended to relax tensions, the new Soviet leadership 
consented to various changes in policy: Negotiations with regard to the Korean 
War were resumed, and in July 1953 an armistice was signed. Western diplomats 
in Moscow were granted more freedom of movement, Soviet anti-Western propa-
Cold War History 6, no. 1 (2006), 63–84. For more detail, cf. idem, Die sowjetische Besatzung 
in Österreich 1945–1955 und ihre politische Mission (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005); and idem, “Gab es 
eine verpasste Chance? Die sowjetische Haltung zum Staatsvertrag,” in Arnold Suppan, Gerald 
Stourzh and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), The Austrian State Treaty 1955: International Strategy, 
Legal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissen-
schaften, 2005), 89–120. See also Stefan Karner, Barbara Stelzl-Marx, and Alexandr Tschubarjan 
(eds.), Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Krasnaia armiia v Avstrii, 1945–1955 (Graz: Oldenbourg, 
2005); and Andreas Hilger, Mike Schmeitzner, and Clemens Vollnhals (eds.), Sowjetisierung oder 
Neutralität? Optionen sowjetischer Besatzungspolitik in Deutschland und Österreich 1945–1955 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006). Key Russian documents on Soviet policy in Austria 
are published, in Russian and German, in Wolfgang Mueller, Arnold Suppan, Norman Naimark, 
and Gennadij Bordjugov (eds.), Sowjetische Politik in Österreich: Dokumente aus russischen 
Archiven: Sovetskaia politika v Avstrii: Dokumenty iz Rossiiskikh arkhivov (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005). For a history of Soviet-Austrian relations 
1918–1955, see Wolfgang Mueller and Hannes Leidinger, “Tiefes Misstrauen – begrenztes In-
teresse: Die österreichisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen 1918 bis 1955,” in Arnold Suppan, Klaus 
Koch, Walter Rauscher, and Elisabeth Vyslonzil (eds.), Von Saint-Germain zum Belvedere: Öster-
reich und Europa 1919–1955 (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2006), 70–114.
 3 Quoted in Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 142
 4 Conversation of Zhdanov with the leaders of the Austrian Communist Party Koplenig and Fürn-
berg, 13 February 1948, in Mueller, Suppan, Naimark, Bordjugov, Sowjetische Politik: Sovetskaia 
politika, 452–465. A German translation is published in Wolfgang Mueller, “Die Teilung Öster-
reichs als politische Option für KPÖ und UdSSR 1948), in Zeitgeschichte 32, no. 1 (2005), 47–54.
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ganda was tempered, territorial claims against Turkey were relinquished, and diplo-
matic relations with Yugoslavia, Greece, and Israel were reestablished.5 In the Unit-
ed Nations, the Soviet delegate ended his earlier blockade by giving a green light 
for the nomination of Dag Hammarskjöld for the position of Secretary General, and 
in Germany, Soviet traffic blocks around Berlin were loosened. Most sensationally, 
the US president’s address to the Soviet people was published in Pravda. With re-
gard to Austria, whose release from four-power control had also been demanded in 
Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” speech of 16 April, as a test case for the serious-
ness of Soviet intentions to end the Cold War,6 the Kremlin allowed certain relaxa-
tions in its control over the Austrian authorities, which eased everyday life in the 
Soviet zone and slackened the bilateral tensions.7 The diplomatic representations 
in Vienna and Moscow were upgraded to embassies (roughly at the same time the 
USSR established an embassy in East Berlin). 
The new Austrian chancellor, Julius Raab of the Christian-democratic Austrian 
People’s Party (ÖVP), publicly expressed his gratitude for the Soviet concessions. 
He grasped that, given the Soviet reluctance hitherto shown for withdrawing from 
Austria, the country’s path to full sovereignty was via Moscow, and he was there-
fore ready to please the Soviets in order to achieve this goal. His interest in devel-
oping trade and commerce, particularly Osthandel, (an interest partially based on 
Raab’s roots in small business and his political activity as president of his party’s 
organization for entrepreneurs, the Wirtschaftsbund) seemed to be a further incen-
tive for developing ties with Eastern Europe. Austria’s geographic location between 
the frontlines of the two emerging blocs, squeezed in between communist Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, between NATO member Italy and soon-to-be member West 
Germany, between neutral Switzerland and nonaligned Yugoslavia, made an ac-
commodation with the East appear even more desirable. Therefore Raab called on 
his fellow citizens not only to stop the “propaganda against the ‘people’s democra-
cies’” but also to refrain from, as he famously put it, too often “pinching the tail of 
the Russian bear who is standing right in the middle of [our] garden.”8 
Additionally, the Austrian government started to sound out whether an Austrian 
declaration of neutrality might improve chances for concluding the state treaty. 
 5 Wilfried Loth, Overcoming the Cold War: A History of Détente (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 19. 
 6 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to 
Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 157. On the background of 
including Austria into the speech, see Deborah Welch Larson, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian 
State Treaty,” in International Organization 41, no. 1 (1987), 27–60, 36.
 7 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 220–239; Rauchensteiner, Stalinplatz, 213–215. 
 8 Quoted in Günter Bischof, “The Robust Assertion of Austrianism: Peaceful Coexistence in Aus-
tria after Stalin’s Death,” in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood (eds.), The Cold War after Stalin’s 
Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 233–256, 241. 
The Western powers remained suspicious of Raab’s intentions. Cf. Warren W. Williams, “Brit-
ish Policy and the Occupation of Austria” (PhD Thesis, University of Wales, Swansea, 2004), 
356–360. 
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Since the end of the Habsburg Monarchy in 1918, members of the political elite 
of the small country had repeatedly aired their support for the idea of adopting a 
neutral status.9 After 1945 some leaders of the main political parties in Austria had 
continued to do so; however, while social democrats and conservatives refused 
ideological neutrality and insisted on Austria’s status as a Western democracy, the 
communists’ advocacy of keeping the country out of the West contributed to the 
idea of neutrality being somewhat discredited. After Stalin’s offer for neutralizing 
Germany was rejected, Soviet diplomats joined their Austrian colleagues in dis-
cussing the option for Austria. At a four-power conference in Berlin in January and 
February of 1954, the USSR’s delegation seemed pleased with the idea of neutraliz-
ing Austria. However, no agreement could be reached regarding the Soviet foreign 
minister’s demand of a prolonged military presence of the four powers in Austria 
until the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. If the Soviet government had, 
in the spring of 1953, intended to withdraw from Austria, it must have faltered in 
the wake of the anti-communist uprising in East Germany in June. After the Soviet 
crackdown on East German workers, the chances for further experiments in foreign 
relations such as a withdrawal from Austria looked dim. A new cooling down in 
Soviet-Austrian relations was the consequence.10
“Peaceful coexistence”
It seems doubtful that a breakthrough could have been achieved had not the new 
Soviet leadership underlined its readiness for global détente by embarking on a 
new policy called “peaceful coexistence.” During the late Stalin years, the Soviet 
doctrine had stressed the permanent struggle between the forces of communism and 
capitalism. In consideration of mounting East-West tensions and with the Cold War 
actually turning into a hot war on the Korean peninsula, Stalin had repeatedly un-
derlined the danger of a general conflagration between the two main opponents, the 
Soviet Union and the United States, and their allies.11 The confrontation between 
the two blocs in an age of thermonuclear weapons, however, included the risk of 
mutual or even global destruction.
 9 Stephan Verosta, Die dauernde Neutralität: Ein Grundriss (Vienna: Manz, 1967), 47–60. Cf. 
Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 242–282; and his “The Origins of Austrian Neutrality,” in 
Alan Leonhard (ed.), Neutrality: Changing Concepts and Practices (Lanham: University Press of 
America, 1988), 35–57. It is therefore not entirely correct to claim that “neutrality in Austria has 
no historical roots prior to World War II,” as stated in Joan Johnson-Freese, “Austria,” in S. Victor 
Papacosma and Mark R. Rubin (eds.), Europe’s Neutral and Nonaligned States: Between NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 161–180, 161.
 10 William Lloyd Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria: An Analysis of Soviet 
Policy in Austria, 1945–1955 (Bonn: Siegler, 1961), 146–148.
 11 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1996), 60. 
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In addition to this risk that the new Russian leaders seemed eager to avoid, 
at least two other factors may have been involved when the Kremlin opted for a 
new course: In Western Europe, the expansion of communism had been stopped 
by Western Containment and various attempts had been made at creating a united 
West European bloc, attempts that the Kremlin tried to prevent from materializing. 
In Asia and Africa, vast areas, from Egypt to India to Indonesia, freed themselves of 
colonial rule and gained independence. Their leaders’ political tendency was rather 
more nationalist and neutralist than communist, but they were open to advances 
from any supporters, including the USSR.12 The new Soviet leadership was inter-
ested in exploiting the former colonies’ natural anti-colonialist sentiment as well 
as not letting these countries join the Western camp.13 To reach both goals, it was 
necessary to project a friendlier and more “peaceful” image of Soviet policy than 
had been possible in the late Stalin years.
Therefore, after Stalin’s death the new Kremlin leadership launched a “peace 
initiative.”14 Already in 1953, Georgii Malenkov revoked the thesis of the inevita-
bility of war and declared that “peaceful coexistence between countries of different 
social systems” was not only possible but also the correct and “truly Leninist” basis 
for Soviet foreign policy. In his speech on the occasion of Stalin’s funeral, on 9 
March, the prime minister stated that there was a “possibility of a lasting coexist-
ence and peaceful competition between the two different systems.”15 This received 
confirmation in his speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet on 8 August, in 
which he declared: “There is no outstanding issue of dispute which cannot be set-
tled in a peaceful manner […]. We stand for the peaceful coexistence of the two 
 12 David Reynolds, One World Divisible: A Global History Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2000), 
58–66.
 13 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2005), 67; Alexander Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin 
(London: Methuen, 1962), 286–295; on India, cf. Andreas Hilger, “The Soviet Union and India: 
The Khrushchev Era and its Aftermath until 1966,” in idem, Anna Locher, Roland Popp, Shana 
Goldberg, Matthias Pintsch (eds.), Indo-Soviet Relations Collection (Zurich: Parallel History Pro-
ject, 2009), http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_india/documents/IntroII_final_001.pdf, 
1; on Indonesia, see Ragna Boden, Die Grenzen der Weltmacht: Sowjetische Indonesienpolitik 
von Stalin bis Brežnev (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2006), 99–114. 
 14 Geoffrey Roberts, A Chance for Peace: The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953–1955, 
Cold War International History Working Paper 57 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 
2008). Whether the initiative really was a “chance for peace” and a lasting East-West settlement is 
doubted by many scholars. See Mark Kramer, “International Politics in the Early Post-Stalin Era: 
A Lost Opportunity, a Turning Point, or More of the Same?,” in Klaus Larres and Kenneth Osgood 
(eds.), The Cold War after Stalin’s Death: A Missed Opportunity for Peace? (Lanham: Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2006), xiii–xxxiv, xiii. 
 15 Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, 19; Keesing’s Contemporary Archives IX (1952–1954), 12869 
and 13097–13099. The thesis of the inevitability of wars among capitalist powers had been re-
cently reconfirmed by Stalin in his Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Moscow: For-
eign Languages Publishing, 1952), 32–37. 
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systems.” This claim was further underlined in Foreign Minister Molotov’s speech16 
at the session of the Supreme Soviet on 9 February 1955 and by the new Kremlin 
chief, Nikita Khrushchev, at the twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956.17 
Although Lenin, Foreign Commissars Leon Trotskii and Georgii Chicherin, and 
later Stalin had sometimes spoken of the possibility and even necessity of peace-
ful relations between the Soviet state and the capitalist world,18 the embracing of 
the idea could be regarded a major sea change in postwar international politics. 
Khrushchev’s concept differed from Lenin’s and Stalin’s in many respects: The 
earlier leaders’ theses had allowed for short periods of coexistence only, designed 
to create breathing space for the Bolshevik regime. Stalin’s heir, however, claimed 
that the emergence of the socialist camp after World War II had created the precon-
ditions needed for a longer lasting, albeit limited, period of “peaceful coexistence.” 
As always in communist propaganda, avoiding war was depicted as the result not 
of Soviet insecurity or Western compromises, but exclusively of Soviet strength 
and the growth of the socialist bloc, which had allegedly disrupted Western war 
plans and forced the West to accept a continuation of peace.19 Nonetheless, it was 
 16 Archiv der Gegenwart, 9 February 1955, 05003-1. On the Soviet doctrine of “peaceful coexis-
tence,” see Margot Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1988), 27–68; for further details, cf. Edward McWhinney, Peaceful Coexistence and Soviet-
Western International Law (Leyden: Sythoff, 1964); and Bernard A. Ramundo, Peaceful Coexis-
tence: International Law in the Building of Communism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); 
Alois Riklin, Weltrevolution oder Koexistenz? (Zurich: Schweizerischer Aufklärungsdienst, 
1969); Henn-Jüri Uibopuu, Die sovjetische Doktrin der friedlichen Koexistenz als Völkerrechts-
problem (Vienna: Notring, 1971); Jessica E. Martin, “Peaceful Coexistence,” in Ruud van Dijk 
et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Cold War (New York: Routledge, 2008), 689–690. The Soviet 
theory is elaborated in, e.g., N.S. Chruschtschow, Für dauerhaften Frieden und friedliche Koexi-
stenz (Berlin: Dietz, 1959); A.A. Gromyko (ed.), Die friedliche Koexistenz: Der Leninsche Kurs 
der Außenpolitik der Sowjetunion (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, [1964]); A.E. Bovin, “Peace-
ful Coexistence,” in A. M. Prokhorov et al. (eds.), Great Soviet Encyclopedia 16, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1977), 625–627; G.I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1974), 37–39; W.I. Jegorow, Friedliche Koexistenz und revolutionärer 
Prozess (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1972); Schalwa Sanakojew and Nikolai Kaptschenko, 
Theorie der Außenpolitik des Sozialismus (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1979), 90–102.
 17 N.S. Chruschtschow, Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei der 
Sowjetunion an den XX. Parteitag 14. Februar 1956 (Moscow: Verlag für Fremdsprachige Lite-
ratur, 1956), 21–25, 32–51; N.S. Khrushchev, O mirnom sosushchestvovanii (Moscow: Gospoli-
tizdat, 1959). For an English version, see “On Peaceful Coexistence,” in Foreign Affairs 38, no. 
1 (October 1959), 1–18. 
 18 V.I. Lenin, On Peaceful Coexistence (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing, [1962]); J. Stalin, 
For Peaceful Coexistence: Postwar Interviews (New York: International Publishers, 1951). Cf. 
Riklin, Weltrevolution oder Koexistenz?, 27. 
 19 N.S. Khrushchev, Otchetnyi doklad Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo 
Soiuza XX s”ezdu partii (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1956), 40; “Doklad tov. N.S. Khrushcheva,” in 
Vneocherednoi [XXI] s”ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Sovetskogo Soiuza: Stenograficheskii otch-
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made clear that a period of “peaceful coexistence” was seen as merely a transitory 
phase on the road to communism. Khrushchev’s somewhat naïve and therefore 
over-optimistic belief in Marxism-Leninism and its victory convinced him that a 
few years of peace in the world would be sufficient for all mankind to recognize 
that communism was the most efficient system.20 
Formally, the new doctrine drew heavily on non-Soviet sources such as the five 
Principles Guiding the Relations between the People’s Republic of China and India 
that had been listed in the Chinese-Indian treaty of 29 April 1954 and solemnly 
declared by Nehru and Chou En-Lai in June, and the ten principles of the final 
declaration of the Third World countries’ conference in Bandung in April 1955. 
According to the Chinese-Indian treaty, “peaceful coexistence” was comprised of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, nonaggression, noninter-
ference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, coexistence and economic 
cooperation. Of these, the first four were part of the UN Charter.21 
The adoption of such “peaceful” principles notwithstanding, Soviet leaders 
stressed that the ideological struggle between communism and capitalism had not 
been given up.22 In their estimation, “peaceful coexistence,” as a “special form of 
the class struggle,” would even intensify such competition and promote the transi-
tion of the world to communism by demonstrating the superiority of the socialist 
bloc and by supporting the struggle of anti-imperialist and “progressive forces” 
in the West and in the southern hemisphere.23 At the same time, the economic ad-
vancement of the Soviet Union was expected to make it possible to win a nonvio-
lent race with the West. Thus, “peaceful coexistence” did neither mean reconcili-
ation with capitalism nor the elimination of the East-West conflict but merely its 
transformation into an ideological, political, economic, technological, and cultural 
“footrace” between the “two systems.” Western observers were critical whether 
et (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1959), 73; N.S. Khrushchev, Otchet Tsentral’nogo Komiteta Kommu-
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this kind of “coexistence” meant anything other than Cold War.24 If, in such a 
situation, war could be avoided depended ‒ from the Soviet point of view ‒ upon 
whether the leading classes in capitalist states finally conceded to communism. 
“Peaceful coexistence” did not comprise a renunciation of the “armed struggle 
of the proletariat,” or of local wars. Not openly declared was that “peaceful co-
existence,” in particular economic cooperation with the West, was to provide the 
Soviet economy with much-needed imports, which would reduce the burden on 
the overstretched industry as well as raise the exhausted East European workers’ 
mood.
In general, the Soviet aim of “peaceful coexistence” appears to have been two-
fold: first, avoiding a global war with the West while undermining Western resist-
ance against communism, and secondly, strengthening the Soviet side by increasing 
trade, projecting a friendly image and winning new friends abroad. It was antici-
pated that this new strategy would make it easier for the USSR to achieve some of 
its main foreign policy goals by safeguarding beneficial international conditions for 
the development of communism in the Soviet Union and the “World Socialist Sys-
tem,” the struggle of the Third World for decolonization and independence, as well 
as the class struggle abroad.25 At the same time, as claimed by the Soviet theory 
of international law and as proven by the Soviet interventions of 1956, 1968, 1979 
and 1981 in the USSR’s neighborhood, “peaceful coexistence” and noninterference 
in internal affairs did not apply to the Soviet relations with its small neighboring 
states.26 
The Austrian state treaty and declaration of neutrality
It was within this framework of “peaceful coexistence” that Khrushchev, the 
emerging Soviet leader, took the opportunity to scale down international tensions 
and to improve the image of the USSR in the West and in the Third World by tak-
 24 Rodney Gilbert, Competitive Coexistence: The New Soviet Challenge (New York: Bookmailer, 
1956), 17. Quoted in Gromyko, Die friedliche Koexistenz, 116.
 25 Programm der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion, angenommen auf dem XXII. Parteikon-
gress 1961, in Meissner, Das Parteiprogramm der KPdSU, 181–184; Erklärung der Beratung von 
Vertretern der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien in Moskau, November 1960, in Schenk, 
Kommunistische Grundsatzerklärungen, 108. 
 26 See, e.g., N.S. Chruschtschow, “Gespräch mit dem Chefredakteur der japanischen Zeitung Asahi 
Shimbun, Tomoo Hirooka, 18 June 1957,” in idem, Für dauerhaften Frieden, 125; Gromyko, Die 
friedliche Koexistenz, 11. Among Western analyses, see Theodor Schweisfurth, Sozialistisches 
Völkerrecht? Darstellung – Analyse – Wertung der sowjetmarxistischen Theorie vom Völkerrecht 
„neuen Typs“ (Berlin: Springer, 1979), 262–284. For a critical analysis of the content and devel-
opment of “peaceful coexistence” from 1956 until the mid-1970s, see Standenat to Austrian MFA, 
22 December 1975, in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (hereafter: ÖStA), AVA, NL Bielka, File 115. 
On the Brezhnev doctrine, see Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise and Fall of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 
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ing various steps, such as joining the Geneva conference on Indochina, reducing 
Soviet forces, withdrawing from obsolete Soviet bases such as Port Arthur, China, 
and Porkkala, Finland, settling the Soviet dispute with Yugoslavia, and agreeing 
on the Austrian state treaty, thus ending its Allied control and occupation. After 
Khrushchev had demoted Malenkov from leadership, on 8 February 1955 Molotov 
announced that the Austrian question should be solved soon, and following some 
bilateral exploratory contacts, the country’s leaders were invited to Moscow. Their 
promise to see to it that Austria adopt a neutral status like the one of Switzerland,27 
as agreed upon in bilateral negotiations in Moscow and laid down in a memoran-
dum of 15 April, was an unofficial conditio sine qua non for the Soviet consent to 
join the Western powers in the signing of the state treaty. This Soviet promise was 
also inserted into the Soviet-Austrian Moscow memorandum. The trip of an Aus-
trian governmental delegation to the Soviet capital ‒ the first high ranking bilateral 
Austrian visit to the USSR28 ‒ and the successful conclusion of the negotiations 
were highly celebrated in the communist propaganda. 
The State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic 
Austria was signed on 15 May in Vienna by the foreign ministers of the four pow-
ers plus Austria. The document declared the union with Germany, as it had been 
established after Hitler’s Wehrmacht had marched into Austria in March 1938, as 
null and void and recognized the reconstruction of a democratic independent Aus-
tria within its pre-Anschluss borders. As stipulated by article 4 of the treaty, a new 
Anschluss was prohibited, as were the purchase and use of certain categories of 
weapons, in particular torpedoes and missiles (article 13). Furthermore, it was codi-
fied, as had been agreed in the Moscow memorandum, that Austria buy the Soviet-
run “German assets,” including oil wells and the Danube Steamship Company, in 
eastern Austria for a lump sum of 150 plus 2 million dollars plus the delivery of 
10 million tons of oil to the USSR. This provision was especially important, as the 
Western powers had feared that the prolonged existence of major Soviet enterpris-
es in Austria might undermine the country’s independence. But surprisingly, one 
searches the treaty in vain for a clause on Austria’s neutrality, this despite the coun-
try’s neutralization being the price that had to be paid for the Soviet’s willingness 
to join the Western allies in its signing. Neutrality was declared only afterwards in 
an act of national legislation. This was thanks to the Western powers, who insisted 
 27 The official Swiss doctrine of neutrality of 26 November 1954, in Schweizerisches Jahrbuch 
für Internationales Recht (1957), 195–199. Also published in Verosta, Die dauernde Neutralität, 
113–117. On the relation between Swiss and Austrian neutrality, see Christian Jenny, Konsens-
formel oder Vorbild? Die Entstehung der österreichischen Neutralität und ihr Schweizer Mu-
ster (Bern: Haupt, 1995). For Soviet comments on draft declarations of Austria’s neutrality, see 
Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 404–405.
 28 The minister of agriculture Franz Thoma was invited to the All-Union Agricultural Exhibit in July 
1954. Ludwig Steiner, “Zur Außenpolitik der Zweiten Republik,” in Erich Zöllner (ed.), Diploma-
tie und Außenpolitik Österreichs (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1977), 169–187, 179. 
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that Austria’s neutrality should only be enacted if self-chosen.29 However, on the 
eve of the state treaty’s signing, all four powers issued a joint declaration that they 
were willing to respect and honor Austria’s neutral status.
Both the Soviet “green light” and the end-spurt towards the state treaty had 
come quite unexpectedly. Hitherto, a withdrawal from Austria had been obstructed 
mainly by the Soviet foreign minister,30 whose advisors warned that an end of the 
Soviet armed presence “would give the country into the hands of the Americans.”31 
This does not mean, however, that Molotov had been opposing mainstream Krem-
lin opinions that were pro-state treaty. It seems that his opinion was the mainstream 
until the end of 1954, and old “iron bottom,” as Molotov was sometimes referred 
to, simply did not react quickly enough when the new leadership under Khrush-
chev changed its course in the Austrian question. After the treaty’s successful con-
clusion, the Austrian solution and Molotov’s alleged resistance against it came in 
handy in Khrushchev’s subsequent power struggle to demote the experienced for-
eign minister and capture supremacy in foreign-policy issues.32 Apparently, the new 
 29 Kurt Steiner, “Negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty,” in: Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley 
and Alexander Dallin (eds.), U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 46–82, 60. 
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hakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War, 156–158; Gerald Stourzh, “Der österreichische Staatsver-
trag in den weltpolitischen Entscheidungsprozessen des Jahres 1955,” in Arnold Suppan, Gerald 
Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), The Austrian State Treaty 1955: International Strategy, 
Legal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissen-
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leader’s readiness to withdraw from this Alpine country did not stem as much from 
Austrian as from inner-Soviet and international factors, as the social democratic 
state secretary in the Austrian Foreign Department at that time, Bruno Kreisky, 
cleverly assessed.33 The state treaty and the neutralization of Austria were only 
possible due to a number of special factors. These included a perceived balance of 
forces between the East and West in the international sphere that was roughly equal, 
relative stability and low conflict intensity in the area, Austria’s peripheral location 
between the two military blocs, the country’s relatively small size, weakness, and 
passivity on the international stage. 
By consenting to the state treaty and insisting on Austria’s neutralization, the So-
viet leaders were able to aim at various objectives: 34 Because denying the Austrian 
territory to the opposing alliance had been a goal in the policy of both superpowers 
since the beginning of the Cold War, the reciprocal withdrawal of forces under the 
condition of Austria’s neutralization offered a classic solution.35 In the nineteenth 
century, the neutralization of a weak territory that was strategically located between 
two major powers or blocs had been applied in many cases that were similar to 
postwar Austria, such as Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg. By withdrawing 
reciprocally from such contested territories, recognizing their neutrality, and, thus, 
creating a strategic buffer, the great powers ‒ France and Germany in the nineteenth 
century or the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II ‒ chose to 
avoid further tensions that could escalate into a major conflagration.
text, Highlights,” ibid., 7–25; and Vladislav Zubok, “CPSU Plenums, Leadership Struggles, and 
Soviet Cold War Politics,” ibid., 28–33.
 33 Karl Molin, “The Supportive Observer: Sweden and the Austrian State Treaty 1955,” in Arnold 
Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), The Austrian State Treaty 1955: International 
Policy, Legal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 2005), 397–415, 407. On the following, see Hanspeter Neuhold, “Der Staatsver-
trag als Grundlage der österreichischen Außenpolitik,” in Alois Mock, Ludwig Steiner, Andreas 
Khol (eds.), and Rainer Stepan (red.), Neue Fakten zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität (Vienna: 
Politische Akademie, [1980]), 157–180, 161–162.
 34 For a discussion of the Soviet motives for ending their occupation of Austria, see also William L. 
Stearman, “An Analysis of Soviet Objectives in Austria,” in Robert A. Bauer (ed.), The Austrian 
Solution: International Conflict and Cooperation (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1982), 99–125. The most comprehensive analysis, based on Soviet archival material, is found in 
Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 450–485. Cf. Suppan et al., The Austrian State Treaty, here 
especially Aleksei Filitov, “The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the Austrian State Treaty,” 
ibid., 121–143; Vojtech Mastny, “The Launching of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Grand Strategy,” 
ibid., 145–162.
 35 The classic alternative was either the creation of a militarized buffer zone, the division of the 
territory ‒ an option that was rejected by both sides for different reasons ‒ or a condominium, an 
option that had failed in the early Cold War years due to the interallied rift. Daniel Frei, Dimensio-
nen neutraler Politik: Ein Beitrag zur Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen (Geneva: Institut 
Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1969), 28–47. 
24 Introduction 
Furthermore, the Soviet readiness for withdrawing from Austria was very much 
increased by the integration of West Germany into the Atlantic alliance, a decision 
that was agreed upon by NATO members in the autumn of 1954 and in the proc-
ess of being ratified. The French National Assembly had passed the Paris Treaty in 
December 1954, albeit by a narrow margin, the West German Bundestag approved 
it on 27 February 1955, and the French Senate followed in March. It seems unlikely 
that the Kremlin counted on fully preventing the ratification by means of signaling 
that neutrality might also open the way for Germany’s reunification and demilita-
rization. Nevertheless, Soviet propaganda in early 1955 alluded to the theme, thus 
attempting to stir up resistance in Western Europe against West Germany’s inclu-
sion into NATO and to delay the implementation of its rearmament.36 
By insisting on Austria’s becoming neutral Khrushchev also managed to prevent 
it from following the neighboring FRG into the Atlantic alliance. This actually seems 
to have been the main reason for the Soviet urgency to solve the Austrian problem. 
Indeed, this was recognized by contemporaries: On 8 April 1955, US Ambassador 
Charles Bohlen wrote to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles: “The chief immedi-
ate motivation of the Soviets in reopening the Austrian question is to endeavor to en-
sure neutralization of Austria in order to prevent military integration three western 
zones of Austria into NATO.”37 In the postwar decade, Austria had positioned itself 
on the Western side and was even treated by the United States as a “secret ally.”38 In 
the early 1950s, Soviet internal reports and political statements increasingly warned 
against the growing possibility of Austria being integrated into NATO’s military 
 36 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 466–480. This issue has sparked dicussion among historians 
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 37 Quoted in Günter Bischof, “The Making of the Austrian Treaty and the Road to Geneva,” in idem 
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planning.39 As a result of the Allied occupation, the Western powers had been free to 
use the Western parts of the country for troop and supply transports between West 
Germany and Italy. With the FRG’s full integration into the Atlantic alliance, oppor-
tunities like this became even more precious for the West. It was exactly at this mo-
ment, that the Kremlin agreed to a four-power withdrawal from Austria, thus forcing 
NATO transports between the Munich and Verona headquarters to make a consider-
able detour. It was clear that Austria’s neutralization made life more difficult for the 
Atlantic alliance by driving a wedge between West Germany and Italy.40 
In addition to disrupting the Western communication lines and forestalling west-
ern Austria’s integration into NATO, the conclusion of the state treaty offered sev-
eral positive side effects for the Kremlin on the international stage: In early 1955, 
the USSR had received further signals from the West that solving the Austrian 
problem was a precondition for a much-wanted summit with the Western powers 
‒ the first meeting of such kind since the end of the war. This summit later took 
place in the summer of the same year in Geneva.41 The US president had kept his 
word and in May extended an invitation for a four-power conference. The Soviet 
concessions regarding Austria therefore made it easier for the Soviet leadership to 
leave the international isolation it had found itself in since the Cold War. Further-
more, a Soviet withdrawal from Austria seems to have been repeatedly demanded 
by Belgrade as a precondition for relaxing the tense Yugoslav-Soviet relationship.42 
On 13 May, Khrushchev announced his intention to go to Canossa and visit Stalin’s 
old boogey man Tito. Besides straightening out relations with the Yugoslav leader, 
this initiative ‒ like the Austrian one ‒ would serve Khrushchev in undermining 
Molotov’s position in the Kremlin.
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Signing the Austrian treaty offered still more advantages for the Soviet Union: 
The postponement, prior to 1955, of the Soviet withdrawal from Austria had not 
only embarrassed Soviet diplomats on the international stage, but also increasingly 
strained Austrian-Soviet relations. Most economic enterprises that had been seized 
by the USSR in this country had turned from being assets to being financial bur-
dens.43 By giving a green light for the state treaty, Khrushchev not only got rid of 
this political and increasingly economic liability. As Khrushchev recalled, the im-
provements at the bilateral level were not the least of his aims when he pushed for 
a quick conclusion of the state treaty.44 
Since turning Austria into a pro-communist state and Soviet ally had failed in 
1945,45 the state treaty plus neutrality formed the second best solution from the 
Soviet perspective. For the Kremlin, permanent neutrality opened the chance for 
improving Soviet-Austrian relations and, in addition, having a say in future Austri-
an international behavior. Since neutrality was explicitly mentioned in the Soviet-
Austrian Moscow memorandum (albeit not in the state treaty, as mentioned above), 
it promised to provide the Kremlin a lever over this country’s foreign policy ‒ a 
lever that could be useful for distancing Austria from the West, in particular from 
its traditional postwar patron, the United States.
Last but not least, by creating a showcase of the benefits of neutrality, Khrush-
chev reinforced the Soviet attempts to undermine the pro-Atlantic consensus in 
Western Europe. The Austrian solution was thus part of the Soviet campaign for 
promoting neutrality in order to contain or dissolve NATO and other pro-Western 
blocs and to neutralize Western Europe and South Asia.46 In order to make neu-
trality more attractive for other Western and pro-Western states, Soviet relations 
with neutral Austria were designed to serve as a “model for peaceful and mutually 
beneficial relations between states of different social systems,” as was frequently 
claimed by Khrushchev and other Soviet voices.47 Soviet leaders repeatedly drew 
 43 Michail Prozumen��ikov, “Nach Stalins Tod: Sowjetische Österreichpolitik 1953–1955,” in Ste-
fan Karner and Barbara Stelzl-Marx (eds.), Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Beiträge (Graz: Olden-
bourg, 2005), 729–753.
 44 Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vremia, liudi, vlast’: Vozpominaniia 2 (Moscow: Novosti, 1999), 211–220. 
A similar explanation was given by Khrushchev and Presidium member Anastas Mikoian during 
the plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee on 11 July 1955. Stourzh, Um Einheit und 
Freiheit, 454–461; Karner, Stelzl-Marx, Tschubarjan, Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Dokumente, 
840–843. For an English version, see Nikita Khrushchev, The Memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev III: 
Statesman 1953–1964, ed. by Sergei Khrushchev (University Park: The Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 4–28.
 45 Mueller, “Stalin and Austria,” 67–68; idem, Die sowjetische Besatzung in Österreich, 71–135.
 46 See below, pages 48–54. Cf. Harto Hakovirta, “The Soviet Union and the Varieties of Neutrality 
in Western Europe,” in World Politics 35, no. 4 (1983), 563–585. 
 47 Quoted in William Banks Bader, Austria between East and West, 1945–1955 (Stanford: Univer-
sity Press, 1966), 208. See also, e.g., Sovremennik, “Das österreichische Beispiel,” in Neue Zeit, 
no. 20 (1955), 6–8; S. Okhantsev, “An Example of Peaceful Coexistence,” in International Af-
fairs, no. 9 (1958), 85–86; L. Vidyasova, “An Impressive Example of Peaceful Coexistence,” in 
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the attention of their foreign guests to Austria, which, by declaring neutrality “had 
given an excellent model, which by following would be beneficial for other people 
as well.”48 While the Austrian model, in Soviet eyes, should be imitated by as many 
Western states as possible, it seems to be one of the many ironic footnotes of the 
Cold War that the United States, in particular under the Kennedy administration, 
also envisaged Austria as functioning as a model ‒ a model, however, that would 
work in the opposite direction, namely, attracting East European and nonaligned 
states and shaping their behavior.49 Gerald Stourzh seems to have been the first 
historian to draw our attention to this type of Soviet propaganda, in which Austrian 
neutrality is praised as a model for other Western states.50 This praise did not come 
without strings attached; its aim was to accomplish a certain goal. Khrushchev and 
his successors wanted to break states out of the Western bloc and to prevent oth-
ers from entering. Therefore, they had to offer an acceptable alternative to them. 
Neutrality was meant as such an alternative. Soviet leaders also wanted their diplo-
matic initiatives to be successful and thus, needed them to be supported by Western 
countries as well. The neutral countries were expected to provide such helpful serv-
ices by promoting communist proposals. Although neutrality underwent several 
changes during the next forty years as a consequence of the changing international 
environment, this approach proved highly serviceable. 
For Austria, neutrality was the price to be paid for the Soviet willingness to 
join the West in signing the state treaty. When the country was offered the choice 
between the factual neutralization by foreign occupation or a declaration of perma-
nent neutrality, it chose the latter. Solemnly adopted by the Austrian parliament on 
26 October 1955, neutrality enabled the country to attain full sovereignty. This re-
flected the classical purpose of neutrality for neutral states, i.e. the realization and/
or preservation of independence. However, as we shall see, being small and neutral 
turned out to be less attractive, easy and secure than Austrian leaders had imagined. 
The signing of the treaty, which was ratified by all contracting parties by 27 July, 
and the Austrian declaration of neutrality were perceived by Khrushchev as his first 
International Affairs, no. 8 (August 1960), 11–15; Speech by N.S. Khrushchev in Vienna, 30 June 
1960, in Druzhestvennyi vizit: Prebyvanie Predsedatel’ia Soveta Ministrov SSSR N.S. Khrush-
chëva v Avstriiskoi Respublike 30 iiuniia–6 iiulia 1960g. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960), 10; I.K. 
Kobliakov, G.G. Kuranov, and D.N. Mochalin, SSSR v bor’be za nezavisimost’ Avstrii (Moscow: 
Politizdat, 1965), 166; I.G. Zhiriakov, SSSR i Avstrija v 1945–1975 gody (Moscow: Molodaia 
gvardiia, 1982), 28.
 48 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 19 May 1959, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. 
Berichte Moskau. 
 49 Martin Kofler, Kennedy und Österreich: Neutralität im Kalten Krieg (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 
2003), 26–27.
 50 Gerald Stourzh, “Grundzüge der österreichischen Außenpolitik, 1945–1960,” in Anton Kolabek 
(ed.), Österreichische Zeitgeschichte im Geschichtsunterricht (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundes-
verlag, 1961), 185–211, 209. Cf. Sovremennik, “Österreichs Neutralität und ihre Bedeutung,” in 
Neue Zeit, no. 21 (1955), 7–9.
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major “victory” in foreign policy and duly celebrated by Soviet propaganda. It had 
been only in 1954 that Khrushchev had started to focus on foreign affairs. In his 
recollections, the inexperienced country bumpkin’s “trip to Europe had been a suc-
cess,” and the Austrian state treaty was
“a demonstration that we were capable of orienting ourselves in international affairs without 
Stalin’s guidance and instructions. To put it in a more colorful way, in our international policy we 
had now changed from the short pants of boyhood into the trousers of grown men. Our successful 
debut was recognized not only in the USSR but in other countries as well, which was of great 
importance. We were feeling our strength.”51 
In the following months and years, Soviet propaganda would elevate the state 
treaty into a gem of détente and a cornerstone of Soviet-Austrian relations. In order 
to keep the memory alive and to engrave it into Austrian public consciousness, on 
the occasion of the anniversary of the signing of the state treaty the Kremlin sent an-
nual congratulatory messages and Soviet media published articles about the happy 
event.52 Kremlin leaders and propagandists would systematically claim that it was 
the USSR that had made the state treaty possible.53 In bilateral meetings, Khrush-
 51 Khrushchev, Memoirs III, 15. Cf. Sergei N. Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of 
a Superpower (University Press: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 79; William 
Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man: His Era (London: Simon & Schuster Free Press, 2003), 349; 
331; 333; 349. 
 52 See, e.g., Telegram Mikoian to Schärf, 14 May 1965, in Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza 
i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1965 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1966), 218: “The 
past decade shows convincingly that the state treaty and the policy of permanent neutrality satisfy 
the national interests of the Austrian people and other European peoples.” Cf. “Das Jubiläum der 
österreichischen Neutralität,” in Neue Zeit, no. 21 (1965), 9; S. Tarow, “20 Jahre Neutralitätspo-
litik,” in Neue Zeit, no. 43 (1975), 23–24; G. Rozanov, “Austria: Twenty Years of Independent 
and Democratic Development,” in International Affairs, no. 6 (June 1975), 66–72; Wjatscheslaw 
Jelagin, “Fundament der Neutralität,” in Neue Zeit, no. 45 (1978), 8–9; Igor Melnikov, “Partner 
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in Neue Zeit, no. 21 (1980), 10–11.
 53 See, e.g. Die Initiative der Sowjetunion brachte Österreich den Staatsvertrag: Dokumente und 
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6–8, “Gosudarstvennyi dogovor o vosstanovlenii nezavisimoi i demokraticheskoi Avstrii,” in 
A.A. Gromyko, S. A. Golunskii, and V.M. Khvosotov (eds.), Diplomaticheskii slovar’ 1, 2nd 
ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960), 403; V.N. Beletskii, Sovetskii Soiuz i Avstriia (Moscow: In-
stitut Mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii, 1962), 132–240; I.K. Kobliakov, G.G. Kuranov, and D.N. 
Mochalin, SSSR v bor’be za nezavisimost’ Avstrii (Moscow: Politizdat, 1965), 148; “Avstriia,” in 
A.M. Prokhorov et al. (eds.), Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia 1, 3rd ed. (Moscow: Sovetskaia 
Entsiklopediia, 1970), 100; “Gosudarstvennyi dogovor o vosstanovlenii nezavisimoi i demokra-
ticheskoi Avstrii,” ibid. 7 (1972), 168; N. Polyanov, “Austria, Neutrality, Europe,” in Internatio-
nal Affairs, no. 9 (September 1973), 82–88, 84; A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarjow (eds.), 
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291. Cf. Ludwig Steiner, Diplomatie – Politik: Ein Leben für Südtirol: Ein Leben für Österreich 
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chev repeatedly encouraged witnesses of the Soviet-Austrian state-treaty negotia-
tions to testify the correctness of his thesis. When Austrian statements did not adopt 
the official Soviet version that the treaty had been concluded largely thanks to the 
Kremlin’s efforts, the Soviets voiced their displeasure through official channels as 
well as the media.54 Since it was the Soviet Union that had blocked the treaty prior 
to 1955, there was some truth to this claim. However, it was deeply unfair to as-
sert that the Western powers had consistently boycotted the conclusion of a treaty; 
indeed, they had already agreed much earlier to sign one. Therefore, they were 
particularly displeased when Austrian leaders started to repeat the Soviet thesis. 
This was only one of several changes in Austrian-Soviet and Austrian-Western 
relations, changes that Khrushchev seems to have hoped for. Even though the So-
viet-Austrian honeymoon did not last long and certain tensions quickly arose, rela-
tions never again became as “icy” as they had been during the years of the Allied 
occupation of Austria. 
The aim, sources and structure of this study
Austria was among the first to be an addressee of this kind of Soviet policy and 
became one of its most important models. Historian Timothy Snyder called the 
neutral state “perhaps the perfect creation” of its era.55 The aim of this book is to 
contribute, by looking at the Soviet and Austrian interpretations of neutrality and 
the two countries’ foreign policies and relations with one another during the years 
1955–91, to the general knowledge about Soviet foreign policy in the détente pe-
riod and the Cold War. General analyses of Soviet foreign policy usually do not 
dedicate much attention to small states,56 nor do syntheses of the history of the 
Cold War waste many words on neutrality.57 In their narratives, countries like Aus-
 54 See, e.g., Vorsprache des Gesandten Awramow, 11 May 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 
105.880-6/71, Z.111.835; Staribacher Diaries, 16–21 July 1976, in Stiftung Bruno Kreisky Archiv 
(hereafter: SBKA).
 55 Timothy Snyder, The Red Prince: The Secret Lives of a Habsburg Archduke (New York: Basic 
Books, 2008), 243. 
 56 Cf., e.g., Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917–73, 2nd ed. 
(New York: Praeger, 1974); idem, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union and World Politics, 
1970–1982 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Robin Edmonds, Soviet Foreign Policy: 
The Brezhnev Years (Oxford: University Press, 1983); Mastny, The Cold War; Zubok and Ple-
shakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War; Geoffrey Roberts, The Soviet Union in World Politics: 
Coexistence, Revolution, and Cold War, 1945–1991 (London: Routledge, 1999); Fursenko and 
Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War; Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold 
War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007); Svetlana 
Savranskaya and William Taubman, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1975,” in Melvyn P. Leffler 
and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War II: Crises and Détente 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 134–157.
 57 The same holds true with regard to recent syntheses of the history of the Cold War, e.g. John 
Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler and 
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tria or Finland usually pop up in the discussion of certain historic events, such as 
the signing of the state treaty or the return of Porkkala, only to fall into oblivion 
immediately afterwards. In a recent article, historian Jussi Hanhimäki called the 
role of small-state neutrality “one of the less researched topics of the Cold War.”58 
Understandably, the focus of most Cold War studies rests on the main features of 
the bipolar system, the big players and the hotspots of interbloc tension, as well 
as, increasingly, the various forms of intrabloc client-patron relationships, which 
were positioned between obedience and insubordination, support and brutal sup-
pression. Nonetheless, during the Cold War neither small states nor neutrality were 
irrelevant, and Soviet-Austrian relations offer a case study for both. 
It has been said that “it is rewarding when a bilateral state relationship of ter-
tiary importance focuses our attention on fundamental questions of international 
relations.”59 This study shows that Austria ‒ despite its small size ‒ was given dis-
proportionate Soviet attention in order to achieve the Soviet goals outlined above. 
Neutral Austria was not only a product of Soviet foreign policy; the USSR also 
attempted to exploit it as an instrument of foreign policy. The Kremlin used official 
statements and the media as well as certain privileges to encourage desired behav-
ior in Austria and suppress unwanted, with the latter being depicted as at odds with 
neutrality. 
By analyzing the Austrian example from the Soviet perspective, this book, sec-
ondly, intends to add to our understanding of the role of small states as objects 
and actors in the European international system in the Cold War.60 In particular, 
if we want to better understand what constituted détente, we have to take into ac-
count the foreign relations of its small members on both sides of the Iron Curtain.61 
Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, 3 vols. (Cambridge: University 
Press, 2010). The massive, two-volume Encyclopedia of the Cold War contains neither articles on 
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While the small and neutral states, in order to increase their maneuvering room, 
were generally interested in a relaxed international climate, they, due to their lack 
of weight, were not able to “create” détente, but only to reinforce it. However, due 
to their small size and strong interest in détente they were often much quicker in 
establishing channels for East-West communication than the superpowers, which 
were generally less dependent on international exchange and more concerned 
about their prestige, the possible deceptiveness of the other side’s initiatives, and 
the risks that détente or diplomatic failure might bring to the cohesion of their al-
liances. 
Thirdly, this book will take a fresh look at certain key aspects of Austria’s inter-
national relations and its shifting interpretation of neutrality.62 It will argue that the 
drift in the direction of the Soviet understanding of neutrality was, at least in part, a 
consequence of the Kremlin’s “carrot and stick” policy. Open Austrian criticism of 
Soviet actions disappeared from official Viennese statements, and Austrian govern-
ments ‒ in accord with the Soviet neutrality doctrine ‒ tended towards replacing 
a commitment to armed defense with their claim of achieving security through 
foreign policy activism. 
To write this monograph, the first on this topic in English or another West 
European language to rely on Soviet sources, this author drew on a large body of 
Soviet and Western literature, including Soviet texts and Western research on So-
viet theories concerning international law,63 international relations in general64 and 
 62 An analysis of and agenda for research on Austria’s neutrality is set forth in Thomas Angerer, “Für 
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Gildenverlag, 1960); [D.B. Levin, and G.P. Kaliuzhnaia (eds.)], Mezhdunarodnoe pravo (Mos-
cow: Iuridicheskaia literatura, 1964); Drei sowjetische Beiträge zur Völkerrechtslehre (Hamburg: 
Hansischer Gildenverlag, 1969); G.I. Tunkin, Theory of International Law (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1974). For a Western bibliography of Soviet works, see Boris Meis-
sner (ed.), Sowjetunion und Völkerrecht 1917 bis 1962: Eine bibliographische Dokumentation 
(Cologne: Wissenschaft und Politik, 1963); idem, Dietrich Frenzke, Erika Chilecki (eds.), Sowje-
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Politik, 1977). For Western analyses, see, e.g. Hans Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law (New 
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neutrality in particular,65 on Soviet political language and foreign propaganda, and 
on the Soviet foreign policy towards the European neutrals.66 The research that 
has already been done on Austrian general foreign policy and its neutrality is quite 
sufficient for the purpose of this study.67 Furthermore, there are useful Soviet and 
ßenpolitik des Sozialismus (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1979). For Western analyses, see, e.g. 
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Western studies concerning the bilateral Soviet-Austrian relations68 and mutual 
perceptions.69 However, in contrast to the considerable number of archival sources 
on the occupation period that have been made available since the partial open-
ing of Russian archives, almost no Soviet documents on Soviet-Austrian relations 
after 1955 have been published.70 It is therefore the aim of this book not only to 
base itself on the large corpus of Soviet and Western official and semi-official 
publications, speeches, and media, as for instance the Moscow New Times and 
International Affairs (with the Soviet press seen as expressing an official point of 
view71), available scholarly literature as well as eyewitness accounts72 of former 
 68 Viktor N. Beletskii, Sovetskii Soiuz i Avstriia: Bor’ba Sovetskogo Soiuza za vozrozhdenie nezavi-
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Bo Huldt and Atis Lejins (eds.), European Neutrals and the Soviet Union (Stockholm: Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs, 1986), 83–118; Heike Malicek, “Die Beziehungen Österreich-
Sowjetunion 1945 bis 1975: Ein pragmatisches Verhältnis” (MA Thesis, Vienna, 1995); Ludmilla 
Lobova, “Die Außenpolitik und Neutralität Österreichs aus Sicht der UdSSR 1955–1972,” in 
Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), The Austrian State Treaty 1955: 
International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005), 891–922; and N. M. Bogoliubova and Iu. V. Nikolaeva, 
Russko-avstriiskie kul’turnye sviazi v XVIII–XXI vv. (St. Petersburg: SPbKO, 2010).
 69 Monika Reitinger, “Österreich in den Augen der Sowjetliteratur nach 1945” (PhD Thesis, Vienna, 
1969); Evelina Merhaut-Gurevitsch, “Die Innen- und Außenpolitik Österreichs in der sowjeti-
schen Presse 1954–1961” (MA Thesis, Vienna, 1995); Ruth Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild 
in der sowjetischen Berichterstattung vom Beginn der Zweiten Republik bis zum Zusammen-
bruch der UdSSR” (MA Thesis, Vienna, 1998); Ludmilla Lobova, “Die Moskauer Perzeption 
politischer, ökonomischer und sozialer Entwicklungen in Österreich in den 1980er und 90er Jah-
ren,” in Oliver Rathkolb, Otto Maschke, and Stefan Lütgenau (eds.), Mit anderen Augen gesehen: 
Internationale Perzeptionen Österreichs 1955–1990, Österreichische Nationalgeschichte 2 (Vi-
enna: Böhlau, 2002), 91–160.
 70 Hans Mayrzedt and Waldemar Hummer (eds.), 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Eu-
ropapolitik 1955–1975, Österreichische Gesellschaft für Außenpolitik Schriftenreihe 9 (Vien-
na: Braumüller, 1976); Ministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten der UdSSR (ed.), UdSSR 
– Österreich 1938–1979 (Moscow: Novosti, 1980).
 71 On the Soviet press in the Cold War, see Jeffrey Brooks, Thank you, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Pu-
blic Culture from Revolution to Cold War (Princeton: University Press, 2001); Martin Ebon, The 
Soviet Propaganda Machine (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1987). 
 72 For memoirs of Soviet diplomats and political actors, see, e.g., A. M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot 
Kollontai do Gorbacheva: Vospominaniia diplomata, sovetnika A.A. Gromyko (Moscow: Mezh-
dunarodnye otnosheniia, 1994); Georgy Arbatov, The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics 
(New York: Times Books, 1992); Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow’s Ambassador to 
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political and diplomatic actors, but also to draw on internal political documents 
stored in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (in particular 
the Third European Department of the Foreign Ministry which was responsible 
for dealing with German speaking countries), the former party archives of the 
CPSU, now the Russian State Archives of Contemporary History, the archives of 
the Gorbachev Foundation, the Austrian State Archives, and the Bruno Kreisky 
Archive. 
The archival situation in Russia and Austria confronts the researcher with a 
number of problems. At the time this manuscript was completed, neither the pa-
pers of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, nor of the CPSU Central Committee’s Foreign 
Department had been fully declassified. While the archives of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry and the Gorbachev Foundation do allow access to certain documents from 
the 1960s to the 1990s, search aids at the Foreign Ministry do not give the research-
er a clear overview of what is available and what not. In Austria, the documents 
of the Political Department of the Foreign Ministry (upon which the “Austrian 
perspective” of the first two parts of this study is mainly based) and of the Council 
of Ministers have been transferred to the State Archives, but only for the years up 
to 1977. Copies of documents from the remaining period were acquired from the 
Bruno Kreisky Archive (covering the years up to 1983) and from published sourc-
es, in particular the Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik. Unfortunately, the 
papers of the Bureau of International Law of the Austrian Foreign Ministry have 
not yet been transferred to the State Archives. The US perspective, as the view 
of the leading Western power, has been deduced from published documents. Due 
to the above-mentioned archival restrictions, some conclusions that are drawn in 
this volume are therefore preliminary, inasmuch as not all documents are declassi-
fied. However, the ground is solid enough for making quite well-based theses, and 
the general interpretation is unlikely to be changed fundamentally by any records 
that are released in the future. All quotations from languages other than English 
America’s Six Cold War Presidents 1962–1986 (New York: Times Books, 1995); Valentin Fa-
lin, Politische Erinnerungen (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993); Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs of 
Nikita Khrushchev III: The Statesman, 1953–1964, ed. by Sergei Khrushchev (University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); Anastas I. Mikoian, Tak bylo: Razmyshleniia 
o minuvshem (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999). For memoirs of Austrian ambassadors in Moscow, see 
Heinrich Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” in Erich Bielka, Peter Janko-
witsch, Hans Thalberg (eds.), and Reinhold Wagnleitner (red.), Die Ära Kreisky: Schwerpunkte 
österreichischer Außenpolitik (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1983), 143–193; Otto Eiselsberg, Erlebte 
Geschichte 1917–1997 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1997); Herbert Grubmayr, “In zwei Wochen gehst Du 
nach Moskau,” in Demokratie und Geschichte (1999), 127–154; idem, “Streiflichter aus meiner 
Moskauer Zeit,” in Alfred Stirnemann and Gerhard Wilflinger (eds.), Russland und Österreich, 
Pro Oriente XXIII (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1999), 258–277; Gerald Hinteregger, “Erinnerungen an 
Moskau 1978–1981,” ibid., 244–257; idem, Im Auftrag Österreichs: Gelebte Außenpolitik von 
Kreisky bis Mock (Vienna: Amalthea, 2008); Friedrich Bauer, Russische Umbrüche: Von Gor-
batschow über Jelzin zu Putin (Graz: Vehling, n.D.). 
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have been translated by the author of this book. The system of transliteration from 
Cyrillic used in this volume is that of the Library of Congress, without diacritics. 
Taking into account political, economic and cultural relations, personal contacts, 
and mutual perceptions (as far as they are decipherable from the media and a hand-
ful of opinion polls), this volume, inspired by the methods of New International 
History,73 aims at providing the reader with a comprehensive picture of various lay-
ers of international relations. Due to archival restrictions, the area of Soviet secret 
service activities in Austria had to be excluded from the project. In order to fully 
comprehend the Soviet-Austrian relationship and the role neutrality played in it, the 
author of this study has deemed it particularly important to complement the method 
with relevant aspects of ideology as well as both countries’ theories of international 
law, factors that were especially important for Soviet foreign policy. Despite the de-
clared primacy of internal affairs for the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and despite the 
influence that historic, power-political, and geostrategic factors doubtlessly exerted 
on Soviet behavior, the communist ideology played a fundamental role in shaping 
Soviet perceptions and foreign policy as well as providing its inward and outward 
justification. The “scientific” teachings of Marxism-Leninism made Soviet foreign 
policy, as its leaders always proudly emphasized, “unlike any other.”74 This is not 
to say that ideology left no space for pragmatism and realpolitik: While creating a 
system of beliefs, defining long-term goals and interpreting the outside world ac-
cording to the “laws of historic materialism,” Marxism-Leninism offered a set of 
rules for Soviet foreign policy that was, to a certain extent, flexibly applicable and 
regularly updated. The belief in the ultimate victory of communism never closed 
Soviet leaders’ eyes to the possibility of alliances with noncommunists, tactical 
retreats and temporary compromises. Western compromising, in contrast, was gen-
erally depicted as a sign of the imminent decline of capitalism. Due to the principle 
that any gain for the USSR was a success for socialism, ideology was always used 
with regard to Soviet power interests.75 
 73 See, e.g. Wilfried Loth and Jürgen Osterhammel (eds.), Internationale Geschichte: Themen – 
Ergebnisse – Aussichten (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2000); Eckart Conze, Ulrich Lappenküper, and 
Guido Müller (eds.), Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen: Erneuerung und Erweiterung 
einer historischen Disziplin (Cologne: Böhlau, 2004); Hans-Christof Kraus and Thomas Nicklas 
(eds.), Geschichte der Politik: Alte und Neue Wege, Historische Zeitschrift Beihefte 44 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2007). For a classic study of bilateral relations, see Arnold Suppan, Jugoslawien und 
Österreich 1918–1938: Bilaterale Außenpolitik im europäischen Umfeld (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 
1996); on methods, see 21–23. 
 74 Vojtech Mastny, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953–1962,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War I: Origins (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 
312–333, 312.
 75 Boris Meissner, “Triebkräfte und Faktoren sowjetischer Außenpolitik,” in idem and Gotthold 
Rhode, Grundfragen sowjetischer Außenpolitik (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970), 9–40, 15. On the 
role of ideology in the Cold War and the relation between ideology and foreign policy in the So-
viet Union, see Mark Kramer, “Ideology and the Cold War,” in Michael M. Cox (ed.), Twentieth 
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Although Soviet experts of international law claimed the opposite,76 the same 
can be said with regard to the development of the Soviet theory of international 
law ‒ a theory that, due to its politically motivated inconsistencies, consistent anti-
Western bias and one-sided self-praise, was regarded by some Western observers 
as lacking most of the characteristics that define legal analysis.77 In the USSR, the 
theory of international law was and had for the most part been shaped by ideology 
and the aim of serving foreign policy. Since from time to time the revolutionary 
state was forced to enter agreements with noncommunist states and governments, 
the Marxist-Leninist theory of international law could not flatly deny the rules of 
the bourgeois world. In contrast to the Western understanding, however, interna-
tional law was seen in the USSR as reflecting the balance of economic power and 
as serving the ruling classes by legally underpinning the “class struggle in the in-
ternational arena.”78 In order to best advance Soviet political interests in a chang-
Century International Relations 2: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War (London: Sage, 2008), 
26–68. For a classic view of the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy, cf. Zbigniew K. Brze-
zinski, Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1962). Among recent works, 
see Gabriel Gorodetsky, “The Formulation of Soviet Foreign Policy: Ideology and Realpolitik,” 
in idem (ed.), Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–1991: A Retrospective (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 
30–44; Nigel Gould-Davis, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics during the 
Cold War,” in Journal of Cold War Studies 1, no. 1 (1999), 90–109; Nikolaus Katzer, “Ideologie 
und Pragmatismus in der sowjetischen Außenpolitik,” in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 1–2 
(2009), 3–10; David C. Engerman, “Ideology and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917–1962,” in 
Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War I: Origins 
(Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 20–43. 
 76 “Together with the growth of the forces of peace, which stand up for the strict observance of the 
principles and norms of international law, the influence of international law on the foreign policy 
and diplomacy of states increases.” „Mit dem Anwachsen der Friedenskräfte, die für die strikte 
Einhaltung der Prinzipien und Normen des Völkerrechts eintreten, erhöht sich der Einfluss des 
Völkerrechts auf die Außenpolitik und die Diplomatie der Staaten.“ G. I. Tunkin, Das Völkerrecht 
der Gegenwart (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1963), 190.
 77 Eberhard Menzel, “Vorwort des deutschen Herausgebers,” in F.I. Koschewnikow (ed.), Völker-
recht (Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag, 1960), xi–xxvii, xvi.
 78 D.B. Lewin, and G.P. Kaljushnaja (eds.), Völkerrecht (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1967), 16. 
Among Western analyses, cf. Meissner, Sowjetunion und Völkerrecht, 22–25; 33. See also Erick-
son, International Law, 1–26; Theodor Schweisfurth, “Entwicklung und ideologische Grundlagen 
der sowjetischen Völkerrechtstheorie,” in Dietrich Geyer (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch Sowjetu-
nion Außenpolitik III: Völkerrechtstheorie und Vertragspolitik (Cologne: Böhlau, 1976), 27–48, 
47. For further literature on the Soviet theory of international relations, see above, footnote 64. 
For the “class character” of international law, see [E.A. Korowin,] “Begriff, Quellen und System 
des Völkerrechts,” in F.I. Koschewnikow (ed.), Völkerrecht (Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag, 
1960), 1–20, 2–5. Kelsen, The Communist Theory of Law, 150, argues that “international law, in 
itself, is perfectly neutral with respect to the struggle of classes within the state subjects of this law 
and that, consequently, international law, guaranteeing state-domination of any kind, has in itself 
no class character at all. Just because international law is no class law in any sense of this term, 
the Soviet Government ‒ and, following their government, the legal scientist ‒ finally recognized 
the existing international law as a normative order […].”
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ing environment and to justify the Kremlin’s oft contradictory actions, the Soviet 
theory of international law, too, had to be regularly adjusted. This also applied to 
the Soviet view of neutrality, which will be put into the context of Soviet-Austrian 
relations.
The narrative of this volume mainly follows a chronological approach. The first 
five years, from the signing of the state treaty until Khrushchev’s visit to Austria, 
outlined in Part I, are seen as a formative period in the Soviet attitude towards 
neutrality and Soviet-Austrian relations. The first chapter compares the Soviet and 
the Austrian concepts of neutrality as they emerged in the 1950s. While the Soviet 
Union was interested in defining neutrality in a manner that was as all-encom-
passing as possible, Austria initially confined it to mere nonparticipation in mili-
tary alliances. Despite such disagreements, bilateral relations were established that 
were demonstratively friendly. The Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the resulting 
Soviet crackdown on it, which occurred in Austria’s closest neighborhood, put bi-
lateral relations to a hard test and ushered in a process that would finally lead to 
an Austrian reinterpretation of neutrality, a reinterpretation that was provoked, not 
only a little, by Soviet policy and, in particular, its criticism of Austria’s implemen-
tation of neutral policy. 
The following period, from 1961 to 1972, depicted in Part II, was dominated by 
Soviet-Austrian quarrels over (a) the Austrian wish to become part of West Europe-
an integration and (b) the Soviet hope that Austria would initiate one of the Soviet 
Union’s dearest détente projects ‒ a conference on European security that, in the 
Soviet view, would rubberstamp the postwar status quo with regard to communist 
rule over Eastern Europe and East Germany and loosen the transatlantic bonds of 
Western Europe as well as the cohesion of NATO. Although neither wish was ful-
filled, amicable Soviet-Austrian relations were nevertheless preserved despite the 
second major Soviet military intervention in Austria’s neighborhood: the Warsaw 
Pact’s crackdown on the “Prague Spring” of 1968. This will be dealt with in a sepa-
rate chapter in Part II. In this context, the Eastern military alliance’s war planning 
from the late 1950s to the 1980s with regard to Austria as well as the Soviet attitude 
towards Austria’s armed defense will also be discussed. 
After both the EEC and the conference issues were resolved in 1972–73 (the 
first by Austria’s free-trade agreement with the Common Market, the second by the 
convening of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSCE), 
bilateral relations entered the decade delineated in Part III that was defined, on one 
hand, by a dropping Soviet interest in having its projects promoted by neutrals as 
well as in promoting neutrality itself, and, on the other hand, by the foreign policy 
activism of Austrian chancellor Bruno Kreisky, which was devised to enhance his 
country’s international reputation, security, and maneuvering space. Paradoxical 
as it may seem, although the détente of the 1970s saw a reduction in Austria’s 
importance as an international mediator for Soviet diplomacy and as a supplier of 
Western goods on the Soviet market, it also marked, in Austria’s understanding of 
38 Introduction 
neutrality, a further drift towards the more all-embracing Soviet interpretation. This 
was at least in part a consequence of the events of 1968.
The Gorbachev years saw a reversal of some of these developments. While the 
final peak of the Cold War (had it lasted longer) might have brought about a revival 
of Austria’s mediatory importance for the Soviet Union, the Cold War’s end set 
the seal on the decline of the special relationship between the two countries. At the 
same time, the neutral discontinued respecting Soviet reservations about European 
integration and applied for EC membership.
I.  LAYING THE GROUNDWORK AND 
CHANGING NEUTRALITY, 1955–1960
“Neutrality is rather like virginity. Everybody starts off with it, but some lose it quicker than oth-
ers, and some do not lose it at all. Unlike virginity, however, neutrality once lost can sometimes 
be recovered, albeit with difficulty.” Roderick Ogley, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 1.

1.  Two Differing Concepts of Neutrality
In Western theory and practice, neutrality is defined as a state of nonparticipation 
in war, including the refusal to lend the own territory to foreign military, and of im-
partiality towards belligerent countries.1 Until World War II, the main focus rested 
on classical, wartime neutrality, as codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907.2 
According to these documents, belligerents are obliged to refrain from attacking 
or using neutral territory, while the neutral state is to abstain from joining the war 
except for self-defense; to prevent belligerents from entering, crossing, or using 
neutral territory for military purposes; to refrain from supporting any belligerent; 
and to treat belligerents equally (except in economic matters).3 
In the second half of the twentieth century, as a consequence of the waning 
acceptance of the “right to war” in international law on one hand, and the perma-
nence of the Cold War on the other, permanent neutrality, as it had been adopted by 
Switzerland in 1815 and by Austria in 1955, garnered more interest. If in peacetime 
a country commits itself to observe neutrality in future wars, it may issue a decla-
ration of permanent neutrality ‒ an act that can happen either in the context of an 
international settlement (as in the case of Switzerland) or solely through a unilateral 
declaration of will (as was the case in Austria). In wartime, a permanently neutral 
state bears roughly the same obligations as any other wartime neutral.4 In peace-
time, a permanent neutral must not start a war, although it is obliged to prepare for 
self-defense. Furthermore, a permanent neutral shall maintain a discretionary “neu-
tral policy,” i.e. refrain from any action that might draw it into a conflict or restrict 
its neutrality during a future war.5 In particular, it may not join a military alliance, 
 1 On the history and Western theory of neutrality, see Verosta, Die dauernde Neutralität, 7–44; 
Hans Haug, Neutralität und Völkergemeinschaft (Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1962); Michael 
Schweitzer, Dauernde Neutralität und europäische Integration (Vienna: Springer, 1977), 95–103; 
Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 13–30; Michael Gehler, Finis Neutralität? Historische und 
politische Aspekte im europäischen Vergleich: Irland, Finnland, Schweden, Schweiz und Öster-
reich, Center for European Integration Studies Discussion Paper C 92 (Bonn: Rheinische Fried-
rich-Wilhelms-Universität, 2001), 3–29.
 2 Verosta, Die dauernde Neutralität, 118–133. 
 3 Gerhard Hafner, “Österreichs Neutralität 1955–2005,” in Thomas Olechowski (ed.), Fünfzig Jah-
re Staatsvertrag und Neutralität (Vienna: WUV-Universitätsverlag, 2006), 15–44, 24. 
 4 Boleslaw A. Boczek, “The Conceptual and Legal Framework of Neutrality and Nonalignment in 
Europe,” in S. Victor Papacosma and Mark R. Rubin (eds.), Europe’s Neutral and Nonaligned 
States: Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989), 1–42, 8; 
on the following, see also 9–16.
 5 Schweitzer, Dauernde Neutralität, 111–145.
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permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, or take on any (politi-
cal, military, or economic) obligation that might render it impossible to maintain 
neutrality in a future war. In their entirety, such “secondary obligations” or “antici-
patory effects” of permanent neutrality in peacetime were, however, never interna-
tionally codified, ill-defined and, therefore, subject to diverging interpretations and 
conflicting views. While most Western experts argued that such obligations had to 
be interpreted restrictively so that acts of prudence were not turned into legal duty, 
other actors indeed were interested in or contributed to making such acts obligatory. 
In the wake of the Cold War and the decolonization process, the phenomena 
of neutralism and nonalignment emerged. Like the European permanent neutrals, 
the nonaligned states, mainly in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America, were not 
to join military alliances with any of the two big Cold War blocs or allow foreign 
military bases on their soil. Since neutralism was, in contrast to permanent neutral-
ity, not an institute of international law but merely an orientation of foreign policy, 
such pledges were, however, not legally binding.6 The nonaligned, including small 
European states such as Yugoslavia and Malta, aimed at not getting involved in 
the Cold War. In contrast to the Western concept of permanent neutrality, however, 
their nonalignment did not apply to regional military alliances. In addition, the 
nonaligned states vowed to support the decolonization struggle of the Third World 
and actively contribute to the spread of disarmament and coexistence. While they 
strove for equal distance, not only between the military alliances, but also between 
the ideologies of the Western and the communist world and their societal, politi-
cal, and economic systems, some of them turned out to be much more critical of 
the West than of the Soviet bloc7 and refrained from making the commitment of 
remaining neutral in the case of war. 
 6 For a brief comparison of permanent neutrality and nonalignment, see Hanspeter Neuhold, “Per-
manent Neutrality and Nonalignment: Similarities and Differences,” in Robert A. Bauer (ed.), 
The Austrian Solution: International Conflict and Cooperation (Charlottesville: The University 
Press of Virginia, 1982), 161–204, esp. 174, 180; Daniel Frei, Neutrality and Non-Alignment: 
Convergencies and Contrasts (Zurich: Forschungsstelle politische Wissenschaft, 1979); Jens Ha-
cker, “Neutralität, Neutralismus und Blockfreiheit,” in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, no. 18 
(1983), 3–20. Cf. on neutralism and nonalignment Peter Lyon, Neutralism (Leicester: University 
Press, 1963); Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance 
(London: Pinter, 1982); Paul Luif, “Neutralität – Neutralismus – Blockfreiheit: Ideologien und 
Interessen,” in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 8, no. 3 (1979), 269–285; Karl 
E. Birnbaum, and Hanspeter Neuhold (eds.), Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe, Laxenburg 
Papers 4 (Vienna: Braumüller, 1981). 
 7 Boczek, “Conceptual and Legal Framework,” 18.
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The Soviet attitude towards neutrality
When Khrushchev decided that Austria should become a “life-size test of neutrality,”8 
he relied on a concept relatively fresh in postwar Soviet foreign-policy thinking. 
In Marxism-Leninism, the general attitude towards neutrality was defined by the 
theory of class struggle, a permanent conflict of historical dimensions taking place 
in all societies of the world between the proletariat, supported by “progressive,” 
i.e. socialist, forces, and reactionary ones, the bourgeoisie. Until the final victory 
of socialism was achieved, this struggle would not allow any sort of indifference. 
Any person not supportive of the proletariat was by definition a bourgeois or “class 
enemy.” Neutrality was often depicted by Marxists as camouflage, a cover-up for 
the neutral’s preference for bourgeois forces. In a similar vein, Frederick Engels 
attacked neutral Switzerland’s authorities for cracking down on exiled revolutio-
naries, thus giving in to the demands of the foreign reaction.9 In his “Tasks of the 
Left Zimmerwaldists,” written during World War I, Lenin stated that neutrality was 
merely a “bourgeois deception or hypocrisy, that in fact it means passive submis-
sion to the bourgeoisie and to such of its particularly disgusting undertakings as 
imperialist war.”10 
 Once the Bolsheviks had taken power in Russia, the Marxist-Leninist attitude 
towards neutrality was influenced by Soviet state interests. This applied not only 
to (a) the Soviet interpretation of what duties neutrality comprised. As we shall see 
soon,11 in Soviet theory and practice, neutrality meant different things at different 
times, and its content was redefined several times according to the political aims 
of the USSR. The “highly changeable character of Soviet views on neutrality”12 
also applied to (b) whether the USSR welcomed or promoted the neutrality of a 
particular state at a particular time. If neutrality was good or evil from the Soviet 
perspective depended on the side exercising it, the specific circumstances under 
which it was declared, and its effect on the fate of communism.13 In the case of a 
war between two imperialistic powers, the neutrality of a socialist state was con-
 8 Thomas M. Verclytte, “Austria between East and West,” in N.I. Egorova and A.O. Chubar’ian 
(eds.), Kholodnaia voina i politika razriadki: diskussionnye problemy 1 (Moscow: Institut Vseob-
shchei Istorii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2003), 103–116, 104.
 9 Engels, “Political Position of the Swiss Republic,” [1853], 90–92. 
 10 V.I. Lenin, “Tasks of the Left Zimmerwaldists in the Swiss Social Democratic Party,” [1916], in 
idem, Collected Works 23, 4th English edition (Moscow: Progress, 1964), 137–148, 144. 
 11 See below, pages 56–67, 205–207, 246–248.
 12 Petersson, The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality, 111. Cf. Harto Hakovirta, “East-West 
Tensions and Soviet Politics of European Neutrality,” in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), The Neutral De-
mocracies in the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 198–217. 
 13 “One must not decide, once and for all, that neutrality in general, or of this or that particular 
country is good or bad. It all depends on the concrete historical circumstances. Under contempo-
rary historical conditions, as they emerged after World War II, the main criterion for evaluating 
neutrality is the neutral state’s attitude towards supporting the cause of peace and the prevention 
of war.” Ganiushkin, Sovremennyi neitralitet, 8. 
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sidered possible. If a war was revolutionary, defensive, or a war of liberation, and 
therefore according to Lenin “just,” no type of neutrality was justifiable.14 In such a 
case, all countries had to decide whether to be friend or foe. 
The changing Soviet attitude towards neutrality can be traced through several 
decades. After the revolution, when the existence of Soviet Russia was endangered 
by the armed intervention of capitalist powers, the Marxist-Leninist attention shift-
ed somewhat from wartime to peacetime (i.e. permanent) neutrality and the pres-
tige of such neutrality improved. With an eye on the weakness of Soviet Russia and 
its perception of the threat of capitalist “encirclement,” every neighbor that stepped 
out of the cordon sanitaire and declared itself neutral vis-à-vis the Bolshevik state 
was regarded a gain. When in 1920 some of Soviet Russia’s newly independent 
neighbors, such as Lithuania and Estonia, showed interest in strengthening their 
independence by declaring neutrality, the Kremlin readily accepted.15 Similarly, 
the Copenhagen agreement of the same year between Soviet Russia and Austria 
on the repatriation of prisoners of World War I stipulated Austria’s neutrality in the 
Polish-Soviet war.16 
In the interwar years, the USSR continued to aim at weakening the capitalist 
camp by concluding agreements of neutrality and nonaggression with bourgeois 
countries, such as Afghanistan, China, Finland, Iran, Turkey and others. It has been 
argued that, from the Soviet point of view, nonaggression was not the objective in 
any of these treaties:17 On one hand, such pledges could be torn up as soon as an 
invasion took place, on the other, no sane human being would expect a tiny country 
like Estonia to attack its huge neighbor on its own. Therefore the real meaning of 
these treaties was rather the declaration that these countries would neither join alli-
ances hostile to the Soviet state, nor allow foreign troops to use their soil as a base 
against the motherland of communism. For this reason, peacetime neutrality was 
hailed by Stalin as a guarantee against foreign aggression, and the respective trea-
ties on neutrality and nonaggression were praised as a “weapon in our fight for the 
destruction of the imperialistic states’ front against the USSR.”18 
This, however, did not change the utilitarian Soviet attitude towards neutrality 
as exercised by capitalist states: From 1939 to 1941 the Soviet Union provided Nazi 
Germany’s war effort with raw material and also violated the neutrality agreements 
with Finland, the Baltic republics and Iran by attacking or occupying these states. 
 14 Light, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, 229–237. 
 15 Heinz Fiedler, “Politische Verträge mit westlichen Staaten und Entwicklungsländern,” in Dietrich 
Geyer (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch Sowjetunion Außenpolitik III: Völkerrechtstheorie und Ver-
tragspolitik (Cologne: Böhlau, 1976), 194–223, 195–197.
 16 Mueller and Leidinger, “Tiefes Misstrauen – begrenztes Interesse: Die österreichisch-sowjeti-
schen Beziehungen 1918 bis 1955,” 75.
 17 Vigor, The Soviet View, 184–186. 
 18 “Neitralitet,” in O. Iu. Shmidt et al. (eds.), Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia 41 (Moscow: 
OGIZ, 1939), 487–489, 488. 
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At the same time, Soviet propaganda castigated the “nonintervention” policy of the 
West during the Spanish Civil War as some “sort of special, unarmed participation 
in the war.”19 According to this interpretation, countries that declared themselves 
neutral during World War II, such as Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey, in Soviet 
eyes supported the enemy’s war effort.20 An exception was Japan, whose neutrality 
benefited the Soviet Union. In 1945, not only the USSR, but many nations were 
critical of the European neutrals for their behavior during the war and thus of neu-
trality in general. In the aftermath of World War II, neutrality was deemed incom-
patible with UN membership by many members and legal experts.21 It was even 
considered to include a passage banning neutrality into the Charter of the United 
Nations, and the Soviet representative delayed the Portuguese accession to this 
organization with reference to this country’s wartime neutrality.22
Another kind of neutrality had emerged in Soviet wartime plans. These assigned 
to each of the great powers several European countries as a sphere of influence. 
Between these spheres, a neutral buffer zone consisting of Denmark, Germany, 
Austria, Switzerland and Italy was to be created.23 In this case, belonging to this 
zone was not a matter of permanent neutrality chosen by a sovereign state, but 
rather a consequence of great power politics. However, the Cold War and the for-
mation of two blocs made neutrality virtually impossible. Zhdanov’s doctrine of 
the “two camps,” launched in 1947 by Stalin’s mouthpiece, left little space between 
the blocs. Apparently, the Soviet leader did not consider neutrality feasible between 
the opposing powers; especially small states would ultimately gravitate to one or 
the other emerging bloc.24 The most prominent examples of small, permanently 
neutral states in Europe, Sweden and Switzerland, were repeatedly attacked by 
Soviet propaganda for allegedly following NATO, and their neutrality was accused 
of being “camouflage.”25 
 19 Ibid., 487.
 20 “Neitralitet,” in A. Ia. Vyshinskii (ed.), Diplomaticheskii slovar’ 2, 1st ed. (Moscow: Gospolitiz-
dat, 1950), 230–234, 232. Cf. George Ginsburgs, “Neutrality and Neutralism and the Tactics of 
Soviet Diplomacy,” in The American Slavic and East European Review 19, no. 4 (1960), 531–
560, 534–537. 
 21 O.I. Tiunov, Neitralitet v mezhdunarodnom prave (Perm: Gosudarstvennyi universitet im. 
Gor’kogo, 1968), 59. 
 22 Menzel, “Vorwort,” xxii.
 23 Memorandum, Litvinov to Molotov, 11 January 1945, in G.P. Kynin and J. Laufer (eds.), SSSR i 
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1995 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000), 29–43, 32.
 25 Quoted in Hans Rudolf Fuhrer, “Neutral zwischen den Blöcken: Österreich und die Schweiz,” in 
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Between 1950 and 1954, in the context of the Soviet struggle against the emer-
gence of Western blocs, such as the European Defense Community (EDC),26 and 
of Soviet attempts at breaking up the Western anti-communist front, the Kremlin’s 
assessment of neutrality began to shift. Neutrality was now seen mainly as a tool for 
preventing such blocs from coming into being, and it was recommended by West Eu-
ropean communists.27 A particularly remarkable initiative of the late Stalin years was 
the dictator’s proposal of March 1952, which offered the reunification of Germany 
at the price of the country’s declaration of neutrality. However, there is consensus 
among most experts that the offer, rejected by the West, was not meant seriously.28 
After Stalin’s death and the abortive anti-communist uprising in the GDR in 1953, 
the idea of a neutral unified Germany (allegedly brought up again by KGB boss and 
Politburo member Lavrentii Beriia29) remained unaccepted in the Politburo. 
In the case of Austria, neutrality had not yet seemed a viable option to So-
viet foreign-policy makers.30 In 1950, however, the Austrian communists joined 
the West European comrades in the propaganda campaign for neutral status to 
be adopted by their countries.31 While Austria was not a member of the planned 
EDC, the debates concerning this bloc made Soviet diplomats reconsider neutral-
izing the country for two reasons: First, such a move would prevent Austria from 
even thinking about joining the Western bloc; secondly, it would send out a signal 
strong enough to make France and West Germany waver in their determination to 
tralität aus sowjetischer Sicht,” in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 5, no. 3 (1965), 
144–163, 158.
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History 15, no. 2 (2009), 67–85.
 27 Ginsburgs, “Neutrality and Neutralism and the Tactics of Soviet Diplomacy,” 538–539.
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participate. In late 1952, Soviet representatives signaled that an Austrian declara-
tion of neutrality might be conducive to their willingness to sign the state treaty.32 
However, this did not mean that the Soviet leadership was no longer ambiguous 
about neutrality. On one hand, Molotov, at the Berlin conference in February 1954, 
reiterated the Soviet proposal for Germany’s neutralization and named Austria’s 
nonparticipation in military alliances as one of the preconditions for a conclusion 
of the state treaty. On the other hand, the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) was 
ordered by the Soviet leadership to abandon its neutrality campaign, because “such 
a small bourgeois country like Austria” would not be able to carry out a neutral 
policy.33 Furthermore, it would seem “questionable if the Communist Party acts as 
a promoter of neutrality between blocs, of which one is fighting for the preparation 
of war.” However, Molotov’s proposal at the Berlin conference and Dulles’ posi-
tive reaction had proved that the idea of making Austria neutral was acceptable to 
both superpowers, although the secretary of state insisted that neutrality would be 
acceptable only if it followed the Swiss model.34 
Thus, it was only once the general deadlock in the global arena became obvi-
ous and the new Kremlin leadership realized that the Stalin years had ended in “a 
Cold War of positions” or even a “dead end,”35 that the Soviet attitude towards 
permanent neutrality changed to any fundamental degree. As Soviet experts in in-
ternational law recognized, an international stalemate between two or more oppos-
ing powers of roughly equal strength had often fostered a tendency to neutralize 
certain disputed areas.36 Although no official Soviet statement would have applied 
this observation to Soviet policy, it was just such a stalemate that characterized the 
Cold War after Stalin’s death. Therefore, Khrushchev started to look for new ways 
to get things moving again in the international balance of forces, and “peaceful 
coexistence” was declared as a strategy to reduce tensions while continuing the 
international struggle.37 
Together with “peaceful coexistence,” neutrality and nonalignment were redis-
covered by the new Soviet leadership as possible, even desirable, means of détente 
and as a strategy to slow nonsocialist countries’ integration into the Western sphere 
or eventually to lure them out of it. While the Austrian state treaty seems to have been 
 32 Ibid., 220–221; Wildmann to Austrian MFA, 27 November 1952, in Alfons Schilcher (ed.), Öster-
reich und die Großmächte: Dokumente zur österreichischen Außenpolitik 1945–1955 (Vienna: 
Geyer, 1980), 158–160.
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sotsial’no-politicheskoi istorii (hereafter: RGASPI), 82/2/1121, 121–122.
 34 Stourzh, “Der österreichische Staatsvertrag,” 976.
 35 “Cold War of positions”: Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Warsaw 
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the first case in which the new Soviet attitude towards neutrality was materialized,38 
the Soviet re-evaluation of this status was the result of the international stalemate 
in Europe, and most likely also the integration of West Germany into NATO as a 
new member in 1955. Another factor was the new international dynamic triggered 
by the decolonization process in Asia and Africa.39 Some of the independent states 
of East Asia and the Middle East had already joined pro-Western blocs, such as the 
South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), which was founded in 1954, and 
the Baghdad Pact of 1955. In order to block the expansion of pro-Western alliances, 
to keep newly independent territories out of such blocs, and, at the same time, 
to peacefully expand Soviet influence and socialism in independent countries that 
were nonsocialist, either neutralization or nonalignment was promoted.40 
Obviously Malenkov and Khrushchev grasped that the rigid concept of “two 
camps” had had little to offer for the many nonsocialist countries in the West or for 
the even larger number of emerging independent states in the South.41 Therefore, 
the Soviet concept of “two camps” was transformed into one of three, with the third 
one consisting of the neutral or nonaligned states. This third group of states, which 
the Soviet Union was not yet strong enough to claim outright as a sphere of influ-
ence, was expected to be a natural ally for the USSR, to support Soviet initiatives 
in the international arena, and to block any further rapprochement of European, 
Asian, and African states with the Western camp. The Third World’s anticolonial-
ism made it likely that these countries would be critical of their former West Euro-
pean colonial powers, and the Kremlin seemed optimistic that it might be possible, 
by supporting the decolonization process and extending foreign aid, to win over the 
new camp, which comprised one third of the global population, as new allies, to 
merge the socialist and neutral camps into a “zone of peace,”42 and thus to tilt the 
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 41 Westad, The Global Cold War, 67.
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international balance in favor of the Soviet side. Even if Khrushchev ‒ as former 
Soviet diplomats argue ‒ did not understand the difference between the various 
forms of neutrality and neutralism,43 the new leader came to see it as a great suc-
cess, regarding it as a means for weakening pro-Western forces worldwide and, in 
Europe, fostering “schemes of undermining NATO by building the bridges towards 
its smaller members.”44
For the Soviet Union, the neutralization of nonsocialist states offered several net 
effects: In the international system, permanent neutrals, depending upon their loca-
tion, created safe buffer zones and thus reduced the likelihood of an interbloc con-
flagration. Since neutrality was promoted exclusively among nonsocialist states, 
Western alliances and blocs were weakened by “losing” potential allies, while the 
neutralized state was isolated from the Western collective defense and economic 
integration and, thus, also weakened. The Soviet Union, however, could demand 
that the neutrals, their Western traditions and convictions notwithstanding, distance 
themselves from the West and support Soviet initiatives.45 
Communism did not accept peacetime neutrality as something stable and eter-
nal, but rather as something intermediary and transitory, a status between capital-
ism and socialism. Nonetheless, for the time being, it was, from the Soviet side, a 
preferred status for Western countries, preferable to their full membership in the 
Western bloc. In Soviet eyes, neutrality was defined a status more progressive than 
capitalism but less progressive than socialism, a status that actually paved the way 
for this optimal condition.46 By means of ever closer political, economic, and cul-
tural relationships with the Eastern bloc, neutrals were expected to lean towards 
socialism. For a socialist state, however, neutrality was not deemed a fit condition. 
Naturally, after socialism was reached in a certain country, Soviet ideology did not 
consider a return of the country to peacetime neutrality possible.47 Therefore, unlike 
during the interwar period, the Soviet Union did not consider declaring itself or its 
satellite states neutral. 
The founding of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 seems to have been an important 
precondition for the Soviet re-evaluation of neutrality. The new organization would 
reduce the danger of an East European state misunderstanding the role of neutral-
ity and deserting into the neutral camp. The Soviet refusal to accept the Hungarian 
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 46 Tiunov, Neitralitet, 115; Tunkin, Das Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, 25. Cf. Dallin, Soviet Foreign 
Policy, 330–331. 
 47 E. Korovin, “Proletarian Internationalism in World Relations,” in International Affairs, no. 2 
(February 1958), 29. Quoted in Allison, The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, 18. 
50 Laying the Groundwork and Changing Neutrality, 1955‒1960 
1956 decision to leave the Warsaw Pact and become neutral48 proved that the So-
viet purpose of neutrality as it had been advanced a year earlier in Austria “was to 
promote the dissolution of the military organizations of the Western powers only.”49 
Neutrality was thus recommended by the USSR only in exchange for membership 
in Western alliances or for young nations that had recently emerged from colonial 
rule. At the Geneva conference of the heads of state of the four powers, from 18 to 
23 July 1955, Soviet president Nikolai Bulganin made it clear that neutrality was 
not for the “people’s democracies,” when he stressed the Soviet support for this 
status among Western states and their former colonies and encouraged the leading 
Western powers to take a similar stance: 
“It is a fact that for some time a movement in favour of a policy of neutrality, a policy of nonpar-
ticipation on military blocs and coalitions, has been gaining ground in some countries. Experience 
shows that some states which pursued a neutral policy in time of war were able to ensure security 
for their peoples and play a positive role. This was confirmed, in particular, by the experience of 
the Second World War, although the neutrality of some countries was not beyond reproach.
The Soviet Government is also of the opinion that should any nation desiring to pursue a policy of 
neutrality and nonparticipation in military groupings, while these groupings exist, raise the ques-
tion of having their security and territorial integrity guaranteed, the Great Powers should accede 
to these wishes. In any case, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is prepared to take part in 
such guarantees, as it has, for instance, declared in respect to Austria. 
At this point mention was made of the countries of Eastern Europe ‒ the people’s democracies. To 
raise this question at this Conference, means interference in the internal affairs of these states.”50
At the founding conference of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, on 11 May 1955, 
Bulganin lambasted the creation of NATO and SEATO, as well as the integration of 
“militaristic” West Germany into the former. However, he observed that “it would 
be incorrect to presume that the Austrian government is the only one adopting a 
position [of neutrality]”; quite the contrary, “there are a number of states, both in 
Europe and Asia, that are averse to joining aggressive military blocs.”51 From the 
Soviet point of view, this type of aversion did not apply to the Warsaw Pact, which 
was by definition not “aggressive.” At their first meeting in January 1956, the mem-
bers of the Warsaw Pact declared: 
“It is no accident that the policy of setting up aggressive military blocs is being condemned by an 
increasing number of countries. There is growing recognition of the desire of countries to make 
collective efforts in the struggle for peace, the desire of international cooperation on the basis of 
 48 Telegram Imre Nagy to Diplomatic Missions, 1 November 1956, in Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm 
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mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, nonaggression, noninterference in internal 
affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. This aim is served by 
the efforts of a number of countries to pursue a policy of nonparticipation in aggressive military 
blocs, a policy of neutrality.
The states that are parties of the Warsaw Treaty acclaim these efforts, convinced that support for 
them strengthens the forces of peace and weakens the forces of war.”52 
In 1955–59, the Soviet campaign for promoting neutrality in the West and the 
Third World reached its highest level. The nonaligned states’ Bandung conference 
in April 1955 was greeted enthusiastically in the Soviet media; however, after “the 
Khrushchev-Bulganin regime’s first large experiment with neutralism,”53 Soviet 
diplomats worried that the Third World might display not only too much independ-
ence from any power, but also struggle too fiercely against their internal challeng-
ers, most of them communist.54 At the conference, criticism of colonialism could 
not be voiced without also referring to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. None-
theless, Bandung opened the door for improving Soviet relations with the South 
Asian regimes, which had hitherto been discarded as “semi-feudal” or “lackeys 
of imperialism.”55 On 23 May 1955, the Communist Party of Indonesia welcomed 
this rapprochement, and a few weeks later the Soviet media proudly reported that 
India’s Communist Party was among the strongest supporters of Prime Minister 
Nehru’s neutralistic foreign policy.56 Similarly, the foreign policy course of both 
countries was positively re-evaluated by Soviet scholars. In June 1955 Nehru was 
welcomed in Moscow, and in October the Burmese prime minister U Nu followed 
suit. The new bonds to the nonaligned were strengthened by the triumphal tour of 
Khrushchev and Bulganin through India, Burma and Afghanistan in November and 
December 1955. With the aim of “attracting” such states “to our side,”57 the Krem-
lin offered hundred-million-dollar loans for Egypt, Syria and Afghanistan, and 
concluded trade agreements with Indonesia, India, Burma and other nonaligned 
states. While India and Indonesia rejected Soviet offers of arms sales, Afghanistan 
was flooded with Soviet and Czechoslovak weapons soon after the signing of a 
Soviet-Afghan convention on Afghanistan’s neutrality. In 1956 President Sukarno 
of Indonesia visited Moscow to receive Soviet loans and aid; between 1955 and 
1960 Soviet-Indonesian trade grew tenfold and the Soviet bloc quickly supplanted 
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the sterling area as the main trading partner of Burma.58 In the following years, the 
Soviet Union was a partner in the settlement leading to the neutrality of Laos in 
1962 and, in the same year, it also recognized the neutrality of Cambodia, which 
had been declared in 1957.59 Egypt, Afghanistan, Mali, Burma, India, Indonesia 
were applauded in Soviet statements as “having a neutral policy.”60 
The Soviet re-evaluation of neutrality was also reflected in praise for the Swiss 
status61 and Sweden’s neutral policy,62 as well as by the recognition of Finnish neu-
trality. Scandinavia in particular, with its delicate Nordic Balance between NATO 
members Iceland, Denmark, and Norway (the latter two without foreign soldiers on 
their soil), neutral Sweden, and the special case Finland, as well as its strong lean-
ings towards nuclear disarmament, was chosen by Soviet policy to be another test 
case for “peaceful coexistence” and neutralization. In 1948, Finland, which had been 
attacked by the USSR in 1939 and fought a “Continuation War” until 1944, rejected 
the Soviet offer of a military alliance, but was forced to agree to a Treaty of Friend-
ship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.63 This treaty included three main stipula-
tions: Finland was obliged not to tolerate foreign military bases (other than Soviet) 
on its soil, nor being used for aggression towards the USSR; the Soviet government 
recognized Finland’s aspirations for staying outside the conflicts of the great pow-
ers; if unable to cope with an invasion by Germany or a state allied with it, Finland 
was to consult the Soviet government, which in this case would be ready to render 
military assistance. Both sides claimed that this treaty did not contradict Finnish 
neutrality, which was explicitly recognized by Khrushchev in 1956 at the twentieth 
congress of the CPSU.64 For more than thirty years, Finnish neutrality, much like 
the status of Austria, allowed the Soviet Union to hold the respective country “on a 
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leash.”65 Even before Finland’s neutrality was recognized, Khrushchev offered the 
Finnish president, Juho Paasikivi, who was in Moscow in September 1955, a special 
package that aimed at creating another showcase of Soviet generosity while secur-
ing the victory of a pro-Soviet candidate in the forthcoming presidential elections: 
The Finns had to sign an extension of the Soviet-Finnish treaty for another twenty 
years; in return, the Soviet naval base in Finnish Porkkala would be relinquished in 
January 1956 and Finland would be admitted into the UN. When the Norwegian, 
Danish, and Swedish prime ministers Einar Gerhardsen, Hans Christian Hansen, 
and Tage Erlander successively visited Moscow in late 1955 and early 1956, they 
were received with Soviet words of praise for neutrality and given the suggestion 
of making northern Europe a neutral “zone of peace.”66 Khrushchev revealed to 
Hansen that the Kremlin would “shake NATO loose with peace initiatives”67 and in 
January 1956, the Communist Party of Sweden issued an appeal to the government 
to make Swedish neutrality internationally binding.68 Earlier Soviet attempts to woo 
Norway out of NATO had also used the attraction of neutrality.69 Iceland was offered 
a Soviet guarantee, if it chose to expel US forces and declare itself neutral. The ini-
tiative, which was combined with threats of the catastrophic consequences that the 
deployment of nuclear weapons would have for the host country, was not in vain: 
Denmark and Norway ruled out the deployment of such weapons on their soil, while 
the Icelandic parliament demanded a withdrawal of US troops and changed its mind 
only after the Soviet intervention in Hungary. Although the three NATO members 
remained firmly integrated into the alliance, the USSR, by accepting Finland’s neu-
trality, had more leverage on the situation in Scandinavia if it did not force Finland 
into a closer alliance ‒ a step that might have induced Sweden to join the Atlantic 
defense and its western neighbors to invite US bases onto their soil. Thus, when in 
the coming years the Soviet Union used pressure on Finland for communicating 
disagreement with perceived shifts in the strategic balance in Europe’s north, it had 
to be careful not to try the Scandinavians’ patience too far.70 
 65 Hanhimäki, “The Lure of Neutrality: Finland and the Cold War,” 263.
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In the years from 1955 till 1959, the Soviet Union promoted the adoption and 
exercise of neutrality not only by Austria, the Third World, and the Scandinavian 
countries, but also by other Western allies such as West Germany, Italy, Greece, 
Turkey, and Japan.71 All NATO members were warned of or threatened with disas-
trous consequences in the event of a war. In the case of Japan, Soviet proposals in 
1958 and 1961 aimed at neutralizing the country and clearing it of US troops. In 
the case of Italy, Soviet offers were made to guarantee this country’s neutrality and 
security ‒ an offer that would later be extended to Austria. In order to make neutral-
ity more attractive for West Germany, it was underlined that this status would not 
preclude its unification with “another state.”72 During the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev, 
in his struggle to rid West Berlin of the protection by the Western powers and to 
let the GDR “swallow” it, suggested “neutralizing” the western part of the city and 
replacing the Western garrison in the city with armed forces from neutral countries, 
thus aiming at weakening West Berlin’s defense and flattering the self-esteem of 
the neutrals. 
On as many official occasions as possible, Soviet leaders praised the benefits 
of neutrality: At the twentieth congress of the CPSU in 1956, the “strengthening 
of the amicable relations” to Asian nonaligned countries and European neutrals 
such as Finland and Austria was lauded as a major achievement of Soviet foreign 
policy.73 The communist world conference in Moscow in November 1960 wel-
comed the activities of the neutral and nonaligned countries for “peace and peace-
ful coexistence,”74 and at the twenty-second CPSU congress in 1961, Khrushchev 
commended all neutralists for “not being neutral with regard to the main question 
of our times, the question of war or peace,” and assured them again of their unwa-
vering Soviet support.75
In order to be better able to promote neutrality in the West, Soviet official and 
propaganda statements quickly developed a neutrality “myth.” This myth under-
1953–1965 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 239–257, 240. Cf. John Logue, “Sweden,” in S. Victor 
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lined the moral qualities of neutrality and stressed various benefits that were al-
legedly ready to be harvested by neutrals, such as friendly relations with all states, 
including the USSR, low defense spending, and thus the availability of more re-
sources for welfare.76 In this myth, neutrality was depicted as a status enabling the 
respective country to maintain “peaceful and mutually beneficial relations” with 
the Eastern bloc. The benefits of neutrality were contrasted with the disadvantages 
of membership in Western alliances by Soviet politicians and legal experts, who 
claimed that “life shows that those capitalist states maintaining the policy of neu-
trality receive enormous political and economic benefits from it.”77 Other capitalist 
states, such as West Germany and Japan, it was stated, had lost their sovereignty 
and security and had to live under the constant threat of being transformed into the 
battlefield of a nuclear war. However, the threat of nuclear annihilation applied also 
to those neutrals that, like Switzerland, declined to abdicate nuclear weapons.78 
Similar claims were maintained by Khrushchev on many occasions. With regard to 
the benefits of neutrality, the leader, in an interview with an Italian newspaper cor-
respondent in 1958, developed the thesis that neutrality increased the security of the 
neutrals and the globe, reduced international tensions and military expenditures, 
and raised the prestige of the neutral countries79 ‒ a claim that found its way into 
the second edition of the official Diplomatic Handbook of the USSR.80 However, 
it was also part of the Soviet “song of neutrality” that neutrals had always to be on 
their guard to not be recruited by “imperialists” for their “aggressive blocs.”81 Since 
the neutrals had extricated themselves from the Western club, they, according to 
Soviet propaganda, attracted the “implacable enmity of their late overlords, whose 
determination to return the heretics to the fold posed a mortal threat to the survival 
of these seditionist regimes.”82
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The Soviet theory of neutrality in the late 1950s and 1960s
The advent of “peaceful coexistence” and the changes in Soviet foreign policy re-
garding neutrality and neutralism in Western Europe, Asia and Africa were accom-
panied by the dawning of a new period in the development of the Soviet theory of 
international law. Early signs of these changes can already be noticed in 1955 and, 
in the context of the twentieth congress of the CPSU, the new theory was codified, 
with “peaceful coexistence” being officially adopted as a foreign policy doctri-
ne.83 Outwardly less revolutionary than before, the new dogma of international law, 
as outlined by its champion, the head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Legal De-
partment and Soviet representative in the UN Commission for International Law, 
Professor Grigorii Tunkin, contained, as its main feature, the acceptance of one 
universal system of international law.84 While some Western experts, as for instance 
Alfred Verdross, had voiced similar ideas,85 the new Soviet thesis differed from 
both the predominant Western opinion, in which such a legal system could only 
be created if all contracting parties had a minimum of common convictions, and 
the hitherto valid Soviet doctrine that there were two distinct sets of international 
law, communist and bourgeois.86 While the latter teachings had been appropriate in 
revolutionary or isolationist times, the new dogma seemed to better serve the inte-
gration of the USSR into the international system based on a lasting, albeit limited, 
“peaceful coexistence.” In Marxism-Leninism, national law had always been seen 
as part of the superstructure of human societies and shaped by economic roots and 
the interests of the ruling classes; international law, however, Tunkin argued, was 
created by international custom and agreements.87 Since such agreements had been 
concluded between bourgeois and socialist states, international law was charac-
terized as being universal.88 As in the interwar period, this change seemed to be a 
 83 Meissner, Sowjetunion und Völkerrecht, 57–59; Erickson, International Law and the Revolutiona-
ry State, 14–16; Menzel, “Vorwort,” xviii.
 84 Bracht, Ideologische Grundlagen der sowjetischen Völkerrechtslehre, 62.
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concession to the needs of Soviet foreign policy; Khrushchev was quoted as having 
said: “We know very well that without respecting the norms of international law 
and fulfilling the assumed obligations in international relations there can be no 
trust; without trust, there can be no peaceful coexistence.”89 
Because achieving such coexistence had become a central task of Soviet for-
eign policy, it followed to agree on international norms being universal. This goal 
was linked with the second main feature of the Soviet theory of international law 
under Khrushchev’s auspices, the attempt of equating the general principles of 
international law that had been recognized in the Charter of the United Nations 
(such as nonaggression, noninterference in internal affairs, the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, equal rights, the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity) with 
the Soviet concept of “peaceful coexistence.”90 Since the latter comprised further 
obligations (such as decolonization, disarmament, a ban on hostile propaganda and 
others), the process aimed at making the Soviet principles internationally bind-
ing.91 In general, the new Soviet dogma of international law combined revolution-
ary postulates (e.g. recognizing “wars of liberation” as legal) with traditional values 
(e.g. the cult of sovereignty). While the former strove at fostering a legal basis for 
insurrection against colonial powers, the latter was to ward off Western influence 
in inner-Soviet or inner-socialist affairs such as issues of human rights or self-
determination.92
It can be argued that the new Soviet theory of international law, in particular its 
more flexible approach towards Western international law, made it easier for Soviet 
academics to deal with Western concepts such as neutrality. In any case, the new 
Soviet political attitude towards neutrality also triggered Soviet academic efforts 
to intellectually and legally substantiate the recently rediscovered status and to de-
velop it into a genuine theory.93 Soviet theory differentiated between wartime and 
peacetime neutrality, with the latter falling under permanent or “positive” neutrality: 
While the first was characterized as having existed since the “age of slavery,” per-
 89 „Wir wissen sehr gut, dass es ohne Einhaltung der Normen des Völkerrechts, ohne Erfüllung 
der übernommenen Verpflichtungen in den zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen kein Vertrauen und 
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manent neutrality was seen as a product of the “age of capitalism and imperialism”; 
positive neutrality, the most recent phenomenon, was declared an outcome of the 
“age of coexistence,” which was marked by the appearance of the Soviet state on the 
international scene.94 It was claimed by Soviet scholars that the meaning of neutral-
ity had changed through these different periods of time; wartime neutrality had often 
been misused to the aggressor’s advantage and the victim’s detriment and thus, only 
contemporary positive neutrality could be recognized as “true” neutrality.95
In a note on 7 March 1955 to the Netherlands, the depositary country of the 
Hague Conventions of 1907, the Soviet Union subscribed to this international doc-
ument defining wartime neutrality. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the 
contemporary Soviet interpretation of wartime neutrality was similar to that in the 
West. It included, among other duties: 1) nonparticipation in hostilities; 2) refusal 
to lend military help or military deliveries to the combating parties; 3) refusal to 
make the neutral’s territory available for military use, including military action, 
military transports or recruitment of forces; 4) internment of military personnel 
of the combating parties; 5) equal treatment of all belligerents; 6) the defense of 
neutrality. A declaration of neutrality was not deemed necessary.96 According to 
the contemporary Soviet interpretation, wartime neutrality did not curb the right of 
the neutral to, e.g., 1) maintain self-defense; 2) have its territorial integrity respect-
ed; 3) conclude agreements and conduct negotiations and trade of a nonmilitary 
character; 4) intern the military personnel of the combating parties; 5) allow the 
transport of injured personnel of the combating parties if no weapons were being 
carried; 6) terminate its neutrality by entering the war, if the neutrality had not been 
based on a legal obligation.97 Even according to the Soviet theory, wartime neutral-
ity did not limit the freedom of opinion or the press, nor did it oblige the neutral 
to abstain from conducting trade with the combating parties, with the exception of 
contraband.98 The subscription to the Hague Conventions did not rule out the Soviet 
criticism, albeit unofficial, that in the age of “coexistence” there was no general 
“right to war,” and thus, wartime neutrality should follow Marxism-Leninism in 
distinguishing between just and unjust wars and between aggressors and victims. 
Some scholars went as far as claiming that, due to the general ban on war, wartime 
neutrality would soon disappear.99 
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Contrary to the Western concept of neutrality, the Soviet interpretation of the 
late 1950s and the 1960s put a focus on peacetime obligations.100 This was, at least 
in part, due to the circumstances of the Cold War under which this new interpre-
tation of neutrality emerged, i.e. the “coexistence” of two blocs with their tense 
struggle for political influence over as many countries as possible, albeit in the 
absence of a general war. This shift from wartime to peacetime obligations was 
legitimized by Soviet legal experts by referring to the nuclear threat, the emergence 
of the United Nations Organization,101 the changes in the international balance of 
forces, i.e. the rise of the socialist camp and the creation of a nonaligned one,102 and 
a “general change in international law, which today not only strives at struggling 
against existing aggression, but also above all at preventing it.”103
The Soviet theory of international law gradually developed its own interpreta-
tion of peacetime neutrality.104 As we have seen above,105 the peacetime obligations 
of a permanently neutral state are poorly defined in Western international law. The 
absence of a generally accepted international doctrine was criticized by Soviet law-
yers, who took on the task of formulating a set of rules that reflected the Soviet 
interest in turning both neutrals and nonaligned into useful promoters of Soviet pol-
icy. Numerous articles and monographs were written by Soviet experts, including 
Lidiia Modzhorian, Boris Ganiushkin and Oleg Tiunov, who aimed at (re-)defining 
and codifying internationally binding rules for neutral policy in times of peace.106 A 
major step in codifying the Soviet doctrine of neutrality and making it legally bind-
ing was made in the “Resolution on the Legal Aspects of Neutrality,” adopted by 
the seventh conference of the Soviet-sponsored International Association of Demo-
cratic Lawyers, which took place in Sofia, Bulgaria, from 10 to 14 October 1960.107 
During the conference it was stressed that it was necessary to analyze which stipula-
tions of classic neutrality were still valid, which had grown obsolete, and which new 
obligations and rights of peacetime neutrals should be codified. A commission was 
set up to work out a new definition of neutrality. Soviet demands108 were hereby cast 
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into legal sounding formulas and used to supplement the original stock. The end 
product thus emerged “as a curious mix composed in relatively equal proportions 
of 1) familiar principles of international law pertaining to wartime neutrality re-
tooled for peacetime service and attuned to the spirit of the politics of nonalignment 
and 2) planks from the political platform of the movement of nonaligned countries 
dressed up as normative prescriptions to justify insistence upon strict compliance 
with their terms.”109 The result contained “traditional Western concepts, adaptation 
to the realities of the politics of neutrality in today’s Europe, and efforts to persuade 
the European neutral states to support the ‘peace policies’ of the socialist camp.”110 
This rather demanding definition concerning neutrals’ peacetime obligations was 
published and later incorporated into semi-official Soviet publications.111
 The teachings of the late 1950s and early 1960s distinguished between per-
manent neutrality (which was founded either on an international agreement or a 
national declaration that was recognized by other states) and “positive” or “active” 
neutrality or “neutral policy” (which was in the majority of cases declared unilat-
erally and a synonym for neutralism or nonalignment).112 According to the Soviet 
theory, the differences between permanent neutrality and neutralism were mainly 
formal ones: While permanent neutrality was an institute of international law and 
the permanent neutrals were legally obliged to maintain wartime neutrality and, in 
peacetime, to conduct a neutral policy,113 positive neutrality was merely a course of 
peacetime foreign policy, based on free will and without any legal obligations. The 
permanent neutral was bound “to permanently maintain neutrality, never to start a 
war, and to refrain from conducting a policy that might lead to war,” and, there-
fore, “not to partake in military blocs or groupings, to ban the presence of foreign 
troops on their soil, and to maintain friendly relations with all states.”114 Another 
the neutral’s territory; 3) a ban on nuclear weapons; 4) good relations with all states; 5) no aid to 
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formal difference between permanent and positive neutrality was that the former 
was regarded valid only if internationally notified and recognized.115 As in Western 
international law, the notification and recognition of neutrality were seen as creat-
ing a contractual relationship between a neutral state and other states: “As long and 
insofar the permanently neutral state fulfills his obligations, the other states are, 
according to international law, obliged to respect his permanent neutrality.”116
Here, however, the differences between permanent and positive neutrality, as 
based on the Soviet theory, ended. Soviet politicians and publications stressed that 
both groups, i.e. permanent as well as positive neutrals, had to conduct a neutral 
policy in peacetime (one by obligation, the other by free will) and refused to see 
any difference with regard to peacetime obligations. Ganiushkin postulated that 
“regarding the comprehensiveness and character of the measures taken to carry out a policy of 
neutrality, there can be no difference between permanently neutral countries and countries that 
follow the path of nonalignment. However, there is a difference with regard to the fact that in 
general, nonaligned countries conduct a policy of nonalignment only by virtue of a unilateral 
declaration of intention, whereas permanently neutral states conduct such a policy on the basis of 
an international agreement.”117
Since the peacetime policy of permanently neutral and nonaligned countries 
was subsumed under “neutral policy,” the differences between the foreign policies 
of countries as diverse as India, Yugoslavia, Finland, Austria, and Switzerland were 
blurred.118 Even more importantly, the Soviet claim that in peacetime permanent 
neutral policies, i.e. not partake in military alliances and coalitions, not conclude agreements that 
might draw the permanently neutral state into a war, and strengthen the friendship with other sta-
tes.” Cf. Tiunov’s definition: “Permanent neutrality is a status in international law of a sovereign 
state that is, according to a unilateral expression of will or an international contract, obliged not 
to participate in any war except in the case of self-defense, and, in peacetime, to conduct a policy 
that prevents him from being entangled in a war, i.e. not to enter military alliances, not to allow the 
locating of foreign military bases on its territory, not to conclude treaties that foster an economic 
or a political preparation for war, and not to provide its army with weapons of mass destruction, 
as well as obliged to struggle actively for peace and peaceful coexistence.” Tiunov, Neitralitet v 
mezhdunarodnom prave, 21.
 115 Tiunov, Neitralitet v mezhdunarodnom prave, 49. While Tiunov and Ganiushkin, Sovremen-
nyi neitralitet, 94, deemed tacit recognition possible, the same was considered insufficient by 
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neutrals were legally obliged to follow the same foreign policy as the nonaligned 
massively increased the burden laid on the permanent neutrals. This was, actually, 
the main feature of the Soviet neutrality doctrine and its main bone of contention 
for the Western neutrals, which rejected such claims. 
While neutrality was defined by Soviet theory as a “means to conserve the 
peace,” it meant not only abstention from war, but also from the Cold War.119 This 
postulate was a clear example of how Soviet political demands were transformed 
by Soviet experts of international law into legal claims. In addition to nonparticipa-
tion in war, military alliances and closed economic blocs, as well as avoidance of 
any measure that might compel the neutral to join a conflict, including participation 
in economic embargoes or hostile propaganda against foreign powers, a neutral’s 
international obligations, from the Soviet point of view, also comprised “neigh-
borly” or “friendly” “peaceful relations with all other countries.”120 This concerned, 
in particular, the neutrals’ relations to the socialist states. It aimed at obliging the 
neutrals to establish ties with socialist states that were not yet recognized by the 
West, such as the GDR and communist China, and not to partake in Western boy-
cotts against the Eastern bloc.
In general, a neutral was not to be “passively indifferent to all occurrences in 
the international arena” or even “neutral in the question of war or peace,” but to 
“actively struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence,” fighting the “forces of war 
and imperialism” (i.e. the West), supporting the “forces of peace” (i.e. the Eastern 
bloc), and thus to augment a “zone of peace.”121 It was to contribute to a reduc-
tion of tensions, promote neutrality, and struggle for all-European security, in short 
to be “one form of peaceful coexistence.”122 The active “struggle for peace” and 
“friendship” was seen as the highest duty of a neutral and as “the main criterion for 
following, see Hafner, “Die permanente Neutralität,” 225. Cf. L. A. Modzhorian, Politika neitra-
liteta (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1962). 
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evaluating it.”123 In Soviet political understanding, it was not possible for a posi-
tively or permanently neutral country to be content with its own neutrality, but it 
had to actively contribute, by means of its neutrality and policies, to a “relaxation 
of tensions.”124 Neutrality’s international function was construed as a contribution 
towards the spreading of the “zone of peace,” “a form of the struggle against the 
formation of blocs,”125 and a way to “limit the sphere of action of the aggressive 
NATO bloc” and to weaken its cohesion. Thus, the USSR, unlike the theory of neu-
trality as held in the West, thought neutrality to be a “means of changing the balance 
of power rather than preserving it.”126
Some accounts even claimed that, in the event of war, the neutral was not to treat 
the aggressor and the victim equally.127 While such thoughts were a result of the 
Leninist theory of “just wars,” they were hardly reconcilable with the core concept 
of neutrality. Similarly inconsistent with the Western theory was the Soviet claim 
that a neutral should join the struggle for decolonization128 ‒ a movement that was 
expected to dismantle Western bases worldwide, disrupt the flow of raw material 
from the colonies to Western Europe, and thus, to cripple global capitalism and 
Western power. While permanent neutrality meant the obligation to abstain from 
any war except for self-defense, in contrast, positive neutrality, in the Soviet under-
standing, did not comprise such obligation; the armed struggle for decolonization 
was, in any case, seen as justified.
Such obligations, Soviet publications claimed, were readily accepted by the 
neutrals: 
“Step by step, the states exercising a neutral policy came to the awareness that, in our time, one 
must not confine oneself to mere nonparticipation in blocs, but rather, if one seeks to conserve and 
foster peace, one must fight a decisive battle for peace […].
The states that follow the road of neutrality are not neutral in questions of war and peace; they 
stand up for peace and peaceful coexistence, for the friendship and cooperation of large and small 
states, of the peoples of all lands. This is why neutrality under the current conditions is assessed 
as positive by the Soviet Union and other states of the global socialist community, by Marxist-
Leninist parties, and by the international communist and Labor movements.”129
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In practice, the Soviet Union expected neutral countries to support Soviet or 
the “people’s democracies’” existing initiatives on détente, arms control, nuclear 
nonproliferation and the banning of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the USSR, 
particularly after the experience of 1950 when the United Nations, against Soviet 
wishes, took active part in the defense of South Korea against communist armed 
aggression, encouraged neutral and nonaligned countries to join the UN and even 
its peace missions.130 Soviet scientists cited Austria as proof that it was not longer 
seen as incompatible to be neutral and also a member of the United Nations. Obvi-
ously, the Soviet Union was interested not only in making neutrality more attrac-
tive by inviting the neutrals into such organizations, but also in benefiting from the 
neutral countries’ support for the Soviet struggle within the international forums. 
The reason was simple: 
“The majority of nonaligned states in the UN support the peace-loving efforts of the USSR and 
other socialist states, and they stand up together with them. This enlarges the forces of peace in 
the United Nations Organization, even augments its possibilities for securing peace and security. 
The change of the balance of forces within the UN, which interrupts the US and other imperialistic 
states in using the formerly unchallenged ‘voting machine,’ delights all who hold peace dear.”131
Within the United Nations, neutral states, according to the Soviet doctrine, had 
to obey the following rule: If the Security Council unanimously, i.e. with Soviet 
support, sponsored a decision, a neutral state had to follow. If the General Assem-
bly made a decision that was against the Soviet will, the neutrals were expected to 
remain “neutral” and not to follow.132
Another duty of permanent neutrals and nonaligned as claimed in Soviet the-
ory and practice was nondiscrimination and economic equidistance between the 
blocs.133 Hence, the neutrals’ participation in schemes of West European integration 
was ruled out. Both claims were deduced by Soviet theorists from the Hague Con-
ventions on wartime neutrality and, without further legal basis, transferred to the list 
of the permanent neutrals’ peacetime obligations. As far as economic equidistance 
was concerned, when criticizing the European neutrals’ bonds with the West, So-
viet experts tended to tacitly overlook the fact that many nonaligned states oriented 
themselves towards the Eastern bloc. This bias was justified in Soviet statements 
with the observation that the Eastern bloc, by definition, did not abuse economic 
links by using them to exert pressure. In fact, the more socialist components spotted 
in the neutralist’s economy, the more “neutralist” it was considered in Soviet eyes.134
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The question of whether neutrals would be allowed or had to defend themselves 
in the case of war was not unanimously answered by Soviet scholars.135 Unanimity 
existed regarding the demand that the neutrals’ armies be moderate in size and the 
claim that the Swedish and Swiss armies clearly exceeded such dimensions. In ad-
dition, there was a Soviet tendency to discount small states’ efforts for self-defense 
as futile. When Sweden, a small neutral, aimed at increasing its deterrence, Soviet 
propaganda criticized such efforts as obsolete and militaristic, and the Soviet navy 
and air force systematically violated Sweden’s territorial waters and airspace, as if 
to demonstrate the futility of the neutral’s efforts.136 This type of policy reflected the 
consistently one-sided depiction of self-defense in Soviet propaganda in general: 
While a Soviet build-up of armed forces (including nuclear weaponry and an offen-
sive military doctrine) was hailed as strengthening the peace, Western self-defense 
was attacked as being aggressive. The neutrals were positioned somewhere in the 
middle: Since not even TASS dared to claim that the Swedish or Austrian armies 
were designed to invade the USSR, it aimed at demoralizing them. The possession 
of nuclear weapons was deemed incompatible with neutrality, for it would increase 
a neutral’s dependence on foreign military technology and also the risk of being 
destroyed in a war by a nuclear counterattack.137 When Switzerland and Sweden, 
in the late 1950s and 1960s, considered introducing a program for nuclear defense, 
both countries were fiercely attacked by Soviet propaganda. 
Even trickier than self-defense was the issue of freedom of opinion. Leaders of 
neutral states such as Austria’s Julius Raab or Finland’s Urho Kekkonen insisted 
that “our neutrality does not extend to political convictions.”138 Indeed, neither 
wartime nor peacetime neutrality, even according to Soviet theory, curbs the free-
dom of opinion or of the press. However, Soviet scholars insisted on a ban against 
“hostile propaganda” and ‒ not without a side blow against Western ideas such as 
“freedom of the media” ‒ advised the governments of both permanent and positive 
neutrals to take action against such behavior: 
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“It is true that neutrality obliges the state as such, but not its individual citizens. It is also true ‒ as 
has been mentioned ‒ that international law does not demand that a neutral state conform to so-
called ideological neutrality, the neutrality of the press, etc. However, […] this type of activity 
from its individual citizens does not conform to the interests of a permanently neutral state as, for 
example, the propaganda of war, fostering an atmosphere of hostility in relation to a certain coun-
try or its representatives, etc. As much as they referred in such cases to ‘freedom of conscience,’ 
‘freedom of thought’ or other ‘democratic rights,’ we cannot but remember that in the past, ac-
tions of this sort by individual citizens led Switzerland into serious conflicts with other countries. 
Therefore, it is primarily in the own interests of a permanently neutral state to put a stop to such 
activities by individuals, as it may draw the neutral state into conflict.”139
It is quite telling that the “other country,” referred to by the Soviet author when 
recommending not criticizing foreign powers was Nazi Germany. Indeed, similar 
ideas had been put forward by German legal experts who had been instrumental in 
shaping the contemporary Swiss understanding of neutral policy.140
Fulfilling all these expectations and tasks (apparently believed by Soviet leaders 
to work to the Soviet advantage), in Western understanding, would have been in-
terpreted as abandoning neutrality in favor of joining the Soviet “peaceful coexist-
ence” rally. At the very least, it was considered nonalignment rather than neutrali-
ty.141 From the Soviet point of view, however, these points were declared necessary 
for being neutral. 
While most claims of the Soviet theory of neutral policy could be dismissed 
as unofficial postulates without legal basis or international relevance ‒ some were 
even mutually contradictory ‒ the growing catalog of demands was nonetheless 
increasingly hard to ignore and, if unchallenged by the West, bore the risk of being 
transformed into legal claims. This threatened to become a constant strife factor,142 
even more so, because Soviet experts on international law claimed the right of other 
states to evaluate the policies of each neutral and decide whether its obligations 
were being properly fulfilled. Only by faithfully observing the Soviet theses, we 
are told in Soviet statements, can a neutral guarantee that it will not be drawn into 
future conflicts.143
“If the permanently neutral state deviates from fulfilling his obligations of neutrality, then the 
guarantor and other interested powers may draw this state’s attention to the inadmissibility of a 
unilateral change or the abandonment of the status that is based on a multilateral international 
 139 Ganiushkin, Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie, 146. Cf. ibid., 13, 118–120. 
 140 Schweitzer, Dauernde Neutralität, 107. 
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agreement, and use the means at their disposal ‒ with the exception of force or threat thereof ‒ to 
prevent the status of permanent neutrality being abandoned without the consent of all interested 
powers.”144
If a neutral country did these things “correctly,” it was highly praised by the 
Soviet side and rewarded. This might include tributes in the news media, other 
publications, or official statements, or increases in official exchanges or trade and 
cultural relations. If the Soviet side felt that a neutral was on the right path, the 
country was encouraged to continue steps in the same direction. If it did not fulfill 
Soviet expectations, however, it was criticized for not living up to its “international 
obligations,” threatened with negative consequences and told what to do. Attempts 
at persuasion were made by references to “popular opinion” or a “sober assess-
ment of the facts.” In most such cases, the Soviet side relied on an instrumental 
approach: Since neutrality was portrayed as desirable, undesired actions by neutral 
states were branded as being at odds with neutrality and inspired by sinister milita-
ristic and imperialistic circles, their local “lackeys,” or “unreliable and adventurous 
elements.” Therefore, it was stated that “neutrality” did not allow neutral countries 
to do what the USSR did not want them to do.145 If Soviet demands were neglected 
too long, reminders of its stipulations were published. Other means of “reminding” 
a neutral of the Soviet point of view included economic sanctions and political 
pressure, as were applied, for instance, by the Soviet Union against Finland during 
the “night frost crisis” of 1958, when the Kremlin, after a change of government in 
Finland and out of fear of a swing in Finnish policy towards the West, put pressure 
on the newly-elected cabinet, froze trade negotiations, and withdrew the Soviet 
ambassador.146
Austria’s neutrality, its Swiss model, and the Soviet interpretation
Although the Austrian state treaty was one of the first results of the changed Soviet 
attitude towards neutrality and despite the Kremlin’s paramount role in Austria’s 
neutralization,147 the Soviet interpretation of neutrality was not automatically adop-
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ted by Austria. In order to avoid any ambiguity and not to buy a neutrality “pig in a 
poke,” the Western powers already before signing the state treaty, had made it clear 
that Austria would adopt neutrality only “as it was maintained by Switzerland.” 
And in order to convince the Austrian delegation in Moscow, which had been re-
luctant to mention neutrality at all, the Soviet side had proposed this definition for 
the Moscow memorandum.148 
The roots of Switzerland’s neutrality are usually traced back to the Old Confed-
eracy’s army’s defeat in the battle of Marignano in 1515, which put an end to all 
Swiss ambitions to become a great power. The idea of neutrality was also fostered 
by the religious and ethnic diversity of the Alpine cantons ‒ a diversity that made 
taking sides in the various European religious wars seem a risky undertaking, indeed 
a risk to the very existence of the Confederation. Squeezed in between France and 
the Holy Empire, Switzerland henceforth strove at remaining neutral in numerous 
conflicts. After the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars had affected the country, 
the great powers at the Congress of Vienna fulfilled a Swiss request by officially 
recognizing this country’s permanent neutrality and guaranteeing the inviolability 
of its territory.149 It was after the experience of two world wars, which in many ways 
challenged Switzerland’s status and principles, and in the wake of a new challenge 
posed by the Cold War, that the Swiss Foreign Ministry, in November 1954, chose to 
write down the principles of permanent neutrality based on its own understanding. 
The internal document that was published soon afterwards defined the peacetime 
obligations of Swiss neutrality as having two main duties: 1) not to start a war, and 
2) to be prepared for “defending [the country’s] neutrality and independence.”150 
Besides these main obligations, the Swiss doctrine contained the secondary duties 
“to do everything to avoid being drawn into a war and to refrain from anything that 
might draw [the neutral] into a future war.” To this end, the neutral had to “maintain 
a neutral policy.” Although the design of such policy was a “matter of [the neutral’s] 
discretion,” the doctrine drafted by law expert Rudolf Bindschedler listed the fol-
lowing points as obligatory: In politics and military matters, Switzerland must not 
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join any alliances nor allow the maintenance of foreign bases on its soil. In the 
economic field, the neutral must not conclude a customs or economic union with 
stronger partners, since such moves would compromise the country’s sovereignty. 
The Swiss neutrality doctrine rejected the notion of “moral neutrality” or an obliga-
tion of the press or the individual to bow to concepts of this kind.
As soon became visible, the Austrian practice of neutral policy deviated in many 
respects from that of the Swiss,151 in particular with regard to Austria’s earlier date 
of joining the United Nations (1955 vs. 2003) and the Council of Europe (1956 
vs. 1963), and its not creating a strong army. Suffice it here to say that in 1955 
the Swiss doctrine does not seem to have been publicized in Austria. Although 
the Austrian-Soviet Moscow memorandum mentioned Swiss neutrality in general 
terms, none of the official Austrian statements of 1955 referred to the Swiss doc-
trine, and it was publicly discussed by Austrian scholars only from 1967.152 The 
Austrian Constitutional Law on Neutrality, adopted on 26 October 1955, stipulated 
that Austria 
1) “voluntarily declares its permanent neutrality. Austria will maintain and defend [neutrality] by 
all means at [the country’s] disposal.
2) In order to secure these objectives in the future, Austria will not join military alliances nor al-
low military bases of foreign powers to be created on its soil.”153
The official comments on the government’s proposal for the motion explained 
that Austria was obliged to avoid any “relations that might draw it into a war,” es-
pecially military alliances and foreign bases.154 In addition to this, neutrality would 
not cause any restrictions with regard to Austria’s “design of internal or foreign 
policy,” or the freedom of its citizens and the media. In contrast to the Swiss and, 
still more, the Soviet doctrine, Austrian leaders in 1955 imagined neutrality merely 
as a status of nonaggression combined with freedom from alliances and foreign 
bases. No further document was published to specify the so-called secondary obli-
gations. Chancellor Raab in 1955 claimed that neutrality would “contain no com-
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mitments and obligations in economic and cultural areas.”155 This fell short even 
of the official Swiss neutrality doctrine, with its reference to economic neutrality. 
With the notable exception of the social democratic party leadership surrounding 
Bruno Pittermann, who spoke out for this type of neutrality,156 Raab’s coalition 
partner, the SPÖ, like most West European social democratic parties at the time, 
stressed Austria’s bonds to the Western world even more than Raab’s own ÖVP 
and limited neutrality strictly to military matters. Prior to 1955, Bruno Kreisky, the 
social democratic state secretary in the Foreign Department, avoided mentioning 
neutrality and preferred instead to use the term “nonalliance” as being something 
Austria might adopt.157 Despite such differences, the Austrian consensus was simi-
lar to that of Switzerland or Sweden in that the country’s neutral policy included a 
clear refusal of ideological neutralism.158 It was part of this consensus that neutral-
ity bound only the actions of the government, not the right of the country’s citizens 
or the media to state their opinions.159 
Austrian scholars, for their part, began to develop a neutrality doctrine in the 
late 1950s. Their champion, Alfred Verdross, defined the following characteristics 
of permanent neutrality: 1) the obligation to refrain from starting a war and to 
maintain neutrality in future wars; 2) the obligation to defend the country’s neutral-
ity and territorial integrity; 3) not to undertake any obligations that might draw the 
neutral into a war; 4) neutrality can be guaranteed by foreign powers; 5) the neutral 
remains free with respect to its domestic and foreign policies; 6) there is no obliga-
tion for ideological neutrality.160 Despite the fact that citizens bore no international 
obligations, they, in Verdross’ view, had the moral duty to their own country to be 
moderate and honest when criticizing foreign affairs in order not to cause difficul-
ties for the neutral country’s foreign policy. The idea of economic neutrality was 
publicly debated in Austria only from 1959.161
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The restrictive Austrian definition of the neutral’s obligations was not approved 
by the Soviet side. There cannot be any doubt that the general Soviet attitude to-
wards Austria’s neutrality was positive: “Since the USSR was one of the architects 
of Austria’s permanent neutrality, the benevolent and favorable attitude adopted by 
the Soviet Union towards it over the years should not come as a surprise.”162 Andrei 
Gromyko, the generally bland Soviet foreign minister, was truly enthusiastic when 
remembering Austria in his memoirs: 
“Which other country in central Europe can one consider a pillar of neutrality? The answer must 
be Austria […] Those across the Atlantic who do not like Austria’s neutrality and who criticize it 
as ‘amoral’ are deeply wrong. The Soviet Union’s relations with Austria are a compelling example 
of balanced cooperation between states having different social systems. In fact, if there is amo-
rality, it lies in any attempt to make Austria repudiate her neutrality. […] Europe needs a neutral 
Austria, and so do the Austrian people.”163
This description contained all the main elements of Soviet neutrality propagan-
da: the high moral value of neutrality, its benefits, and its sinister enemies “across 
the Atlantic.” As we shall see, Soviet statements were not always as positive, and 
the Austrian practice of neutral policy was repeatedly and quite explicitly subject 
to Soviet critique. This kind of disagreement concerned a number of facets of the 
Western understanding of neutrality in general and its Austrian variant in particular, 
its genesis as well as the legal obligations stemming from it. 
Some consensus existed between Soviet and most Austrian experts and pol-
iticians that Austria’s neutrality had been established through an act of national 
legislation that was made officially known to and was recognized by many other 
states.164 The combination of notification and recognition was generally interpreted 
as “creating a contractual relationship” under which Austria’s permanent neutrality 
was based on international law; such a “relationship” could be terminated only in 
accordance with international law.165 As a result, Austria ‒ like Switzerland ‒ was 
considered to be “legally bound to practice permanent neutrality and to abide by 
the obligations stemming from it.”166 Therefore, until the 1990s Austria was gener-
ally seen as not free to modify or abandon its status at will. In the late 1950s, legal 
expert Felix Ermacora doubted this doctrine, but later conceded his error.167
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Concerning the background of the country’s neutralization, Austrian experts 
in international law did not subscribe to the Soviet thesis that neutrality was the 
consequence of a shift in the international balance of forces towards socialism. In 
contrast, they, more traditionally, saw the neutralization of a country to be the result 
of, or a solution for, a stalemate between two external great powers in their strug-
gle for influence over said country. It entailed a postponement ad infinitum of the 
struggle.168 While Austrian official statements consistently repeated that Austria’s 
neutralization had been a voluntary act ‒ a claim that was correct from a purely 
legal point of view ‒ interestingly, Ermacora acknowledged that this was only half 
of the truth, with Soviet insistence being the other side of the coin.169 Soviet state-
ments, however, rejected any notion of Austria having been “neutralized.”170
Regarding other aspects of Austrian neutrality, further disagreements can be dis-
cerned. Some of them had to do with the legal value of the Moscow memorandum, 
which had stipulated the Soviet government’s preparedness to join the Western 
powers in signing the state treaty and the Austrian delegation’s promise to submit a 
declaration of neutrality to the Austrian parliament for consideration and adoption. 
Since the delegation had lacked the legal power to declare Austria’s neutrality, and 
since the memorandum was not subject to ratification by the parliaments of the two 
countries, it was, as concurred by most Austrian legal experts, not an international 
agreement that was binding for anyone other than the two delegations.171 Only a 
minority of Austrian experts regarded the memorandum as binding to the state of 
Austria, thus making obligatory a declaration, if not adoption, of neutrality. On the 
Soviet side, legal expert Tiunov claimed that the Moscow memorandum created an 
obligation for Austria to declare and maintain neutrality, and his colleague Gan-
iushkin argued that the Moscow memorandum had been cited by Foreign Minister 
Molotov at the four-power gathering on the eve of the signing of the state treaty and 
thus acquired “the importance of an act of international law.”172 Since the memo-
randum was referred to in the state treaty, the entire contents of the memorandum 
allegedly became a part of the international agreement. Some (even semi-official) 
statements, as in the Soviet Diplomatic Dictionary, went so far as to allege that 
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Austria’s neutrality was founded or, at least, “recognized in the state treaty.”173 An-
drei Gromyko, who served as foreign minister from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, in 
his consistently biased memoirs, even referred to “Austria, which acquired neutral 
status by the Vienna State Treaty, signed on 15 May 1955 by the USSR, the USA, 
Great Britain, France and Austria”174 ‒ a minor, albeit in the Austrian case substan-
tial, distortion that can hardly be attributed to a lapse in the impeccable diplomat’s 
memory. Other Soviet statements claimed that the four powers had to be consulted 
if Austria wished to modify or abandon neutrality.175 Such claims, ultimately boil-
ing down to creating an international obligation for Austria to declare and maintain 
neutrality, and a special Soviet entitlement for controlling its practice, were consid-
ered by Austrian experts to be “groundless.”176 Austrian scholars and diplomats did 
their best to correct such claims.177
Another particularly controversial issue was the question of who was entitled to 
define the obligations comprised by a neutral peacetime policy. Since the interna-
tionally recognized catalog of legal duties only dealt with wartime obligations, the 
Swiss and Austrian governments claimed that the task of defining and shaping their 
neutral policy in peacetime rested on the respective government alone.178 Although 
the judgment of the Austrian government in this respect was accepted by the Soviet 
Union during Chancellor Raab’s visit to Moscow, some Soviet scholars continued 
to declare such claims as unjustified.179
The main contrast between Soviet and Austrian interpretations, however, re-
garded the legal obligations stemming from permanent neutrality, in particular the 
fact that Austrian neutrality was, especially in the first years after its declaration, 
far from “total” (i.e. applied to politics, bilateral relations, trade, and the media), 
as was demanded by the Soviet side. Austria’s neutral policy comprised neither re-
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strictions against criticizing the Soviet Union or joining West European integration 
nor obligations to struggle against Western blocs or to “actively” promote peace 
and international understanding. The restrictive definition of a neutral’s duties and 
the “passivity” of Austria’s neutral policy were criticized by Soviet scholars as 
disregarding “the new character” of neutrality and limiting it to an alliance-free sta-
tus.180 Making Austria more neutral in the Soviet sense was therefore a paramount 
goal of Soviet policy, which sometimes even referred to Finland as a model for 
Austria.181 As we have seen, Soviet statements produced their own catalog of the 
neutrals’ obligations ‒ a catalog that was much more demanding than the Western 
understanding, which, however, was quite poorly defined. Secondly, the same state-
ments strove to make the Soviet wish list legally binding. It seems to have been 
the Soviet intention to make the neutrals less “Western” by such means. These two 
tendencies made it almost impossible for a neutral to fulfill the Soviet agenda if 
remaining true to its own identity as a Western state. If a neutral, however, adhered 
to its pro-Western posture, conflicts concerning the Western and Soviet definitions 
of neutrality seemed unavoidable. 
The struggle for supremacy in defining the obligations of neutral Austria, and the 
Soviet attempts at molding the country’s practice of neutral policy stretched well 
into the 1970s and 80s. It permeated diplomatic conversations, official statements 
and media reports. In order to induce or reinforce Austrian behavior as desired by 
the Soviet leadership and to prevent or deter the Austrian government from taking 
steps that ran counter to Soviet intentions, the main themes of Soviet neutrality 
propaganda were exploited: the claim that the Soviet interpretation of neutrality was 
the correct one, the need for and benefits of this kind of neutrality, the Soviet-Aus-
trian “example of peaceful coexistence,” and the distant villains who strove to dis-
suade Austria from its correct, i.e. neutral, path. While the general Soviet narrative 
of neutrality underlined the moral qualities and material benefits of this status,182 its 
variant regarding Austria stressed that the country owed not only its good relations 
with the Kremlin, but also its economic recovery to its neutral status183 ‒ a recovery 
that hitherto has usually been attributed largely to US aid.184 Another characteristic 
of neutrality, claimed by Soviet propaganda, was a good relationship with the social-
 180 L. Vidyasova, “An Impressive Example of Peaceful Coexistence,” in International Affairs, no. 8 
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ist states. Whenever the Soviet side was interested in fostering East-West contacts, 
Austria was reminded of its alleged duty to maintain such relations.185 
Among the “enemies of neutrality,”186 Soviet propaganda identified the West-
ern powers, which were repeatedly accused of having hampered Austria’s wish for 
neutrality before 1955 and having continued to do so ever since; West Germany 
and some unidentified circles of Austrian pan-German industrialists plotting a new 
Anschluss; and, last but not least, Austrian Nazis and political organizations close 
to them, such as the Freedom Party (FPÖ). Indeed, neutrality raised the suspicion 
of many Western leaders, from John Foster Dulles to Konrad Adenauer and Paul 
Henri Spaak, who feared that the spread of neutralism in the West might undermine 
the consensus of the alliances they considered necessary to defend the West. And 
indeed, some groups and individuals in Austria were not convinced that neutrality 
was the correct path. However, in Soviet propaganda, these “enemies of neutral-
ity” served as voodoo dolls to denounce tendencies affecting the neutral’s political 
posture ‒ tendencies that were unwanted by the Soviet Union, such as Austria’s 
traditional mainstream allegiance to the West, the country’s close economic rela-
tions with West Germany, and, although an increasingly marginal phenomenon, 
pan-German or neo-Nazi sentiment.
Such Soviet statements aimed at either reinforcing or readjusting the Austrian 
practice of neutral policy. As we shall see, some of these Soviet demands fell on 
fertile ground: For Austria, which since the beginning of the Cold War had been 
isolated from its communist neighbors and shaken by East-West tension, perma-
nent neutrality ensured not only the withdrawal of foreign troops and the achieve-
ment of the country’s full sovereignty, but also opened opportunities for making 
relations with the East easier and for increasing the country’s security by raising 
its international profile.187 Therefore, Austria was highly interested in exercising its 
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neutral policy as actively as possible. However, while some of the Soviet wishes 
regarding neutrality dovetailed with Austria’s ambitions, some of the differences 
led to sharp disagreement.
2.  The Post-State Treaty Honeymoon
The Khrushchev years were a rough period in international affairs. Probably the 
“last true believer”1 in the global victory of communism in the Kremlin, the Soviet 
leader, while earthy and energetic, also somewhat unrefined and naïve, declared 
that the Soviet system would enable the USSR to “catch up and surpass” the United 
States within fifteen years.2 His condemnation of some of the excesses of Stalinism 
in a secret speech at the twentieth CPSU congress 1956 and the signs of a cautious 
“thaw” triggered a process that, over time, not only undermined the Soviet-Chinese 
alliance, but also the prestige of communism in his own state and, ultimately, the 
stability of the Soviet empire.3 While Khrushchev’s reconciliation with Tito, his 
visit to Yugoslavia in May and June 1955, and the signs of superpower détente had 
fostered hopes for a certain relaxation in the Soviet reign over Eastern Europe, the 
suppression of unrest in the Baltics and in Ukraine, and the crushing of the Hungar-
ian people’s uprising signaled the limits of this liberalization.
From 1957 Khrushchev’s foreign policy, although at times attenuated in the 
CPSU Presidium (the Politburo) by Anastas Mikoian, was executed loyally and 
with “doglike devotion”4 by Andrei Gromyko, a technocrat who allegedly “played 
his cards so close to his chest that he paused carefully before answering a West-
ern diplomat who asked him if he had had a good breakfast with a noncommit-
tal ‘perhaps.’”5 He had been molded in Stalin’s apparatus and was, very much 
like Prince Gorchakov’s famous self-description, “a sponge in the hand of [his] 
master.”6 After Molotov’s ouster and the Shepilov intermezzo, Gromyko served as 
foreign minister until he was retired by Gorbachev in 1985 to the ceremonial rank 
of head of state. 
 1 Mastny, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953–1962,” 317–318.
 2 Nikita S. Khrushchev, “The Task of Surpassing the U.S.A.,” [1957], in Robert A. Goldwin, Gerald 
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Khrushchev had left his international debut, the 1955 Geneva summit, “without 
any agreements, yet with big sighs of relief”7 that no gaffe had been committed and 
that the US president was at least as afraid of nuclear war as the Soviet leadership. 
Some weeks later, Khrushchev received the West German chancellor Konrad Ade-
nauer, who had, in Soviet propaganda, hitherto ranked as the right hand man of the 
devil, and a lively exchange of visits between Western and Soviet politicians was 
begun. Due to the Soviet leader’s explosive temper, most of these occasions, such 
as Khrushchev’s visits to Britain, the United States and France and the abortive 
Paris and Vienna summits, however, turned into platforms for ideological bickering 
and “verbal sparring.”8 
In the meantime, the “thaw” was overshadowed by a chain of crises. They 
were, if not created, at least aggravated by Khrushchev’s “surprising ignorance”9 
of legal issues and his recklessness. Some historians claim that Khrushchev was 
determined to reach a lasting détente and did not grasp that his crisis mongering 
was not conducive for attaining such an objective.10 Others state that ‒ despite the 
momentous effect of Soviet thermonuclear tests, the launching of Sputnik in 1957, 
and Iurii Gagarin’s 1961 space flight on US insecurity and Soviet confidence11 ‒ 
Khrushchev remained aware of US power superiority. In order to cover up this 
disadvantage, the Soviet leader resorted to brinkmanship, risky provocations, and 
a “hot-cold therapy” of “peace initiatives” and nuclear intimidation designed to 
increase the USSR’s leverage and demoralize its opponents.12 The Suez crisis 
misled Khrushchev to believe that his nuclear threat against Britain and France 
had convinced the two countries to retreat. The Soviet leader was prepared to re-
peat his bluff several more times, in particular during the Berlin crisis, which he 
staged, in his own words, in order to grab the West “at its balls.”13 In the follow-
ing years, most West European NATO states were, on various occasions, threat-
ened by the USSR with nuclear annihilation. By bluffing with still-nonexistent 
Soviet missiles, Khrushchev, however, fanned the arms race. In the meantime, 
the USSR embarked on a massive nuclear build-up: In March 1955, two months 
before the signing of the state treaty, Khrushchev approved the secret deployment 
of medium-range ballistic missiles in border regions of the USSR, in Bulgaria and 
 7 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 107. On the Geneva summit, cf. Bischof, Dockrill, Cold War Respite. 
 8 Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy, 239. 
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the GDR;14 in 1959 the first Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile was success-
fully launched, and in 1962 the stationing of Soviet missiles in Cuba brought the 
world to the brink of nuclear war.
The establishment of friendly relations
In Soviet-Austrian relations, the first five years after the conclusion of the state trea-
ty were a formative period. Both sides had to get accustomed to their new roles, to 
find their own positions and, without falling back into the behavior of the postwar 
decade, take steps to establish a lucid relationship. For the Austrian side, normaliz-
ing relations with the Soviet Union was not only an unwritten obligation stemming 
from the state treaty, as so aptly observed by international-law expert Hanspeter 
Neuhold,15 but a question of survival. While international relations between the 
superpowers after Stalin’s death, with all good intentions to avoid nuclear war and 
to secure a lasting settlement, were still dominated by the residual dynamics of the 
early Cold War, caution and mutual distrust,16 a small neutral located at the edge 
of the Soviet bloc could not afford to be so cautious. For Austria, there was no 
alternative to making compromises: Before 1955, the country had been too weak 
to be an independent player, and with the Soviet military presence, there had been 
no chance of becoming exclusively a client of the United States or of joining other 
West European states in their integration efforts. Neutrality was therefore consid-
ered the only solution and an acceptable price for getting the “Russian occupation” 
out of eastern Austria. Once this goal was achieved, Austria, which continued to 
have good relations with the other three signatories of the state treaty, had to estab-
lish a modus vivendi with the superpower in the East. 
From the Soviet side, which portrayed itself as the main architect and patron of 
Austria’s independence and neutrality, relations to Austria were designed and pre-
sented as an “example,” or even “model,” for “peaceful coexistence.”17 In Soviet 
understanding, the Austrian state treaty and its constitutional law on neutrality of 
4 November 1955 “established the real preconditions for the peaceful coexistence 
of the USSR and Austria.”18 On 6 December 1955 the Soviet Union officially rec-
ognized Austria’s declaration of neutrality. Some divergences between the Soviet 
and Austrian interpretations of neutrality would soon and, thereafter, repeatedly 
lead to conflict. However, as long as the Soviet Union was interested in promoting 
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neutrality, “peaceful coexistence” and détente, and in using Austria as its living 
example, the Kremlin had to refrain from voicing its critique too sharply and from 
publicly damaging its relations to its own “creation” and that creation’s prestige. 
Soviet-Austrian relations were therefore presented by the Kremlin not only as posi-
tive example for “peaceful coexistence,” but, as stated on countless occasions, even 
as a model thereof. At the twentieth congress of the CPSU in 1956, in the report 
on the Soviet foreign policy tasks, the “strengthening of the amicable relations to 
Finland, Austria, and other neutral countries” was named right after “strengthening 
the fraternal relations to the people’s democracies” and the amicable relations to 
the nonaligned.19
From the first moment after the successful conclusion of the Soviet-Austrian 
state treaty negotiations of April 1955, the recently established friendly bilateral 
relations as well as the reliability and farsightedness of the Austrian politicians 
were demonstratively praised, and this repeatedly, by Soviet leaders and media. 
At the official dinner during his visit to Yugoslavia in May, Khrushchev received 
the Austrian ambassador to express his satisfaction about the signing of the state 
treaty and stated that “the relations between the Soviet Union and Austria are very 
good today and will, I hope, become even better in the future.”20 At the farewell 
ceremony for the Austrian delegation at the Moscow airport on 15 April, Molotov 
had shared with the Swedish ambassador that the Austrians seemed to be satisfied 
with the outcome of the negotiations; however, “we,” Molotov emphasized, “are 
very satisfied.”21 During an official reception for the Yugoslav national holiday, in 
the presence of several diplomats, the usually laconic foreign minister made “the 
most pleasant compliments” concerning the abilities of Chancellor Raab,22 and at a 
reception held during the visit of Khrushchev, Mikoian, and Bulganin to Bulgaria, 
the Austrian ambassador in Sofia was reportedly the only diplomatic representa-
tive with whom all three Soviet leaders spoke extensively ‒ a distinction that “did 
not pass unnoticed” by the diplomatic corps. The honor was even higher when 
Khrushchev publicly characterized the Austrian chancellor an “extremely sympa-
thetic man” and Mikoian also “found warm words about him.”23 Similar statements 
were made in later years, as for instance in 1958, when Khrushchev, during another 
reception for the diplomatic corps in Moscow, pointed at the Austrian ambassador 
and declared publicly: “This is Austria, a capitalist country. Its chancellor is also 
 19 Chruschtschow, Rechenschaftsbericht an den XX. Parteitag 14. Februar 1956, 51. 
 20 Austrian embassy Belgrade to Austrian MFA, 31 May 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 322.691–
pol/55, Z. 322.691–pol/55.
 21 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 18 April 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 321.412–
pol/55, Z. 312.593–pol/55. Emphasis mine. 
 22 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 29 November 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 
322.691–pol/55, Z. 326.422–pol/55.
 23 Austrian embassy Sofia to Austrian MFA, 4 June 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 323.080–
pol/55, Z. 323.076–pol/55. 
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a capitalist, but a very decent one whom we communists hold in high regard. We 
remember his visit to Moscow with joy. Please send him my cordial regards.”24 
Such friendliness was after a certain goal. By lauding the state treaty and Austria’s 
neutrality and leaders, Moscow was not only depicting Soviet-Austrian relations as 
a positive result of Soviet statecraft. Raising Austria’s profile on the international 
scene was also a means of promoting neutrality in the West.
The personal relationships between the leaders of different states are, for the 
most part, difficult to evaluate. In the case of Khrushchev and Raab, the successful 
conclusion of the Moscow negotiations in April 1955 seems to have contributed 
to mutual sympathy. Due to his lack of foreign experience, which he covered with 
boasting, bluff and bluster, the Soviet leader concentrated on personal trust rather 
than political issues in his relationships with foreign politicians,25 and it is likely 
that in 1955 he was looking for a Western leader with whom he would be able 
to “do business,” as Margaret Thatcher thirty years later famously described her 
impression after Gorbachev’s first visit to Britain.26 Since the Austrian chancellor 
Raab was the first Western politician Khrushchev negotiated with (and this suc-
cessfully), the Soviet leader may have developed an emotional bond to the “little 
capitalist,” as Raab had described himself during the talks. In a typically totalitarian 
fashion, Raab was elevated by Soviet media and his political contenders were at-
tacked by Khrushchev. This was very similar to the Soviet treatment of the Finnish 
long-time president Kekkonen, who was personally depicted in Soviet statements 
as a guarantor for his country’s neutrality and friendship with the USSR; accord-
ing to Khrushchev: “Whoever is for Kekkonen is for friendship with the USSR; 
whoever is against him, is against friendship with the USSR.”27 Mikoian, who was 
familiar with Austrian affairs, even spoke of a “Raab Line”28 ‒ a reminder of Fin-
land’s famous “Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line.” But while after Khrushchev’s ouster 
Kekkonen managed to establish a similar cordial relationship with Kosygin, Aus-
trian leaders failed to do so. 
The new Soviet attitude was underlined by a sudden shift in the image of Austria 
as depicted in the media. As in many other totalitarian regimes, the Kremlin used its 
media not only as a means of creating images of external enemies to legitimize its 
own rule, but also as a means of communicating approval and displeasure about the 
current ongoings in the world. Whereas the Alpine country had until then been pri-
 24 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 28074, 11 November 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, AVA, NL 
E/1770: Bischoff, File 108.
 25 On Khrushchev’s bargaining style in the domestic struggle for power and in the Cuban and Berlin 
crises, cf. James M. Goldgeier, Leadership Style and Soviet Foreign Policy: Stalin, Khrushchev, 
Brezhnev, Gorbachev (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 21–25, 52–74.
 26 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 77.
 27 Quoted in Max Jacobson, Finnland im neuen Europa (Berlin: Arno Spitz, 1999), 66, 69.
 28 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 19 May 1959, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. 
Berichte Moskau. 
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marily portrayed as a shelter for Nazism, a breeding ground of anti-Soviet conspira-
cies, and a country where the working masses were vegetating in poverty and being 
betrayed by corrupt leaders, this changed abruptly following the Soviet-Austrian 
negotiations of April 1955. Chancellor Raab underwent a remarkable metamorpho-
sis from a “fascist Heimwehrführer” to a “statesman of great wisdom.”29 Although 
the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ), despite its insignificance, was still granted a 
disproportionately large amount of attention by the Soviet media (a tactic that was 
undoubtedly conceived to convince Soviet readers of its “leading role,” thus sup-
porting the claim for a similar role of communist parties in the East), the Austrian 
communists’ opponents ceased to be depicted indiscriminately as villains, fascists, 
and traitors. In addition to communicating Soviet approval or displeasure about cur-
rent Austrian actions, Soviet media reports about Austria generally focused on two 
other themes: praise for neutrality and for Austria’s growing national conscious-
ness, both preconditions for the country to remain independent from Germany;30 
and warnings against “enemies of neutrality,” in particular neo-Nazis in Austria, 
combined with criticism of the lax Austrian attitude in this regard.31 Mostly de-
signed for Soviet readers, the media contained regular “invidious reports”32 about 
Austria’s social, political and economic system, about the allegedly catastrophic 
situation of workers, or about the country’s “tricky electoral system that has noth-
ing to do with democracy.”33 
Some Soviet officials were well aware of the fallacy of such depictions. During 
a discussion in the CPSU apparatus, Sergei Lapin, in the 1950s Soviet ambassador 
to Vienna and then director of the Soviet news agency TASS, stated: “The pension-
ers’ fate in our country is not easy. I have been living in Austria. There, the people 
can’t wait to retire. They have a lot of time for leisure, go to cafés and bars. We 
only have factory clubs. Coffee is usually for young people and other purposes…”34 
Nonetheless, such claims seem to have been deemed necessary by propagandists 
 29 Quoted in Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 49, 152. Although the KPÖ after 1959 never 
again garnered the percentage necessary to be represented in the Austrian parliament, its leader 
was more often mentioned than the Austrian head of government. 
 30 See, e.g., Ilja Konstantinowski, “Österreichische Impressionen,” in Neue Zeit, no. 26 (1966), 
29–32; and “Eine vernünftige Politik,” in Neue Zeit, no. 44 (1968), 2–3.
 31 Pravda, 16 January 1962; “Gute Aussichten,” in Neue Zeit, no. 48 (1966), 3–4.
 32 Eiselsberg to Kreisky, 25 September 1959, with report Hinteregger, Die Situation der österreichi-
schen Arbeiterschaft in sowjetischer Sicht, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau. 
The report referred to O.V. Sal’kovskii, Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie rabochego klassa Avstrii 
posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Sotsekgiz, 1958).
 33 Dmitri Motschalin, “Österreich nach den Wahlen,” in Neue Zeit, no. 12 (1966), 23–24.
 34 Zapis’ soveshchaniia po voprosu doklada TsK KPSS, 3 February 1971, in Sergei Kudriashov 
(ed.), General’nyi sekretar’ L.I. Brezhnev 1964–1982, Vestnik Archiva Prezidenta: Spetsial’noe 
izdanie (Moscow: Vestnik Archiva Prezidenta, 2006), 96–113, 101. For a short biography of La-
pin, who after his term as ambassador to Austria from 1956–60, served as deputy foreign minister 
1962–65 and as a general director of TASS 1967–70, see ibid., 232.
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to support Soviet contentions regarding the superiority of the social system in the 
USSR and to underline the thesis that workers in capitalist countries were poor 
and deprived of their rights. Despite such distortions, it seems that over the years 
the image of Austria that emerged among Soviet citizens was that of a Western-
oriented country which was nevertheless progressive and friendly.35 
Even in Soviet literature, which had hitherto used the dark image of a crisis-
ridden, hungry and corrupt postwar Vienna as a foil for memoirs and novels,36 the 
Austrian image brightened and gave way to the idyllic and light clichés of waltzes, 
Vienna Woods, pretty girls and plucky workers, stereotypes that had been spread in 
the interwar period by Il’ia Erenburg’s report about the social democratic Schutz-
bund’s uprising or by the US movie “Great Waltz,” which became popular in the 
USSR.37 However, these stereotypes were moderated, to a certain extent, by some 
critical undertones, such as Austrians allegedly having an inherent retrospective-
ness, melancholy and nonchalance that prevented them from confronting clan-
destine neo-Nazis or turning the Austrian labor movement into something more 
Soviet-like.38 
Almost immediately after the visit of the Austrian governmental delegation to 
Moscow in the spring of 1955, direct bilateral links at all levels were intensified. 
Any vestiges of the war and Austria’s postwar status were eliminated. Prisoners-of-
war and some expatriates were repatriated ‒ a process that took several more years 
‒ although some Austrian prisoners of Soviet labor camps or other persons willing 
to return never made it back to their homeland.39 
During the postwar decade, due to the Cold War, the Soviet obsession with 
secrecy, and the Austrian anti-communist boycott, Soviet-Austrian exchanges of 
delegations in the cultural, scientific, and political spheres or between trade union-
ists had been limited for the most part to pro-communist propaganda activities.40 
This now changed, a change that reflected the interests of both sides. The Soviet 
leaders were eager to leave their isolation and, by hosting guests from a Western 
country and sending delegations abroad, to demonstrate that their country was not 
the backward and ugly prison it had seemed under Stalin. Since this exchange first 
took place with a neutral, it was expected to raise the prestige of neutrality in the 
 35 Walter Wodak, Diplomatie zwischen Ost und West (Graz: Styria, 1976), 104. 
 36 See, e.g. A. V. Sofronov, Zarubezhnye vstrechi (Moscow: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1952); G. Savenok, 
Venskie vstrechi (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1961). 
 37 Victor Erlich, Modernism and Revolution: Russian Literature in Transition (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1994), 252; Julia Köstenberger, “The Great Waltz/Bol’shoi Val’s,” in 
Karin Moser (ed.), Besetzte Bilder: Film, Kultur und Propaganda in Österreich 1945–1955 (Vi-
enna: Filmarchiv Austria, 2005), 303–322. 
 38 Reitinger, “Österreich in den Augen der Sowjetliteratur nach 1945,” 13, 162–174.
 39 Moskau, July 1958, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 1; and Information, 20 June 1962, Zl. 
231.387-12/62, ibid., File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962. 
 40 Mueller and Leidinger, “Tiefes Misstrauen – begrenztes Interesse: Die österreichisch-sowjeti-
schen Beziehungen 1918 bis 1955,” 105–107.
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West. For Austrian leaders, as well as for leaders from other small and, in particular, 
neutral states, it was important on one hand to better understand what the Soviet 
Union expected from them and, on the other hand, to communicate as thoroughly 
as possible what they were willing to fulfill. 
Soon after the last Soviet soldier had left Austria, a delegation of Austrian jour-
nalists traveled to Russia in October 1955; in December a group of parliamentari-
ans followed suit, responding to a Soviet invitation that had been expressed already 
the previous February.41 The invitation had been addressed to all parliaments in 
countries with whom the USSR had diplomatic contacts, in order to break the So-
viet isolation. It was accepted, by the end of 1957, by thirty-one delegations.42 The 
Austrian visit was returned by members of the Supreme Soviet in June 1956,43 im-
mediately after the Leningrad Symphony Orchestra had finished a much acclaimed 
concert tour through Austria. In the months before, pianist Emil Gilel’s and violin-
ist Igor Oistrakh had been celebrated in Vienna’s largest concert hall, and Austrian 
opera singer Wilma Lipp had made several appearances in the USSR. Bilateral 
travel was made easier, at least theoretically, with the creation of a regular and di-
rect train connection between Vienna and Moscow in June 1956.44 
The establishment of friendly relations seemed to be the materialization of the 
dreams of Austria’s ambassador Norbert (von) Bischoff, who had been accredited as 
a diplomatic representative in Moscow since December 1946.45 A former nobleman 
and leftist-bourgeois enthusiast for everything Russian and Soviet, who because of 
his appearance was repeatedly mistaken for the French socialist Léon Blum,46 he 
had, before 1955, often criticized Austria’s policy as being anti-Soviet. Bischoff 
saw the Cold War and the division of Europe as being solely a result of Western pol-
icy, “even though the Soviet Union has contributed to paving the way.”47 Contem-
poraries and Austrian fellow-diplomats thought he tended to adopt the viewpoints 
 41 Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia, 35; Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 3 December 1955, 
in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 319.852–pol/55, Z. 326.606–pol/55. 
 42 Gromyko and Ponomarjow, Geschichte der sowjetischen Außenpolitik 1945 bis 1976, 270.
 43 ÖStA, AdR, BMAA GZ. 511.246–pol/56, Z. 517.301–pol/56.
 44 Lobova, “Die Moskauer Perzeption,” 151. 
 45 Oliver Rathkolb, “Der Wiederbeginn der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und 
der Sowjetunion 1945–1947 zwischen Kaltem Krieg und österreichischer Innenpolitik,” in Mit-
teilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 50 (2003), 157–166, 163. For a short biography of 
Bischoff, see Rudolf Agstner, Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, and Michaela Follner, Österreichs Spit-
zendiplomaten zwischen Kaiser und Kreisky: Biographisches Handbuch des Höheren Auswärti-
gen Dienstes 1918 bis 1959 (Vienna: Dokumentationsarchiv des österreichischen Widerstandes, 
2009), 133–135.
 46 Andrej Gromyko, Erinnerungen (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1989), 265. This passage is missing in the 
English edition. 
 47 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 7 June 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ., Z. 
515.753–pol/56. In 1959, Bischoff claimed that the West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
had “set a disastrous course towards the division of Germany.” Bischoff to Figl, 9 May 1959, in 
ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau. 
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of his host country48 and even that he had pro-communist leanings. The ambas-
sador’s adoption of Soviet propaganda theses, his uncritical stance towards Soviet 
policy, and his anti-Western bias ‒ all aspects that were probably reinforced by his 
twelve-year tenure in Stalinist Moscow ‒ were mirrored in his reports to the For-
eign Ministry. Carried away by propaganda slogans and (falsified) statistical data 
that he collected,49 Bischoff described the USSR and its sphere of power as “a sin-
gle zone of peace […] from which the Asian and African peoples can be hindered 
from joining only […] by the use of force”; the seven-year plan, in his eyes, would 
bring about the “liquidation of poverty” in the Soviet sphere.50 Bischoff, whose 
reports often contained communist propaganda terms such as “Westdeutscher 
Wehrmachtsminister,”51 had in Stalin’s time already sounded so pro-Soviet that his 
Austrian colleagues ironically expected him, too, to be “purged” when Khrushchev 
expelled the Stalinists from the Soviet leadership in 1957.52 When the ambassador, 
obediently following the twists of official Soviet ideology, sent a report on Khrush-
chev’s denunciation of the “gruesome past” and of Stalin’s “Caesarian delusions of 
grandeur” after the twentieth CPSU congress to the Foreign Ministry on Vienna’s 
Ballhausplatz, one of Bischoff’s colleagues maliciously scribbled on the margin of 
the page: “If anybody had dared to talk to Bischoff like that two years ago…!”53 
Indeed, some years earlier, Bischoff had argued that Stalin’s terror, although kill-
ing hundreds of thousands of innocent people, had nonetheless “unmasked a fifth 
column” and thus strengthened the country on the eve of Hitler’s aggression.54 With 
Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, the Austrian ambassador, who died in 1960 shortly 
after leaving Moscow, considered the threat of dictatorship banned forever and the 
Soviet Union a respected constitutional state.55 His naiveté about not only Soviet 
political intentions but also practices was well known in Vienna, and there were 
 48 Fritz Molden, Besetzer, Toren, Biedermänner: Ein Bericht aus Österreich, 1945–1962 (Vienna: 
Molden, 1980), 50; Eiselsberg, Erlebte Geschichte, 201. For a detailed account of Bischoff’s view 
of the world, see Paul Ullmann, “Das Russlandbild der österreichischen Diplomatie in den ersten 
drei Jahrzehnten nach dem Ende des 2. Weltkrieges” (unpublished paper, Vienna, n.d.). Ullmann 
argues that Bischoff was impressed by the collectivist and authoritarian ideas of the 1920s and 
30s, and, therefore, attracted by the USSR. Ibid., 43. A copy of this paper was given by DDr. Ull-
mann to the author of this book. 
 49 ÖStA, AdR, AVA, NL E/1770: Bischoff, Files 104–105. On Bischoff’s views, cf. Matthias Pape, 
Ungleiche Brüder: Österreich und Deutschland 1945–1965 (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000), 253–258.
 50 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 January 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 
319.130–pol/55.
 51 Bischoff to Austrian MFA, 28017, 2 February 1957, ÖStA, AdR, AVA, NL E/1770: Bischoff, File 
108.
 52 Grubmayr, “In zwei Wochen gehst Du nach Moskau,” 138. 
 53 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 10 March 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 
511.069–pol/56, Z. 512.813–pol/56. 
 54 Ullmann, “Das Russlandbild,” 15.
 55 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 April 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 544.606–
pol/58, Z. 547.895–pol/58; 6 March 1959, ibid., BMAA, GZ. 236.076–pol/59, Z. 239.921–pol/59.
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rumors among Austrian diplomats that he sent his secret telegrams, open, with his 
Russian housemaid to the cipher service.56 The publication of his memoirs was, due 
to its containing official secrets and its pro-Soviet bias, suppressed by the Ballhaus-
platz.57 Already in 1946, Bischoff had been informed by the foreign minister that 
the ambassador’s assessment of Soviet policy did not reflect the official Austrian 
line.58 Nonetheless, Bischoff, who in a memorandum in the fall of 1955 pleaded for 
Austria actively engaging in a dialog with Eastern Europe, seems to have had some 
influence on Raab’s understanding of neutrality.59 In contrast to his assessment by 
the Soviet and Austrian sides during his lifetime, Bischoff’s “progressiveness” and 
“loyalty” was, after his death, acknowledged by Soviet diplomats.60
Frictions
It is clear that the friendly Soviet-Austrian atmosphere, established with the ne-
gotiation and conclusion of the state treaty, did not mean, however, that no prob-
lems arose in the bilateral relations. Frictions resulted from the differing Soviet 
and Viennese interpretations of Austrian neutrality with regard to, for example, in-
ternational communist organizations. Soviet officials complained that Austria had 
refused visas to Soviet functionaries of such organizations. However, the reproach 
was parried by Bischoff with the argument that the Austrian refusal concerned only 
ten of more than six hundred applications, and that the USSR certainly was also 
not willing to grant visa to Austrians if they declared their intention of traveling to 
Moscow to anti-communist gatherings.61 When the headquarters of the communist 
World Federation of Trade Unions was officially expelled from Vienna in early 
1956, the city’s communist press, seconded on 8 February by Pravda, accused the 
Austrian government of violating neutrality.62  A year later, the communist World 
Peace Council was also banned from Austria, and the move was harshly criticized 
by Izvestiia on 5 February 1957 and Pravda four days later. 
A second stumbling block was Austria’s external neutrality, i.e. the maintenance 
of neutrality regarding foreign military alliances. Since the late 1940s, Austria had 
become accustomed to Western troop transports passing through Tyrol between 
West Germany and Italy. While this had not, prior to 1955, violated any Austrian 
 56 Grubmayr, “In zwei Wochen gehst Du nach Moskau,” 134.
 57 [Gutachten Verosta, 21 January 1959,] in Österreichisches Institut für Zeitgeschichte (hereafter: 
ÖIZG), NL 72 Fuchs, DO 842, File 111. Cf. Hinteregger, Im Auftrag Österreichs, 41.
 58 Ullmann, “Das Russlandbild,” 6.
 59 Manfried Rauchensteiner, Die Zwei: Die Große Koalition in Österreich 1945–1966 (Vienna: Bun-
desverlag, 1987), 320–322.
 60 Dölling to Ulbricht with Amtsvermerk, 12 July 1960, in Bundesarchiv Berlin, Stiftung Archiv der 
Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (hereafter: SAPMO), NY 4182/1320, 8–10. I am 
grateful to Mag. Maximilian Graf for granting me access to his copy of this document.
 61 ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 322.691–pol/55, Z. 325.503–pol/55.
 62 Merhaut-Gurevitsch, “Die Innen- und Außenpolitik Österreichs,” 76–81. 
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obligations, after its declaration of neutrality, the problem was trickier: In peace-
time such transports could be allowed, in wartime not. But since Austria, on one 
hand, had learned to perceive the United States as a trusted friend and protector, and 
on the other, did not have the means to prohibit flyover troop transports, the neu-
tral country continued to tolerate such actions and was, indeed, rather generous in 
permitting the US air force to use its airspace. Foreign Minister Leopold Figl asked 
US Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in 1956 only to make sure that the flights 
would be undertaken at high altitudes and under weather conditions that would not 
enable the flights to be monitored from the ground.63 Military personnel traveling 
overland had to be in civil clothing.64 However, the Soviet Union was not a watch-
dog to let such shenanigans pass unnoticed. On 22 February 1956, Izvestiia accused 
NATO of violating Austrian neutrality by transferring troops between Germany and 
Italy through Austria,65 and on 20 March, Pravda charged Austria with letting US 
organizations use its territory for covert activities and ignoring its obligations as a 
neutral country. 
A few weeks later, Soviet criticism eased. The transports were over, and Mos-
cow could only hope that the neutral had learned its lesson. In April, Pravda stated 
that Austria’s neutrality constituted a major setback for NATO, and it was for this 
reason that the Atlantic bloc was trying to undermine it. Despite such attempts, the 
relations between Austria and the “people’s democracies” would continue to de-
velop positively, as diagnosed by the CPSU organ and the May issue of the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry’s periodical Mezhdunarodnaia zhisn’. The “true Austrian patri-
ots,” the Soviet press stated, would resist all temptations to give up neutrality. 
Soviet-Austrian relations were not even strained by the Austrian failure to ob-
tain the international guarantee for its territorial integrity that had been conceived 
by Austrian diplomacy and foreseen in the Moscow memorandum.66 Despite So-
viet reminders, such as those published on the occasion of the first anniversary of 
the memorandum’s conclusion, that Austria’s status should be guaranteed by the 
four powers, no progress was achieved. The Western powers, after two world wars 
in which guarantees for Belgium and Poland had not helped to prevent aggres-
sors from entering these countries, remained reluctant to guarantee the neutrality 
of Austria, a country that was considered by many a “military vacuum.”67 Since 
the risks of such a guarantee, such as reducing Austria’s own efforts to defend 
 63 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 184.
 64 Angebliche Verletzung der österr. Souveränität durch Amerika, 21 March 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, 
BMAA, GZ. 512.757–pol/56, Z. 512.786–pol/56.
 65 Malicek, “Die Beziehungen,” 53. 
 66  On the genesis of the idea see Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 354–356, 568–574.
 67 Rauchensteiner, Die Zwei, 324–330; quotation ibid., 329. Rauchensteiner, ibid., 514, points out 
that in 1955 Kreisky ‒ in contrast to his later depiction of the event ‒ supported the idea of ob-
taining a territorial guarantee issued by the four powers. Bruno Kreisky, Zwischen den Zeiten: 
Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten (Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1988), 469–470. 
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itself and opening a door for Soviet intervention, seemed to outweigh the benefits, 
British diplomats decided to “kill the project” through “masterly inactivity.”68 Af-
ter repeated attempts to receive the desired declaration, the Austrian government 
finally acquiesced and concluded that it was better to do without a guarantee, than 
letting all four powers claim the right to decide whether Austria’s neutrality had 
been violated or not. Despite such issues, Soviet-Austrian relations could generally 
be described as satisfactory, when they were exposed to their first serious test in the 
fall of 1956. As a consequence they cooled down noticeably, indeed to the “abso-
lute low point” since 1955.69
 68 Quoted in Michael Gehler, “‘to guarantee a country which was a military vacuum.’ Die West-
mächte und Österreichs territoriale Integrität 1955–1957,” in Manfried Rauchensteiner (ed.), Zwi-
schen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 89–134, 
109–116.
 69 Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 163. 
3.  …and Its Sudden End
The conclusion of the Austrian state treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops 
from Austria had not gone unnoticed in neighboring Hungary. Both events, which 
were connected to the Austrian declaration of neutrality, were widely welcomed in 
the socialist state and left a deep impression on its population and on some leaders. 
The fate of Austria undoubtedly inspired Hungarian hopes for freedom and neutral-
ity of its own. When, in connection with the unrest in Poland in the summer and au-
tumn of 1956, the Hungarian revolution started, Austria was affected in a number of 
ways. The Austrian population, media and political representatives expressed their 
solidarity with the Hungarian people; Austria became, at least temporarily, refuge 
for thousands of Hungarians; and last but not least, Austria, as the only capitalist 
neighbor state of Hungary, was chosen as one of the “natural” scapegoats in Soviet 
propaganda and blamed for tolerating the infiltration of Hungary by the “fascist 
groups” and “Western agents” that were allegedly responsible for the “reactionary 
counterrevolution.”1
The Hungarian revolution
On 24 October, TASS accused “reactionary underground organizations” and similar 
“foreign forces” with having inspired the Hungarian revolution. The night before, 
following the request of the Hungarian communist government, the first interven-
tion of Soviet troops in Hungary had started. Within days, thousands of Hungar-
ians fled their homeland to neighboring Austria. Both developments as well as the 
perceived threat that Austria might also fall victim to a Soviet intervention led to 
anxiety in the Austrian population, but also to a wave of solidarity with the Hungar-
 1 On the Hungarian revolution, see, e.g. Csaba Békés, Malcolm Byrne, János M. Rainer (eds.), The 
1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents (Budapest: Central European University 
Press, 2002). On Austria and the Hungarian revolution, see Andreas Gémes, Austria and the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution. Between Solidarity and Neutrality (Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2008); Johanna 
Granville, “Neutral Encounters of the Paranoid Kind: Austria’s Reactions to the Hungarian Crisis 
of 1956,” in Günter Bischof, Michael Gehler, and Anton Pelinka (eds.), Austrian Foreign Policy 
in Historical Context, Contemporary Austrian Studies 14 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2006), 
143–169; Ibolya Murber and Zoltán Fónagy (eds.), Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 
1956 (Vienna: Czernin, 2006); Erwin A. Schmidl (ed.), Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2003); Michael Gehler, “The Hungarian Crisis and Austria 1953–58: A Foiled 
Model Case?” in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak (eds.), Neutrality in Austria, 
Contemporary Austrian Studies 9 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001), 160–213. See also the 
journalist account in James A. Michener, The Bridge at Andau (New York: Random House, 1957).
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ian freedom fighters and the incoming refugees. On 28 October, shortly before the 
cease-fire in Hungary went into effect, the Austrian government publicly appealed 
to the Soviet Union “to contribute to a termination of the hostilities and bloodshed.” 
Although the memorandum underlined Austria’s neutrality, it also expressed the 
hope that “the restitution of freedom with regard to human rights would strengthen 
peace in Europe.”2 This unique and “courageous appeal”3 was even more remark-
able in light of the fact that the United States, until then, had only expressed its 
regret about the disaster, and had called for a meeting of the UN Security Council 
but refrained from publicly addressing the Soviet Union directly. The Austrian gov-
ernment was fully aware that its appeal would not be well received by the Soviet 
leadership. Nevertheless, Raab considered it necessary that “we have the guts to re-
fer to our special status and to say that we do not agree with these events or the use 
of tanks.”4 Such convictions were shared by other European neutrals as well. While 
the Swiss president Max Petitpierre regarded Austria’s response “admirable but 
not worth imitating,”5 in Zurich hundreds of students took to the streets in solidar-
ity with the Hungarian uprising and the prime minister of Sweden, Tage Erlander, 
cited the revolution as proof that “dictatorships, no matter how strong they may 
appear and how effective the may organize the surveillance and oppression of their 
citizens, bear nevertheless within themselves the seed of their own destruction.”6
The Austrian government and its mission in Budapest considered there to be 
no immediate danger of a Soviet invasion into Austria. Such an act, in fact, would 
have meant a failure of the Soviet policy vis-à-vis Austria. Nevertheless, the Aus-
trian army was put on alert. The Austrian-Hungarian border, which in the summer 
of 1956 had been cleared of Hungarian mines,7 was closed on 24 October, and the 
Bundesheer was ordered to disarm all people crossing it. While in October only 
a few Hungarian refugees fled to Austria, starting with 4 November after the sec-
ond Soviet intervention, a wave swept over the border. Help for refugees and the 
wounded was organized by the authorities; aid and medication was sent to Hungary 
by charitable organizations. The former noncommunist Hungarian prime minister, 
 2 Text in Heinrich Siegler, Österreichs Weg zu Souveränität, Neutralität, Prosperität (Bonn: Sieg-
ler, 1959), 111. Cf. Michael Gehler, Der lange Weg nach Europa: Österreich von Paneuropa bis 
zum EU-Beitritt: Darstellung (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2002), 165; Granville, “Neutral Encoun-
ters,” 145–146. 
 3 Rainer Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen. Das Verhalten Österreichs während des Ungarnauf-
standes 1956 and der tschechoslowakischen Krise 1968 (Vienna: Herold, 1981), 34. 
 4 Council of Ministers, Protocol 12a, 28 October 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP. 
 5 Quoted in Johanna Granville, “Of Spies, Refugees and Hostile Propaganda: How Austria Dealt 
with the Hungarian Crisis of 1956,” in History 91, no. 1 (2006), 62–90, 66. 
 6 Quoted in Molin, “Central Issues of Swedish Neutrality Policy,” 262. 
 7 Manfried Rauchensteiner, Spätherbst 1956: Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand (Vienna: Bundesver-
lag, 1981), 22. Cf. Erwin A. Schmidl, “Die österreichische Reaktion auf die Ereignisse in Ungarn 
1956 und der Einsatz des Bundesheeres an der ungarischen Grenze,” in Ibolya Murber and Zoltán 
Fónagy (eds.), Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956 (Vienna: Czernin, 2006), 93–115.
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Ferenc Nagy, who had lived in exile since 1947 and, during the uprising, had come 
to Austria, was asked to leave the country in order to prevent any cause for discus-
sion about the Austrian role and its efforts to help the refugees. 
No Soviet public statement concerning Austria was issued until 30 October, 
when Ambassador Bischoff was confronted in Moscow with charges that the upris-
ing had been orchestrated by Hungarian émigré organizations in Austria and West 
Germany with American support.8 On 1 November, after the Hungarian prime 
minister Imre Nagy had declared his country’s neutrality and the second Soviet 
intervention started, the Soviet delegate to the United Nations repeated these ac-
cusations.9 Pravda, Izvestiia, Radio Moscow and numerous other Soviet media ‒ 
referring to the Austrian communists’ Volksstimme, which since 27 October had 
fiercely attacked the Austrian government for supporting the “counterrevolution” 
‒ joined in and accused Austria of not observing neutrality carefully enough, help-
ing the insurgents and serving as a military base for them. The propaganda reported 
alleged US covert activities in Austria that supported Hungarian “fascist” fighters, 
ongoing flights between Austria and Hungary, and the smuggling of weapons and 
ammunition, secret service agents and saboteurs from Austria to Hungary.10 The 
Soviet effort to depict the Hungarian anti-communist revolution as the result of a 
plot organized by “fascist” and “reactionary” groupings based in Austria and sup-
ported by the United States was aimed at de-legitimizing the revolutionaries and 
legitimizing Soviet intervention. This policy, as assessed by the Austrian Foreign 
Service, was designed “to create, by incessantly repeating such claims, a legend 
that the events in Hungary had been orchestrated from abroad.”11 
Having become a scapegoat of Soviet propaganda tactics, the Austrian govern-
ment rejected all allegations. In a radio speech on 3 November, Raab stated that 
all Soviet accusations were invented “from A to Z,” and Figl filed an official pro-
test about the accusations with the Soviet ambassador. On 4 November, the issue 
of the Volksstimme which had printed the invented allegations was confiscated by 
the Austrian authorities. The military attachés of the four powers were invited to 
inspect the border zone, and the Hungarian government was assured that Austria 
would not tolerate any intrusion of émigrés into Hungary.12 Ambassador Bischoff in 
Moscow filed a protest with the Soviet Foreign Ministry. However, when he stated 
 8 Rauchensteiner, Spätherbst 1956, 52. 
 9 Békés, Byrne, Rainer, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution, 332; Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Gren-
zen, 45. 
 10 Renáta Szentesi, “Anschuldigungen gegen Österreich von Seiten der Sowjetunion und der KPÖ 
während der Ungarnkrise von 1956 anhand österreichischer Quellen,” in Ibolya Murber and 
Zoltán Fónagy (eds.), Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956 (Vienna: Czernin, 2006), 
243–282. 
 11 Besuch Mikojans, 17 April 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 215.864-pol/57, Z. 219.187-
pol/57.
 12 Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 42–43. 
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it would be better if the false accusations against Austria were terminated, Deputy 
Minister Valerian Zorin replied that it would be better if Austria’s “activities” were 
terminated.13 The Soviet deputy minister called upon Austria to carefully observe 
neutrality and stated that “any lack of foresight would be exploited by others in 
order to weaken neutrality.”14 
The Austrian position was strengthened by the United States’ declaration of con-
cern about Soviet troops near the Austrian border and by two statements made on 3 
and 6 November stating that any attempt to violate the territorial integrity and inner 
sovereignty of Austria would be considered a “grave threat to peace.”15 Although 
some Czechoslovakian and East German leaders and even the Soviet minister of 
defense, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, are said to have demanded the reoccupation 
of eastern Austria by Soviet troops,16 Soviet units, during most phases of the in-
tervention, stayed away from the Austrian border. When the border was violated, 
Raab called Soviet Ambassador Sergei Lapin to receive the Austrian protest.17 Two 
weeks later, two Soviet soldiers who had chased Hungarian refugees were caught 
on Austrian territory, and one, M.P. Lopatin, was shot to death when trying to flee. 
Four days later the Soviet embassy delivered a formal note of regret stating that the 
USSR was determined to respect Austrian territory.18 
With the second Soviet invasion, which reached Budapest on 4 November, 
claiming more than 3,000 lives and causing about 20,000 casualties, Austrian 
anger towards the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet Austrian Communist Party 
reached a still higher level. The Austrian press published drastic and critical re-
ports about the brutal crackdown on the uprising. In Vienna the police had to pro-
tect the Soviet army’s monument, erected in 1945 in the center of the city, from 
being attacked by angry demonstrators;19 communist party offices were stormed 
and destroyed by Austrian citizens.20 The dimensions of the Hungarian disaster and 
the flight of almost 200,000 refugees to neighboring Austria left a deep mark on 
the public consciousness. Most Austrians, who, as the Foreign Ministry later as-
 13 Iz dnevnika V. A. Zorina: Priem posla Avstrii, 3 November 1956, in RGANI, 89/45/21, 1. 
 14 Quoted in Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 164.
 15 Quoted in Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 44. 
 16 Manfried Rauchensteiner, “Sandkästen und Übungsräume: Operative Annahmen und Manöver 
des Bundesheeres 1955–1979,” in idem (ed.), Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt 
und Österreich (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 253–322, 258; Malicek, “Die Beziehungen,” 60.
 17 Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 50. 
 18 Glasneck, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich,” 92. 
 19 Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe, 42.
 20 Manfred Mugrauer, “Zwischen Erschütterung, neuer Offenheit und „Normalisierung“: Die KPÖ, 
der 20. Parteitag der KPdSU und die Ungarn-Krise 1956,” in Wolfgang Mueller and Michael Port-
mann (eds.), Osteuropa vom Weltkrieg zur Wende (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 2007), 257–298. See also A. S. Stykalin, “XX s”ezd KPSS: otkliki v Vengrii 
i Avstrii,” in G.G. Litavrin, T.V. Volokitina, and R.P. Grishina (eds.), 1956 god: Sbornik statei 
(Moscow: Institut Slavianovedeniia Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 2008), 220–235.
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sessed, felt historically “connected by countless bonds” to the Hungarian people, 
were thrown into “horror and shock” by the crushing of the revolution.21 Even 
the Soviet-friendly Bischoff claimed: “Never in history has anything similar taken 
place, and nobody should be surprised if such an unprecedented phenomenon has 
created psychological consequences, consequences that nobody regrets more than 
I, but which were, however, unavoidable.”22 The leadership of the Austrian-Soviet 
Friendship Society ÖSG (which had been established on Soviet initiative in May 
1945, and in the following years been systematically taken over by the Austrian 
communists) tried to justify the Soviet bloodshed in Hungary and declared that the 
society’s activities would not be touched by the events.23 This outraged its newly 
gained noncommunist members and the public in general, and led the society back 
to the isolation of the pro-Moscow communist ghetto it had left only a short time 
earlier. When State Secretary Franz Grubhofer of the conservative People’s Party, 
with an eye on the USSR, called for the introduction of a neutrality protection law 
that would oblige citizens and the media not to do things that might cause difficul-
ties in observing neutrality,24 he was forced, because of the fierce reactions, to drop 
his proposal. The Austrian Federation of Trade Unions appealed to its Soviet coun-
terpart to exert its influence on the actions in Hungary and to mediate. It called on 
Austrians for solidarity, collecting more that sixteen million schillings for aid, and 
organized a strike to protest the forceful oppression of the Hungarian resistance.25
On the international theater, Austria supported the UN resolution proposed by 
the United States on 4 November that demanded the Soviet army’s withdrawal, 
the formation of a Hungarian government reflecting the people’s will, the right of 
entry for UN observers, and organizing humanitarian help for the Hungarian peo-
ple. Austria thus made it clear that it was not adopting a neutralistic stance towards 
freedom and democracy.26 However, Austria also supported an Indian motion for 
cancelling all references to the political background of the Hungarian disaster in 
a US draft, but did not support an Italian resolution calling for free elections in 
Hungary. The latter abstention was ostensibly due to the lack of new elements in 
the document. However, the true reason seems to be that Austria did not consider 
the Italian draft acceptable to the Soviet Union and wanted to avoid further aliena-
tion of the USSR before bringing forward its own proposal.27 The Austrian draft, 
 21 Mikojan-Besuch, 9 March 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 215.864-pol/57, Z. 217.544-
pol/57.
 22 Bischoff to Austrian MFA, 21 February 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 215.033-pol/57, 
Z. 217.176-pol/57.
 23 Glasneck, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich,” 99. 
 24 Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität, 96–97.
 25 Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 71. 
 26 Wolfgang Strasser, Österreich und die Vereinten Nationen: Eine Bestandsaufnahme von 10 Jah-
ren Mitgliedschaft (Vienna: Braumüller, 1967), 88–89.
 27 Text in Archiv der Gegenwart, 6090, 9 November 1956. On UN aid for Hungary, see Georg Kast-
ner, “Hilfsaktionen der Vereinten Nationen für die Volksrepublik Ungarn,” in Ibolya Murber and 
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focusing exclusively on an initiative for humanitarian aid, did not touch on politi-
cal questions and won sixty-seven yes-votes with eight abstentions and no refusals 
‒ until then the highest level of support ever reached for a proposition in the UN 
General Assembly. The abstentions came mainly from the Soviet bloc, whereby 
Yugoslavia and even Poland voted in favor of the Austrian initiative. Concerning 
the NATO countries’ boycott of Soviet diplomatic representations in response to 
the violent Soviet crackdown in Hungary, the Austrian conduct was not consistent: 
whereas the Austrian ambassador in Rome did not show up at the Soviet embassy 
on the USSR state holiday, Bischoff visited the reception in the Kremlin.
In the meantime, however, the Soviet propaganda campaign against alleged 
Austrian toleration of American and Hungarian revolutionary activities on Aus-
trian soil did not cease. The attacks were even intensified; the number of Soviet 
newspaper articles concerning Austria published in 1956 almost reached the all-
time high of 1955, and was three times more than the annual average of the fol-
lowing years.28 After the crackdown on the uprising, the new pro-Soviet Hungar-
ian government joined in. Although covert American actions, such as the sending 
of propaganda balloons by Radio Free Europe over Austrian territory,29 could not 
be denied, it seemed clear that no Austrian official authorities were involved in 
such activities. Therefore, all allegations were rejected as unjustified by Raab in 
a radio speech on 11 November, in which the Austrian chancellor very bluntly 
criticized all oppressors of freedom and stated that “the domination over foreign 
nations and the oppression of free speech will never bring blessings.”30 Three 
days later and again in the December issues, the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s organ 
Mezhdunarodnaia zhisn’ and the Literaturnaia gazeta attacked Raab and stated 
that Austria had failed the first test of neutrality.31 In late November, the Soviet 
delegate to the United Nations and the Komsomolskaia pravda accused Austria 
and its embassy in Budapest of having provided handguns to the insurgents,32 and 
in Moscow, Defense Minister Zhukov charged the neutral with having allowed 
US military flights from Munich to Vienna.33 When Ambassador Bischoff inves-
tigated further details in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Gromyko appeared to be 
uninformed. 
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 31 Malicek, “Die Beziehungen,” 64–65. 
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In mid-December the propaganda concerning the neutral’s involvement in the 
uprising was scaled back;34 however, Izvestiia and Pravda continued to publish a 
series of communist horror stories about Austrian maltreatment of Hungarian refu-
gees, particularly about children been kept in Austria behind barbed wire and sold 
into slavery in the United States.35 The Austrian Foreign Service felt particularly 
indignant about the Soviet accusations.36 Bischoff tried to counteract by sending 
a copy of an official note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, in which the Hungarian 
government thanked Austria for its charitable activities,37 but the campaign did not 
cease before mid-February. The propaganda about alleged Austrian violations of 
neutrality seemed to be aimed at creating an external scapegoat for the uprising, 
destroying the attractiveness of neutrality for the East European peoples, and at 
warning the Austrian government and its citizens not to go too far in its solidarity 
with the Hungarian uprising. However, it soon became clear that the USSR was not 
interested in actually discrediting Austrian neutrality.
The recovery
It was noted that the Soviet leadership, even before the unfriendly agitation end-
ed, had begun to send out signals that it did not want Soviet-Austrian relations or 
Austria’s international reputation in the West to be damaged. When the Austrian 
ambassador visited the Soviet president to give condolences for the Soviet sol-
dier who had been shot on Austrian territory on 23 November, he noticed that “no 
critical words were said from the Soviet side concerning the implementation of 
our neutrality.”38 At a Kremlin reception in the honor of the Bulgarian delegation, 
Bulganin and Khrushchev, after criticizing Austria for allegedly letting “counter-
revolutionaries” enter Hungary, tacitly acquiesced with Bischoff’s reply that such 
foreign activists ‒ if they had existed at all ‒ were of no importance in comparison 
to the hundreds of thousands of Hungarian insurgents and refugees.39 At a similar 
event on 1 December, Khrushchev welcomed Bischoff with the words: “Greetings 
to the neutral Austria!” When the Romanian ambassador implicitly questioned the 
neutral’s impartiality, the Soviet leader openly assured the Austrian representative 
that his words had been meant sincerely and honestly.40 A few days later, Austrian-
 34 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 15 December 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. 
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 36 Mikojan-Besuch, 9 March 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 215.864-pol/57, Z. 217.544-
pol/57.
 37 Austrian embassy Moscow to Shepilov, 4 December 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. Berichte 
Moskau.
 38 Quoted in Szentesi, “Anschuldigungen gegen Österreich,” 253. 
 39 Bischoff to Austrian MFA, 21 February 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 215.033-pol/57, 
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Soviet negotiations concerning a delivery of 100,000 tons of Austrian oil to the 
USSR to be substituted with goods were concluded successfully.41 
Not even Chancellor Raab’s speech of 20 January 1957, which advocated the 
adoption of neutrality by Hungary, disrupted the upturn in the relations. Deputy 
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was in Vienna in January for Austrian 
president Theodor Körner’s funeral, is said to have ‒ unsuccessfully ‒ tried to press 
Raab to eliminate some passages.42 In a report of the Committee of Information of 
the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Raab’s speech is depicted as an indication of growing 
“tendencies in Austrian foreign policy, in response to the plans of the Western pow-
ers and the Vatican, to use Austria for detaching the people’s democracies from the 
socialist camp.”43 As further evidence for these plans, the report charged the Aus-
trian deputy foreign minister Kreisky with having offered Austrian loans to Poland 
in order that it “not become dependent upon the USSR” and the social democratic 
foreign policy expert Karl Czernetz with calling for “full independence of the East 
European states.” Although Raab’s proposal of neutrality for Hungary was later 
denounced as “unacceptable interference in Hungarian affairs” by the Soviet press, 
it seems not to have hindered the Soviet-Austrian détente.
Neither did Foreign Minister Dmitri Shepilov’s speech at the sixth session of 
the Supreme Soviet on 12 February 1957; it contained criticism of “certain ac-
tions of the Austrian government that hardly conform to Austria’s chosen status 
of neutrality,” such as “the use of Austrian territory by imperialistic forces during 
the counterrevolutionary plot against […] Hungary” or “the prohibition of inter-
national democratic organizations being seated in Austria.” However, the foreign 
minister also underlined that the USSR still “supported Austrian neutrality and in-
dependence” and was determined to “henceforth develop the amicable relations to 
this country.”44After the bilateral Soviet-Hungarian declaration of 28 March 1957, 
issued on the occasion of the new Hungarian communist leader János Kádár’s visit 
to Moscow, Austrian-Hungarian relations remained strained for some time.45 The 
communiqué repeated the accusations against the West in general and Austria in 
particular, accusations that were as well known as they were invented: According 
to the communiqué, “aggressive circles of the West” had overseen the “counter-
revolutionary putsch” of the previous fall and taken part in it; Austria had allowed 
 41 Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 51. 
 42 Rauchensteiner, Die Zwei, 352–353. For extracts from the speech, see Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 
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 43 Committee of Information to Suslov, Shepilov, Ponomarev, 27 February 1957, in RGANI, 
5/30/224, 49–52.
 44 Rede des sow. Außenministers, 16 February 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 215.014–pol/57, 
Z. 216.660–pol. 
 45 Andreas Gémes, “Austria and Hungary,” in Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), Peace-
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 ...and Its Sudden End 97
its territory to be used for activities “obviously hostile towards Hungary” ‒ a policy 
that was “hardly in accordance with neutrality as declared by Austria.”46 
Soviet-Austrian relations soon recovered. A symbol of this relaxation was the 
visit of Soviet leadership member Anastas Mikoian to Vienna from 23 to 27 April 
1957. With hindsight, it seems safe to claim that it was “not a coincidence,” as 
Russians might say, that the first visit of a Soviet statesman to the West (Finland 
excluded) after the violent crackdown on the Hungarian uprising went to Austria. 
Mikoian’s trip, which had been scheduled for November 1956 and postponed by 
the Kremlin47 at the height of the Hungarian crisis, became proof that the Soviet 
Union was interested not only in restoring Soviet-Austrian relations and receiving 
some assurance that Austria had learned its lesson, but also in showing its intention 
to improve East-West relations after the crises of 1956. Mikoian’s words carried 
even more weight since the Soviet envoy, after Molotov’s dismissal from the lead-
ership, functioned as number two of the party and as foreign-policy curator of its 
Presidium (the former Politburo). 
On the Austrian side, the Hungarian revolution and the Soviet campaign against 
the neutral scapegoat loomed large in the Foreign Ministry’s preparations for the 
visit. In Vienna, it was well understood that neither the Soviet nor the new Hungar-
ian government “wants to admit that the cause for the events in Hungary in the pre-
vious autumn lay within Hungary itself.”48 Nonetheless, rejecting the groundless 
Soviet accusations against Austria’s maintenance of neutrality was vital for keeping 
the country’s international status from becoming stained. 
In his conversations with the Austrian government, Mikoian, albeit in a very 
moderate tone, mentioned “forces struggling to dissuade Austria from observing 
neutrality and to disturb Austrian-Soviet relations”49 and the “strange parallelism” 
of Austrian statements in the fall of 1956 with statements by NATO members. Af-
ter expressing his appreciation of Austria’s adoption of neutrality in 1955 and un-
derlining that he did not want to interfere in Austrian affairs, Mikoian criticized 
“certain words and deeds of Austria in the last period” with which “we are not 
content,”50 particularly the promotion of the Austrian policeman who had shot a 
 46 Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart, 1 April 1957, 6363.
 47 In November 1956, the Austrian MFA dicussed the inappropriateness of Mikoian’s visit under 
the current conditions. A few days later, the USSR asked the visit to be postponed due to “lack of 
time” for preparations. A.A. Fursenko et al. (eds.), Prezidium TsK KPSS 1954–1964, 1 (Moscow: 
Rosspen, 2003), 970. After the death of the Austrian president Körner, the Kremlin offered to 
postpone Mikoian’s visit once more in order to avoid any collision with the election campaign. 
Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 March 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 
215.864–pol/57, Z. 217.823–pol/57.
 48 Besuch Mikojans, 17 April 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 215.864-pol/57, Z. 219.187-
pol/57.
 49 Quoted in Glasneck, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich,” 97–98.
 50 Besprechung im Bundeskanzleramt, 24 April 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 215.864–pol/57, 
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Soviet soldier on Austrian territory, and the ban of the World Federation of Trade 
Unions and the World Peace Council. By stating that “we cannot understand which 
interest Austria might have in meddling into Hungarian affairs,” he also implied 
that the neutral may have interfered in its neighbors’ politics. Nevertheless, he un-
derlined Soviet interest in Austrian neutrality, “because Austria’s role as a neutral 
state is more useful for peace than anything else.” When Raab complained about 
the propaganda attacks of the new Hungarian government against Austria, Mikoian 
encouraged Raab to re-establish friendly relations with Austria’s communist neigh-
bor states and even to contact the new Hungarian leaders (and thus, to help them 
out of their international isolation). 
The Austrian chancellor did not give in to Mikoian’s criticism and stated that 
Austria had never violated neutrality, that the country was interested in friendly 
relations with its neighbors and the USSR, and that it was not Austria who had 
erected the Iron Curtain. He also did not let Austria be instrumentalized for Soviet 
initiatives. When preparing for the Mikoian visit, the Austrian Foreign Ministry had 
emphasized that it would be necessary in the negotiations to stick to a “purely Aus-
trian” position, as “flattering” the Soviets would undermine Western trust in Aus-
tria.51 With this in mind, the Austrian delegation refused to include any reference 
to the Soviet proposal for an all-European security system in the communiqué.52 
On the bilateral level, Mikoian’s visit contributed to a noticeable warming in the 
relations. The Soviet leader expressed the interest in consolidating “all the good that 
has been reached in our relations” and in endeavoring “to overcome all obstacles 
and prejudices that hinder the friendship between the Soviet and Austrian people.” 
This did not mean, however, that he granted Austria its desired Soviet approval of 
a reduction in the Austrian oil deliveries stipulated by the state treaty53 (this “car-
rot” was held back by the Kremlin to get Raab to visit Moscow). Nevertheless, 
the “friendly relations” established in 1955 were, as stated in the joint communi-
qué, “again approved.” Both sides underlined the importance of the preservation 
of peace, of disarmament, and of Austria’s neutrality. In the communiqué, neither 
the Hungarian crisis nor Soviet-Austrian disagreements were mentioned. Only the 
reference to “open” talks hinted at Soviet disapproval of Austria.54 
The most important aspect of Mikoian’s visit to Vienna, however, was, as con-
temporary commentators from Poland to Italy and the United States agreed, that 
Austria had helped the Kremlin to leave the international isolation into which it 
 51 Mikojan-Besuch in Österreich, 9 March 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA GZ. 215.864–pol/57, Z. 
217.544–pol/57. 
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 53 The Austrian Foreign Ministry had considered it unlikely that the question would be solved during 
the visit. Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 March 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, 
GZ. 215.864–pol/57, Z. 217.823–pol. 
 54 Aus dem sowjetsch-österreichischen Kommuniqué, 28 April 1957, in UdSSR – Österreich, 105–
106. 
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had fallen after its brutal invasion of Hungary.55 In the words of the head of the 
Swiss Political Department, Fritz Gygax, “the visit of Mr. Mikoian to Vienna was 
one link in a chain of efforts to make the Soviet Union fit again for international 
society [wieder international hoffähig zu machen] after the events in Hungary, and 
to send some messages to the West from Vienna.” Austria, the diplomat stated, 
was chosen for this visit of “extraordinary importance” as a sounding board for 
these messages, in order “to demonstrate the good intentions and the good will of 
the USSR towards all European states that were keeping out of military blocs and 
nuclear armament.”56
Indeed, it soon became clear that Mikoian primarily used his stay in Vienna to 
“speak out of the window” to the West.57 The Soviet intention to invite not only 
Austria, but the West in general to a new start of détente was not to be misunder-
stood. “Everything,” Mikoian explained, even the crises in Egypt and Hungary, 
which could have been used to incite a world war, had “good effects”: now both 
the East and the West knew that the other side did not want war.58 This assessment 
was not to be underestimated, since some years earlier the Soviet Union, in the 
words of an Austrian official, had been convinced of the aggressive intentions of 
the United States. Mikoian’s second message was even more important. He ex-
pressed his optimism about the possibility of getting international disarmament, 
which had gotten stuck, moving again and of even coming to an agreement. The 
Soviet Union, Mikoian stressed, had unilaterally reduced its army by 1.8 million 
men, and it advocated a nuclear test stop and the destruction of all nuclear weap-
ons.59 He welcomed the Western decision to drop the Baruch Plan for a complete 
ban on nuclear weapons and advocated a nuclear-weapons free zone 800 kilometers 
east and west of the Elbe River (similar to the Rapacki Plan, which was launched in 
October by the Polish foreign minister60). However, any ideas of creating a “neutral 
belt” in Europe were discouraged by the Kremlin.61 Raab’s proposal for a neutral 
 55 Austrian embassy Warsaw to Austrian MFA, 24 May 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 215.864–
pol/57, Z. 220.913–pol.
 56 Austrian legation Bern to Austrian MFA, 8 May 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 215.864–
pol/57, Z. 220.117–pol.
 57 Schöner to Matsch, 30 April 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Z. 219.707–pol/57.
 58 Besprechung im Bundeskanzleramt, 24 April 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 215.864–pol/57, 
Z.222.278–pol. For the full protocol of the conversation, see pages 287–293.
 59 Ibid. On Khrushchev’s troop cuts, cf. Matthew Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army?” Khrush-
chev’s Troop Reductions, Cold War International History Project Working Paper 19 (Washington, 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1997), 4–5.
 60 On the Rapacki Plan, see Piotr Wandycz, “Adam Rapacki and the Search for European Security,” 
in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim (eds.), The Diplomats, 1939–1979 (Princeton: 
University Press, 1994), 289–317; and Wanda Jarczabek, Hope and Reality: Poland and the Con-
ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964–1989, Cold War International History Pro-
ject Working Paper 56 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2008), 4. 
 61 Schöner to Matsch, 30 April 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Z. 219.707–pol/57.
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Hungary was rejected and the uniqueness of Austria’s status underlined. When on 
10 May the Austrian Neue Tageszeitung claimed that Mikoian’s visit had showed 
that the USSR was ready to give up the GDR, the Soviet ambassador asked for an 
official correction.62
With Mikoian’s trip, which left a “generally favorable impression” in Austria,63 
the ice at the official bilateral level was broken. It must be noted, however, that it 
took much longer for the Soviet Union to regain acceptance among the general 
Austrian population after the bloodshed in Hungary. When the Viennese Eisrevue, 
an ice skating company that was later taken over by the United States’ Holiday on 
Ice, traveled to Moscow in April 1957, its members were fiercely attacked in the 
Austrian media as “traitors.” Similar reactions were published when the Austrian 
minister of justice followed a Soviet invitation to Moscow in July. The Austrian 
press criticized that Otto Tschadek, who was the first Western justice minister to 
accept a Soviet invitation, thus helped the “infamous Russian judiciary” to gain 
prestige equal to the Western one.64 
While the Soviet image remained, in the Austrian public opinion, linked to the 
brutality of the Stalin era and that of 1956, Austria, in the eyes of its pro-Soviet 
ambassador in Moscow, seemed to be “one of the most-liked Western countries” 
among the Russians. All thirty-five performances of the Eisrevue, Bischoff claimed, 
were sold out. Whereas this success could also be attributed to a lack of variety in 
the Soviet capital’s entertainment program, there might be some truth to Bischoff’s 
assessment that “for average Muscovites, Austrians today are not ‘the evil people 
who sent weapons to the Hungarian fascists,’ and not even ‘the wise people who 
kept out of NATO and declared neutrality,’ but they are ‘the people who gave the 
world Mozart and Johann Strauß and now sent their Eisrevue to us.’”65 
The Soviet media, indeed, repeatedly called attention to Soviet-Austrian affini-
ties with regard to culture, particularly high culture.66 This had been a stock theme 
of Soviet propaganda in Austria in 1945, and was used now in support of the current 
tendency in Soviet foreign policy towards Austria. However, in order that Austria 
not become too attractive as a model for Eastern Europeans and the Soviet people, 
the communist media kept up a certain medium-level criticism with regard to, on 
one hand, “political circles” attempting to derail Austria’s neutral course, and, on 
the other, unjust social and economic conditions in Austria as a capitalist country. A 
generally positive report about Austria in the youth magazine Ogonek on 18 August 
 62 Artikel in der Neuen Tageszeitung, 12 June 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 215.864–pol/57, Z. 
222.136–pol.
 63 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, IX: Berlin Crisis, Germany, Austria (Wa-
shington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 768. 
 64 Presseangriffe, 2 July 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 221.442–pol/57, Z. 221.795–pol/57.
 65 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 May 1957, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 215.633–
pol/57, Z. 220.793–pol.
 66 Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 142. 
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1957 was embellished with pictures of beggars and homeless on Viennese streets, 
and in the following months, several publications appeared featuring the allegedly 
poor living conditions of Austrian workers.67 However, once Pravda, on 27 August 
1957, praised the idea of neutrality, which had “taken strong roots in Austria” and 
enabled the country to “exert a great deal of positive influence on international de-
velopments,” nobody could doubt that Soviet-Austrian relations had been restored 
following the most severe test they had as yet undergone.
 67 Cf. Austrian embassy Moscow to MFA, 25 September 1959, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 248.423–
pol/59.

4.  Starting Anew: After the Hungarian Revolution
In the meantime, Soviet diplomacy tried to strike the Austrian iron while it was 
hot: After Soviet Premier Bulganin had presented his “peace notes” of 10 Decem-
ber 1957 and of 8 January 1958 to the member states of the United Nations plus 
Switzerland,1 a document that proposed a nonaggression treaty between the two 
blocs and a conference of world leaders to end the Cold War, he, in a “personal mes-
sage” to Chancellor Raab, called on Austria to support the initiative. The Bulganin 
notes, one of the most comprehensive Soviet disarmament proposals until that time, 
had come only after the Soviet decision to withdraw from the UN disarmament 
negotiations in Geneva;2 the notes were aimed at projecting a more peaceful image 
of the USSR,3 re-engaging the West in negotiations, and angling for a summit. Pro-
moting the Rapacki Plan, they were likely to frustrate NATO plans for tactical nu-
clear rearmament in Western Europe, which was deemed indispensable by Western 
leaders for balancing the quantitative superiority of Soviet conventional forces in 
Europe. In Bulganin’s proposal, a special status of “nuclear neutrality” was offered 
to all NATO states that gave up their launching sites. In the long run, the propos-
als, if accepted, were to create a Soviet preponderance in Europe by eliminating 
nuclear weapons from the Western parts of the continent and to undermine the US 
presence in Europe by expelling all “foreign troops” from Germany. Although the 
notes admitted that no quick success was likely to be reached at a summit, such a 
meeting was considered essential for building trust and also for fostering economic 
ties between the East and West. The participation of neutral and nonaligned states 
was welcomed explicitly. 
By claiming that Austria, by virtue of its status, “must be interested” in securing 
peace and “could make a special contribution,” Bulganin, in his personal message, 
encouraged Raab to take on the responsibility for proposing the conference as well 
as disarmament ideas to the West, while mobilizing Austria against the creation of 
 1 Keesing’s Archiv der Gegenwart, 11 December 1957, 6809; 10 January 1958, 6836. For the text 
of the letter to US president Eisenhower and other Western leaders, 10 December 1957, see Do-
kumente zur Deutschlandpolitik III/3, no. 3: 1957, bearb. von Ernst Deuerlein, Gisela Biewer und 
Hansjürgen Schierbaum (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1967), 2030–2042; the follow-up letters 
to the West German chancellor Adenauer and to other Western leaders, and the Soviet proposal, 8 
January 1958, in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik III/4, no. 1: 1958, bearb. von Ernst Deuerlein 
und Gisela Biewer (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1969), 21–81.
 2 John van Oudenaren, Détente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West (Durham: Duke Univer-
sity Press, 1991), 50–52.
 3 Veljko Mi�unović, Moskauer Tagebücher 1956–1958 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1982), 392. 
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nuclear launching sites in Italy. The letter contained pleasant compliments about the 
possibilities and also the responsibility carried, in Bulganin’s eyes, by neutral Aus-
tria for relaxing tensions and “restoring confidence in international relations.”4 Such 
advances were part and parcel of a Soviet campaign for a new détente, the neutrali-
zation of Western Europe, and the dissolution of the European-American alliance, a 
campaign that combined relaxing measures, such as Soviet conventional troop re-
ductions, with a Soviet nuclear build-up and nuclear threats against Western coun-
tries, among them the United States, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Greece, 
Turkey, and Israel.5 Like most of the numerous Soviet proposals in the years 1955 
to 1958, it found little resonance abroad and was soon overshadowed by new crises. 
In March 1958, Nikita Khrushchev encouraged the Austrian government to sup-
port his recent initiative for a nuclear test ban, and in July, Austria, among other 
countries, received a Soviet invitation for preparing the conclusion of an all-Euro-
pean treaty on friendship and cooperation.6 Even earlier, Chancellor Raab had been 
invited to come to Moscow, and signals were sent to Vienna that the USSR would 
be appreciative of Austria’s good services in the German question.7
Concerning Bulganin’s “peace initiative” and the Rapacki Plan, the chancel-
lor’s cautious answer, namely, that Austria appreciated both blocs’ efforts to disarm 
and that he was ready to support any initiatives leading to détente,8 was greeted in 
both the East and the West. In the case of Germany, Raab, who, erroneously, was 
convinced that both parts of the country would be granted and willing to accept a 
status similar to Austrian neutrality, launched an initiative to found an interallied 
commission on Germany with the task of investigating the conditions necessary 
 4 Correspondence Bulganin – Raab, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA GZ. 227.665–pol/57, Z. 227.678–
pol/57 and GZ. 544.297–pol/58, Z. 544.588–pol/58. The full text is published on pages 293–297. 
In his message to US president Eisenhower dated 4 February 1958, Bulganin proposed a summit 
meeting dealing with a suspension of nuclear tests, an abandonment of nuclear weapons, and a 
nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. TASS, 4 February 1958.
 5 On the troop cuts, see Evangelista, “Why Keep Such an Army?”, 4–6. On the nuclear build-up, see 
Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 324–335; idem, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold 
War,” in Melvin Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War I: 
Origins (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 376–397. Cf. Frank Umbach, Das rote Bündnis: 
Entwicklung und Zerfall des Warschauer Paktes 1955 bis 1991 (Berlin: Links, 2005), 105–106.
 6 Rauchensteiner, Die Zwei, 381–382. On the Soviet proposal, see Bernhard Schalhorn, “Sowjeti-
sche Westeuropapolitik I,” in Dietrich Geyer (ed.), Osteuropa-Handbuch Sowjetunion II: Außen-
politik 1955–1973 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1976), 61–145, 93–95; on further initiatives for disarma-
ment, see ibid., 86–99. The text of the Soviet note and proposal, 15 July 1958, is published in 
Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik III/4, no. 2, 1464–1469. 
 7 Michael Gehler, “Neutralität und Neutralisierungspläne für Mitteleuropa? Österreich, Ungarn, 
Tschechoslowakei und Polen,” in Dominik Geppert and Udo Wengst (eds.), Neutralität – Chance 
oder Chimäre? Konzepte des Dritten Weges für Deutschland und die Welt 1945–1990 (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2005), 105–131, 111–115.
 8 Verbalnote Bundeskanzleramt, Zl. 544.441-pol/58, 21 January 1958, Ministerratsprotokoll 64, 21 
January 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, MRP.
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for its reunification and for free all-German elections (similar to what had been 
proposed by the Western powers between 1952 and 1954 but turned down by the 
Kremlin).9 The Soviet proposal for solving the problem by talks between the FRG 
and the GDR was characterized by Raab as “absurd” and “illusory.”10 
It soon became clear that Raab’s idea had no chance of realization and was 
dropped. Nevertheless, a few days before Khrushchev staged the second Berlin cri-
sis by attempting to expel the Western powers from West Berlin and rid the city of 
its protection, Gromyko chose the Austrian ambassador, Bischoff, to convey secret-
ly to the West German representative in Moscow, Ambassador Hans Kroll, the mes-
sage that “the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany could lead to the resolu-
tion of the entire German problem.”11 In return, the West German government was 
to renounce nuclear weapons and recognize the “people’s democracies” plus the 
GDR. Bischoff expressed his conviction that the USSR sincerely wanted to open 
the way to German unification ‒  as it turned out, a serious misunderstanding on the 
Austrian ambassador’s side. Though Bischoff fulfilled the request, it did not lead to 
the goal the Kremlin had hoped for: After the Soviet ultimatum to Berlin, there was 
no longer any basis for fruitful negotiations. In a conversation with Khrushchev on 
11 November 1958, Bischoff looked into how the USSR would react if the West 
rejected the Soviet proposal about Berlin. The day before, Khrushchev, in a recep-
tion for the Polish delegation, had rebuffed any Western rights in West Berlin.12 The 
Soviet leader replied coolly: “In that case, our missiles are ready and aimed at the 
right targets. We only need a few of them.”13 Obviously Khrushchev again counted 
on Bischoff to pass this message on to Bonn. 
An effort by Bruno Kreisky to arrange a meeting between Berlin mayor Willy 
Brandt and a “high ranking Soviet representative” in the spring of 1959 also failed 
after Brandt withdrew.14 During Khrushchev’s visit to Austria, Gromyko asked 
 9 Matthias Pape, “Die Deutschlandinitiative des österreichischen Bundeskanzlers Julius Raab im 
Frühjahr 1958,” in Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 48, no. 2 (2000), 281–318. Cf. Report on 
Raab’s interview with Industriekurier, 26 April 1958, in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik III/4, 
no. 2: 1958, bearb. von Ernst Deuerlein und Gisela Biewer (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1969), 
1057–1058.
 10 Quoted in Glasneck, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich,” 106.
 11 Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 205, 207, 211. Cf. Austrian embassy Moscow to 
Austrian MFA, Z. 73–pol/58 and Z. 74–pol/58, 23 November and 1 December 1958, in SBKA, 
Länderbox UdSSR, 1; Bischoff to Figl, 28080, 26 November 1958, ÖStA, AdR, AVA, NL E/1770: 
Bischoff, File 108; Pape, Ungleiche Brüder, 499–500, 618–620. An extract of Kroll’s memoir is 
published in Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik IV/1, no. 1: 10 Nov. 1958–31 Jan. 1959, bearb. 
von Ernst Deuerlein und Hannelore Nathan (Frankfurt am Main: Metzner, 1971), 121–122.
 12 Gerhard Wettig, Chruschtschows Berlinkrise 1958 bis 1963: Drohpolitik und Mauerbau (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 2006), 25. 
 13 Bischoff to Austrian MFA, 28073, 11 November 1958, ÖStA, AdR, AVA, NL E/1770: Bischoff, 
File 108.
 14 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 200, 204. Cf. Martin Kofler, “Kreisky – Brandt – Khrushchev: 
The United States and Austrian Mediation during the Berlin Crisis 1958–1963,” in Günter Bi-
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Kreisky to contact the West Germans and pass on a Soviet proposal, dated 2 July 
1960, on the transformation of West Berlin into a “free city.” Although Secretary 
of State Christian Herter asserted that the Soviet memorandum contained “nothing 
new,”15 Brandt and Adenauer were informed. However, information was leaked to 
the press, and the initiative did not bear any fruit. In 1959 and 1962, Khrushchev 
used his conversations with Kreisky and other Austrian representatives to repeat 
his threats against West Berlin.16 The Soviet leader indicated that he was concerned 
about a possible nuclear rearmament of West Germany and was prepared to sign 
a separate treaty with the GDR; while he ruled out German reunification any time 
soon, Khrushchev claimed West Berlin as part of East Germany and threatened to 
“cut [it] off.” Despite their fruitlessness, these communications show, on one hand, 
the Soviet strategy of using the neutral not only for conveying Soviet messages to 
the West Germans, but also for repeatedly reminding the latter of the privileged 
status they could attain if they were ready to abandon their alliance with the West. 
On the other hand, these episodes prove that Austrian leaders were only too ready 
to offer their services (not just to improve their standing in the Kremlin, but also out 
of their sincere aspirations to help their friends in Germany). However, according 
to Brandt, neither Raab nor Kreisky seemed to grasp the differences between the 
Austrian solution of 1955 and the Soviet attitude towards Germany.17 
The Raab visit and the Lebanon crisis
With Mikoian’s trip to Vienna, a series of regular mutual visits at the high and 
intermediary political levels was taken up again. On the Austrian side, such visits 
were much more frequent with the USSR than with any other signatory power 
of the state treaty.18 The year 1958, with thirty-six Soviet and thirty-one Austrian 
delegations, marked an all-time high in the exchange. The Austrian chancellor’s 
journey to the land of the soviets, which the Kremlin had encouraged in 1957, was 
particularly important to the Soviet side, since Raab was the first Western statesman 
to visit the USSR after the Hungarian disaster of 1956. While the Soviet invitation 
schof, Michael Gehler, and Anton Pelinka (eds.), Austrian Foreign Policy in Historical Context, 
Contemporary Austrian Studies 14 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2006), 170–185. Kreisky later 
claimed that Brandt had expressed the wish to meet a high ranking Soviet politician. Bruno Kreis-
ky, Im Strom der Politik: Der Memoiren zweiter Teil (Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau, 1988), 10–22. 
For a critical assessment, cf. Röhrlich, Kreiskys Außenpolitik, 186–187.
 15 Martin Kofler, “Eine Art „Nabel der Welt“: Österreich und der Chruschtschow-Besuch 1960,” in 
Zeitgeschichte 26, no. 6 (1999), 397–416, 409. Cf. Egon Bahr, Zu meiner Zeit (Berlin: Siedler, 
1996), 127–129.
 16 Conversation Khrushchev with Kreisky and Schärf, 13 October 1959, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, 
II-Pol, GZ. 236.711–pol/59, Z. 249.552–pol/59. For the full text of the conversation in 1959, see 
pages 298–300. For the conversations in 1962, see below pages 302–303, 310–312, 321–325.
 17 Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1999), 174. 
 18 Neuhold, “Austria and the Soviet Union,” 95; Glasneck, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich,” 114.
 Starting Anew: After the Hungarian Revolution 107
clearly aimed at demonstrating to the world that “peaceful coexistence and friendly 
relations between states of different social systems” were possible and even mutu-
ally beneficial,19 the Austrian government’s goal for its trip from 21 to 28 July 1958 
was much more down-to-earth: Raab wanted to test the sincerity of these slogans 
at a practical economic level, seeking solely a reduction in the Austrian oils debts 
to the Soviet Union. 
The circumstances of the visit were not easy. In June, the political trial and ex-
ecution of Imre Nagy brought back dark memories of the Soviet crackdown on the 
Hungarian uprising two years earlier. On 15 July, the Soviet leadership launched 
its proposal for a “peace pact” between all European states and the United States, 
and it was anticipated that the Kremlin would press its Austrian guests to publicly 
endorse the initiative. The Ballhausplatz had warned already in June that, “due to 
the lacking political content of the visit and the absence of bilateral problems,” 
the Austrian delegation might well be “exploited for propaganda statements in the 
contemporary Cold War in favor of the Soviet stance.”20 
Last but not least, Raab’s trip to Moscow was overshadowed by the beginning 
of the Lebanon crisis, a pro-Egyptian Muslim rebellion against the country’s Chris-
tian pro-Western president, who called on the United States for help. From 16 to 
18 July, about a hundred US aircraft passed over the Alps on their way to the Near 
East. Austria, responding to a request by the US State Department, had given verbal 
permission for some thirty-two overflights. However, this number was exceeded 
considerably by the flights that had started before the official permission was re-
ceived. When Austrian communist newspapers began to report the incident, the 
Austrian government, which was obliged to observe neutrality but did not have an 
air force to prevent foreign planes from flying over its territory, had to react official-
ly. The Austrian dilemma ‒ on one hand, to fulfill its obligations and, on the other, 
not to alienate its traditional patron, the United States ‒ led to a double game. The 
Austrian government filed a protest with the US embassy in order to assuage the 
Soviet side, which was trying to pressure the Austrians into observing their neutral-
ity more comprehensively. Therefore, the Kremlin itself also protested with the US 
government, and later even offered the Soviet air force to protect Austrian air space. 
At the same time, Foreign Minister Figl unofficially reassured US representatives 
that his protest was “just for the record.” On 19 July, the State Department issued a 
press release stating that, as requested by the Austrian side, the US air force would 
henceforth respect Austrian neutrality.21 However, no official regret was expressed. 
 19 Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 164–165. 
 20 Vorbereitung des Besuches, 20 June 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 544.163–pol/58, Z. 
550.368–pol/58.
 21 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 184–186; Walter Blasi, “Die Libanonkrise 1958 und die US 
Überflüge,” in Erwin A. Schmidl (ed.), Österreich im frühen Kalten Krieg: Spione, Partisanen, 
Kriegspläne (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000), 239–259. On the Soviet protest, see Rauchensteiner, Die 
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When the Austrian chancellor, vice-chancellor, minister of foreign affairs, and 
state secretary, bearing an original letter by Karl Marx and a film about Vienna’s 
Spanish Riding School as gifts, arrived in the Soviet capital, banners with the 
motto “Long live Austrian-Soviet friendship” were hung above Moscow’s main 
streets. On 21 July Pravda praised Raab and Austria’s “international authority,” 
which had risen as a consequence of the country’s neutrality, applauded the Aus-
trian protest against the US flights and expressed its wish that “the amicable rela-
tions between the Soviet Union and Austria will be strengthened.” The claim that 
“by means of the Austrian example, the idea of neutrality has become popular 
among other West European peoples,” hinted at the intentions Soviet diplomacy 
was pursuing in the bilateral relationship. At the airport, in the presence of a re-
ception committee consisting of countless Soviet ministers, deputy ministers and 
ambassadors,22 a committee large enough to welcome the UN secretary general 
or the pope, Khrushchev personally praised the “statesmanlike wisdom” of his 
Austrian guest, which had made the successful conclusion of the state treaty pos-
sible. Raab took up this reference to the leitmotiv in Soviet-Austrian relations and 
thanked his host-country for its efforts, “owing to which preeminently the treaty 
was concluded”23 ‒ a statement that was neither historically fully correct nor well 
received in the United States.24 Both sides paid tribute to Austria’s neutrality as a 
contribution to international peace. In his speech in the Kremlin on the next day, 
however, Khrushchev warned the guests of “groups, intent on getting Austria off 
its neutral path.”25 
The negotiations, which according to the communiqué were conducted in an 
“atmosphere of friendship and cordiality,” demonstrated the “good relations reflect-
ing the national interests of both countries” and contributed to the “strengthening of 
peace in Europe,” resulted in Austria’s wish being fulfilled: its remaining obligation 
of delivering seven million tons of oil in the following seven years, as stipulated 
by the state treaty, was cut by 50 percent.26 An invitation to come to Austria was 
extended to Khrushchev and Mikoian, who was repeatedly referred to by Raab and 
Khrushchev as a “friend of Austria” or even as “Austrian.” On their side, the Sovi-
ets were pleased to learn that Austria, as the first Western state and despite Western 
misgivings, declared itself ready to become a member of the Danube Convention 
of 1948 ‒ a move that was perceived as a slap in the face of the West, which had 
condemned the founding document of this organization as a violation of interna-
 22 Vizit Avstriiskoi pravitel’stvennoi delegatsii, 21–28 July 1958, in AVPRF, 66/37/72/13, 15–19. 
Cf. Kreisky, Im Strom, 104–105. 
 23 Reden, 29 July 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 544.163–pol/58, Z. 552.245–pol/58
 24 FRUS, 1958–1960, IX, 771. 
 25 Daily Review of the Soviet Press, 23 July 1958.
 26 Schlusskommuniqué, 24 July 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 544.163–pol/58, Z. 552.061–
pol/58. Cf. Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 Jahre Österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik 2, 
138–140.
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tional law and a means of enforcing Soviet control in Eastern Europe.27 The West 
had been assured by Foreign Minister Figl that Austria would not join the Belgrade 
Convention.28 Since the organization was entitled to make majority decisions about 
the free transport of any goods (including, e.g. arms) on the river, membership for 
a neutral state was deemed by legal experts to be at least problematic in the case 
of war.29 
In the negotiations on the communiqué, the Soviets pressed the Austrian del-
egation to include a paragraph stating that the USSR was ready to defend Austrian 
neutrality ‒ an attempt that was refused by the delegation from Vienna.30 Never-
theless, Soviet diplomacy succeeded in advancing a paragraph stating that Austria 
had been informed about “all steps being taken by the Soviet government aiming 
at détente in international relations and at reducing the threat of a nuclear war.” 
Austria would be ready “to contribute to a consolidation of peace ‒ with respect 
to Austria’s [limited] possibilities.” For the first time, “peaceful coexistence” was 
mentioned in an Austrian-Soviet communiqué ‒ a break of a diplomatic taboo, 
since the term, due to its communist connotation, was still rejected by the West. 
The statement was watered down, however, by the Austrian delegation, who added 
the words “as defined in the twelfth general assembly of the UN.”31 The Austrian 
delegation avoided qualifying recent Soviet “peace initiatives” and ‒ in general 
words only ‒ welcomed “all measures contributing to a consolidation of peace and 
to the reduction of the nuclear threat.” While the Kremlin was interested in using 
the communiqué for promoting its political initiatives, it was particularly important 
for the Austrian government to draw this fine line and avoid becoming solely an 
instrument of Soviet propaganda.32 Khrushchev had emphasized the Soviet thesis 
that neutral states should actively contribute to the reduction of tensions, press-
ing Austria to be more active in this matter so as to become a “major force in the 
preservation of peace.” The Austrian government, however, was interested in not 
alienating the Western powers and, therefore, only joining an initiative once it was 
clear that it would gain the approval of both blocs. 
 27 Stephan Verosta, “Außenpolitik,” in Erika Weinzierl and Kurt Skalnik (eds.), Österreich: Die 
Zweite Republik (Graz: Styria, 1972), 295–343, 328.
 28 FRUS, 1958–1960, IX, 780.
 29 Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität, 100. 
 30 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 186.
 31 Aus dem sowjetisch-österreichischen Kommuniqué, 24 July 1958, in UdSSR – Österreich, 107–
111. The resolutions of 15 December 1957 and 10 December 1958 of the UN General Assembly 
had avoided using the term, at that time primarily a Soviet expression, and referred instead to 
“peaceful and good neighborly relations.” Cf. “Mirnoe sosushchestvovanie,” in A.A. Gromyko, 
S. A. Golunskii, and V.M. Khvostov, Diplomaticheskii slovar’ 2, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 
1961), 297–300.
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BMAA, GZ. 544.163–pol/58, Z. 552.250–pol/58.
110 Laying the Groundwork and Changing Neutrality, 1955‒1960 
The Soviet reticence from pressing the delegation more strongly to make propa-
gandistic statements, and the Austrians’ ability to walk the fine line between com-
plimenting the Soviets and insulting the United States, between advancing their 
country’s international role and being put at the top of the Soviet propaganda chart, 
were recognized in Western media. On 25 July the Neue Zürcher Zeitung acknowl-
edged that there had been “no Russian attempt to express wishes or demands that 
would embarrass the Austrians,” and the Danish Finanstidende wrote on 15 Au-
gust: “The Austrians took note of the incense offered to them without letting it go to 
their head.” From the US State Department, some critical remarks on the Austrian 
failure to consult with the Western powers about the Danube Convention and on the 
Austrian excessive praise of the Soviet merits in concluding the state treaty were 
communicated via diplomatic channels.33 With regard to the Austrian invitation to 
Khrushchev, the US ambassador in Moscow criticized Austria’s “unfortunate dis-
play of callousness” in inviting the Soviet leader “within few weeks of execution of 
[Hungarian leaders Imre] Nagy, [Pál] Maléter, et al. under Soviet orders.”34
In Moscow, Raab’s visit left, as Khrushchev, Mikoian and Zorin unanimously 
pointed out to the Austrian ambassador, “the best and most pleasant impressions.”35 
Pravda characterized the Soviet-Austrian relations as a “convincing example of 
peaceful coexistence” and on 26 July Izvestiia praised the “further strengthening of 
mutual understanding, trust and cooperation” that had been achieved, as its editors 
had predicted. Both papers expressed their conviction that the example of amicable 
Soviet-Austrian relations could and should be followed by every good-willed West-
ern country. In an internal report, the Soviet embassy in Vienna also assessed the 
results of the Austrian visit in Moscow positively.36 The position not only of Aus-
tria’s neutrality, but also of Austrian circles advocating a rapprochement between 
the two countries was strengthened. The report continued by stating that in the 
People’s Party, as among the social democrats, Raab was celebrating a comeback as 
the unquestioned leader. There had even been recent Austrian calls to improve the 
country’s relations with the “people’s democracies,”37 a move that until that point, 
the Soviet embassy guessed, had been kept at a low level in order to placate the 
West for the cordial Austrian-Soviet relationship. As a result of the warm reception 
for the Austrian delegation, the USSR and the KPÖ had regained a certain degree 
 33 Austrian embassy Washington to Austrian MFA, 6 August 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 
544.163–pol/58, Z. 553.023–pol/58. 
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 35 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 30 July 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 544.163–
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 36 Soviet embassy Vienna to Soviet MFA, 9 September 1958, in AVPRF, 66/37/72/13, 31–40. 
 37 These Austrian calls, which were stimulated by the Soviet-West German agreements of 1958, 
squared with Soviet demands. Amtsvermerk, Conversation Kreisky with Gromyko, 14 October 
1959, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA GZ. 236.711–pol/59, Z. 249.384–pol/59; Soviet embassy Vienna on 
Austrian reactions with regard to the Soviet-West German agreement, 13 May 1958, in AVPRF, 
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of popularity in the Austrian population. As proof for the overwhelmingly positive 
impact of the trip on the bilateral relations, the daily Neues Österreich was quoted 
as stating that “the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Austria after 
1945 are over now.”
Once Raab had broken the international boycott against the Soviet Union that 
was a result of the events of 1956, further Austrian and Western guests followed. 
The Austrian minister of defense Graf traveled to Moscow still in 1958, and in 
October 1959, the Austrian president Adolf Schärf became the first Western head 
of state to visit the USSR after the Hungarian uprising.38 In the communiqué, once 
again, bilateral relations were praised for developing “in friendship and mutual un-
derstanding and cooperation.”39 It is not unlikely that, as was the opinion of the So-
viet embassy, the demonstratively welcoming reception of Austrian delegations in 
Moscow as well as the Soviet economic concessions had had an impact on the pub-
lic attitude towards the Soviet Union.40 Austrian media coverage on Soviet techni-
cal developments and economic progress, on Sputnik and the seven-year plan, also 
improved, although the anti-communist editor of the social democratic Arbeiter-
Zeitung, Oscar Pollak, remained cautious in the face of any signs of overly benevo-
lent attitudes towards the Soviet Union. Contrary to earlier occasions, however, 
after an incident of the paper being too critical of the USSR, the social democratic 
party leadership apologized in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador.41 
Cultural relations and the World Youth Festival
Meanwhile, cultural relations between the two countries, which had been badly 
damaged by the Soviet intervention in Hungary 1956, began to revive. In the deal-
ings between liberal democratic societies and their communist counterparts, cul-
tural relations played a special role. While between open societies, in general, a 
free flow of ideas, contacts, and even individuals is possible and liberal states usu-
ally consider it unnecessary to regulate this exchange, this is not the case in closed 
systems, in which personal contacts as well as private and mass communication 
are under strict control and any exchange with foreign institutions is impossible 
without official permission. Despite this, communist leaders considered some sort 
of exchange necessary to gain prestige both nationally and internationally and to 
prevent their countries from falling into intellectual isolation and economic back-
wardness. While the travel of Western artists to communist countries remained 
 38 Glasneck, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich,” 115; Schärf to Voroshilov, 20 September 1958, 
Russian translation, in AVPRF, 66/37/72/13, 43–45; Conversation Khrushchev with Kreisky and 
Schärf, 13 October 1959, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 236.711–pol/59, Z. 249.552–pol/59. 
For the full text of the conversation, see pages 298–300.
 39 Quoted in Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 166. 
 40 Glasneck, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich,” 115–118.
 41 Conversation Lapin with Pittermann, 24 July 1957, in AVPRF, 66/36/68/10, 23–25.
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controlled, sending Eastern musicians abroad was considered by Soviet leaders as 
a fine tool for promoting their own culture and fostering détente. For this reason, 
communist governments proved quite eager to form new regulations for cultural 
relations, which were endorsed in solemn and formal intergovernmental agree-
ments. This held true particularly for the Soviet Union, which strove at reinforcing 
its status as a beacon of progress and culture, as well as the leader of the “world 
communist system.” As historian Vladislav Zubok has aptly observed, “In no other 
regime in modern history, aside from Nazi Germany, did the promotion of culture 
(kultura) preoccupy the political leadership to this degree or involve such large 
expenditures.”42 However, most Western governments did not share the totalitarian 
approach towards culture nor the eagerness of such regimes to establish the ritual-
ized promotion of culture abroad. In addition, they did not want to contribute to the 
prestige of communist governments by formalizing bilateral exchanges of delega-
tions, especially if it did not offer the opportunity of fostering the freedom of ideas 
in Eastern societies. 
Here again, Austria was chosen by the Kremlin to serve as an icebreaker. In or-
der to build a legal framework for cultural relations with Austria, Soviet diplomats 
in 1956 resumed pressuring for the signing of a cultural agreement, an agreement 
that Moscow and the Austrian-Soviet Society had already been advocating since 
the 1940s.43 After the conclusion of the state treaty, this pressure was intensified 
by the USSR, which, at that time, had almost no cultural contacts with Western 
countries.44 The Soviet Union aspired to concluding new cultural agreements with 
Western states in order to promote “peaceful cooperation” in an area of East-West 
relations that was relatively unproblematic. As a neutral country with a well-re-
puted high culture and due to its weakness and vulnerability to Soviet pressure, 
Austria (in addition to Belgium, Britain, France, and Norway, with which Soviet 
agreements were signed in 1956–5745) seemed a natural target for this initiative. 
In the spring of 1956, a cultural agreement became, in the words of an Austrian 
diplomat, the “favorite subject” of the Soviet embassy in Vienna, which raised the 
issue often, sometimes twice a week, and presented two agreement drafts to the 
Austrians.46 That autumn, deputy foreign ministers Smirnov and Zorin took an in-
terest in these matters and deplored the ‒ allegedly politically motivated ‒ Austrian 
 42 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 165. 
 43 Mueller and Leidinger, “Tiefes Misstrauen,” 106.
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 46 Beziehungen zur Sowjetunion, 1 March 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 512.215–pol/56, Z. 
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reluctance to react to the Soviet overtures.47 However, both the Ballhausplatz and 
the Ministry for Education denied any political concerns and agreed between them-
selves that “the agreement will remain on paper, in which case it is worthless, or it 
will be implemented, in which case we cannot afford the associated obligations.”48 
Increasingly under pressure, both from Soviet diplomatic circles and Austrian com-
munists, Ambassador Bischoff, in order to defend the Austrian position, prepared 
an explanation stating that the four cultural agreements in effect between Austria 
and other countries were only remnants of the interwar period. Austria’s reluctance 
to conclude a new culture treaty, Bischoff explained, was motivated by fears of 
pressure from the FRG to sign a West German-Austrian agreement.49 It was only 
in 1968 that Austria conceded to Soviet pressure and signed a cultural agreement.50
Without an official basic regulatory document, a major part of cultural relations 
depended, on one hand, upon nongovernmental organizations, and on the other, the 
openness and level of proactiveness each side displayed. Therefore, during Raab’s 
visit to Moscow in 1958, a Soviet-Austrian Society, corresponding to the society 
already in existence in Austria, was founded under the presidency of composer 
Dmitri Shostakovich. It included several “corporate members,” such as the Lenin-
grad University and numerous Moscow theatres. Its aim was to “spread informa-
tion about Austria” by organizing concerts, lectures, and exhibits and to receive 
Austrian guests in the USSR. The matching task in Vienna was taken over by the 
Austrian-Soviet Society, which “as a consequence of the Hungarian events had suf-
fered great difficulties,” and in 1957 took pains to reintensify its efforts.51 On the 
occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957, the ÖSG 
organized more than three hundred events, including a film festival, twenty lectures 
(mostly by Austrian communist speakers), and concert tours of renowned classical 
and folk musicians. These efforts, the Soviet Foreign Ministry noted with satisfac-
tion, were duly supported by the Austrian authorities, who “proved their loyalty 
with regard to these measures.”52 This was even more remarkable as the society, 
due to its communist and pro-Soviet leanings, had been boycotted by Austrian au-
thorities until the early 1950s. In 1956, the Austrian-Soviet Society ran forty-one 
libraries, the largest of which containing more than 14,000 Russian books.53 Since 
 47 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 September 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 
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the 1940s, courses in Russian language and literature were offered at a number of 
Austrian high schools; in 1957, 86 schools taught 2,373 students who had chosen 
Russian either as a major or as an elective.54 A Soviet-Austrian agreement on film 
exchange, concluded in 1956, enabled Soviet citizens to experience Austrian kitsch 
(Reich mir die Hand, mein Leben), and confronted Austrians with Socialist Realism 
(Letiat zhuravli). In 1959, thirteen Soviet movies were seen by 600,000 Austrians; 
however, they could not live up to the competition from Hollywood. In addition to 
these more serious types of cultural exchange, a year earlier, the soccer teams of the 
Soviet and Austrian armies had met for a friendship match.
It soon became clear that with regard to cultural exchange the Soviet side was 
much more proactive than the Austrian, and that Soviet regulations were still much 
more restrictive for foreigners than vice versa. Thus, until the early 1960s Austrian 
activities in the USSR remained rare. In the meantime, Soviet exhibitions on “The 
Peaceful Application of Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union” and other contempo-
rary Soviet high-tech achievements were sent to Vienna; the Eisrevue tour of 1957, 
with its ice-breaking effect, was answered the same summer with several perform-
ances of the Soviet musicians David and Igor Oistrakh at the Salzburg Festival 
and, in 1959, by an overwhelmingly successful run of performances of the Soviet 
state circus, which was visited by more than 450,000 Austrians. The Moiseev folk-
dance company and a visit by Armenian composer Aram Khachaturian followed in 
1961–62.55
The largest Soviet-sponsored event in Vienna, however, did not have anything 
to do with bilateral relations. In July 1959, the World Youth Festival took place for 
the first time in a noncommunist country. Two years earlier, a similar mass event 
had been organized in Moscow. For the seventh such festival, with its cultural per-
formances, sport competitions and political meetings, the motto “Struggle against 
Imperialism” had been chosen. The Austrian government reluctantly gave in to 
Soviet pressure and consented to host the event, under the condition that the organ-
izers would respect Austria’s neutrality and that any sort of political display such as 
parading in uniforms, or any measures that might strain Austria’s relations to other 
countries would not occur. Chancellor Raab had rebuffed his ministers’ doubts by 
declaring in the cabinet meeting that “we want something from the Russians.”56 
While several Western ambassadors filed their protests against the holding of the 
communist festival with the Austrian government, the Soviet side seemed to use 
its influence on the organizers to find a compromise and to agree with the Austrian 
conditions. In any case, the international youth committee organizing the event was 
no match for the experienced Ballhausplatz diplomats and conceded to their de-
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 Starting Anew: After the Hungarian Revolution 115
mands.57 When the festival opened with several thousand visitors in Vienna’s big-
gest stadium, Raab had sent a welcome address. But conservative and social demo-
cratic Austrian organizations had prepared discussions and leaflets on the crimes of 
communist regimes and organized excursions from Vienna to the Iron Curtain at 
the Austrian-Hungarian border.58 
Although hand fighting between communist and anti-communist youth could 
not be avoided altogether during the week-long festival, in the end most parties 
involved seemed content. The organizers were clever enough to pass over all prob-
lems in silence and to praise the hospitality of neutral Austria ‒ without forgetting 
to mention that “some circles” had attempted to wreck the festival. Western ob-
servers who had been critical of Vienna hosting the event were increasingly con-
vinced by the Austrian argument that it was better to have the festival organized 
in a neutral country, thus being able to control it to some extent as well as to con-
front the participants with Western societies. They furthermore lauded the strategy, 
promoted by the social democratic Arbeiter-Zeitung and followed by all Austrian 
noncommunist media, to turn a deaf ear on the festival.59 The Austrian government, 
last but not least, was also happy for it had avoided getting into trouble with either 
the East or the West. In the same year, Vienna hosted the fourth World Congress of 
Women. Although Soviet and Austrian communist propaganda praised the success 
of the World Youth Festival highly,60 the Kremlin seems to have assessed the event 
more critically. After the Moscow gathering of 1957, during which the appear-
ance of young Americans, Europeans, and Africans had involuntarily contributed 
to undermining the enemy image of the West as seen in Soviet propaganda as well 
as the state-sponsored xenophobia of the USSR,61 the Vienna festival was seen as 
likely to sow doubt among Soviet and East European youth about the superiority of 
their system. It remained the last such event ever held in a Western country (except 
Finland) for the rest of the Cold War.
With the exception of this kind of mass events, travel between the USSR and 
Austria during the 1950s increased only slowly. In 1955 the Austrian Foreign Min-
istry issued 599 visas to Soviet citizens,62 two years later it was 718.63 Of 154 Aus-
trians who were registered in the USSR in 1959, eleven had already died, ten had 
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returned to their homeland, and eighty-seven were unaccounted for.64 Some of these 
had come to Soviet Russia in the interwar period and had fallen victim to Stalin’s 
terror; others had been kidnapped from Austria by the Soviet secret police in the 
postwar years and deported to slave labor camps; one was even a prisoner-of-war 
who had been captured in World War I and sent to Central Asia.65 In February 1959, 
a consular agreement was signed.66 A month earlier, state-owned Austrian Airlines 
(AUA) had, as the first Western company after Finair, inaugurated a regular direct 
connection to Moscow. In the first year, this flight was hit by a terrible disaster, 
when an AUA plane crashed a few kilometers from Sheremetevo airport with many 
passengers and crew members dying.67 
The Khrushchev visit
While it had been possible at the World Youth Festival in 1959 to prevent the com-
munist guests in Vienna from straining the host country’s relations with the West, 
not the same could be said with regard to Khrushchev’s trip to Austria from 30 June 
to 8 July 1960. It was his second visit to Austria, the first having been some fourteen 
years earlier. Once again, the international atmosphere with respect to the Soviet 
visit was not unproblematic, since the general secretary’s journey was his first visit 
to the West after the failure of the Paris summit and it was undertaken in the middle 
of the Berlin crisis. When Khrushchev arrived in Vienna, he was accompanied by 
a grand entourage including his wife Nina and family, the dry Gromyko, Aleksei 
Kosygin, and Ekaterina Furtseva, the attractive minister of culture (“the Austrian” 
Mikoian was in Norway at the time, where he praised Austria as a “model for 
healthy coexistence”68 and recommended that Norway choose neutrality instead of 
its traditional NATO membership). On his way from the airport, Khrushchev was 
confronted, as Western media reported, by a “frigid” or even “the coolest” public 
reception he had experienced in the West to date. Only a few communists and by-
standers, far fewer than the numbers of policemen, stood on the streets to greet him, 
forming a ridiculously meager line. Catholic bishops had called on their flock not 
to express any empathy for the chieftain of the dark,69 the papal nuncio had left the 
city in haste, priests had reminded Austrians of the suppression of the Church in 
communist countries, and Catholic youth organizations had distributed anti-Soviet 
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leaflets.70 The delegation could also not expect any mercy from Austria’s social 
democrats, whose leaders had for decades been defamed by Soviet propaganda as 
the “revisionist lackeys of imperialism.” The presence of Khrushchev’s old nem-
esis, Molotov, in Vienna, where he had been dispatched as the Soviet representa-
tive to the International Atomic Energy Agency, also did nothing to contribute to a 
warm reception. Chancellor Raab tried to better the tone for the visit by calling on 
his anti-Soviet fellow citizens “not to forget that our guest is the head of a friendly 
great power.”71 However, he could not prevent the social democratic president of 
the Trade Unions’ Federation Franz Olah from making a truly Freudian slip of the 
tongue at a reception ceremony, in which he publicly lauded the Soviet “struggle 
against freedom.”72 Obviously, the 1956 Soviet crackdown on Hungary had left a 
deep mark in Austrians’ minds. 
From its first day, Khrushchev’s journey by bus across Austria developed a dy-
namic of its own, the guest’s behavior often living up to its usual bizarre and unpre-
dictable manner. The official program included visits to the State Opera as well as 
to farms, negotiations with politicians, and meetings with factory workers. Many 
events were used by Khrushchev to stress Soviet economic, social, and technical 
achievements as proof of communism’s superiority and to reiterate his claim that 
the USSR would soon catch up and surpass the United States economically. An im-
pulsive orator as well as a cordial and down-to-earth guest, Khrushchev was clever 
and able to impress his audience. A former worker, he was careful to use socialist 
rhetoric when he addressed his Austrian “comrades,” and coxed their national pride 
with compliments on their cultural heritage, the natural beauty of their country, and 
their wisdom in choosing neutrality. He also made humorous allusions to his friend-
ship with their leaders, such as the “little capitalist” Raab or the popular socialist 
minister of the nationalized industries, “Karl Karlovich” Waldbrunner, who had 
spent the interwar years as an engineer in Soviet Russia.73 
In his many confused speeches, the Soviet leader, who was trying to convince 
Austrian politicians to be more active with regard to détente, praised Austrian 
neutrality and Soviet-Austrian relations as a “convincing example of peaceful 
coexistence”74 and sometimes went as far as announcing that the USSR “won’t 
remain inactive, if someone violates Austrian neutrality.”75 This seemed to be some 
sort of unilateral Soviet guarantee for Austria, something the West had been afraid 
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of since 1955. A similar pledge had been given by Mikoian during his visit in 1957.76 
Khrushchev’s oath raised Austrian fears that the Soviet Union would claim the right 
to decide whether the country’s neutrality had been violated and intervene militari-
ly in such a case. Although he frequently stressed that he did not want to influence 
Austrian-German or Austrian-Italian relations, Khrushchev vigorously attacked 
NATO, the United States, Italy, and West Germany for their policy of maintaining 
army bases and deploying missiles around Austria’s periphery. This kind of assault 
was not unusual for the fiery Cold Warrior from the Kremlin; on his famous trip to 
India in 1955, he had even accused the United States of having started World War 
II against the USSR.77 The recent attacks voiced in Austria were part of the Soviet 
offensive against deployments of nuclear missiles in Western Europe, an offensive 
that was launched exactly when the Soviet leader started stationing Soviet missiles 
in East Germany.78 During visits to the Nordic neutrals in 1958, Soviet guests had 
aired the thesis that NATO missiles launched from Norway were a violation of the 
neutrality of Sweden and Finland,79 in November the Soviet government opined 
that if a missile were shot from an Italian launching site towards the north-east, 
this would violate Austria’s neutrality,80 and in April 1959 Soviet notes of protest 
against Italian launching sites were sent to the Italian and Austrian governments.81 
During his visit to Austria, Khrushchev repeated the allegations against Italian mis-
siles ‒ thus attempting to mobilize Austria against the Italian bases and implicitly 
threatening to hold Austria responsible for others’ actions.82 
Even in his speech at the Mauthausen Nazi concentration camp memorial, Ni-
kita Sergeevich lashed out against “revanchist circles” among West German politi-
cians, calling Konrad Adenauer a reincarnation of Hitler and warning against West 
German “militarism” and a new Anschluss.83 After having received two breeding 
bulls (“Komponist” and “Gustl”) as welcoming gifts and talking to farmers in small 
towns along his route as well as workers at the Linz steel plant, the Soviet lead-
er retabled his proposal for neutralizing the FRG and stripping West Berlin of its 
Western protectors, combined with threats of signing a separate treaty with the 
GDR if the Western allies refused to meet his conditions. 
While the Austrian authorities became more and more embarrassed by their un-
controllable guest behaving like a loose cannon, something unexpected happened: 
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the “traveling circus Nikita” began increasingly to attract Austrians. The longer 
his tour lasted, the more people stood along the streets, curious to see the short, 
rotund grandfather-like man with a bald head, said to be one of the most powerful 
men in the world, who shook his fists furiously against “the imperialists,” sang 
Russian folksongs, and frequently invoked God while displaying un-statesman-
like vulgarity. The charismatic leader’s strange attraction and his natural instinct to 
interact with ordinary people helped him to win over many Austrians. When he was 
greeted in Salzburg by anti-communist demonstrators who booed and whistled, he 
confronted the crowd, raised his short arms and roared: “Peace, Friendship!” This 
was much less aggressive than the energetic leader’s reaction to a similar incident 
at the abortive Paris summit,84 and it seems to have had the wanted effect. The 
stunned demonstrators could not but answer, “Peace, Friendship!,” and the satisfied 
Khrushchev veered off and continued his tour towards the Kaprun Alpine power 
plant, where he declared that before the end of his lifetime, he would see the red 
flag flying over the entire world (including the Austrian Alps).85 
In the meantime Raab came increasingly under pressure from the Austrian me-
dia, Western diplomats, and even his own foreign Minister, Bruno Kreisky, not to 
let Khrushchev attack Western countries and leaders while on Austrian soil. Raab, 
who wanted to repeat his negotiating success of 1955 in order to stabilize his ail-
ing position in Austrian politics, left the impression with his staff that he “could 
not care less” about the porcelain broken by Khrushchev.86 During a cabinet meet-
ing, the social democratic foreign minister, who was supported by his conservative 
colleague Heinrich Drimmel, strongly opposed the Austrian communists’ wish to 
have the Soviet guest’s abusive speeches transmitted by loudspeaker on Vienna’s 
Heldenplatz, where Adolf Hitler had been cheered by a crowd in the wake of the 
Anschluss. While Kreisky’s and Drimmel’s concerns were brushed off by Raab, 
who repeated his “we want something from the Russians,”87 the US and the West 
German ambassadors filed their protests with the Austrian government and gave 
Raab a curtain lecture.88 In a late-night private meeting which casts a bit of light 
on Khrushchev’s personal relationship to Raab, the Soviet leader agreed to cut his 
adventurous tour d’Autriche short and also to reduce Austria’s oil debts by one mil-
lion tons.89 
The bilateral communiqué was shorter than usual. Austrian-Soviet relations were 
described as “based on the principles of peaceful coexistence” (for the first time with-
 84 Wolkogonow, Die sieben Führer, 225. 
 85 Newspaper reports, in SBKA, Länderbox UdSSR 1.
 86 Kofler, Kennedy und Österreich, 22.
 87 Verhandlungsschrift 42, Council of Ministers, 28 June 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP. 
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out any qualifying clause) and as having “developed in a mutually satisfactory way.” 
The visit was characterized as “an important contribution to peace” and as having 
“consolidated the amicable relations between the Austrian people and the peoples of 
the USSR.”90 However, no agreement was reached on several passages.91 Austria not 
only refused Soviet drafts about the Kremlin’s right to protect Austrian neutrality, 
it also wanted to distance itself from certain statements made by Khrushchev. The 
latter point was declared unacceptable by Gromyko. The main focus of the dispute, 
however, was a Russian proposal stating the Soviet wish for peace. Austrian diplo-
mats demanded the paragraph to include an acknowledgment that Western countries 
also wanted peace. Only after Kreisky threatened not to publish a communiqué at 
all, did the Soviet side accept Raab’s proposal to cancel the entire paragraph.92 After 
the signing of the communiqué, Khrushchev, who was apparently trying to play 
Austria’s two governing parties off one another, charged the social democrat Kreisky 
with being an “ally of the West,” while he called the “little capitalist” and conserva-
tive leader Raab his “friend.” The atmosphere in the negotiations had been further 
impaired by Gromyko’s dogged attempts to talk Austria out of signing a trade agree-
ment with the United States, an attempt that was rebuffed by Kreisky with the words: 
“We won’t let anybody deny us this. We can conclude treaties with whom we want.”93 
After a television address to the Austrian people and a last call on the Western 
powers to accept Soviet proposals, the guest left. During the departure press confer-
ence, the quick-witted Khrushchev refused to elaborate on how the USSR would 
react to a violation of Austria’s neutrality, but reiterated his accusations against Ade-
nauer and the United States, his threats against West Berlin, and his claims about the 
ultimate victory of communism. Boos from the audience were answered in a way 
that had already become customary: by stating that the booers were apparently Nazis 
who had escaped their death in Stalingrad.94 In his last speech during the Khrushchev 
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visit, given on 8 July at the airport, Raab reserved Austria’s right to interpret and to 
defend its neutrality itself and denied such rights to any foreign power.95 He also 
stated that Austria did not share Soviet views with regard to the leaders of Western 
nations, and that it rejected any kind of dictatorship as well as any restrictions of 
free speech. However, another speech two days later, in which Raab underlined his 
friendship with Adenauer and his gratitude towards the United States, was needed 
to appease the infuriated German chancellor and the disapproving US ambassador.96 
Despite this, however, the affair created the third deep rift in US-Austrian relations 
in three years, after the Lebanon crisis and Raab’s behavior in Moscow, relations 
that were already strained by bilateral negotiations regarding compensation for US 
oil rights in Austria.97 Regarding Khrushchev’s pledge to become active if Austria’s 
neutrality were violated, the Austrian government officially stated that this an-
nouncement was not in accord with neutrality. The government reserved the right to 
define whether and when the country was endangered and how to react.98
In the face of the trouble Khrushchev’s trip created for Austria, the East Europe-
an press published enthusiastic reports about the neutral in general and the visit in 
particular ‒ probably the friendliest articles that had been published until that time 
about a noncommunist country.99 The Soviet news agencies and media set the tone 
by repeatedly praising Austria from mid-May until mid-July, lambasting US policy 
for alleged attempts of torpedoing the visit and bringing Austria off its straight path 
of neutrality, and by celebrating the event as “proof of a humiliating defeat of the 
US ‘policy of strength.’”100 During the Soviet visit to Austria, Pravda published 
its reports about Austria on the first page, reports that on 2 July lauded the “good-
neighborly relations” and Austria’s “good example for peaceful coexistence,” and 
on 11 July stressed the “conformity” between Austria and the Soviet Union with re-
gard to disarmament and the “approval by the Austrian people of the peace-loving 
Soviet foreign policy.” The Soviet Union published a semiofficial account101 and 
Khrushchev shared his personal recollections in a speech on 9 July at the all-Union 
congress of Soviet teachers, in which he stressed his cordial reception, the friendli-
ness of the bilateral talks, and their conduciveness to “peaceful coexistence” and to 
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an intensification of the bilateral relations. He emphasized that “Austria is a neutral 
country and its government maintains neutrality that we respect and value,” and 
stated that “There are no unresolved problems between the two nations.”102 This 
harmony was passed off by the Soviet leader as international recognition and proof 
of the correctness of the Soviet system and of Soviet foreign policy: 
“What was particularly evident in all these statements and talks, was that the Austrian people, wel-
coming and supporting, as they do [sic], our policy of peaceful coexistence, do justice to the great-
ness of our country, to the gains of our revolution and to the historic victories which the peoples of 
the Soviet Union have scored during the years of Soviet government. This was a recognition and 
approval of the Soviet foreign policy of peace and, thereby a voluntary or involuntary recognition 
of the greatness of our revolution, of our Socialist system, and our ideas on the basis of which so 
great an advance of the economy, culture and the living standards of the Soviet people, and of the 
might of our country was achieved within so historically short a period of time.”103 
Such claims, politically shrewd albeit fuzzy and tinted with ideology, reflected 
Khrushchev’s quest for the Soviet Union to be recognized as a communist super-
power on both the national and international stages. The 1960 visit was therefore 
celebrated ‒ as had been the state treaty of 1955 ‒ by Soviet propaganda as “another 
triumph for the Soviet state’s Leninist peaceful policy.”104 But in order to keep Aus-
tria, as a capitalist country, from appearing too attractive to his Soviet audience, 
the orator did not refrain from mentioning alleged plotting of certain Western and 
reactionary Austrian Catholic, or even fascist, circles against the Soviet-Austrian 
rapprochement. These, however, were doomed to failure in the face of the “peace-
loving Soviet policies,” their alleged appeal to the broad masses of the Austrian 
people, and the sincerity of the Soviet leaders.
Economic relations
From an economic viewpoint, Khrushchev’s visit, particularly his consent to a re-
duction in the Austrian oil deliveries to the USSR, was advantageous for Austria. 
Bilateral economic relations had been induced mainly by the Austrian deliveries of 
oil and goods to the USSR that were stipulated in the state treaty, and the Soviet 
sell-off of former German, then Soviet, enterprises and oil fields in eastern Austria. 
These enterprises had already created an economic link between Austria and the 
Soviet Union in the years before 1955, when their goods were primarily produced 
for the Soviet and East European market.105 The state treaty in 1955 had set de-
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liveries to the USSR at a lump sum of 2 million dollars plus 150 million dollars 
in goods over six years, and ten million tons of crude oil within ten years. In the 
following bilateral negotiations, which were finalized in Moscow on 11 July 1955, 
the Austrian government had achieved its goal of reaching consensus that Austria 
was entitled to export goods of higher-added value instead of oil; furthermore, the 
Soviet request to control the production process in Austria was rejected.106 In 1958, 
Raab gained Soviet approval to cut the remaining seven million tons of oil in half 
(by Soviet re-deliveries of half a million tons per annum); two years later, Austria’s 
oil debts were reduced a second time, the Soviet re-deliveries were stopped and the 
end of Austrian deliveries was set for 1964. Altogether Austria delivered six instead 
of ten million tons of oil.107 
While the deliveries of goods resulting from the state treaty helped Austria to 
gain a lead over other Western states in the East European market,108 other rem-
nants of the past did not have such a positive impact on Austrian-Soviet economic 
relations. When Austria, on the basis of article 27 of the state treaty, explored its 
chances of receiving Soviet compensation for the Austrian economic assets in the 
USSR that had been confiscated by the Soviet government, including real estate, 
company shares and mining rights, the Kremlin agreed to negotiate but at the same 
time tabled its own claims for the repatriation costs of Austrian prisoners-of-war.109 
Since the Soviet claims, totaling seventeen million dollars, exceeded the estimated 
value of Austrian assets, and neither land nor resources could be used as compensa-
tion under Soviet law, the Austrian negotiators concluded that the Soviet side would 
not accept a negative balance and shifted to tactics of protraction.110 
In the meantime, both sides showed an interest in developing bilateral trade.111 
The Kremlin was interested in purchasing machinery and equipment for its industry, 
and consumer goods for the Soviet people; Austria needed raw material. The Aus-
trian chancellor Raab took a particular interest in the Osthandel and expected the 
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USSR to deal with Western Europe via Austria.112 On 17 October 1955, one five-year 
agreement on trade and shipping and another on the exchange of goods and payments 
were signed by the Soviet and the Austrian ministers of trade. These agreements 
granted both sides most-favored nation status (as was stipulated by the state treaty) 
and foresaw deliveries of 650 million Austrian schillings per annum, respectively.113 
The most-favored nation status was soon to create problems on both sides. Neverthe-
less, in 1959 the limit had been surpassed and in 1960, a new trade agreement for 
five years was concluded. In this agreement, the Soviet side accepted 60 percent of 
Austrian deliveries stipulated by the state treaty to be part of the volume as agreed 
upon in the new contract. In response, Austria agreed to increase the trade volume.114 
In these five years, Austrian-Soviet trade that had developed within the frame-
work of bilateral clearing had increased almost ten times. Austrian imports from 
the USSR grew from 4.1 (1955) to 40.3 million dollars and the total share of Soviet 
goods imported to Austria had risen from 0.5 to 2.8 percent. Austrian exports to the 
USSR, in the same period, rose from 5.6 to 39.2 million dollars; the Soviet share of 
Austrian exports had risen from 0.8 to 3.5 percent, figures that do not include Austri-
an deliveries resulting from the state treaty. If these were included, the Soviet share 
of Austrian exports in 1960 amounted to 5.5 rather than 3.5 percent. The 1958 “dent” 
in bilateral trade statistics was due to falling Austrian imports of Soviet grain.115











Share of Austrian 
imports
1955 1,145.6 284.2 1.2 1,107.8 200.3 0.5
1956 1,362.6 149.0 1.8 1,186.4 172.9 0.7
1957 1,711.9 196.3 1.7 1,557.1 198.9 1.9
1958 1,526.3 –26.1 1.4 1,569.0 112.1 2.0
1959 1,874.3 166.1 1.6 1,768.3 135.0 2.6
1960 1,020.6 116.7 1.4 1,049.0 135.5 2.8
Source: Butschek, Statistische Reihen;116 Vneshniaia togovlia117
Exports in millions of Austrian schillings; changes and shares in percent.
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Given this positive development in absolute numbers and from the perspective 
of Austrian trade statistics, it may seem surprising that from the Soviet perspective, 
the importance of Austria as an import source fell. Due to the sale of the Soviet 
enterprises in Austria and an increase in Soviet imports in general, the Austrian 
share dropped from 2 percent in 1950 to 1.4 in 1960, while the Western share of 
Soviet imports rose from 16 to 20 percent, and the West German share from 0 to 4 
percent.118 
Nevertheless, in Austrian eyes, the USSR was a huge market waiting for Aus-
trian goods. At the Austrian industrial exhibition in Moscow in May 1959 (the 
first industrial exhibition by a Western democracy in the postwar USSR119), 240 
Austrian companies presented some 4,000 products, which were seen by 300,000 
visitors including Anastas Mikoian and even Nikita Khrushchev.120 The Soviet 
government had embarked on an initiative to boost trade with Western countries; 
among the European states that were approached next was Italy, which was invited 
for a similar exhibit in 1962.121 In the second half of the 1950s, Austrian deliver-
ies to the Soviet market included above all finished and semi-finished investment 
goods, such as machinery, turbines, electric generators and electrical equipment, 
furthermore iron and steel, locomotives, excavators, barges, ships, cable, as well 
as consumer goods, such as shoes and textiles. The first list of products to be of-
fered by Austria for export to the USSR in 1955 contained, among other things, 
two tugboats, twelve hydraulic turbines, some generators, forty-five diesel loco-
motives, and industrial machinery.122 Within a few years, the Soviet Union became 
Austria’s most important customer for equipment, machinery, and cable. In some 
sectors, trade with the USSR was extremely important for the Austrian economy, 
as, for instance, in the shipbuilding industry, in particular the Korneuburg dock-
yards. However, Austrian attempts to export high-tech machinery and even en-
tire steel plants to Eastern Europe, were frustrated by the United States and CO-
COM.123 When Anastas Mikoian visited Vienna, the Ballhausplatz was prepared 
to explain that Austria had to respect the Western embargo as otherwise Austria 
itself would fall under the restrictions.124 Similarly, the provincial government of 
Lower Austria chose to withdraw an application to the Soviet government for a 
twenty-year loan of 500 million schillings, after US diplomats had expressed their 
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concern and made it clear that this deal would make receiving US loans difficult in 
the future.125 
In the 1950s, 80 percent of Soviet exports to Austria consisted of agricultural 
products (grain, corn and cotton), raw materials (such as coal, asbestos, manganese 
and iron ore), and steel. Although the Soviet deliveries of coal grew tenfold, from 
60,000 tons in 1956 to 897,000 tons in 1964, they still could not fully satisfy Aus-
trian demands.126 However, when in 1958 the USSR offered to export more wheat, 
Austrian traders reacted reluctantly and complained about its allegedly poor qual-
ity. In 1960, bilateral trade exceeded two billion schillings.
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5.  Summary: Soviet “Thaw” and the Making of a 
Neutral
The second half of the 1950s was the heyday of the Soviet campaign to undermine 
NATO and other pro-Western blocs by promoting neutrality among its members 
or aspirants. The neutralization of Austria was one of the most prominent results 
of this policy, and the Kremlin was determined to present Austria as an “example” 
for the benefits a Western state might reap from becoming neutral and experienc-
ing “peaceful coexistence” with the Kremlin. That the Austrian model of 1955 was 
not repeated in Western Europe was at least in part due to the Soviet actions after 
the Hungarian declaration of neutrality: Only “few in the West would doubt af-
ter November 1956 that peaceful coexistence was a strategy not a goal; that for 
Khrushchev and others neutrality was merely a vehicle for undermining the unity 
of the free world.”1 While Khrushchev, in his struggle against UN secretary general 
Dag Hammarskjöld, maintained that there were neutral nations but no neutral men,2 
the 1958 Soviet “night frost crisis” against Finland revealed the dark side of being 
neutral and exposed to Soviet pressure and interference in internal affairs. 
 During the first half decade after the signing of the state treaty and the declara-
tion of Austrian neutrality, the communist superpower and the small neutral man-
aged to lay the groundwork for a special relationship. This relationship, based on 
Austria’s need to normalize its relations with the most difficult signatory of the state 
treaty, and on the Soviet determination to make Austria a showcase of neutrality 
and “peaceful coexistence,” weathered the Hungarian hurricane of 1956. After a 
number of months of fierce propaganda, the relations were re-established, as cor-
dial as they had ever been. Despite the setback that political relations received in 
connection with the Soviet intervention in Hungary, Austrian-Soviet relations, for 
the most part, developed on a friendly basis and quite intensively in the first five 
years after the signing of the state treaty. Each country was host to visits from the 
other, the guests including members of the Soviet leadership, the Austrian chancel-
lor and president, as well as countless ministers and delegations, and these visits led 
even to the establishment of personal relationships. 
Neutrality provided the Soviet Union a lever and the Kremlin was determined to 
use it, despite its limitations, to shape Austria’s foreign policy and assign the neu-
tral country a special role. When Austrian leaders did not behave as desired by the 
 1 Hanhimäki, “The Lure of Neutrality,” 268. 
 2 Michael R. Beschloss, Kennedy v. Khrushchev: The Crisis Years, 1960–63 (London: Faber, 1991), 
213. 
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Kremlin, such as during the Hungarian crisis, they were fiercely attacked by the So-
viet media for allegedly violating neutrality; otherwise they were highly praised for 
having chosen this status. They were welcomed in Moscow and were fine hosts to 
visit. They were treated with friendliness, given economic discounts, and invited to 
support Soviet initiatives in order to make them more acceptable to the West. They 
were reminded of what a neutral country, according to the communist doctrine, 
should do and what not, and exposed to repeated Soviet calls for an intensification 
of Soviet-Austrian and Austrian-East European relations. Soviet armed forces were 
offered to defend Austria’s neutrality, as was put forward after the Lebanon crisis 
and during Khrushchev’s tour d’Autriche. If things went as planned by the Soviets, 
the neutral state would not only help the Kremlin to attain a friendlier image and 
move out of its post-1956 isolation, but would also promote the transition of other 
Western states to neutrality. If they did not and the Soviet-Austrian relationship 
was tainted by international or bilateral crises, the Kremlin was prepared to pres-
sure Austrian politicians and to restrain the neutral’s attractiveness by turning on 
the anti-Western propaganda machinery. In this relationship, the Soviet side had 
nothing to lose.
For Austria, the relationship was riskier. A balancing act had to be carried out 
between irritating the East and annoying the West. Overwhelmed by a rain of Soviet 
advances, the Austrian Foreign Ministry began to fear a Soviet tendency “to detach 
countries like Austria and Finland from the Western world and to lead them into 
neutralistic fairways à la India and Egypt.”3 Although nothing like this even nearly 
occurred during the 1950s and although the Austrian government seemed to be on 
guard when Khrushchev attempted to make Austria “some sort of protectorate,”4 
the intense Soviet advances left their mark. Austria’s neutrality was young and, 
therefore, moldable, and Austria’s understanding of neutral policy was shaped by 
the steady stream of Soviet propaganda, criticism and encouragement. Events such 
as the brutal display of Soviet military might in Austria’s neighborhood also had 
a serious impact. Indeed, the Soviet crackdown on the Hungarian revolution made 
a quantum leap in molding Austria’s neutrality; it was an event that reminded the 
neutral’s leaders that the post-state treaty harmony did not rule out armed violence 
forever. It is clear that within only four years after the Soviet intervention in Hun-
gary, the Austrian interpretation of neutral policy had shifted significantly in the 
direction of that of the Soviets.5 While in 1955 neutrality had been conceived by the 
Austrian side primarily as a means for getting “the Russians out” of the country and 
as a purely military and formal matter of staying out of NATO while being part of 
 3 Betrachtungen zum Besuch der öst. Regierungsdelegation in Moskau im Lichte der derzeitigen 
internationalen Lage, 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Sektion II-Pol 1958, Liasse USSR-2.
 4 Chancellor Raab in the 43th Session of the Council of Ministers, 12 July 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, 
BKA, MRP. Cf. Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 603.
 5 Michael Gehler, “From Non-Alignment to Neutrality: Austria’s Transformation during the First 
East-West Détente, 1953–1958,” in Journal of Cold War Studies 7, no. 4 (2005), 104–136. 
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the West, this attitude gave way to a more comprehensive understanding of neutral-
ity and the growing feeling that the country should maintain equidistance between 
the two blocs and superpowers. 
As a consequence of the Soviet’s close watch on its foreign policy conduct, 
Austria rescinded its liberal policy with regard to military transports through Ty-
rol, protested the US overflights, and praised the Soviet contribution to the state 
treaty as having been the most vital. Chancellor Raab’s “Soviet-friendly” course 
found its expression in his readiness to fulfill Russian wishes (e.g. by supporting 
Moscow’s candidature for the World Exposition 1961) while trying to disregard 
Western ones (e.g. compensation for Jewish claims). When Austria, following So-
viet encouragement, announced its intention to join the Belgrade Convention, the 
decision had not been sanctioned by the Western powers, but concerns that joining 
the Convention might contradict neutrality were readily ignored by Raab. Loudly 
praising the reduction of the Austrian “reparations” to the USSR, Khrushchev’s 
“little capitalist” brushed aside the fact that the United States had not only ab-
stained from claiming any reparations at all, but also handed over former Ger-
man property rights in Austria to the Vienna government without compensation 
and even sponsored the country’s reconstruction with the Marshall Plan. In fact, in 
the postwar decade the US had poured roughly as much money into Austria as the 
USSR had taken out. When Kreisky reminded the chancellor that “the littlest we 
receive from the West is more than [the USSR] can give us,” Raab rebuffed him 
by claiming that “the Western powers haven’t made gifts for us either.”6 As a re-
sult of these convictions and his well-known “antipathy towards the Americans,”7 
the chancellor was instrumental in putting the decisions through to host the com-
munist World Youth Festival in Vienna and to allow Khrushchev to address an 
audience on the city’s Heldenplatz. His party colleague Secretary Grubhofer, in 
1960, asserted that Austria had not protested US overflights clearly enough, and 
the social democratic state secretary for defense, Otto Rösch, caused an uproar 
among Western diplomats by declaring that Austria’s neutrality was endangered 
more by NATO than by the East.8 While Kreisky disagreed with these opinions, 
the social democratic party leader, Vice-Chancellor Pittermann, claimed that “the 
Austrian people are beginning to say […] that the Soviet [Union] has given Austria 
ten million dollars (through the recent, dubious oil deal), whereas the United States 
is taking away five million dollars for the persecutee Jewish claimants [i.e. victims 
of the Nazi regime].”9
 6 Verhandlungsniederschrift 42, Council of Ministers, 28 June 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP.
 7 Report by the West German ambassador to Vienna, Carl Hermann Mueller-Graaf, to the West 
German MFA, 4 August 1958, quoted in Kofler, Kennedy und Österreich, 15. 
 8 Kofler, Kennedy und Österreich, 37–38; Röhrlich, Kreiskys Außenpolitik, 125.
 9 FRUS, 1958–1960, IX, 783. An internal fact sheet stated that the US gave Austria at least 1.4 
billion dollars in aid since 1945. Ibid., 786.
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Despite such disagreements, Kreisky, too, declared that he considered Khrush-
chev’s “peace initiative” genuine10 and later went as far as adopting the Soviet 
expression for Austria, a good “example for coexistence.” It is not yet clear to 
what extent this was an intentional strategy or the result of simply adopting Soviet 
propaganda vocabulary, as seems to have been the case in the negotiations for the 
bilateral communiqué of 1960. In addition, Raab and Kreisky began to grasp that 
neutrality and “coexistence” opened several opportunities to break the diplomatic 
isolation Austria had suffered before 1955, to create a new identity for their coun-
try, as well as raise its prestige, wealth, international profile and, thus, security.11 In 
just these years Raab and Kreisky conceived their own Ostpolitik with the inten-
tion of establishing, by means of travel diplomacy, ties to the USSR and later to 
the “people’s democracies.” This also dovetailed with Soviet claims that Austria, 
as a neutral, was obliged to develop friendly relations with all states, including the 
socialist camp.
In contrast to earlier Austrian declarations that neutrality would be limited to 
the military sphere and affect neither freedom of speech nor the individual citizen, 
the Soviet calls for a wide-ranging interpretation of neutrality seem to have been 
not fully in vain: State Secretary Grubhofer’s abortive proposal, made as a result 
of Soviet propaganda, to require the individual citizen to abide by neutrality re-
flected this development, as did Chancellor Raab’s call on Austrian citizens during 
Khrushchev’s visit not to forget that the USSR was a “friendly power.” While it 
had been claimed in 1955 that neutrality would not affect Austria’s external eco-
nomic relations, a similar “broadening” of the Austrian understanding of neutral-
ity was reflected by the thesis, launched by SPÖ representatives such as Kreisky 
and Pittermann12 and then formulated in 1959 by the expert in international law 
Karl Zemanek, that Austria was not entitled to commit itself to any economic ob-
ligations in peacetime that might make neutrality in wartime difficult.13 This was 
relevant particularly with regard to Austria’s intentions to join the European Coal 
and Steel Community. In view of the negative reaction of the Soviets, such plans 
were increasingly considered by Austrian officials as unwise and contradictory to 
neutrality, and they were finally modified. 
These developments in Austria’s official understanding of neutral policy and 
Raab’s and Pittermann’s lopsidedness did not pass unnoticed by a growing number 
of people. Within Austria, Günter Nenning broke a taboo by publicly stating in 
1959 that Austria’s neutrality had not been voluntarily declared but rather forced 
 10 Bruno Kreisky, Neutralität und Koexistenz: Aufsätze und Reden (Munich: List, 1975), 122. 
 11 Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe, 87; Paul Luif, “Austria’s Permanent Neutra-
lity ‒ Its Origins, Development, and Demise,” in Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak 
(eds.), Neutrality in Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies 9 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 
2001), 129–159, esp. 139. 
 12 Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität, 123.
 13 See below, pages 140–141.
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upon the country by Soviet insistence. The journalist also claimed that Austria 
was entitled to abandon its Neutrality Law or to join the EEC.14 Such claims were 
fiercely attacked by Soviet media15 and rejected by Austrian officials and experts 
as legally and historically incorrect. According to them, neutrality was not “a rab-
bit, produced by a Soviet magician out of his top hat,”16 but had actually been part 
of the Austrian government’s deliberations for a long time. Even earlier, in a press 
conference after his return from Moscow in 1958, Raab had felt the need to deny 
“rumors” about the shifting Austrian understanding of neutral policy. In this con-
ference the chancellor underlined that such reports were incorrect, and that “the 
character and content of our neutrality, as adopted by parliament in 1955 in a clear 
and unambiguous manner, did not change in any way, nor did the Soviet Union 
demand such a change.”17 As is often the case, however, denying the correctness of 
the allegation made it appear even more likely. 
A shift regarding Austria’s relationship to the superpowers was noticeable as 
well. Social democratic publicists claimed that the neutral did not take its financial 
obligations to the West seriously; it was criticized that “since the Russian was dan-
gerous and threatening, he got his unjustified share of our oil and products; since 
the West was correct and friendly, it still has to wait.”18 US diplomats deplored 
Austria’s “increasing tendency to try to avoid taking definitive stands on certain 
East-West issues and, in some cases, to adopt an attitude which, in effect, would 
put the US and the USSR on the same moral plane.”19 And the British ambassador 
remarked critically that “Austria is often prepared to avoid angering the Russians at 
the expense of irritating her Western friends.”20 Such developments, together with 
Raab’s excessive praise for the Soviet contributions to the state treaty, Austria’s 
Alleingang to the Belgrade Commission, the government’s foot-dragging regard-
ing the compensation for Jewish victims of the Nazi regime, and last but not least 
Khrushchev’s attacks against the West during his visit to Austria, led to a growing 
distance between Austria and its traditional patron, the United States.21 As a con-
 14 Günther Nenning, “Die Neutralitätslegende,” in Heute, 31 October 1959, 1; “Das ‘Freiwillige’ 
unserer Neutralität,” ibid., 7 November 1959, 4; “Österreich will, was es muss,” ibid., 14 No-
vember 1959, 4; “Neutralität auf Widerruf,” ibid., 21 November 1959, 4; “UNO-Beitritt verletzte 
die Neutralität,” ibid., 28 November 1959, 4; “Neutralität und EWG-Beitritt,” ibid., 5 December 
1959, 5. 
 15 M. Frolow, “Neutralität auf Widerruf?,” in Neue Zeit, no. 51 (1959), 12–14.
 16 Gerald Stourzh, “Zur Geschichte der österreichischen Neutralität,” in Österreich in Geschichte 
und Literatur 5, no. 6 (1961), 273–288, 275. See also Gerald Stourzh and Peter Jankowitsch, “Wie 
steht es mit unserer Neutralität?,” in Heute, 12 December 1959, 6.
 17 Ausführungen des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in der Pressekonferenz, Beilage 1 zu Ministerratsproto-
koll 88, Council of Ministers, 29 June 1958, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP
 18 Heute, 14 February 1959, 1
 19 FRUS, 1958–1960, IX, 775. 
 20 Quoted in Kofler, Kennedy und Österreich, 38.
 21 Rathkolb, Washington ruft Wien, 132.
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sequence, the US froze payments from the ERP counterpart funds for two years. 
Distancing Austria from the US was not among the least of the Soviet objectives. 
In the 1960s, this trend, as well as the amicable Soviet-Austrian atmosphere, con-
tinued. However, new burdens were put on the bilateral relationship.
II.  OVERCAST, BUT FRIENDLY? 
1961–1972
“[T]here are no universally recognized international legal norms for the policy of neutrality in 
peacetime.” Lev Voronkov, Non-Nuclear Status to Northern Europe (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), 27.

6.  The USSR, Austria’s Rapprochement with the EEC, 
and the Convocation of the CSCE
After the Berlin and Cuban crises, international relations steered into less troubled 
waters and the conclusion of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 signaled rising 
chances for a superpower détente. By the end of the year the treaty had been rati-
fied by twenty-three countries. Austria deposited its ratification document in July 
1964. By the time Malawi, which had recently gained independence, did so in 
November, Khrushchev’s reign in the Kremlin had come to an end. Owing to his 
foreign-political rollercoaster course, his tendency to abandon collective decision-
making, and his failure to stabilize the ailing Soviet economy, the leader had been 
ousted in October by a group of Politburo members and his political protégé Leonid 
Brezhnev. A novice in foreign policy, the new CPSU leader was less ambitious to 
dictate his private wishes than Khrushchev had been.1 Therefore, he relied on the 
loyal Gromyko and the technocratic premier Aleksei Kosygin, while defining the 
strategic goals as a primus inter pares of the leadership. It was only in the wake of 
the rapprochement with West Germany in 1969 that Brezhnev assumed supremacy 
in high diplomacy.2 While the change from Khrushchev to Brezhnev calmed the 
character of Soviet foreign policy, the dichotomy of competitive “coexistence,” 
i.e. the tension between the promotion of détente abroad and the military build-up, 
remained unchanged.3 The Soviet crushing of the “Prague Spring” of 1968 demon-
strated that democratization, even if loyal to Moscow, was more than the Kremlin 
was willing to accept among its satellites. 
Both, the blossoming of the Czechoslovakian reform movement and the Soviet 
decision to end it, were alleviated by détente. Before the Soviet invasion, Gromyko 
had anticipated that “the international relations now are such that extreme meas-
ures cannot produce aggravation of the international situation. There will be no big 
war.”4 Indeed, after the events had taken place, the West did not terminate détente 
 1 Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva, 69–72.
 2 Andrey Edemskiy, “Dealing with Bonn: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Response to West Ger-
man Ostpolitik,” in Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (eds.), Ostpolitik, 1969–1974: European and 
Global Responses (Cambridge: University Press, 2009), 15–38, 22. 
 3 Svetlana Savranskaya and William Taubman, “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1962–1975,” in Melvyn 
P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War II: Crises and 
Détente (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 134–157, 134. For “competitive coexistence,” see 
Stephan Merl, “Außenpolitik und Wettlauf der Systeme,” in Stefan Plaggenborg (ed.), Handbuch 
der Geschichte Russlands V/1 (Stuttgart : Hiersemann, 2002), 273–308, 279.
 4 Quoted in Zubok, A Failed Empire, 208. Emphasis mine.
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nor did it isolate the aggressor, and the Soviet leadership saw the continuation of 
détente as proof of the “rising strength of the socialist camp.” On the Western side, 
détente had been initiated as a result of European hopes of reducing the threat of 
war on the continent. The neutrals had contributed to making the Soviet Union 
an acceptable partner for dialog and trade, in 1964 Italy signed a long-term trade 
agreement with the USSR as the first NATO and EEC member,5 and the subse-
quent Soviet-French rapprochement brought détente to fruition.6 Five years later, 
the Kremlin’s policy of isolating the FRG gave way to an even more spectacular 
rapprochement that outshone all other Soviet partnerships in Western Europe. The 
relaxation of tension was also supported by the United States, and in 1967 the 
Harmel Report welcomed the developments.7 From the Soviet perspective, the new 
trend was to serve an old aim. After Brezhnev had received the prime ministers of 
Norway, Denmark and Sweden in 1965, he revealed to his comrades: “Our recep-
tion of the Scandinavians, our relations now with France ‒ they are all steps for 
undermining NATO.”8 
Keeping in mind the unfriendly Soviet attitude towards the emerging West Euro-
pean Economic Community, one might add: “and the EEC.” European integration, 
both in the East and the West, and the Cold War were “separate but intertwined” 
phenomena.9 Hence, it does not come as a surprise that the Kremlin ‒ after a brief 
“thaw”10 in 1962 ‒ continued to condemn the Common Market as a hostile organi-
zation and watched jealously when three European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and Austria, drew nearer to the organization. For some reason, Austria was the most 
attentively watched among the three; indeed, some West European political lead-
 5 Gromyko and Ponomarjow, Geschichte der sowjetischen Außenpolitik 1945 bis 1976, 544. On 
Soviet-Italian détente, see I. A. Khormach, SSSR – Italiia i blokovoe protivostoianie v Evrope 
(Moscow: Institut Rossiiskoi istorii Rossiiskoi akademii nauk, 2005), 797–845.
 6 On French-Soviet détente, see Marie-Pierre Rey, La tentation du rapprochement: France et URSS 
à l’heure de la détente 1964–1974 (Paris: Sorbonne, 1991); Newton, Russia, France, and the Idea 
of Europe, 57–104.
 7 Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Détente in Europe, 1962–1975,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War II: Crises and Détente (Cambridge: Universi-
ty Press, 2010), 198–218, 207. Cf. Mark Trachtenberg, “The Structure of Great Power Politics, 
1963–1975,” ibid., 483–502, 484; and Angela Romano, From Détente in Europe to European 
Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), 67–71.
 8 Stenogramma vystupleniia L. Brezhneva na vstreche s rukovoditeliami raionnykh komitetov par-
tii, 12 July 1965, in Kudriashov (ed.), General’nyi sekretar’ L.I. Brezhnev, 32–51, 47. 
 9 N. Piers Ludlow, “European Integration and the Cold War,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne 
Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War II: Crises and Détente (Cambridge: Uni-
versity Press, 2010), 179–197, 179. 
 10 In 1962, Khrushchev had announced his readiness to recognize the EEC, but after the failure of 
the British accession to the Brussels club, he seems to have lost interest in it. Wolfgang Mueller, 
“Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” in Michael Gehler (ed.), From the Common Mar-
ket to European Union Building: 50 Years of the Rome Treaties (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), 617–662, 
631–640. 
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ers, Paul Henri Spaak among them, saw Austria’s rapprochement with the EEC as 
a way to “free” the country from the neutrality that the USSR had “imposed” upon 
it.11
While the Soviet leaders must have realized that their hopes to dismantle NATO 
and the EEC by neutralizing Western Europe would materialize less quickly than 
expected, their interest in neutrality did not cease, but it changed somewhat. In 
the wake of the big bang of decolonization, the Soviet focus shifted to the nona-
ligned, which at the 1961 Belgrade summit numbered twenty-five countries, among 
them no less than twenty-one that had previously hosted Western military bases.12 
Denying their soil to foreign troops was advantageous for the USSR. As Soviet 
propaganda often pointed out, a certain parallelism of interests existed between the 
nonaligned and socialist states.13 Taken together, the nonaligned and the socialist 
countries comprised two thirds of the global population. In addition, the USSR 
could score propagandistic points in the United Nations ‒ to which the new nations 
were admitted ‒ by supporting the nonaligned states’ struggle for decolonization 
and nondiscrimination. In return, the USSR received the nonaligned countries’ sup-
port for Soviet proposals on disarmament and “anti-imperialism.”
The increased interest in nonalignment did not mean, however, as was stressed 
by the Soviet media, that permanent neutrality had become obsolete.14 While some 
authors claimed that neutrality was a bulwark against European integration and 
condemned the neutrals for their interest in joining the EEC,15 others criticized 
“that the permanent neutrality of Switzerland and Austria, and the traditional neu-
trality of Sweden ‒ in contrast to the active and dynamic Afro-Asian neutralism ‒ is 
significantly more passive and plays a less positive role in international relations.”16 
Such passivity was deemed incorrect, for not only the nonaligned states, but also 
the permanent neutrals should “take an active part in the struggle for world peace 
and security, peaceful coexistence of states and international friendship.”17 It would 
be wrong, however, to assume that such Soviet appeals aimed exclusively at en-
couraging neutrals to support Soviet initiatives against “imperialism.” There were 
other projects for which the Kremlin desired endorsement by the neutral states, in 
particular the idea of an all-European conference designed to legitimize the postwar 
 11 Michael Gehler, “Von Unabhängigkeitsgaranten zu internationalen Partnern: Die Signatarmächte 
des österreichischen Staatsvertrages 1955–2005,” in Christian Fornwagner and Richard Schober 
(eds.), Freiheit und Wiederaufbau: Tirol in den Jahren um den Staatsvertrag (Innsbruck: Univer-
sitätsverlag Wagner, 2007), 21–36, 26. 
 12 Vigor, The Soviet View, 190; Lyon, Neutralism, 177–195.
 13 Allison, The Soviet Union and the Strategy of Non-Alignment, 23.
 14 Ganiushkin, Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie, 179–180.
 15 Osnitskaya, “Neutrality and the Common Market”; K. Timashkova, “Neitral’nye strany v uslo-
viiakh imperialisticheskoi integratsii,” in M.M. Maksimova (ed.), Ekonomicheskie gruppirovki v 
zapadnoi Evropy (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 269–280.
 16 Ganiushkin, Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie, 176. 
 17 Mojoryan [Modzhorian], “Neutrality in Present-Day International Law,” 219. 
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order, to foster détente in the West, and to weaken the cohesion of NATO and the 
EEC. In the early Brezhnev period, this project shifted to the top of the agenda. As 
we shall see, it was the neutrals who were chosen by the Kremlin to promote this 
idea.
The Soviet attitude towards an Austrian rapprochement with the EEC, 
1959–1963
Although the Soviet Union had not been able to prevent Austria from accepting 
Marshall Plan aid or from joining, in 1948, the US-launched Organization for Eu-
ropean Economic Cooperation (OEEC), it had never stopped criticizing these de-
cisions.18 In the following years, the Kremlin condemned the gradual West Euro-
pean economic integration as being an American ploy to strengthen economically 
NATO’s dominance and to remilitarize West Germany.19 In order not to complicate 
the state treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union, the Austrian government, de-
spite its interest in joining the European Coal and Steel Community as an associ-
ate member, did not pursue this goal for some time after negotiations on tariffs 
between Austria and the ECSC failed in the fall of 1954.20 The Soviet side did not 
miss any opportunity, in conversations with Austrian diplomats, to point out the 
community’s aim “to put small members into a straitjacket.”21 After the conclusion 
of the state treaty, Moscow continued to keep an eye on any Austrian ambitions to 
participate in West European integration. 
The Austrian decision to join the Council of Europe, a decision that was taken 
despite Chancellor Raab’s reservations, was heavily criticized by the Austrian com-
munist press and the Soviet media, with Pravda, on 8 February 1956, even accusing 
Austria of violating neutrality.22 The Soviet ambassador in Vienna was instructed 
 18 Wilfried Mähr, Der Marshallplan in Österreich (Graz: Styria, 1989), 106–115. This also held true 
for the 1960s. Radio Moscow, 19 May 1961. On the Marshall Plan in Austria cf. Günter Bischof 
and Dieter Stiefel (eds.), 80 Dollar: 50 Jahre ERP-Fonds und Marshall-Plan in Österreich (Vi-
enna: Ueberreuter, 1999); Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka, and Dieter Stiefel (eds.), The Marshall 
Plan in Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies 8 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2000).
 19 Mueller, “The Soviet Union and Early West European Integration,” 83. 
 20 Gehler, Der lange Weg nach Europa: Darstellung, 139, 163–164. The Soviet side assessed that 
the conditions offered by the ECSC were too strict for Austria, which had hoped to enjoy con-
ditions reserved for ECSC members without joining the community. Bericht der Abteilung für 
innenpolitische und wirtschaftliche Fragen, 5 October 1954, in Karner, Stelzl-Marx, Tschubarjan 
(eds.), Die Rote Armee in Österreich: Dokumente, 779–783.
 21 Austrian embassy Rome to Austrian MFA, 15 April 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 321.383–
pol/55, Z. 321.383–pol/55.
 22 Merhaut-Gurevitsch, “Die Innen- und Außenpolitik Österreichs,” 76–81. Cf. Izvestiia, 13 January 
and 22 February 1956. See also Wolfgang Burtscher, “Österreichs Annäherung an den Europarat 
von 1949 bis zur Vollmitgliedschaft im Jahre 1956,” in Waldemar Hummer and Gerhard Wag-
ner (eds.), Österreich im Europarat 1956–1986: Bilanz einer 30jährigen Mitgliedschaft (Vienna: 
Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988), 37–52; and Walter Schwim-
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not to react positively, but nevertheless not to obstruct Austria’s accession.23 Soviet 
legal experts considered Austria’s membership in the Council “not a direct viola-
tion of neutrality” as long “as article 1 of the statute of the Council of Europe is 
observed and all questions of military issues are excluded from the organization’s 
sphere of action.”24
However, the focus of Soviet criticism soon returned to Austria’s rapproche-
ment with the ECSC, an effort that had been renewed after the state treaty was 
signed. In March 1956, the Soviet ambassador in Vienna, Sergei Lapin, recom-
mended publishing “in the Soviet press an article about the ECSC and our negative 
attitudes towards this organization.”25 Vienna, which had announced its application 
for membership in the ECSC in October 1956, dropped it during the Soviet inter-
vention in Hungary, after the majority of Austria’s leaders had come to the con-
clusion that full membership was incompatible with neutrality.26 Nonetheless, the 
Kremlin remained vigilant. On 10 February 1957, Izvestiia warned that Austria’s 
membership in the ECSC would not be compatible, on one hand, with neutrality, or 
with the state treaty, on the other. Making these opinions known had been suggested 
by the Soviet embassy in Austria and was quickly approved by the Soviet Foreign 
Ministry, which ordered its media to “publish, within three to four months,” several 
newspaper articles and radio broadcasts in this regard.27 
The Soviet argument, as put forward by Professor Tunkin, ran that the ECSC 
was an industrial basis of NATO and that therefore membership would violate neu-
trality; secondly, within the community, West Germany was the dominating coun-
try, which is why joining the ECSC would mean a new Anschluss and, thus, violate 
the anti-Anschluss clause of the state treaty.28 This second point was obviously con-
sidered necessary by the Soviet ministry, since the reference to neutrality was not 
without weaknesses; the ECSC was definitely not a military alliance.29 However, 
pointing out the FRG’s dominating position within the ECSC was not much more 
mer, “Der Europarat: Entstehungsgeschichte, Rolle und Stellenwert für Österreich,” in Waldemar 
Hummer (ed.), Österreich im Europarat 1956–2006: Bilanz einer 50jährigen Mitgliedschaft (Vi-
enna: Böhlau, 2008), 55–96. 
 23 Michael Gehler, “Austria and the European Integration,” in Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller 
(eds.), Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold 
War and Détente, 1955–1989 (Vienna: Lit, 2009), 143–163, 146. 
 24 Ganiushkin, Sovremennyi neitralitet, 130.
 25 Lapin to Semenov, 19 March 1956, in AVPRF, 66/35/66/26, 1–4.
 26 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 175. Cf. Florian Weiß, “‘Gesamtverhalten: Nicht in den Vorder-
grund stellen.’ Die österreichische Bundesregierung und die westeuropäische Integration 1947–
1957,” in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger (eds.), Österreich und die europäische Integration 
1945–1993 (Vienna: Böhlau, 1993), 21–54; Schweitzer, Dauernde Neutralität, 207–208.
 27 Lapin to Zorin, 21 November 1956; Tunkin to Aleksandrov, 12 December 1956; Lavrichenko to 
Aleksandrov, 20 December 1956, all in AVPRF, 66/35/66/26, 5–6, 19–20. 
 28 Tunkin to Aleksandrov, 12 December 1956, in AVPRF, 66/35/66/26, 19.
 29 Black, Falk, Knorr, and Young, Neutralization and World Politics, 58.
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convincing, since it was hardly possible to equate the Coal and Steel Community 
with a new incarnation of Hitler’s Greater Germany. 
The project of creating a European Free Trade Area (FTA) within the OEEC, 
launched by the United Kingdom in 1956, seemed just as unacceptable to the 
Kremlin, which considered it “directed against the USSR.”30 Soviet ambassador 
Lapin repeatedly questioned members of the Austrian government about their at-
titude towards the project, suspecting that membership would be “used as a cam-
ouflage for joining the ECSC.” He concluded that membership with either would 
be incompatible with the state treaty.31 Austria nevertheless joined the FTA negotia-
tions and, despite the fact that on 24 September 1957 Pravda stressed that Austria’s 
participation in a future European Free Trade Area would have an “unfavorable” 
effect on the country’s neutrality,32 the Austrian government even announced in 
the summer of 1958 that it considered signing a contract with the recently founded 
European Economic Community (EEC) of France, West Germany, Italy and the 
Benelux countries.33 Long before the failure of the FTA project in November, the 
highly respected Austrian daily Die Presse, by arguing that a full integration of 
neutral Austria into the Common Market would prevent the latter from turning into 
a branch of NATO, had sent up a trial balloon to find out whether this point would 
make Austria’s membership in the EEC better digestible for Moscow.34 This argu-
ment, however, did not convince the Kremlin. On 22 January 1959, Pravda warned 
that “certain political circles” aimed at wrecking neutrality and pushing Austria into 
the EEC, and brought forward the thesis that Western economic integration would 
threaten Austria’s independence.
In the meantime, among the Austrian political parties the debate concerning 
the country’s relationship to the EEC intensified. In 1955, possible negative con-
sequences of Austria’s newly adopted neutral status with regard to trade and the 
economy in general and economic integration in particular had been either denied 
or ignored by both the Austrian elite and the general population.35 However, when, 
some years later, economic and industrialist groups within the ÖVP and the right-
wing FPÖ advocated Austria’s participation in European integration, full mem-
bership in the EEC was declared legally incompatible with neutrality not only by 
Foreign Minister Kreisky and the social democrats, but also by a majority of the 
 30 Mueller, “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” 626.
 31 Conversation Lapin with Lugmayer, 8 February 1957; Lapin with Bock, 22 February 1957; Lapin 
with Kreisky, 8 April 1957, in AVPRF, 66/36/68/10, 4–5, 9–11, 18–20.
 32 Cf. Oskar Wictora, 10 Jahre österreichische Integrationspolitik 1956–1966 (Vienna: Bundesmi-
nisterium für Handel und Wiederaufbau, [1966]), 26.
 33 Rudolf Kirchschläger, “Integration und Neutralität,” in Erich Bielka, Peter Jankowitsch, Hans 
Thalberg (eds.), and Reinhold Wagnleitner (red.), Die Ära Kreisky: Schwerpunkte österreichi-
scher Außenpolitik (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1983), 61–95, 63–72. 
 34 Gehler, Der lange Weg: Darstellung, 180.
 35 Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität, 61.
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country’s international law experts, led by Karl Zemanek and Alfred Verdross.36 
This was a strange alliance: Austrian social democrats abhorred the Common Mar-
ket mainly for ideological and protectionist reasons, SPÖ chairman Pittermann 
in summer 1959 criticizing it as a “bourgeois bloc.” In contrast, the basis of Ze-
manek’s and Verdross’ claims was that, in accordance with the Swiss doctrine, 
neutral policy (which hitherto had not been defined in Austria) would not allow 
the acceptance of any economic obligations in peacetime which might restrict the 
neutral’s freedom of action during a war. ÖVP leader Raab also called for the care-
ful adherence to neutrality. Kreisky and Pittermann even went so far as to subscribe 
to the Soviet thesis that joining the EEC would mean a violation of not only the 
country’s neutrality but also the Soviet-Austrian Moscow memorandum and the 
anti-Anschluss clause of the state treaty ‒ an interpretation that was rejected by 
international law professor Felix Ermacora.37 Within the debate, which stretched 
well into the 1970s, Soviet and Austrian communist38 voices underlined their call 
for “total” neutrality. This obviously did not fail to have an impact on the Austrian 
side’s increasing tendency to interpret neutrality extensively and thus to rule out 
EEC membership.
It was decided to join the newly-founded European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and to hold talks on a multilateral association between the EEC and EFTA. 
Only after a Soviet memorandum, dated 28 January 1960, demanded an Austrian 
declaration that the creation of EFTA would not have any consequences for Soviet 
foreign trade,39 on 5 April Austria officially informed the USSR that it had joined 
the recently founded association. This was a significant deviation from the course 
of Austria’s co-neutral Finland, which, after its rapprochement to EFTA had been 
criticized by the USSR, chose only to become an associate member. The associa-
tion was obviously viewed by Soviet leaders with less hostility than the stronger 
EEC. While EFTA’s existence was presented by Soviet propaganda as proof of 
the correctness of the Marxist-Leninist theory of intercapitalist contradictions, the 
organization was denounced by Soviet voices as another “closed bloc” and an ob-
 36 Verdross, Die immerwährende Neutralität der Republik (1966), 17; idem, Die immerwährende 
Neutralität Österreichs, 66–72; Zemanek, “Wirtschaftliche Neutralität,” 249–251. Cf. Schweit-
zer, Dauernde Neutralität, 246; Anselm Skuhra, “Österreichs Sicherheitspolitik,” in Herbert 
Dachs et al. (eds.), Politik in Österreich (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 838–854; Paul Luif, Der Wandel 
der österreichischen Neutralität: Ist Österreich ein sicherheitspolitischer „Trittbrettfahrer“? 2nd 
ed. (Vienna: Austrian Institute for International Affairs, 1998), 13–16.
 37 Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität, 114–116.
 38 Aurel B.J. Moser, “Die Stellung der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs zur österreichischen 
Neutralitätspolitik von 1955–1972” (PhD Thesis, Salzburg, 1973), 183–184. Moser’s character-
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stacle for East-West trade.40 A Soviet memorandum of 20 May deplored Austria’s 
decision, once again condemned the formation of blocs, and attacked EFTA as 
being linked to NATO. Furthermore, with reference to the Austrian-Soviet trade 
agreement of 1955, Austria was called on to grant the Soviet Union the same trade 
conditions as within the Free Trade Association.41 Since this would have gone 
against the association’s rules, Austria and all other EFTA founding members re-
fused; only EFTA associate Finland agreed. As a consequence, tariffs on Soviet 
goods were up to 70 percent higher than those on comparable goods from the 
EFTA area, and the USSR, after protesting such “discrimination,”42 in a retaliatory 
move, raised tariffs on Austrian goods imported to the USSR, until now 7 percent, 
to 20 percent.43 
During his visit to Austria in the summer of 1960, Khrushchev had criticized 
both the EEC and EFTA as being obstacles to free trade between East and West,44 
warned against the country’s rapprochement with the former and declared it incom-
patible with neutrality. The question, however, became increasingly important in 
the spring of 1961. When Alfons Gorbach45 took over the chancellorship from the 
neutralist-leaning Raab, it was signaled by the Soviet media that he was expected 
to be just as staunch a defender of neutrality as his much-praised predecessor had 
been.46 However, the change in leadership to Gorbach, who strongly advocated Eu-
ropean integration, and pressure from his party’s youth and trade organizations had 
an impact on the government’s strategy, while at the international level, the British 
and Danish applications for EEC membership brought the other EFTA states under 
pressure to regulate their relationships to the Common Market. All EFTA neutrals, 
i.e. Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, came to the conclusion that an association 
with the EEC, provided that it curbed neither the neutrals’ treaty-making powers 
nor their right to withdraw, would not impede neutrality.47 Despite warnings and 
criticism voiced by Soviet diplomats,48 by International Affairs in January and May 
 40 Mueller, “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” 628; Conversation Haymerle with Pato-
lichev, 9 December 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. Berichte Moskau.
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Länder, UdSSR 1, File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962.
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and by Radio Moscow on 25 and 26 April about plans “to incorporate Austria into 
the Common Market,” the Austrian government shortly thereafter declared itself 
ready for negotiations with the EEC ‒ in its declaration, however, the government 
stressed its intention to stick to neutrality.49 While the EEC Commission reacted 
by stating that neutrality was not compatible with full membership in the EEC but 
only with an association to the community, the Soviet ambassador in Vienna, Viktor 
Avilov, on 27 August, handed over a note claiming that the EEC was closely linked 
to NATO, that any negotiations with the community would contradict neutrality, 
and asking for explanations regarding Austria’s intentions.50 The federal govern-
ment, in a note of reply that was handed over on 2 October, answered that it was 
seeking an economic arrangement only, and would not commit itself to any obli-
gations that might jeopardize Austria’s international status51 ‒ an assurance that, 
however, did not convince the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Hence, the systematic at-
tempts by Soviet diplomats to warn their Austrian colleagues against the EEC con-
tinued.52 Even earlier, during a visit to Vienna in June, Foreign Minister Gromyko 
had warned that the Common Market was “a bad thing.”53 In a conversation with 
Leopold Figl, the usually grim diplomat went as far as acknowledging that Austria 
had hitherto maintained and earned credit for a “good policy of neutrality” ‒ an 
achievement that would be at risk if Austria continued to tend towards becoming 
associated with the EEC.
In the following months, the atmosphere surrounding such conversations dete-
riorated. In November the deputy director of the Soviet ministry’s Third European 
Department, Aleksandr Bondarenko, in a conversation with Austrian diplomats at-
tempted to equate the EEC with a new Anschluss. He observed that in Austria until 
then only isolated groups had advocated a “rapprochement with West Germany,” 
whereas now even members of the government claimed that membership in the 
Common Market was compatible with neutrality. He refused to accept that Austria 
was only discussing an associative membership in the Community. After this con-
 49 Kirchschläger, “Integration und Neutralität,” 79–80.
 50 Sowjetisches Aide-Mémoire, 27 August 1961, Abschrift, Anlage 9, in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 1, 
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versation, the Austrian ambassador in his report to the Ballhausplatz warned, with 
an eye to the recent Soviet-Finnish “note crisis,” that “we cannot guarantee that 
the Austrian government won’t be confronted with similar Soviet pressure.”54 The 
Soviet demands of Finnish-Soviet military consultations according to the bilateral 
Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, demands that were underpinned by the detona-
tion of a Soviet 50-megaton nuclear device, had come after Denmark, Norway, and 
the FRG had discussed joint naval defenses in the Baltic Sea. It was therefore most 
probably a Soviet attempt to isolate West Germany and to forestall what Moscow 
perceived as a shift in the delicate Nordic Balance. In addition, the imminent presi-
dential elections in Finland might have contributed to the Kremlin’s insecurity.55 
The entire affair appeared even more dangerous, as it overlapped with the Berlin 
crisis and occurred only two months after the erection of the Berlin Wall. In its 
internal assessment, the embassy in Moscow warned that the Soviet government, 
in order to exert pressure on Austria, might withdraw its recognition of neutrality, 
and it recommended remaining alert to the possibility of a similar Soviet-Austrian 
crisis. However, such an event was deemed unlikely before Austria’s negotiations 
with the EEC had officially started. 
Despite warnings by the local correspondent in Pravda on 1 December 1961 
that an Austrian “cold Anschluss” with the EEC would harm the country’s economy 
and turn the neutral into a colony of NATO,56 and despite the “amicable” but criti-
cal Soviet memorandum of 12 December, which warned against the “enemies of 
neutrality” and equated the Common Market with the Atlantic organization,57 three 
days later the neutral EFTA members Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland applied for 
association with the EEC. On 19 October, the foreign ministers of the three neutrals 
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had reached agreement on their attitude to the organization.58 With the unspoken 
final aim of participating in the Common Market and regulating its relations to the 
ECSC, Austria, in July 1962, declared itself ready to harmonize its tariffs, trade 
policy and other areas of its economic relations with the Common Market, and 
to support the principles of the Rome Treaties as far as its neutral status allowed. 
However, Austria reserved “a certain measure of its freedom of action towards third 
countries,” the right not to participate in economic sanctions that were directed 
against third parties and that exclusively served political aims, and the right to take 
“certain measures” in the case of war.59 
The move was followed by a full blown East European campaign against the 
neutral’s attempted rapprochement with Brussels. Still in December 1961, the Hun-
garian prime minister, Gyula Kallay, repeated the Soviet theses, in January 1962 
Czech and Polish newspapers followed suit, in February the Soviet delegate to 
the United Nations Zorin focused his criticism on Austria, and in March, a Czech 
memorandum to Vienna expressed concern that an Austrian arrangement with the 
EEC would violate the state treaty. While the Soviet diplomatic statements vis-à-vis 
Austrian officials were voiced for the most part in a friendly and cautionary man-
ner, the East European allies were more outspoken and their propaganda was not 
friendly at all.60 If the early Soviet warnings had left it unclear whether they were 
referring to Austria’s membership in the EEC or to an association with it, Pravda’s 
10 February 1962 article explicitly mentioned the latter, which was declared just as 
unacceptable as a membership in the community.61 On 13 March, Izvestiia repeated 
that “any arrangement” with the EEC would force Austria to give up neutrality. The 
fact that Moscow, seemingly indiscriminately, switched in its terminology from 
a condemnation of Austria’s “Anschluss” to the EEC to its association, from an 
“arrangement of any form” to membership and back again, seems to have been a 
deliberate tactic to unsettle the Austrian leaders’ convictions and to limit their room 
to maneuver with Brussels and in the internal Austrian discussion.62 
In general, five points were brought forward by Soviet propaganda and legal 
statements warning against the integration of European neutrals into the Common 
Market. 1) Since the EEC, in Soviet eyes, was allegedly an economic basis for 
 58 Alan S. Milward, “European Uses of Neutrality,” in Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit 
1, no. 1 (2001), 103–116, 110. 
 59 Österreichische Erklärung vor dem EWG-Ministerrat, 28 July 1962, in Österreichische Zeitschrift 
für Außenpolitik 2 (1961–62), 288–294. 
 60 Gehler, Der lange Weg: Darstellung, 216–217.
 61 Dienstzettel des Außenministeriums über sowjetische Äußerungen zur Frage der Assoziierung 
Österreichs an die EWG, 22 May 1964, in Gehler, Der lange Weg: Dokumente, 346–349, 347. Cf. 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 2 (1961–62), 186–187.
 62 Report Haymerle, 22 June 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 67129–6/64, Z. 75215–6/64. 
Overviews of the terminology used in Soviet warnings against various forms of arrangements 
with the EEC are in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 44264–6/66, Z. 48063–6pol/66; ibid., GZ. 
17042–6/67, Z. 31717–6/67; SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR, 2.
146 Overcast, but Friendly? 1961‒1972 
NATO, membership in it was deemed intolerable for a neutral. 2) Membership in 
a supranational organization such as the EEC was seen as damaging a neutral’s 
sovereignty and, thus, its ability to maintain neutrality. 3) Since the EEC, by its 
nature, like all regional economic organizations, treated outsiders differently from 
members, this was seen as a violation of the Soviet thesis that neutrals were obliged 
not to discriminate against third countries. 4) The close ties to NATO of most EEC 
countries would make it impossible for the neutrals to maintain neutrality in war-
time. 5) All claims that it might be possible to limit the obligations for neutrals by 
their being associates rather than members of the EEC were unjustified and merely 
a “maneuver” to blind the public.63 Or as Soviet legal expert Ganiushkin argued: If 
the EEC had not accepted a special relationship with mighty Britain, why should 
the small neutrals receive special conditions? G. Osnitskaia, in an article for the 
Soviet monthly International Affairs, declared that any hopes of preserving neu-
trality while an associate member of the EEC were “illusory.” Since the Brussels 
club would “require the associated state to fulfill definite commitments to the Com-
mon Market,” Osnitskaia argued, “any form of association, partnership or any other 
variant of cooperation with this organization cannot guarantee the preservation of 
neutrality in a state that agrees to such cooperation.”64 
Most of these allegations were debatable: The EEC was hardly identical with 
NATO, the Common Market’s supranationality was anything but fully achieved, 
and its discrimination against outsiders was similar to the principles of other re-
gional trade organizations. Regarding the compatibility between neutrality and an 
associative membership in the EEC, the Soviet posture was clearly inconsistent: 
Whereas the West European neutrals were attacked for their desire to gain associa-
tive membership in the EEC, African associates of the same organization were still 
recognized by Soviet propaganda as being neutral or nonaligned.65 
For Austria, the rest of the Soviet arguments against an association with the 
EEC remained the same as they had been regarding its rapprochement with the 
ECSC; both organizations were allegedly supporters of NATO and therefore unac-
ceptable organizations for a neutral state to join; the FRG was the leading country 
in the ECSC and EEC, and therefore a rapprochement between Austria and either 
of the communities would lead to a new Anschluss and thus be incompatible with 
the state treaty. The warnings against a new Anschluss were underlined by repeated 
Soviet criticism of veterans’ meetings in Austria and the country’s mild treatment 
of neo-Nazis.66 The Austrian position ‒ that an association with the EEC would not 
interfere with neutrality ‒ was rejected by Soviet law experts, who emphasized the 
“political character” of the community and argued that any association with the 
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Common Market would limit Austria’s freedom of action towards third parties and 
thus also curb neutrality.67 
Roughly the same points were made by Austrian international law experts, who 
pointed at the failure of the Austrian-German tariffs union of 1931. Nevertheless, 
on several occasions Austrian officials tried to explain that Austria’s interest in an 
arrangement with the EEC was strictly economic and that this would not dimin-
ish Austria’s ability to fulfill its international obligations. In a conversation with 
Avilov, Foreign Minister Kreisky referred to recent Soviet hints that even the USSR 
might be ready for relations with the EEC, but he could not convince the ambassa-
dor.68 Khrushchev had, indeed, in 1962 sent out some friendly signals regarding the 
establishment of mutual relations with the Brussels club, but later, once the British 
accession to the EEC had failed, he did not follow up on the matter.69
Four main reasons for the Soviet policy with regard to the European neutrals’ 
striving towards the EEC can be extrapolated. First of all, the Kremlin was interest-
ed in preserving the status quo it had achieved in Europe after World War II.70 This 
status quo was comprised of a Western sphere of power, a Soviet-controlled power 
sphere in Eastern Europe, and some neutral states in between. It was in Soviet inter-
ests to keep the Western sphere as weak as possible. “Divide and rule” long served 
as the motto of Moscow’s policies towards Western Europe. An alarming aspect of 
European integration was, however, that the continent’s capitalist areas seemed to 
be increasingly unified and less involved in intracapitalist struggles than had been 
preached in Marxism-Leninism. From the Kremlin’s perspective, any form of West 
European integration ran counter to the Soviet aim of keeping the West divided and 
playing Western states (including the US) off one another. It was part of the Soviet 
strategy, therefore, to obstruct, as far as possible, the emergence of a strong and 
integrated Western bloc, to hamper European integration by building strong ties to 
the EEC’s individual member states, to fan intra-European differences, and to deter 
potential member states or associates from joining and strengthening the commu-
nity, which was depicted as an economic basis for NATO. In his crusade against the 
Common Market, Khrushchev even went as far as encouraging EEC members such 
as Italy and France to leave the community.
Secondly, the Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe as had been accomplished 
by 1945 seemed endangered, on one hand, by growing economic difficulties and 
public discontent in the Eastern bloc, and on the other, by the wealth and hence, the 
attractiveness of Western Europe. The Soviet propaganda war orchestrated from the 
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early 1950s against West European integration, therefore, aimed at least as much at 
deterring East Europeans from the temptations of European integration and pros-
perity, as at abetting West Europeans to resist their governments’ “wicked plans.”71 
If the neutrals now joined the EEC, this would seriously undermine the Soviet 
strategy of depicting European integration as an evil ploy. 
The third reason for Soviet dissatisfaction was that the European ambitions of 
the neutrals ran counter to their role as it had been envisaged by the Kremlin in 
1955 and still was. This applied not only to Austria; the same can be said about 
Soviet plans regarding Finland, Switzerland, and Sweden. A common trait of these 
states was that they were not part of the Western bloc. If their rapprochement with 
the EEC succeeded, from the Soviet perspective, they would become even more 
“Western” than they already were and, as a consequence, would also draw nearer 
to other Western institutions such as NATO. To the Soviet leaders, such a shift in 
the European balance of power seemed unacceptable. In addition, a neutral coun-
try, in Soviet eyes, was to serve as a promoter of Soviet strategic concepts, such 
as “peaceful coexistence” and (as will be discussed below) all-European security 
and cooperation.72 It was to promote neutrality and East-West trade and struggle 
against Western “closed blocs,” such as the EEC.73 Therefore, it did not suit the 
Soviet strategy for a neutral country to leave its space between the blocs and slip 
into an organization that was not only considered close to NATO, but also economi-
cally attractive. Any move from the neutral sphere, which was from the ideological 
point of view regarded more “progressive” than the capitalist sphere, to the latter 
by becoming part of a Western organization like the EEC was considered a forceful 
attempt at reversing the course of history and a setback for Soviet policy. It would 
set an unwanted example and probably trigger dangerous dynamics with critical 
consequences for Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. 
Last but not least, association of the neutrals with the EEC ran counter to Soviet 
interests in East-West trade. As a regional economic organization aiming at creating 
a unified economic sphere, the Common Market contained characteristics that were 
considered discriminatory for the outside world. Since the Soviet Union wanted to 
foster East-West trade on a state-to-state basis, any rapprochement of third states 
with the EEC was criticized by Soviet propaganda, also from an economic point 
of view.74 
The entire issue overshadowed Chancellor Gorbach’s visit to Moscow, Len-
ingrad, Irkutsk and Bratsk from 28 June to 5 July 1962. In his cordial welcome 
speech, Khrushchev stressed the mutual bonds and feelings between the Soviet and 
the Austrian people and commended Austria’s “policy of permanent neutrality” and 
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the “Soviet-Austrian friendship.”75 Although the official communiqué of the visit 
praised the “amicable atmosphere,” lauded “Austria’s neutrality as a positive con-
tribution to détente and the consolidation of peace,” and declared that there were 
“no unresolved problems” in Soviet-Austrian relations,76 the bilateral talks were 
tough. The main Austrian aim was to get Soviet consent for an association with the 
EEC. While the Austrian delegation declared that neutrality was only a military 
matter, Khrushchev denied this, as well as ‒ with reference to a recent declaration 
by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer that the EEC would develop further into a political 
union ‒ the compatibility between an Austrian association to the Common Market 
and neutrality.77 The CPSU chief indicated, in a friendly manner but firmly, that 
Austria’s “Anschluss” with this new “Holy Alliance against the East” would be 
understood by the Soviet Union as a violation of the state treaty and of neutrality. In 
such a case, Austria would not only lose all benefits of its status, but also “destroy 
the basis of Austrian-Soviet relations,”78 and the hitherto friendly attitude of the So-
viet government towards Austria would “change fundamentally.”79 Invoking God 
not to let a new “Anschluss” happen and referring to the patronage he had conferred 
on Gorbach’s predecessor, Khrushchev warned against damaging what had been 
built up by his “friend” Raab, the “little capitalist.”80 The references to his personal 
relationship to the ex-chancellor was interpreted by the Austrian side as a sign that 
their country had managed to preserve the Soviet leaders’ trust, while their ostenta-
tious friendliness was perceived as a demonstration of what Austria would forfeit 
if it fell from grace with the Kremlin.81 As a solution for the dilemma regarding the 
EEC, the Soviet leadership hinted at the possibility that Austria might conclude a 
trade agreement. Nonetheless, Kreisky, who had accompanied Gorbach, displayed 
optimism and, at a press conference, formulated cryptically (and somewhat mis-
leadingly) that the Soviet government had signaled trust in Austria’s diplomacy “at 
 75 Sowjetunion heute 8, no. 27 (1962), 2. 
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jetunion, 5 July 1962, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Eu-
ropapolitik 2, 142–143; cf. Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 
1962 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1963), 292–294.
 77 Rede des Ministerratsvorsitzenden der UdSSR, 4 July 1962, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 Jahre 
österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik 1, 358–359.
 78 Dienstzettel des Außenministeriums über sowjetische Äußerungen zur Frage der Assoziierung 
Österreichs an die EWG, 22 May 1964, in Gehler, Der lange Weg: Dokumente, 346–349, 347. 
 79 Verhandlungsschrift 54, Council of Ministers, 5 July 1962, and Beilage A, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 
MRP.
 80 Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 176. Cf. Report Gorbach to the Council 
of Ministers, 5 July 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 66649-6/62, Z. 70081-6pol/62. See 
also the Protocol of the Conversation Gorbach with Khrushchev, 29 June 1962, in SBKA, Länder-
boxen UdSSR, 1. For the full text of the conversation, see pages 300–318.
 81 Beilage A, Verhandlungsschrift 54, Council of Ministers, 5 July 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, MRP. 
Cf. Report Haymerle, 23 June 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 67129–6/64, Z. 75215–
6/64.
150 Overcast, but Friendly? 1961‒1972 
a time when we are trying to reach an association with the countries of the Common 
Market.”82 He also stressed that after the visit to Moscow, Austrian hopes for a rap-
prochement were still intact. In the Austrian draft communiqué, which was almost 
fully accepted by the Soviet side,83 no reference was made to the EEC. The same 
was the case during Bruno Pittermann’s visit to Moscow from 13 to 18 September.84 
Instead, Khrushchev used a conversation with the Austrian vice-chancellor that 
took place in the run-up to the Cuban missile crisis to convey some propaganda 
messages and to wage psychological warfare against the West by depicting US 
president John F. Kennedy as mentally instable and threatening that a US blockade 
against Cuba would lead to nuclear war.85 Soviet ships, Khrushchev boasted, per-
haps referring to the recently launched top secret operation for stationing Soviet 
missiles in the Caribbean, were already on their way to Cuba. If something went 
wrong, the USSR would exert pressure on “the Americans’ Achilles heel,” West 
Berlin. He also renewed his classic threat to deprive the city of its allied protection 
by signing a “peace treaty” with East Germany and transferring the four-power 
rights to its communist government. Khrushchev’s threats against West Berlin had 
also loomed large in a conversation with Gorbach and Kreisky held in June.86 The 
extensive misuse of bilateral meetings with Austrian leaders by the Soviet govern-
ment for propaganda purposes, characteristic for Khrushchev, bore the risk of Aus-
tria becoming an instrument of Soviet psychological warfare.
The Alleingang, 1963–1967 
After the British application for EEC membership was vetoed by French president 
Charles de Gaulle in January 1963 and despite the EEC’s reluctance to accept neu-
trals as associates, the Austrian government ‒ against the wishes of Kreisky, whose 
SPÖ had lost two seats in the 1962 elections ‒ on 26 February declared its wish to 
continue the Alleingang towards European integration,87 thus provoking still more 
Soviet countermeasures. Switzerland had decided to terminate its rapprochement 
with the EEC, and in the Swedish case, the neutral’s reluctance to accept the Com-
 82 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 2 (1961–62), 310. 
 83 Amtsvermerk, 12 July 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, GZ. 66649–6/62, Z. 70015–6pol/62. For 
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mon Commercial Policy and its demand that an associative agreement be “super-
vised” had virtually “killed any chances of an agreement” well before de Gaulle’s 
veto against the British accession did.88 Austria’s ambassador to Moscow, Heinrich 
(von) Haymerle, a more critical observer than his predecessor Bischoff and in So-
viet eyes a “reactionary,”89 believed that from the Soviet point of view, any further 
Austrian rapprochement with the Common Market had become even more danger-
ous, since without the other neutrals Austria would be more susceptible to Western 
influence.90 
While the Austrian press had understood the Soviet stance during the Gorbach 
visit as being a green light for an Austrian association with the EEC, this assumption 
proved to be a misunderstanding.91 Between 13 January 1963, with the publishing 
of an article in Pravda, and April, at least nineteen direct and indirect Soviet warn-
ings were issued to the Ballhausplatz. Radio Moscow aired about the same number 
of broadcasts claiming the inadmissibility of a rapprochement between Austria and 
the EEC.92 On 28 February and 9 April, TASS underlined that the Soviet position 
remained unchanged.93 However, whereas West Germany, the US, NATO, as well 
as economic and pan-German circles in the FPÖ had until this time been depicted in 
Soviet propaganda as the main culprits responsible for Austria’s strive towards the 
EEC, from this point in time the blame was more frequently put directly on the Aus-
trian government. On 8 March, the CPSU daily, which published three editorials on 
the subject in these months, stated, in response to Austrian claims of having the ex-
clusive right to interpret its own neutral policy, that neutrality was an international 
obligation not to be defined by Austria alone.94 A Soviet memorandum of 3 May 
forecast “serious, negative consequences” for Austrian-Soviet relations in the case 
of Austria’s “participation” in the Common Market,95 and less than three weeks 
later, Ambassador Avilov followed up on the topic in a lively conversation with 
 88 Milward, “European Uses of Neutrality,” 110. 
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Kreisky.96 The Soviet warnings continued well into 1964, Pravda repeating on 10 
July that, with regard to Austria and the EEC, there was no difference between as-
sociation and membership.97 Within the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the negative posi-
tion was supported by recent reports from the Soviet embassy in Brussels pointing 
out that “the [EEC] Commission’s proposals for negotiations with Austria would 
result in Austria’s de facto accession to the EEC with regard to its economy.”98
On the Austrian side, Ambassador Haymerle expressed the opinion that Austria 
should not renounce its hopes to find an economic arrangement with the Common 
Market that in the end would be accepted by the Soviet Union.99 If Austria yielded 
too soon, this would bring about further Soviet pressure for Austrian concessions 
and a subsequent constriction in the neutral’s freedom of action. Nevertheless, 
he anticipated that the Austrian ambitions with regard to the EEC would become 
a touchstone of Soviet-Austrian relations and any Austrian rapprochement with 
Brussels would put Moscow’s patience to a serious test.100 But since Vienna did not 
intend to sign anything other than an economic arrangement with the EEC, it was 
thought that Moscow would finally comply with a fait accompli. Thus, Kreisky, in 
his conversations with Soviet officials, pleaded for a wait-and-see approach with 
regard to the Austrian EEC negotiations.101 Internally, at least from May 1963, Kre-
isky recommended focusing on the creation of a free-trade area between Austria 
and the Common Market and giving up other ways for reaching a rapprochement 
with the EEC.102
In order to avoid a deterioration of Austrian-Soviet relations, Vienna had, from 
the beginning, regularly informed the Soviet side about its aims and the steps being 
taken in the decision-making and negotiating process with the EEC.103 Emphasis 
was laid thereby on assuring that under no circumstances would Austria enter into 
an agreement contradicting the neutral’s international obligations, but also on the 
economic necessity of Austria joining the Common Market in order to forestall 
financial and economic losses, as it accounted for approximately half of Austria’s 
foreign trade. On 22 November 1963, the Soviet ambassador jokingly conceded to 
Fritz Bock that the Austrian minister of trade had almost succeeded in convincing 
 96 See Kreisky’s report in Ministerrat, 29 May 1963, Abschrift, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA, 4215-PrM/63; 
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the Soviets. Nonetheless, the diplomat reminded Bock of the “strong links” between 
the EEC and NATO.104 In a more “dramatic” meeting, Avilov told his designated 
Austrian counterpart Walter Wodak on 12 June 1964 that Austrian-Soviet relations 
had entered a “critical phase,”105 while Ambassador Haymerle, in his farewell visits 
to Mikoian and Kosygin, was informed of the negative Soviet opinion of Austria’s 
being associated with the EEC.106 Similar sermons were given to Wodak upon his 
arrival in Moscow by Mikoian,107 who as head of state had developed the habit of 
turning such ritualized diplomatic events into serious political discussions.108 Wo-
dak, whose “sharp-wittedness” was highly respected by one of the keenest minds 
among his Soviet counterparts,109 did his best to reassure the Soviet side. A conver-
sation, described as the “friendliest in tone, however most serious in content,” had 
been reported by Haymerle in May,110 and in June, Ambassador Avilov told Kreisky 
that the Soviet Union would no longer feel bound to the state treaty [sic] if it was 
violated by Austria by entering the EEC.111 On 30 September, a Soviet memoran-
dum repeated that an “Austrian Anschluss with the EEC, in whatever form,” would 
be considered a turning point in Austria’s neutral policy and a de facto economic 
unification with Germany, which was prohibited in the state treaty. 
Remarkably enough, all these conversations were conducted in a forthcoming 
and amicable atmosphere. The Soviet Union was interested in communicating its 
doubts about the rapprochement between Austria and the EEC in a well-balanced 
way, so that the neutral country would not feel alienated. As if to demonstrate that 
Soviet-Austrian relations were not suffering, on 23 October 1964, shortly before the 
ninth anniversary of Austria’s declaration of neutrality, Radio Moscow broadcast 
the CPSU motto “Long live the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of 
the Soviet Union and Austria!” and called Soviet-Austrian relations again a good 
“example of peaceful coexistence,” coexistence that was threatened only by the 
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plans in “certain circles” of incorporating Austria into the EEC ‒ a subject that was 
further delineated in an Izvestiia article the same day. An Austrian memorandum 
explaining that the country was forced to seek an arrangement with the Common 
Market solely for economic reasons was answered by the Kremlin on 20 September 
by a repetition of its well-known views.112
The official USSR opinion was that an agreement on tariffs and trade would be 
sufficient to solve the economic problems resulting from Austria’s nonparticipation 
in the EEC. During his meeting with Gorbach in the summer of 1962, Khrushchev 
had hinted at this possibility. The Austrian embassy in Moscow was also of the 
opinion that an “arrangement of purely trade-political [handelspolitisch] nature” 
between Austria and the EEC would be accepted by the Kremlin despite all its loud 
warnings, as long as it did not discriminate against third parties. But anything more 
would not leave Soviet-Austrian relations untouched.113 This was underlined by an 
article in Sovetskaia Rossiia on 26 September 1964.114 Within the Soviet apparatus, 
the only viable option that was considered remained a trade agreement between 
Austria and the EEC according to articles 111 or 114 of the Rome Treaty, as had 
been concluded between the Common Market and Iran.115 Both other alternatives, 
a customs union between Austria and the EEC or a free-trade area according to 
article 24 of the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were ruled 
out as incompatible with neutrality and the state treaty.116
When direct negotiations between Austria and the EEC started in March 1965, 
Pravda, Izvestiia and TASS issued further warnings towards Austria not to continue 
its EEC ambitions as otherwise it would risk coming under the dictate of the ag-
gressive forces responsible for World War II.117 During his visit to Vienna on the 
tenth anniversary of the state treaty, Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that Austria 
had a special international position and good relations with the USSR. Both would 
be at risk if Austria joined the EEC.118 When the Soviet ambassador followed up 
on the topic the next day, he was less discrete and prophesized “irreparable dam-
ages” to Soviet-Austrian relations if Austria continued to steer its course towards 
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the EEC.119 The Soviet foreign minister also used the opportunity to promote his 
proposal of complete disarmament in both German states. 
In the meantime, the Austrian government had modified its goal: it was no long-
er seeking an association with the EEC, but rather an “arrangement of a special 
kind.” It remains yet to be shown to what extent this was due to reservations by the 
Community and the United States (which wanted to avoid the EEC being watered 
down by an association of the neutrals’120) or to the steady stream of Soviet propa-
ganda. A change of terminology had been recommended by the Austrian embassy 
in Moscow in 1961 and then again in 1963, when it was claimed that gaining an 
associative membership was possible only in collaboration with Switzerland and 
Sweden.121 
However, after the ÖVP’s triumph in the general elections of 1966, the rap-
prochement with the EEC was intensified. This shift in the Austrian political land-
scape, as well as the resolution of the internal “empty chair” crisis in the EEC, 
which had been provoked by de Gaulle’s power struggle against the Commission 
of the EEC, led to a certain amount of concern on the Soviet side.122 Soon after the 
elections, the head of the Austrian desk at the Soviet Foreign Ministry expressed 
his uneasiness that “the circles seeking Austria’s entry into the EEC had been given 
leeway in the elections.”123 A few weeks later, the Austrian ambassador reported 
that the formation of Chancellor Josef Klaus’ one-party government had “sparked 
astonishment in Moscow and, in parts, even dismay,” as well as fears of a change in 
Austria’s foreign policy.124 Soviet media had dubbed the new cabinet an “advance 
payment to the Western blocs.”125 Their disquiet increased when Fritz Bock, one of 
the strongest advocates of Austria’s rapprochement with the EEC, was appointed 
vice-chancellor. An indication of Soviet insecurity was a sharp Izvestiia editorial of 
25 April 1966 stating that “if Viennese reactionary circles intend, by linking Austria 
with the EEC, to use the election success of the ÖVP for a semi-masked Anschluss 
with Bonn and the aggressive military bloc of NATO, they would do their country 
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a disservice.” Klaus was severely attacked for having omitted, in his declaration 
of the new government, any reference to the state treaty.126 Izvestiia openly asked 
whether this indicated a change in the neutral’s political line and on 29 April, the 
Austrian communist Volksstimme spread the word as quickly as possible.127 Shortly 
thereafter, a severe warning was published by Nikolai Polianov, an influential Iz-
vestiia correspondent, in the journal of the Austrian Society for Foreign Policy.128 
Despite these discussions, the bilateral relations, which had been in a state of 
limbo after Khrushchev’s ouster, received some sort of consolidation by the visit 
of Petr Demichev to Austria in June 1966 ‒ although Klaus did not succeed in con-
vincing the CPSU Presidium member of the economic necessity of Austria’s asso-
ciation with the Common Market. The Soviet guest repeated that such an arrange-
ment would seriously flaw Soviet-Austrian relations.129 In reassessing the results of 
the visit, on 15 June Lev Tolkunov, the Izvestiia editor, drew an ambiguous picture: 
On one hand, he expressed Soviet “concern” about Austria’s ambitions regarding 
the EEC, depicted the alleged West German threat to the neutral’s independence 
in dark colors, and criticized Austria’s policy, which was, in his eyes, not neutral 
enough ‒ Austria neither “condemned aggressive US policy” nor did it recognize 
the GDR. He also rejected the idea that neutrality was merely a military matter. On 
the other hand, Tolkunov commended Klaus for his loyal course with regard to the 
Soviet Union. Similar points were raised in a Pravda article on 30 June. Despite 
such ambivalence, the Demichev journey paved the way for the Soviet president’s 
state visit to Vienna in November 1966. 
The trip of the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Nikolai Podgorny, had 
been preceded, on one hand, by a “wave of Austrian visits” to the USSR in the 
fall, including delegations of parliamentarians, trade-unionists and industrialists, 
the mayor of Vienna, and the Austrian minister of defense.130 On the other hand, 
on 3 November Izvestiia published, in the Austrian ambassador’s eyes, the “frank-
est ever” declaration of the Soviet standpoint concerning Austria and the EEC, 
which, as Wodak stated, “sailed close to the shore of meddling in our most internal 
affairs.”131 The article had depicted Austria as being again on the brink of 1938, and 
portrayed West German and EEC leaders as apostles of Adolf Hitler. Since Soviet 
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soldiers had spilled their blood on Austrian soil in 1945, the article claimed the 
right for the USSR to have a say in Austria’s future. 
The program for the Soviet state visit to Vienna from 14 to 21 November 1966, 
which was Podgorny’s first journey to the West as head of state, reflected the wish 
of both sides to overcome these political burdens and to repeat the success of 
Khrushchev’s trip in 1960. A tour through the country included a visit to the house 
where Mozart was born and meetings with factory workers at the VÖEST steel 
plants. The guest’s wife, Natal’ia Podgornaia was presented an Alpine Dirndl and 
invited by the chancellor to a dance during an evening visit to his native province 
Salzburg.132 On many occasions neutrality was praised by Podgorny as a contribu-
tion to peace; the president repeated the well-known Soviet thesis that the neutrals 
were in the favorable position of not having to spend money on self-defense. He 
also expressed his satisfaction with the positive development of bilateral relations, 
the friendly personal contacts between the political leaders of the two countries, 
and the tradition of discussing all questions “in the spirit of a good neighborhood, 
mutual understanding and equal rights.”133 Regarding Austria’s rapprochement 
with the EEC, the Soviet position was repeated that “an arrangement in any form” 
other than a bilateral treaty on tariffs and trade would mean a violation of the state 
treaty and neutrality. The explicit mentioning of such a treaty between Austria and 
the EEC itself (and not its member-states) seems to have been Podgorny’s blunder. 
Both the Soviet delegation and the embassy later disclaimed the suggestion and 
tried to leave the impression that the president had spoken about treaties between 
Austria and the EEC countries.134 
If Austria suffered from discrimination from the Common Market or the ECSC, 
it should, Podgorny recommended, join the Soviet struggle against closed blocs. 
Podgorny also repeated the suggestion that Austria should recognize the GDR and 
support the Soviet project of an all-European conference on security. Furthermore, 
the Soviet president brought the Austrian government under pressure by calling 
upon all neutral states to condemn the US policy in Vietnam. Similar demands had 
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been communicated to other West European delegations in Moscow.135 After tough 
negotiations, no reference was made to the EEC in the communiqué;136 the issue 
was hinted at only in the mention of “open” talks. In addition, neutrality and the 
“mutually beneficial” development of bilateral trade were praised and the Vietnam 
War deplored.137 
Podgorny’s adherence to the well-known Soviet stance regarding Austria’s pol-
icy vis-à-vis the EEC mirrored Moscow’s internal assessment. A report of the So-
viet Foreign Ministry, which had been prepared a few weeks before the state visit, 
acknowledged that the Austrian plans were motivated by the fact that “Austria, in 
the area of foreign trade, is closely linked to the countries of the Common Market, 
especially West Germany.”138 However, negotiations had gotten stuck because the 
EEC allegedly demanded “nothing less than Austria’s de-facto giving up neutral-
ity.” Neither within the Common Market, where France was against strengthen-
ing the “German position,” nor in the Austrian government was there a consensus 
about how to solve the problem. With regard to Soviet-Austrian relations, the report 
acknowledged that 
“the Austrian government tries not to spoil its relations to the Soviet Union with its association 
with the Common Market. It makes great efforts not to give any pretext for charging Austria, from 
the Soviet side, with violating the state treaty or abandoning neutrality, and it takes pains not to 
demote the economic relations to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.”139 
The Soviet position should therefore be understanding, but firm. Furthermore, 
the report pointed out that
“the difficult political situation resulting from Austria’s intention to associate with the Common 
Market creates certain opportunities, in the future, for the Soviet Union to exert influence on the 
Austrian government and to strengthen the position of those Austrian circles that stand for the 
strict observation of the state treaty and of neutrality and that disapprove of Austria’s association 
with the Common Market.”140 
Access to Soviet documents on this subject is still too insufficient for an exhaus-
tive delineation of all internal shifts in the Kremlin’s attitude towards the Austrian 
aspirations to become an associate of the EEC. However, there are indications that 
within the Soviet apparatus, various opinions started to emerge. In addition to the 
groups that rejected the idea entirely and those that were “understanding, but firmly 
against” it, there were, as the communist secretary of the Austrian-Soviet Society, 
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Martin Grünberg, stated in a conversation with the Austrian ambassador, also So-
viet officials who thought “that they had to take into account our economic necessi-
ties if we [i.e. the Austrians] were ready to respect their [i.e. the Soviets’] political 
concerns.”141 These officials were interested in the progress of the negotiations be-
tween Austria and the EEC and their consequences on Austrian-Soviet trade. 
It is very likely that the Austrian chancellor was informed of Grünberg’s as-
sessment, because he tried to address this alleged Soviet demand for respect of 
“their political concerns.” However, the dismissive attitude with regard to the EEC 
remained the Soviet mantra during Klaus’ visit to Moscow, Leningrad, Lipetsk, 
Tbilisi, and Kiev from 14 to 21 March 1967. Prior to the visit, Soviet officials had 
signaled to the Austrian embassy that the decision to receive Klaus in Moscow was 
a sort of Soviet “advance”; within the Kremlin and the Foreign Ministry there had 
been significant resistance to the chancellor’s visit and serious doubts about his loy-
alty, i.e. responsiveness to Soviet wishes.142 According to Ambassador Wodak, the 
Soviet side would not put the EEC issue on the agenda unless the Austrian side pro-
posed discussing it. Instead, concrete steps should be made regarding an agreement 
on cultural exchange as well as the building of a Soviet pipeline to Western Europe.
In order to prepare the visit, the Kremlin had activated a back channel and com-
missioned political analyst Mikhail Voslenskii to convey to the Austrian ambas-
sador that the Soviet side wished to preserve its good relations with Austria and 
therefore recommended not proceeding with the rapprochement with the EEC.143 
An agreement on tariffs and trade was the maximum the USSR would be ready to 
tolerate. Even earlier, Voslenskii had pointed out that Moscow was not convinced 
of the Austrian motives for concluding a special arrangement with the EEC and 
encouraged the Austrian chancellor to send out a memorandum on the topic.144 In 
order to promote the Austrian point of view, the chancellor handed over such an 
unofficial memorandum on the subject to Soviet ambassador Boris Podtserob, a 
month before his departure to Moscow.145 
While it was obviously the aim of the memorandum to convince its readers of 
the economic necessity for Austria to associate with the Common Market, it did 
not have the wanted effect on the Soviet Foreign Ministry experts. In its evalu-
ation of the paper, the Institute for World Economy and International Relations 
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of the Soviet Academy of Sciences criticized the Austrian essay, stating that “in 
order to demonstrate that an associative status is based only on economic aims, 
[it] does not deal with the state treaty, neutrality, and political consequences.”146 
With regard to foreign trade, in the eyes of the Soviet experts the Austrians gave 
undue importance to the neutral’s discrimination by the EEC and did not pay the 
necessary attention to the structural problems of the Austrian economy, which in-
cluded a disproportionately high percentage of heavy industry and the produc-
tion of semi-finished goods, insufficient research and capital formation, falling 
productivity, and, consequently, sinking competitiveness in relation to the EEC. 
Austria, the Soviet experts stated, wanted to become an associate for economic 
reasons; however, it should solve its problems through internal reforms that in-
creased competitiveness, rather than by entering the Common Market. This would 
boost imports of capital and make Austrian exports easier, but at the same time 
increase competition on the domestic market. From a political point of view, the 
Soviet experts predicted, any type of association with the EEC would, as in the 
case of Greece and Turkey [sic], after a certain period of time lead to full member-
ship. This would be intolerable for Austria and have “negative consequences for 
the Soviet Union.” Concerning further action, the experts suggested a “new seri-
ous explanation” of the Soviet standpoint towards the Austrian government, So-
viet proposals for what form of cooperation between Austria and the EEC would 
acceptable for the USSR, and an increase in Austrian trade with CMEA countries 
(Council of Mutual Economic Assistance). In order to allow Austria to step up 
its exports to the Soviet Union within the framework of the trade agreements and 
their stipulated trade balance, Moscow, having reached its limits in the export of 
raw materials, should offer helicopters, trucks, and technical goods such as tel-
etypewriters and television sets. 
Following these recommendations, the Soviet hosts of Chancellor Klaus, in-
cluding Advisor Mikhail Voslenskii, tried to explain to their Austrian guest and his 
foreign minister, Lujo Ton�ić-Sorinj, that any sort of Austrian participation in the 
Economic Community would mean a violation of the state treaty. The chancellor, 
in a speech at the Soviet Academy of Sciences entitled “Neutrality – Austria’s New 
Political Way,”147 again attempted to convince his hosts that the Common Market 
was, as explicitly stated by Khrushchev in 1962,148 a “reality” that Austria had to 
deal with. Neutrality, Klaus stressed, was not to be understood as an obligation to 
ideological neutralism; Austria had never hidden that it belonged to the Western 
democratic and economic model, and it had even joined the Council of Europe. The 
chancellor did not attempt to cover up the difference between the Soviet and West-
ern understandings of neutrality; he reserved the right to define Austria’s neutral 
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policy and repeated the plea to allow Austria to acquire the necessary weapons149 
to defend itself. In an attempt to calm down Soviet worries, Klaus, who was briefly 
received by Brezhnev150 and later given the opportunity to address the Soviet peo-
ple in a televised speech, underlined that the Austrian government understood Mos-
cow’s concerns “very well,” that it would not deal irresponsibly with neutrality, 
and that the final result of the talks between Austria and Brussels would not be “at 
variance with the status of permanent neutrality.”151 
However, the USSR remained adamant, only tolerating a trade agreement or a 
free-trade area between Austria and the Common Market.152 Despite this, Podgorny 
encouraged the chancellor to continue the “open and objective exchange of opin-
ions concerning questions of the further development of the amicable relations be-
tween the USSR and neutral Austria.”153 In addition, the Soviets made attempts to 
encourage Austria to launch an initiative for an all-European conference on secu-
rity.154
The Klaus visit demonstrated the clash of two opposing concepts of neutrali-
ty.155 The Austrian chancellor had traveled to the Soviet capital in order to achieve 
Soviet acquiescence to a special arrangement between Austria and the EEC and a 
less strict interpretation of article 13 of the state treaty, which banned the posses-
sion and use of missiles, even for defensive purposes. Neither wish ran counter to 
the Western understanding of permanent neutrality. On the other side, the Soviet 
Union wanted Austria to promote the Soviet project of an all-European conference, 
which was, by then, suspected by many in the West to be a sinister move to under-
mine NATO. While advancing such a conference was exactly what the Soviet side 
wanted the guest to do, Klaus felt that launching such a call was inappropriate for 
a permanent neutral. In the end, the wishes of neither side were fulfilled and the 
differences remained unreconciled.
In the communiqué, which mirrored the differences in the Soviet and Austrian 
interpretations of neutrality, “friendship,” “cooperation,” and the “open exchange 
of views consolidating […] the mutual understanding” were again extolled; the 
bilateral rejection of “economic discrimination” hinted at Austria’s EEC aspira-
 149 For a discussion of defense issues, see pages 181–184.
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tions.156 In a rather unusual move, the Soviet government, shortly after Klaus’ de-
parture, published an unsigned Izvestiia editorial declaring that “the development 
of the amicable relations between the Soviet Union and Austria is an important and 
positive aspect of international life” and “proof for the validity of the principles of 
peaceful coexistence between countries of different social systems.”157 
Klaus, who was fascinated by Russia and started to learn its language, demon-
strated his gratitude and goodwill towards the Kremlin by intensive travel activities 
in Eastern Europe, including a trip to Hungary in May, to Romania in July, and to 
Bulgaria in October. The chancellor even spent his two-week holidays in August on 
a leisure cruise down the Danube in Eastern Europe, for which he was criticized by 
social democratic circles of “political lopsidedness.”158 Nevertheless, two articles 
on 26 September and 27 October in the weekly Novoe vremia warning of the danger 
of a “cold Anschluss” of Austria to the EEC signalized that Moscow still remained 
vigilant.
The EEC issue and Soviet encouragement for convoking the CSCE, 1967–1972
As usual at that time, a considerable share of the Soviet-Austrian talks during the 
Klaus visit was devoted to the Soviet concept of an all-European conference on se-
curity. The roots of this concept dated back to the Berlin conference of 1954, when 
Moscow had proposed replacing NATO with an all-European security system that 
included the USSR but assigned the United States merely observer status.159 Since 
then, proposals for a security conference or security system were periodically re-
launched in various Soviet attempts to gain legal blessings for the postwar order, 
including the borders of Eastern Europe and East Germany, to foster détente in the 
West and weaken the cohesion of NATO and the EEC. 
From 1955 it had been part of the Kremlin’s patronizing attitude towards Austria 
to encourage the neutral country to take the initiative in the international arena and 
to support Soviet proposals for disarmament and security conferences. Communist 
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propaganda had cited “voices from Austria” who demanded that Vienna take the 
lead in promoting the Soviet ideas; such behavior was depicted as consistent both 
with the neutral’s international obligations and geographic position.160 In 1958, in 
reply to the Bulganin notes, Austria had agreed in principle to back the Soviet pro-
posal launched a month earlier for an all-European summit on security, albeit under 
the condition of the summit being “well prepared.”161 However, since the Western 
attitude towards the Soviet proposal was rather lukewarm, the Austrian government 
was reluctant to go out on a limb and become a spokesperson for the initiative. 
Nevertheless, in the following years, particularly after the change in power from 
Khrushchev to Brezhnev, the Soviet advances towards the neutral countries con-
cerning this matter were intensified. In the Warsaw Treaty Organization’s Bucha-
rest declaration of July 1966, the neutrals were assured that they “could play a 
positive role” in the convocation of an all-European summit162 and in November of 
the same year Podgorny expressed his hope for the neutrals’ support, particularly 
from Austria. Some weeks earlier, the Soviet Foreign Ministry had recommended, 
in an above-cited internal document, to make use of the “opportunity” created by 
Austria’s European ambitions “to exert influence over the Austrian government.”163 
During his visit to Vienna in 1966, the Soviet president declared that the USSR 
welcomed any initiative from the Austrian side that would lead to such a confer-
ence, as well as the active participation of all the neutral countries.164 The Soviet 
insistence on an initiative from the Austrian side was quite remarkable as Finland 
showed much more willingness to support the plan. However, this was not to the 
Soviet liking because in the 1960s, Austria’s neutrality seemed to be better accepted 
in the West than that of Finland. 
A large number of Soviet statements criticizing Austria’s attempts to be part of 
the EEC, such as an article in Izvestiia on 16 June 1966, actually linked the two 
issues and demanded that the neutral country rather engage in more “peaceful” 
activities, as for instance in instigating an all-European conference on security.165 
Similar demands were published in the above-mentioned article by Nikolai Polian-
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ov in the Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik166 shortly before the Soviet 
president’s visit to Austria. Throughout the following months, the Soviet media 
campaign encouraging Austria to give up its European ambitions and to launch an 
initiative for a European security conference instead continued. With such pressure 
from the Soviets, it became an ever more viable option for Austria to try to balance 
its strivings towards the EEC by offering the USSR its help in the conference is-
sue.167 During Podgorny’s visit to Vienna in November 1966, both sides agreed that 
a “well prepared” summit on European security would have a favorable influence 
on the global situation.168 Austria, which in Soviet declarations had repeatedly been 
singled out for the role it could play in an all-European security system,169 thus 
became the first Western country to endorse the proposal in a joint communiqué 
with the USSR.170 Similar endorsements had been made earlier on the occasion of 
Polish-Swedish and Soviet-Finnish meetings in June; further endorsement by Italy 
and Britain followed during Soviet visits to these two countries in early 1967.171 
During Klaus’ visit to Moscow in March, Kosygin again underlined that, in the 
Soviet understanding, neutrality not only provided an opportunity for an “active 
peace policy,” but even made such a policy obligatory. The Soviet prime minister 
continued to argue strongly in favor of an Austrian initiative for an all-European 
conference on security.172 Klaus, who at first had tried to beat the Soviets at their 
own game by stating that Austria had no opinions concerning this question because 
that would be in violation of Austria’s neutrality, conceded.173 
After this agreement was reached, the Soviet interest in more substantial Austri-
an contributions to Soviet initiatives, particularly the all-European conference, in-
creased, as Martin Grünberg reported in early 1967.174 It became clear that Moscow 
would have welcomed an Austrian decision to launch a call for the summit. The 
European communist parties’ Karlovy Vary declaration of 26 April stated that, in 
preparing the conference, much depended upon a “more active peace policy” of the 
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neutrals;175 in his speech in the Czech spa, Brezhnev made this appeal even more 
explicit by encouraging the neutrals to offer their “good services” to the cause.176 
Keeping in mind the imminent expiration of the NATO Treaty in 1969, the So-
viet leader also used the opportunity to call upon the European member states of 
the Western alliance to reconsider their options; he declared that “for a number of 
[NATO] countries, in particular in Europe’s north, neutrality might be an alterna-
tive to participation in military-political groupings.” In order to make the commu-
nist invitation more tempting, the Karlovy Vary declaration tried to bait the neutrals 
with the offer of including an official “recognition of the principle of neutrality and 
of unconditional respect for the inviolability of neutral states” into the conference 
agenda. The Soviet intentions behind this demand seemed to be clear: Since the 
communist proposal obviously had little chance of being accepted by the West if 
it came directly from the Warsaw Pact, the neutrals should step in and promote the 
idea. While Sweden and Switzerland were traditionally less susceptible to Soviet 
pressure, the weaker neutrals Austria and Finland were regarded as more likely to 
fulfill Brezhnev’s wishes. However, with the prestige of Finnish neutrality in de-
cline both in the East and the West, Austria remained the favorite addressee for the 
Soviet demand. 
It did not take long for a more explicit Soviet invitation for Austria to be issued: 
In an article commemorating the signing of the state treaty in May, Pravda repeated 
that “in our times, much depends upon the role of the neutrals.” Novosti underlined 
their role and, alluding to the question at hand, stated that “every state has to decide 
whether it wants to strengthen cooperation [i.e., the conference project] or closed 
blocks [i.e., the EEC].”177 In his correspondence with Klaus, Kosygin hinted that 
the Soviet Union might be ready to fulfill the Austrian chancellor’s wish and sup-
port Austria’s candidature for hosting the United Nation’s nuclear research center 
CERN; however, the Soviet premier coupled this information with further praise 
for the Soviet idea of an all-European system of security being created and state-
ments that this should be promoted by the neutral.178 
In addition to inspiring Austria to initiate an all-European conference, Soviet 
diplomacy aimed at inducing the neutrals to recognize the GDR. Already in 1959, 
Khrushchev had charged Austria with violating the principles of neutrality by main-
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taining diplomatic relations with West Germany while not recognizing the East Ger-
man Republic. Foreign Minister Kreisky had apologized by referring to the Hall-
stein Doctrine of powerful West Germany.179 In the 1960s, together with growing 
pressure for an all-European conference, the Soviet appeals to become active in the 
recognition process of the GDR were intensified in numerous diplomatic conversa-
tions as well as during the Demichev and Podgorny visits to Austria.180 The Soviet 
argument ran that it would be easier for neutral states to extend their recognition 
to the GDR than for NATO members.181 Austria’s “passivity” and “inconsequent 
position in the German question” were criticized by Soviet statements on many oc-
casions.182 When the CSCE drew nearer, the Austrian government signaled support 
for an accession of both German states into the UN, support that was further encour-
aged by Soviet diplomacy.183 Nonetheless, Austria recognized East Germany only 
after the Bonn government had established diplomatic relations with the GDR.184 
However, the background for all these Soviet attempts to influence Austria’s 
policy soon changed fundamentally. In March 1967, after Klaus’ return from Mos-
cow, the Austrian Foreign Ministry had drawn the conclusion that the Soviet gov-
ernment, despite its negative official statements, might be prepared to accept an 
economic arrangement between Austria and the Common Market that guaranteed 
maximum economic benefits for Austria.185 The ministry therefore recommended 
that Austria continue negotiating with the EEC. Yet in June 1967, Italy, due to Ger-
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man-speaking South Tyrol’s struggle for autonomy from Rome (which had been 
denounced by Radio Moscow as nationalist and condoning terrorist acts sponsored 
by West Germany [sic]), vetoed any further EEC negotiations with Austria. France, 
until then supportive of an Austrian association, but now, in light of promising 
developments in Soviet-French relations,186 suddenly also came to the conclusion 
that such an association would not be compatible with neutrality. During his visit 
to Austria in September 1967, French prime minister Georges Pompidou took up a 
suggestion that had recently been made by Podgorny, namely that Austria should 
conclude trade agreements with the EEC members instead of further striving for 
a special arrangement with the community.187 Due to this profound change in the 
West as well as the constant Soviet pressure, the Austrian government finally gave 
up its ambition of reaching such an arrangement with the EEC. Within the cabinet, 
the staunchest supporter of the EEC course, Vice-Chancellor Bock, resigned as did 
Ton�ić-Sorinj; EEC matters were transferred to the newly appointed foreign min-
ister Kurt Waldheim, who in September 1968 ruled out any special arrangements 
with the EEC.188 After still another conversation on the topic with the adamant 
Kosygin, a frustrated Klaus acquiesced, stating that Austria would remain “rather 
poor, but neutral.”189
In the Soviet press, the reshuffle of the Austrian cabinet caused the usual signs 
of uneasiness.190 It took some time for Moscow to assess that the changes reflected 
the fading Austrian chances of renewing negotiations with the Common Market. 
Even though the Austrians received some encouragement by Pompidou, once he 
succeeded de Gaulle as president of the republic in 1968, their prospects remained 
dim. The Italian position was, if perhaps no longer entirely negative, at least un-
clear. The EEC’s priorities favored the accession of the northern candidates Britain, 
Ireland, and Denmark over an Austrian association. In August 1969, the Soviet 
embassy in Vienna came to the conclusion that “despite all efforts by the Klaus 
administration, the Austrians have no real chance for renewing the talks with the 
Commission of the Common Market in the near future. It is unlikely that such ne-
gotiations can begin this year.”191
The failure of its European ambitions seems to have had a negative impact on 
Austria’s readiness to support the Soviet all-European conference plan. Although 
 186 Newton, Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe, 75–77.
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support for an Austrian association with the EEC might strain de Gaulle’s relations to Moscow. 
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the CSCE became the main “nonbilateral” theme of Austrian-Soviet communiqués, 
Austria remained reluctant and no initiatives were made to call for the conference. 
During the visit of Waldheim to Moscow from 18 to 25 March 1968, Gromyko 
again harped on the role the neutrals could and should play in convening an all-
European conference and, anonymously, criticized those politicians who verbally 
endorsed the project but did not take any actions to move it forward.192 The Aus-
trian side did not want the communiqué to include the Soviet reference to inviting 
all “interested European states” (thus excluding the United States and Canada) to 
the summit, but Waldheim did not succeed in making this clear, which resulted in 
a grave gaffe.193 On the other hand, the Soviet wish that Austria follow the Swed-
ish example and condemn alleged Israeli “provocations” in the Near East and the 
so-called US “aggression” in Vietnam did remain unfulfilled:194 The communiqué 
mentioned both sides’ “concern” about the two hotbeds, but did not repeat Soviet 
propaganda slogans. When the Austrian minister made the mistake of mentioning 
the Austrian attitude towards the EEC, he, as the Soviet protocol of the conversa-
tion stated, was “told in strict terms” that the Soviet Union, for known reasons, 
remained dismissive about any plans of Austria entering the Common Market and 
would vigilantly monitor any measures that might damage Austria’s independence 
and neutrality.195 In contrast, Waldheim’s report in the Austrian cabinet depicted 
the Soviet criticism of Austria’s EEC ambitions as “less dramatic than it had been 
earlier.”196 The reason was, as Waldheim guessed, that “they [the Soviet leaders] 
know that nothing can possibly happen any more” regarding an Austrian associa-
tion. A month before Waldheim’s visit, the Soviet press, in an article that the Aus-
trian embassy considered “the most unfriendly in a long time,” had criticized the 
Austrian striving to become an associate of the EEC. 197 
No reference was made to the EEC issue throughout Franz Jonas’ stay in Mos-
cow.198 During the visit from 20 to 25 May 1968, which was ennobled by the un-
expected appearance of Leonid Brezhnev, Podgorny repeated to the Austrian presi-
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66/47/101, 23–29. Cf. Conversation Waldheim with Gromyko, 19 March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, 
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328–330.
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dent the Soviet call for an Austrian contribution to convening the CSCE, to forming 
an “initiative group” in the matter, and also for Austria’s recognition of the GDR.199 
Waldheim, who accompanied Jonas, had expected that he would have to defend his 
government against Soviet claims that they had verbally endorsed the conference 
project but remained inactive. Such charges had been published by the Soviet press, 
which criticized that Austria was not doing all it could to find a solution to the Euro-
pean problem. However, Gromyko, who rejected the Western idea to form a group 
of nine countries that would be charged with organizing the conference, refrained 
from pressing the issue too hard.200 Other East European leaders, such as Bulgaria’s 
Todor Zhivkov, also encouraged Austria to launch an invitation.201 However, once 
the EEC application had failed, the USSR had lost one of its levers over Austria.202 
Another neutral had to step in. In 1968, Finland, which of the European neu-
trals was traditionally the one most exposed to Soviet demands, had come under 
increased pressure. While the neutral had hitherto avoided recognizing either of 
the two Germanies, the USSR and the GDR demanded with growing insistence 
that the Finnish government recognize the East German state. With the waning 
power of West Germany’s Hallstein Doctrine, the pressure on Helsinki to give in to 
Soviet demands grew.203 A further menace could be seen in the decreasing Soviet 
willingness to recognize Finland’s neutrality, a change that had been noted since 
early 1968. In the official report to the Supreme Soviet on 27 June 1968, Finland 
was not counted among the neutrals when Gromyko praised the role of neutrality 
and the USSR’s good relations with Austria, Sweden and Switzerland.204 During a 
bilateral visit in 1969, the Soviet side forestalled the hitherto traditional mentioning 
of Finnish neutrality in the communiqué.205 In 1970 President Kekkonen threatened 
to resign and thus managed to convince the Soviet leaders to again include the 
reference in a declaration. But this was to be the last such mention for many years. 
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Until 1989 reference was only made to Finland’s “striving for neutrality,” and the 
so-called Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line of foreign policy was praised in Soviet state-
ments. Although the Soviet reasons for downgrading Finland’s neutrality are yet to 
be fully analyzed, it seems that in the wake of the “Prague Spring,” the Kremlin 
was interested in limiting the attractiveness of neutrality in Eastern Europe. Hence, 
Finland was promoted by Soviet propaganda as a model for “friendship with the 
Soviet Union” rather than as a model for neutrality. Finland saw the writing on the 
wall, which was all the more threatening since from 1966 to 1971, the Soviet Union 
seemed to support what appeared to be a major, final attempt at gaining power by 
Finland’s pro-communist People’s Democratic League.206 Against this background 
it does not come as a surprise that the Warsaw Pact’s invasion in Czechoslovakia in 
August 1968 created widespread fear in Finland; even the crafty Kekkonen felt his 
country might be the next on the list. 
In this situation, the Finnish president decided to strengthen his country’s pres-
tige and independence vis-à-vis the USSR by following the Soviet proposal and 
calling for an all-European conference ‒ without, however, assessing the chances 
very high that such a conference might actually come into being.207 It was only 
after Finland, in a declaration issued on 5 May 1969 to all European states plus the 
United States and Canada, proposed holding a CSCE and declared itself ready to 
host the conference208 that Austria reacted positively, submitting its own memoran-
dum on 28 May. During talks with Soviet Foreign Ministry officials in December of 
the same year, their Austrian counterparts underlined their country’s interest in the 
conference and insisted on meticulous preparations; it was announced that Austria 
was prepared to serve as a mediator during the conference, to which all “interested 
European states plus the US and Canada” were to be invited.209 Some weeks earlier, 
Vienna had hosted a conference of “representatives of the public on problems of se-
curity and cooperation in Europe,” which had supported the Soviet project and was 
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highly publicized in communist propaganda.210 Furthermore, in a memorandum in 
July 1970 to all interested states (including the United States and Canada), Austria 
offered a meeting place for the conference and support for the Soviet bloc’s two-
point agenda as well as for portions of the NATO proposal on mutual and balanced 
reductions of armed forces.211 In an earlier declaration, dated 22 June, of the Eastern 
foreign ministers, which had been forwarded to all interested states by Hungary, the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization had tabled the proposal to create a permanent body 
following the conference.212
In the meantime, French president Pompidou had withdrawn de Gaulle’s veto 
against the British accession to the EEC and, in December 1969, the EEC had 
decided to restart negotiations with all EFTA members. As a result, Soviet warn-
ings, despite having grown fewer in 1968, again began to intensify towards Aus-
tria and the other neutrals Sweden and Switzerland, which had decided to rejoin 
Austria in striving for some sort of EEC participation. Soviet propaganda against 
the Swedish leader Olof Palme was particularly vehement, as it long remained 
unclear whether Sweden was perhaps even aiming for full membership in the 
EEC, not merely a free-trade agreement.213 Communist propaganda castigated the 
Common Market as a basis for NATO and a branch of “West German imperial-
ism,” criticized the wavering of the neutrals, warned against their loss of sover-
eignty, and offered favorable bilateral trade agreements and an increase in East-
West trade as an alternative to the EEC-EFTA rapprochement. With regard to 
Austria, the Soviet voices referred to the Anschluss ban in the state treaty and the 
country’s neutrality. On 26 October 1970, on the eve of the preparatory talks be-
tween the EEC and Austria, TASS declared that Austria’s “accession to the EEC 
in whatsoever guise” would contradict the country’s international obligations. In 
January 1971 Podgorny told Rudolf Kirchschläger, the new Austrian foreign min-
ister, that the Soviet position was unchanged. He also repeated the argument that, 
since the EEC was not merely an economic organization, if Austria finalized an 
agreement with it, this could not but affect the country’s neutrality.214 Due to such 
 210 Schalhorn, “Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik I,” 128.
 211 Austrian memorandum, 24 July 1970, in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 10 (1970), 
250–251. Cf. Jacobsen, Mallmann, Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) 
II/1, 234–236. The Austrian proposal made it clear that the reductions should apply to all forces in 
Europe, not only non-European ones. For the further Austrian contribution in the pre-conference 
stage, see Thomas Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE: The N+N States and the Making of the 
Helsinki Accords (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), 120–128.
 212 Text in Jacobsen, Mallmann, Meier, Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE) II/1, 225–
227. 
 213 Scarlis, Neutralität, 126–127, 132–143. 
 214 Conversation Kirchschläger – Podgorny, 29 January 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 
105.456-6/71, Z.108.141 Cf. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 11 (1971), 50. The com-
muniqué omitted the topic. Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 
1971 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1972), 9–11.
172 Overcast, but Friendly? 1961‒1972 
contentions and Kirchschläger’s failure to attain Soviet consent regarding Aus-
tria’s wish to buy defense missiles, the visit was considered a disappointment by 
the Austrian media.215 
After EEC-Austrian talks were recommenced in November 1970, Soviet diplo-
mats requested that their Austrian colleagues continue to inform the USSR about 
the negotiating progress. However, when Ambassador Wodak invited the Soviet 
side to feel free to ask whatever it deemed necessary, Deputy Foreign Minister Se-
menov responded that he did not wish to “meddle in [Austria’s] domestic affairs.” 
In addition, he confessed in a “confidential” aside, the Soviets had lost track of the 
twists and turns of Austria’s integration into the EEC and “no longer knew what 
questions to ask, since they simply no longer understood the European Community 
issue and no one at the Soviet embassy in Vienna was able to formulate relevant 
questions.”216 
As it turned out, in the neutrals’ negotiations with the EEC, only free-trade 
agreements with the EFTA members were in the cards and a special arrangement 
with Austria, as had been discussed prior to 1968, was out ‒ a fact that was noted 
positively by Izvestiia on 1 December 1970. The agreements between EFTA mem-
ber states and the EEC, which were signed on 22 July 1972, were, as the Soviet 
ambassador in Vienna Averkii Aristov stated afterwards, not considered a threat 
to neutrality nor to Soviet interests.217 In the meantime, Brezhnev had signaled, in 
a speech at the all-Union congress of the Soviet trade unions in March 1972, that 
the Soviet Union might be prepared to revise its hitherto negative attitude towards 
the EEC. The Soviet leader had been convinced to modify his stance in light of 
prospects for European détente, for smoothing the ratification of the Soviet-West 
German Moscow Treaty of 1970, and for realizing an all-European conference on 
security.218 During an audience with the Austrian ambassador in April, Brezhnev in-
sisted that if the EFTA states concluded agreements with the EEC, Soviet economic 
interests in free trade must be safeguarded.219 In the case of Finland, the Soviet 
Union achieved several extra concessions: an extension of both the Soviet-Finnish 
Treaty and the term of President Kekkonen, the conclusion of an associative agree-
ment with the CMEA, and the signing of bilateral free trade agreements with the 
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CMEA members. This delayed the Finnish agreement with the EEC, which was 
signed only in October 1973.220 
When Austria’s free trade agreement with the EEC was concluded, the Pravda 
report of 28 July 1972 displayed some modest misgivings. A month later, a Soviet 
aide-mémoire reminded the Austrian government of its duties resulting from the 
state treaty and neutrality. The document stressed the importance of a statement 
made by Chancellor Kreisky on the day of the signature of the free trade agree-
ment, “that Austria takes this step in due consideration of its obligations as a neutral 
state.”221 Furthermore Moscow expressed concerns that the Austrian free trade with 
the EEC might create discriminatory conditions for the Soviet Union on the Aus-
trian market. In its response of 20 September, the Austrian government declared 
that the new agreements with the EEC and ECSC “cannot and shall not” in any way 
impede the fulfillment of the obligations resulting from the state treaty and neutral-
ity. In order to reduce any negative side effects for the trade between Austria and 
the Soviet Union, both sides entered into negotiations on a new trade agreement, 
which was signed in May 1975 and granted the USSR most-favored nation status.
By this time, the CSCE had almost reached its conclusion. At the conference, 
many things had developed differently than the USSR had hoped. Soviet-Austrian 
relations had been affected as well. The Austrian memorandum of 24 July 1970, 
which was addressed to all European states as well as the United States plus Canada 
and supported the Finnish proposal for a CSCE, the Eastern agenda, as well as the 
Western calls for mutually balanced force reductions (MBFR) of all (not only “for-
eign”) troops in Europe, had been received frostily in Moscow. Since the USSR did 
not favor MBFR, Pravda, on 26 October of the same year, called upon Austria to 
show “more activity” as well as “more independence” from the West. In contrast, 
Swiss contributions, which omitted the troop reduction issue, were welcomed by 
Soviet propaganda.222 When Kirchschläger traveled to Moscow in January 1971, 
Gromyko, Kosygin and Podgorny reproached him about the Austrian proposals, 
and in order to put further pressure on the Austrian minister, they struck up the old 
tune about “recognizing the GDR.”223 In addition, Gromyko and Kosygin stated 
that they considered Kreisky’s proposal to put the Near East issue on the CSCE 
agenda “absolutely incomprehensible.”224 The Soviet Union had no interest in tor-
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pedoing the conference by including a major crisis into its program. Kirchschläger, 
who at that point in time had not even read Kreisky’s idea, as he stated during the 
conversation, could only register the Soviet objection. 
Despite earlier Soviet dissatisfaction with Austria’s hesitation regarding the 
convocation of the CSCE, in 1972 Soviet propaganda about Austria took on a pre-
dominantly friendly tone. For the first time in many years, on the occasion of that 
year’s state treaty anniversary celebrations, Pravda correspondent Boris Dubrovin, 
in his commentary “A Good Basis,” neither criticized the country’s EEC policy nor 
its inactivity regarding the CSCE.225 Nonetheless, as soon became apparent, the 
activities of Austria and the other neutrals at the CSCE were not much to the liking 
of the Soviet leadership.
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7.  The Czechoslovakian Crisis of 1968 and Austria’s 
Military Vulnerability
After the failure of Austria’s European ambitions in 1967, the generally friendly 
Soviet-Austrian relations as well as the signs for a general European détente be-
came overshadowed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization’s military intervention in 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968. In May of that year, Austrian president Jonas had 
told his Soviet colleague that the neutral country had watched the “Prague Spring” 
with empathy.1 When the Soviet crackdown on reformist Czechoslovakia started 
in the summer, the Austrian government was caught by surprise, although it had 
received warnings of an imminent Warsaw Pact action five weeks earlier.2 
The Warsaw Pact’s intervention and the Soviet reputation in Austria
Due to lengthy internal disputes on questions of authority, and in striking contrast 
to Klaus’ public claim that “the federal government acted quickly” and that “all 
necessary measures have been taken,” it took the cabinet a total of eight hours to 
have the marching order issued for the army, which was moreover ordered to stay 
twenty-five kilometers away from the border. Also in contrast to his later claims, 
the chancellor, in his first speech on 21 August, broadcast on the radio at 7 a.m., did 
not express any regret or sympathy with the victims nor did he judge or criticize the 
invasion; he barely mentioned “the events in Czechoslovakia.”3 Although the fed-
eral government did not consider Austria threatened by a Soviet invasion,4 Foreign 
Minister Waldheim, who in contrast to Austria’s behavior in 1956 ruled out any 
Austrian comments on the Warsaw Pact’s invasion in its neighborhood save disap-
proval, was said to have deleted two passages from Klaus’ speech that he consid-
ered too outspoken.5 The second speech by Klaus, which was televised, remained 
cautious – in opposition leader Kreisky’s words, “obedient” and “appeasing.”6 It 
adopted the terminology that no country should meddle in the “internal affairs of 
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 2 Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 104–107. 
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Pisa, 21–30 August 1968, in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 8 (1968), 251–254. 
 4 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 341.
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other states.” Whether this referred to Austria or the USSR was ‒ on purpose or 
unwittingly ‒ left open by Klaus. That the events of August 1968 did not constitute 
“internal affairs,” but a violation of international law remained unsaid. In the mean-
time, other West European governments had already protested the Soviet invasion, 
which was denounced in a British memorandum of the same day as a “flagrant 
violation” of the Charter of the United Nations and of all commonly recognized 
norms of international law.7 Only in his third speech on the subject did Klaus mildly 
criticize the invasion as a “blow against détente policy,” expressing regret about the 
damage that had been brought to the “peaceful cohabitation of peoples” and calling 
for respect for the rules of international law, the Charter of the United Nations and 
the rights of small countries. In addition to Klaus’ desire to avoid being charged 
by the USSR with overstepping neutrality, this cautious approach has also been at-
tributed to the Austrian wish to host the SALT talks in Vienna and therefore not to 
alienate the Soviet leadership.8
The Austrian government, in its “hesitant and maneuvering behavior” towards 
the Warsaw Pact,9 did not even go as far as the Austrian Communist Party, which in 
a spontaneous declaration by its Central Committee publicly condemned the inva-
sion.10 The KPÖ was not brought in line by the Kremlin until some days later. The 
CPSU Politburo dispatched the Soviet ambassador in Vienna to inform the KPÖ 
leaders about the Soviet “surprise” at the Austrian comrades’ support for the idea of 
the French communists to organize a conference of West European leftists to dis-
cuss the consequences of the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Prague.11 The crisis led 
to a rift within the KPÖ between apologists and critics of the intervention. Former 
party leader Ernst Fischer, who condemned the military action, was expelled from 
the party.12 
The Austrian self-restraint was not honored by the Soviet Union. When Am-
bassador Podtserob, on 21 August at 12:30 p.m., met with Klaus to explain the 
operation, he assured the chancellor that the USSR did not intend to take any ac-
tions against Austria and that the Warsaw Pact’s invasion would not harm Soviet 
relations with Austria. Nonetheless, he warned that “any [Austrian] greater mili-
tary measure would be considered an unfriendly act, if not even a violation of 
 7 Quoted in Bonwetsch, “Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik II,” 158. 
 8 Anselm Skuhra, “Austria and the New Cold War,” in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), The Neutral Democ-
racies in the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 117–147, 128. 
 9 Gehler, Der lange Weg: Darstellung, 250.
 10 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 8 (1968), 245–246.
 11 Politburo CPSU, protocol 104/3, 8 October 1968; Conversation Podtserob – Waldheim, 29 August 
1968, in Stefan Karner, Natalja Tomilina, and Alexandr Tschubarjan (eds.), Der Prager Frühling: 
Dokumente (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 1331–1335.
 12 Manfred Mugrauer, “Der Prager Frühling und die Parteikrise der KPÖ,” in Stefan Karner et al. 
(eds.), Der Prager Frühling 1968: Das internationale Krisenjahr (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 1043–
1061. 
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neutrality.”13 Despite his reassurances, Soviet planes committed systematic and re-
peated reconnaissance flights into Austria’s air space. On the evening of 21 August, 
Waldheim called Podtserob, warned that if the Soviet flights continued, the federal 
government would be forced to file a protest, and announced the reinforcement of 
Austrian garrisons near the border. The Soviet ambassador again expressed his re-
gret about the Soviet intrusions.14 The violations were explained away as being due 
to technical problems ‒ an explanation that lost its credibility after the flights con-
tinued for several days. After further Austrian semi-protests were communicated to 
Podtserob,15 on 23 August the Austrian ambassador was ordered to file a protest in 
Moscow, but he was not received until 26 August.16 Wodak was, then, again given 
Soviet reassurance that these violations would be discontinued. Nonetheless, So-
viet flights over Austrian territory were still reported on 1 September.17 
Instead of discontinuing these violations immediately, the Soviet side began to 
accuse Austria of disregarding its neutrality. As in 1956, but less intensely, Liter-
aturnaia gazeta charged Austria with tolerating training centers for Western secret 
services and with smuggling Western soldiers and weapons into the Eastern bloc. 
After checking the information, Waldheim, in a conversation with Podtserob,18 
rejected the allegations and Minister of Defense Georg Prader invited the Soviet 
military attaché to visit Austrian military facilities in order to assure him of the 
incorrectness of the Soviet claims. In Moscow, Ambassador Wodak insisted on an 
official correction.19 Both attempts were unsuccessful and the Soviet propaganda 
attacks intensified. Pravda on 27 September charged the Austrian media with con-
ducting a “disinformation campaign,” and on 1 October Radio Moscow attacked 
President Jonas, who had dared to criticize the Soviet intervention. As in 1956, 
the Soviet media campaign against Austria had several aims: warning the neutral 
against going too far in its empathy with the architects of the “Prague Spring,” 
destroying the country’s attractiveness for East Europeans, as well as externalizing 
 13 Quoted in Lobova, “Die Außenpolitik Österreichs aus der Sicht der UdSSR,” 904. This threat was 
not mentioned in Podtserob’s report of the meeting. Conversation Podtserob – Klaus, 21 August 
1968, in Karner, Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente, 1293–1293.
 14 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 8 (1968), 244. Cf. Conversation Podtserob – Wald-
heim, 21 August 1968, ibid., 1295–1297.
 15 Conversation Podtserob – Platzer, 23 August 1968, in Karner, Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente, 
1301–1303.
 16 Bericht Waldheim an Ministerrat, 10 September 1968, in Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 
213–216. On the basis of the Austrian cabinet protocols, see Maximilian Graf, “Internationale 
Reaktionen auf die Intervention der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten in der ČSSR 1968” (MA Thesis, 
Vienna, 2008), 145–153.
 17 Meier-Walser, Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus, 428. 
 18 Conversation Podtserob – Waldheim, 29 August 1968, in Karner, Der Prager Frühling: Doku-
mente, 1309.
 19 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 September 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, 
GZ. 111298–6/68, Z. 127871–6pol/68. 
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the responsibility for the events in the Eastern bloc and thus legitimizing Soviet 
behavior. 
In the meantime the USSR had put pressure on the Austrian government to 
impose restrictions on media coverage of the Soviet intervention. On 29 August, 
Podtserob paid back Waldheim’s rejection of Soviet allegations by criticizing the 
“unfriendly and nonobjective” character of Austrian media coverage, and two days 
later, the ambassador handed over a note protesting the “hostile conduct” of the Aus-
trian television and press with regard to the USSR and other socialist countries.20 
This type of conduct, the note claimed, would contradict Austria’s neutral status. 
Furthermore, the USSR charged Austria with tolerating organizations on its soil that 
were providing “immediate help for counterrevolutionary forces in Czechoslova-
kia.” All these factors, the note claimed, had “damaged Austria’s foreign policy.”
Klaus, who wanted to avoid giving the Soviet Union any pretext for such ac-
cusations, answered that the Austrian government was observing neutrality but that 
neither the public nor the media were bound by or obliged to neutrality. Neverthe-
less, he tried to influence the Austrian Broadcasting Corporation’s (ORF) managing 
director Gerd Bacher and other representatives of the mass media to “soften” media 
coverage.21 Even earlier, State Secretary Karl Pisa had caused an uproar among 
Austrian journalists by appealing to the media not to “dramatize” the events in 
Czechoslovakia. And in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador on 29 August, 
Waldheim had agreed that the freedom of the Austrian press was limited by obliga-
tions resulting from the state treaty.22
While the Austrian and, to some extent, the Soviet government tried to avoid 
damaging the bilateral relations, the Soviet reputation in the Austrian population 
seemed to have been badly harmed. The military intervention was condemned by 
the entire media, the opposition parties and the Federation of Trade Unions. Even 
the Austrian-Soviet Society communicated its “great consternation” to its Soviet 
“brother society” and stated that all its efforts “to explain, in decade-long activities, 
the foreign policy of the Soviet Union as a policy of peaceful coexistence, respect 
for the sovereignty of other states, and nonintervention in their internal affairs,” 
activities that had achieved “a positive attitude” among the Austrian people, had 
been ruined and trust in the USSR was “deeply shaken.”23 The general anger was 
 20 Text of the Soviet note in Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 210–212. The Soviet protocol of 
the conversation, 31 August 1968, in Karner, Der Prager Frühling: Dokumente, 1313–1317.
 21 Berthold Molden, “Die ‘Ost-West-Drehscheibe’: Österreichs Medien im Kalten Krieg,” in Man-
fried Rauchensteiner (ed.), Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich (Vi-
enna: Böhlau, 2010), 687–774, 724, 728.
 22 Conversation Podtserob – Waldheim, 29 August 1968, in Karner, Der Prager Frühling: Doku-
mente, 1311. Cf. Peter Ruggenthaler, “Der Neutralität verpflichtet: die sowjetisch-österreichischen 
Beziehungen 1968,” in Stefan Karner et al. (eds.), Der Prager Frühling 1968: Das internationale 
Krisenjahr (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), 993–1006, 1001.
 23 Austrian-Soviet Society to Soviet-Austrian Society, 28 August 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-
Pol, GZ. 110879–6/68, Z. 127319–6pol/68.
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demonstrated on 21 August, when the Soviet embassy in Vienna was attacked with a 
Molotov cocktail.24 According to an Austrian opinion poll, the likelihood of a Soviet 
invasion of Austria was, in September 1968, considered impossible by 21 percent, 
slightly possible by 29 percent, possible by 37 percent, and probable by 8 percent.25 
In contrast to the image of the Soviets (and of the Austrian government) held 
by ordinary Austrians, official relations quickly recovered. The Soviet minister for 
natural gas, Aleksei Kortunov, who traveled to Vienna in September to celebrate 
the start of gas deliveries to Austria, was officially received by Jonas, Klaus, and 
Waldheim,26 thus revealing Klaus’ statement that the invasion would jeopardize 
détente to have been an empty threat. As Austrian leaders had made clear in a par-
liamentary session the same month, they were still interested in continuing to foster 
détente; in their eyes, only a relaxation in tensions would provide Austria greater 
room to maneuver.27 By receiving Kortunov, the Austrian government, as in 1957, 
again played the role of being the first Western country to make Soviet politicians 
respectable after a violation of international law. In December, a visit by the Soviet 
minister of trade, Nikolai Patolichev, followed. His September trip had been post-
poned by the USSR, although on 31 August, only ten days after the invasion, the 
Austrian government had confirmed its interest in soon receiving the Soviet guest. 
On the economic side, Austria’s passivity in August was rewarded by an increase 
in Soviet oil deliveries from 500,000 tons to 750,000 tons per annum and with an 
invitation to an Austrian delegation including Minister of Trade Otto Mitterer and 
the president of the Austrian chamber of commerce, Rudolf Sallinger, and of the 
board of industrialists, Franz Josef Mayer-Gunthof. The visit of the president of 
the Austrian parliament, Alfred Maleta, from 10 to 18 March 1969, for which the 
Soviet side specially coined the expression “official friendship visit,” was the first 
high-ranking Western official trip (after the Finnish foreign minister) to the Soviet 
Union after the crackdown on the “Prague Spring.”28 
In general, the crisis demonstrates that the Austrian government’s interpretation 
of neutrality had become much more extensive than it had been during the Hungar-
ian crisis in 1956, covering not only military matters, but also its own readiness 
for speaking frankly. That Klaus and Waldheim attempted to curb the freedom of 
speech and influence the Austrian media coverage of the events reveals the extent 
of their “mental neutralization.” Secondly, the crisis underlined that neutrality did 
not automatically mean Austria’s protection from violations from without, not even 
from the USSR, a signatory power of the Austrian state treaty. 
 24 Graf, “Internationale Reaktionen auf die Intervention der Warschauer-Pakt-Staaten,” 152.
 25 Eger, Krisen an Österreichs Grenzen, 121. 
 26 Ibid., 101–102. 
 27 Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl Zemanek, “Die österreichische Neutralität im Jahr 1968,” in Öster-
reichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 9, no. 2 (1969), 144–169, 145. 
 28 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 19 March 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 
151532–6/69, Z. 154983. Cf. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 9 (1969), 116.
180 Overcast, but Friendly? 1961‒1972 
Warsaw Pact plans and Austria’s self-defense
This appears quite surprising, as the Soviet Union, like the other three great pow-
ers, in article 2 of the Austrian state treaty of 1955, had obliged itself to respect the 
independence and territorial integrity of Austria. However, the Soviet respect for 
neutrality in military terms seems to have been defined by considerations of utility 
rather than international law.29 When the Soviet minister of defense, Marshal Rodi-
on Malinovskii, during his visit of the Austrian Bundesheer’s 1959 exercises, stated 
that “the Soviet Union would never violate Austria’s neutrality as an initiator,”30 
the emphasis rested on the last words: In their war games, Warsaw Pact planners 
took it almost for granted that the enemy would soon occupy Austrian territory. 
From that moment on they were ready to enter it too and to use it as a battlefield. 
An authentic detailed plan for a Hungarian command-staff war game, dated May 
1965, foresaw Hungarian troops confronting NATO forces, which under the cover 
of the Bundesheer had entered the country. The Hungarian troops were to deliver a 
main strike in the direction of Vienna and Linz and another in the direction of Graz 
and Villach, and thus within five to six days “to eliminate Austria from the war.”31 
Vienna was to be either totally destroyed or at least largely demolished by two So-
viet 500-kiloton nuclear devices launched from Hungarian soil. 
Whereas such plans always assumed that NATO would be the first to violate 
Austria’s neutrality, it remains up to debate whether the USSR was prepared to 
“cast the first stone.” When the Czech general Jan Šejna defected to the West, he 
caused an uproar by publishing alleged war plans of the Warsaw Pact. He claimed 
that from 1963, the USSR was ready to commit a first strike.32 When some of the 
 29 Erich Reiter and Georg Bautzmann, “Kriegsführungspläne des Warschauer Paktes in der so ge-
nannten Zeit des Kalten Krieges,” in Erich Reiter and Ernest König (eds.), Österreichs Neutralität 
und die Operationsplanungen des Warschauer Paktes, Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik 20 
(Vienna: Landesverteidigungsakademie, 1999), 11–14, 13. On Soviet war planning in general, cf. 
Vojtech Mastny, “Imagining war in Europe: Soviet strategic planning,” in idem, Sven G. Holts-
mark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War: Threat perceptions 
in the East and West (London: Routledge, 2006), 14–45.
 30 Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 23 June 1959. Emphasis mine. 
 31 Róbert Széles, “Die strategischen Überlegungen des Warschauer Paktes für Mitteleuropa in den 
70er Jahren und die Rolle der Neutralen,” in Manfried Rauchensteiner (ed.), Tausend Nadelsti-
che: Das österreichische Bundesheer in der Reformzeit 1970–1978 (Graz: Styria, 1994), 25–45. 
Cf. Czechoslovakia’s Strategic Position in a European War, April 1961; Plan for a Hungarian 
Command-Staff War Game, May 1965, in Mastny and Byrne, A Cardboard Castle?, 118–119, 
189–191. See also Erwin Schmidl, “The Warsaw Pact and Austria: Threats and Threat Percep-
tions,” in Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? 
Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and Détente, 1955–1989 (Vienna: Lit, 
2009), 203–217; Wolfgang Mueller, “Der Warschauer Pakt und Österreich 1955–1991,” in Man-
fried Rauchensteiner (ed.), Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich (Vi-
enna: Böhlau, 2010), 135–191.
 32 Jan Sejna, We Will Bury You (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1982) 42–43, 119–121. Cf. below, 
page 212. On the following, see Alfred Schätz, “Die sowjetische Militärpolitik im Kalten Krieg 
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Warsaw Pact’s war plans were declassified after 1991, defense analysts and repre-
sentatives of all political parties concluded that it appeared unlikely that the Eastern 
alliance would have respected Austria’s status in the case of a general war. This 
could be seen by the preponderance of Blitzkrieg offensives in Soviet preparations 
for war in Europe, as well as the Soviet interest in the case of such a war to quickly 
eliminate West Germany and France: While the concentration of NATO forces in 
the FRG let a quick advance on the German front appear unlikely, the military 
vacuum in Austria almost invited an attack along the Danube. 
While such war games luckily never became reality, the frequent violations of 
Austria’s airspace by Soviet planes during their intervention in Czechoslovakia 
1968 underline the low Soviet respect for Austrian neutrality from a military point 
of view. Eleven years later, Minister of Defense Otto Rösch, after a visit to the 
USSR, reported in an Austrian cabinet meeting: “Neutral Austria’s political impor-
tance for détente and peace in Central Europe has been repeatedly acknowledged 
by the Soviet minister of defense. At the level of the military command and below, 
however, there seems to be no understanding whatsoever with regard to permanent 
neutrality.”33 This assessment conforms to research results that have seen the fate 
of Austria, in the case of a military conflict between the two alliances, to have been 
a matter of strategic deliberations, particularly in view of its geographical position 
as a corridor between Hungary and West Germany. A similar curse of geography 
had been the fate of neutral Belgium in 1914 and 1940. Indeed, even after 1945, for 
a small country “it was still the worst thinkable mistake to be located in the wrong 
place.”34 Only after 1989, following the new “defensive” defense doctrine of the 
Warsaw Pact introduced by Gorbachev, East European military exercise planning 
foresaw Austria retaining her neutrality.35 
Given that Warsaw Pact military planners took a Western, and then Eastern, 
violation of Austria’s neutrality for granted, it comes hardly as a surprise that the 
USSR did not make significant investments in Austria’s capability to defend itself 
and turned a deaf ear on Austrian requests to enable the country to acquire mod-
ern defense weaponry. In comparison to the US donations to the Austrian army of 
und die österreichische dauernde Neutralität” (PhD Thesis, Vienna, 2008), 72–73, 201–209; 
Martin Malek, “Österreich und der Auflösungsprozess des Warschauer Paktes, 1989–1991,” in 
Manfried Rauchensteiner (ed.), Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 557–614, 595–596; Andrew E. Harrod, “Felix Austria? Cold War Secu-
rity Policy between NATO, Neutrality, and the Warsaw Pact, 1945–1989“ (PhD Thesis, Medford, 
2007), 822–830. 
 33 Mündlicher Bericht Rösch an Ministerrat, BMLV Zl. 10061/54–1.1/80, 2 January 1980, in SBKA, 
Länderboxen, UdSSR 5. 
 34 Wilhelm Agrell, “Silent allies and hostile neutrals: Nonaligned states in the Cold War,” in Vojtech 
Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark, and Andreas Wenger (eds.), War Plans and Alliances in the Cold 
War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West (London: Routledge, 2006), 141–162, 145. 
 35 Czechoslovak Description of “Vltava-89” Exercise, 23 May 1989, in Mastny and Byrne, A Card-
board Castle, 634–635. 
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military equipment, worth 100 million dollars, the Soviet side gave only symbolic 
assistance.36 Furthermore, Austria’s (albeit weak) efforts to beef up its defense were 
treated by the Kremlin with suspicion and foot-dragging, while calls for the coun-
try’s complete disarmament, such as the initiative of the Austrian physicist, social 
democrat, and member of the peace movement Hans Thirring met with Soviet ap-
proval.37 In the 1970s, the Soviet army’s newspaper voiced concerns about alleged 
increases in the country’s military spending; it was claimed that peace policies 
would better contribute to Austria’s security than investments in its defense.38 Such 
statements conformed to the Soviet understanding of neutrality and Soviet criticism 
of the defense policies of other Western neutrals, in particular those of Sweden and 
Switzerland, as was repeatedly voiced during the 1960s and 70s.39 
In contrast to the Swiss concept of neutrality, to US insistence, and, indeed, to 
the Austrian declaration of neutrality, the Soviet understanding of neutral policy 
comprised no obligation for self defense,40 and the state treaty contained a number 
of significant restrictions against Austria possessing or using ground-based anti-
aircraft and other missiles. These stipulations of the state treaty’s article 13 had 
been copied from the United Nations’ peace treaties of 1947 with Hitler’s former 
allies, when missiles had been banned as offensive weapons. Due to the devel-
opment of missile-based anti-tank defense, however, such weapons were increas-
ingly used for defensive purposes and the restrictions acquired a new meaning, 
namely they prevented Austria from purchasing the necessary means for this type 
of defense. Although Austria, with US consent, regularly approached the USSR 
to obtain its blessing for buying these weapons, the Kremlin remained adamant-
ly against such purchases, even after Finland had successfully amended the an-
ti-missile article in its peace treaty.41 During Minister of Defense Prader’s visit 
to Moscow in 1966, Austria was granted the right to order anti-tank missiles;42 
however, similar requests by Klaus, Waldheim, Kreisky, Kirchschläger, and Rösch 
concerning ground-air-missiles in the late 1960s and 70s were refused.43 Klaus, 
in a lecture at the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1967, argued in favor of lifting 
 36 Kofler, Kennedy und Österreich, 117–118. 
 37 Ganiushkin, Neitralitet i neprisoedinenie, 125. Cf. Hans Thirring, Mehr Sicherheit ohne Waffen: 
Denkschrift an das österreichische Volk und seine gewählten Vertreter (Vienna: Jugend und Volk, 
[1962]). 
 38 Krasnaia zvezda, 4 February 1975. Cf. Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 February 
1975, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Z. 225.05.40/1-II/75.
 39 Petersson, The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality, 68.
 40 See above, page 65. 
 41 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 22 September 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, 
Pol. Berichte Moskau, 915–917. 
 42 Ministerratsvortrag Prader, 23 September 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 45707–6/66, 
Z. 49028–6pol/66. 
 43 O vizite v Sovetskii Soiuz Ministra inostrannykh del Avstrii, 10 April 1968, in AVPRF, 
66/47/101/11, 11–16; Conversation Kreisky with Kosygin, 31 May 1974, in SBKA, NL Thalberg, 
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the restrictions on Austria’s self-defense; only by acquiring all necessary defen-
sive means, including missiles, would the prestige of the country’s neutrality be 
ensured and its function as a deterrent possible.44 While some of these requests 
were met by the Soviets encouraging Austria, as in 1965 and 1971, to order Soviet 
missiles or planes with air-to-air missiles,45 others were fended off with the thesis 
that, as a neutral, Austria should rather focus on peaceful foreign policy instead 
of wasting money on obsolete defense.46 Such postures can be explained by the 
Soviet interest to keep Austria weak and unarmed in case of a war between the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO. In addition, there seems to have existed a certain So-
viet distrust of Austria’s impartiality. In 1965, press reports cited a Soviet diplomat 
with the words: “Why do you [i.e. the Austrians] need rockets? You would shoot 
down a Czech plane violating your airspace, but would you shoot down an Ameri-
can plane?”47 
During a visit of an Austrian delegation in 1979, the Soviet army demonstrated 
various types of missiles and thus raised Austrian hopes that it might be possible 
to order some. The Austrian minister of defense Otto Rösch, however, felt that this 
would be, from the Austrian standpoint, politically inopportune.48 His predecessor 
Karl Lütgendorf, who had discussed the issue two years earlier, had been stopped 
by Kreisky.49 When Rösch in 1979 drew his Soviet colleague’s attention to the 
problem that Austria still had no anti-aircraft missiles, he was rebuffed by Usti-
nov’s words: “You don’t need them.”50 While politicians of the opposition party 
ÖVP demanded the modernization of Austria’s self-defense, Soviet commenta-
tors ridiculed their “lust for rockets.”51 By this time, all of the former Axis allies 
that had joined the Warsaw Pact, and even Finland had already freed themselves 
from similar anti-missile restrictions contained in their 1947 peace treaties, and 
had bought, mostly from the USSR, anti-aircraft missiles.52 In addition to such 
double standards, the Soviet attitude towards Austrian defense included a certain 
Depositum 1, Box 2, File 3; Report, 28 April 1975, in AVPRF, 66/54/115/13, 34–35. On the Kirch-
schläger visit, see Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 11 (1971), 49. 
 44 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 7 (1967), 168. 
 45 Conversation Prader with Malinovskii, 30 September 1965, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 2; 
Conversation Kirchschläger with Gromyko, 26 and 29 January 1971; Kirchschläger with Kosygin 
and Kirchschläger with Podgorny, 29 January 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 105.456-
6/71, Z.106.503.
 46 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 May 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 
105.880-6/71, Z.111.995; Hanspeter Neuhold and Karl Zemanek, “Die österreichische Neutralität 
im Jahr 1967,” in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 8, no. 1 (1968), 14–32, 25.
 47 The New York Times, 6 October 1965. Quoted in Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality in Postwar 
Europe, 123. 
 48 Hinteregger, Im Auftrag Österreichs, 241–243.
 49 Ginther, “Austria’s Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union,” 78, 80–81.
 50 Conversation Rösch with Ustinov, 17 December 1979, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 5.
 51 S. Tarow, “Gier nach Raketen,” in Neue Zeit, no. 14 (1979), 16. 
 52 Harrod, “Felix Austria?,” 283. 
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amount of hypocrisy: On one hand, it was taken for granted that Austria’s integrity 
and neutrality would be violated by NATO; on the other, Austrian efforts to im-
prove its poor defense were blocked. And when in 1983 NATO secretary Joseph 
Luns questioned Austria’s capability to defend itself, Izvestiia on 2 April issued a 
sharp reprimand against this “blunt intervention in the internal affairs of a sover-
eign state.”53 
The Soviet “nyet” does not seem to have particularly disturbed the Austrian 
government, which indeed usually shied from providing the necessary means for 
the country’s security. Austria’s per capita defense expenditure was, during the 
1960s, 70s and 80s, among the lowest of all European states, lagging significantly 
behind comparable, despite their being strategically less exposed, neutral states 
such as Sweden and Switzerland, both in absolute and relative numbers. During 
theses years, the Austrian government spent 0.9–1.4 percent of the country’s GDP 
on defense purposes, while Finland assigned 1.1–1.7 percent, Switzerland 1.7–2.3 
percent, and Sweden 2.9–3.7 percent; in 1968, per capita spending for defense 
amounted in Austria to $19, in Finland to $27, in Switzerland to $68, and in Swe-
den to $128.54 This was paralleled by the rudimentary mobilization of Austria’s 
population: while in the late 1960s, the Swedish and Swiss armies were able to mo-
bilize about 10 percent of the entire population, the Austrian figure was 2 percent. 
In the 1970s, Switzerland (which, as the proverb goes, does not “have an army, but 
is one”) was able to mobilize 15 soldiers per square kilometer, West Germany 7, 
nonaligned Yugoslavia 6.4, and Austria 1.8. The indicators for Austria’s defense 
capability began to improve somewhat at the end of the Cold War. It was only in 
1985 that the Austrian government decided to upgrade the Bundesheer’s air force 
with twenty-four Saab Draken jets ‒ a decision highly welcomed by the US gov-
ernment.55
 53 Quoted in Ludmilla Lobova, “Russland und die Neutralität Österreichs: Aktuelle Einschätzungen 
vor dem Hintergrund des Verhältnisses zur NATO,” in Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspo-
litik (2000), 371–389, 373. Cf. S. Tarow, “Luns provoziert,” in Neue Zeit, no. 5 (1980), 17. 
 54 Dieter A. Binder, “Trittbrettfahrer des Kalten Krieges,” in Johann Starlinger (ed.), Armee, Zeit-
geist und Gesellschaft 1955–2005 (Vienna: Wissenschaftskommission beim Bundesministerium 
für Landesverteidigung, [2006]), 57–65, 59; Neuhold, “The Neutral States of Europe,” 116; Har-
rod, “Felix Austria,” 297, 309; Otto Heller, “Die Schild-Schwert-These und die Neutralen: Eine 
strategisch/operative Betrachtung über die Zeit von der Aufstellung des zweiten Bundesheeres 
bis zum Beginn der Reform 1970,” in Manfried Rauchensteiner and Wolfgang Etschmann (eds.), 
Schild ohne Schwert? Das österreichische Bundesheer 1955–1970 (Graz: Styria, 1991), 61–88, 
78. 
 55 Ingemar Dörfer, “The European Neutrals in the Strategy of the Reagan Administration,” in Bengt 
Sundelius (ed.), The Neutral Democracies in the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 182–
197, 184. 
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Table 2: Defense indicators of neutral states in the mid-1980s
Austria Finland Sweden Switzerland
Mobilization strength 240,000 734,000 776,000 645,000
% of population 3.2 15.1 9.3 9.8
Tanks 170 165 985 875
Armored vehicles 460 230 1,000 1,475
Fighting aircraft 32 80 501 295
Defense expenditure as % of GDP 1.3 1.4 3 2.3
as $ per capita 106 168 341 301
Source: Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 151.
The alarming shortage of funding, arms, and manpower raised concern not only 
within the Austrian army but also in the West. In the 1960s, both US reports and in-
ternal Austrian documents claimed that the Bundesheer was only capable of main-
taining order within the country.56 In 1974, the Austrian army’s Limes exercises 
led to the conclusion that the Warsaw Pact would probably need only a day to 
reach its strategic objectives in Austria. That the country did not have the neces-
sary means to control or defend its airspace was proven by a Soviet pilot making 
an alleged emergency landing on the neutral’s territory on 30 November 1967, only 
six months before the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Czechoslovakia. But neither 
of these incidents nor the systematic Soviet violations of Austria’s airspace in the 
summer of 1968 increased the Austrian government’s readiness to ensure that its 
airspace was efficiently defended. To make things worse, the Austrian government, 
despite having adopted a Comprehensive Defense Doctrine in 1965, two years later 
was still unwilling to approve any of the Bundesheer’s strategic plans for the coun-
try’s defense. Such disregard of the obligation to prepare for self-defense was quite 
remarkable, since the creation of a credible Austrian deterrent and neutrality being 
“self-chosen” had been the only Western preconditions for agreeing to Austria’s 
neutrality. 
Several factors have been discerned by analysts as reasons for this military weak-
ness: While two world wars and the concentration of troops and nuclear devices in 
the Cold War made defense an increasingly unpopular undertaking in Western Eu-
rope in general,57 in Austria the overwhelming numeric superiority of Warsaw Pact 
forces at the country’s border might have contributed to considerations such as “our 
situation is hopeless, why try to change it?”58 In addition, some Austrians seem to 
 56 Rauchensteiner, “Sandkästen und Übungsräume: Operative Annahmen und Manöver des Bun-
desheeres 1955–1979,” 266–281, 319; Franz Freistetter, “Das strategische Konzept des Ostens 
und Österreich 1955–1970,” in Manfried Rauchensteiner and Wolfgang Etschmann (eds.), Schild 
ohne Schwert? Das österreichische Bundesheer 1955–1970 (Graz: Styria, 1991), 29–60, 56. 
 57 On the “rise of the Civilian State” in Europe, see James J. Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers 
Gone? The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), 172–197.
 58 The Times (London), 7 May 1985, quoted in Johnson-Freese, “Austria,” 177. 
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have taken NATO’s protective “nuclear umbrella” for granted ‒ a tendency that led 
to repeated accusations that the neutral was taking a “free ride” on Western defense 
efforts.59 Even more important, however, may have been the gradual integration 
into Austrian official statements of the Soviet neutrality myth that neutral countries, 
first, were more secure than members of alliances, and, secondly, should focus on 
fostering détente and “peaceful coexistence” instead of creating armed deterrents.60
 59 Binder, “Trittbrettfahrer des Kalten Krieges,” 63; Luif, Der Wandel der österreichischen Neutra-
lität, 60–82. 
 60 See below, pages 199–200.
8.  Making Economic and Cultural Relations Mutual
Despite the Soviet-Austrian debates about Austria’s participation in the EEC and 
despite the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia, the 1960s were a period of steady 
growth in the area of economic and cultural relations. In July 1961 the last delivery 
of goods stipulated by the state treaty was made, and in February 1964 the USSR 
acknowledged the receipt of the last million tons of Austrian crude oil that had been 
the price for the Austrian buy-back of its oil wells seized by the USSR in 1945–46, 
shipments that in the end totaled six million tons instead of the ten originally ne-
gotiated.1 These deliveries, in combination with a growing number of delegation 
visits and several barter agreements, helped to get Soviet-Austrian trade moving. In 
1963 the Soviet Union purchased Austrian goods worth twenty-five million dollars, 
which included mainly rolled steel, machine tools, electric machinery, and barges, 
and delivered, in return, coal (for 14.3 million dollars), crude oil (8.4 million dol-
lars) and iron ore (6.7 million dollars).2
Trade 
Under Brezhnev and Kosygin, the USSR continued to intensify its commercial 
trade with Western countries. Industrial cooperation was begun, such as the Itali-
an-Soviet Fiat/VAZ car-plant project in Toliatti on the Volga. From 1966 to 1970, 
Soviet imports from the West increased on the average by 11.2 percent a year, 
the increase mainly consisting of imports of machinery and equipment.3 The So-
viet-Austrian trade agreement for this period, signed in 1965 in Vienna by Trade 
Minister Patolichev and his counterpart Bock, foresaw increases in volume and 
in the types of goods.4 Austria continued to export largely machinery, industrial 
equipment, and electrical goods (altogether one third of Austrian exports to the 
Soviet Union), sheet metal and metal goods (a quarter), and cable, lacquer, paper, 
spun rayon, textiles, shoes, and breeding cattle (of the kind that had been presen-
ted to Khrushchev in 1960). The Soviet Union delivered feed grain, cotton, coal, 
 1  Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 4 (1964), 37–38; Stourzh, Um Einheit, 774–775.
 2 Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 17–21.
 3 Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic History of the USSR from 
1945 (London: Longman, 2003), 120; 122. Soviet imports of Western machinery rose from 489 
million dollars in 1964 to 1,574 million dollars in 1973. 
 4 Langfristiges Abkommen zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR über den gegenseitigen Warenver-
kehr, 14 July 1965, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europa-
politik 2, 143–144. 
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crude oil, iron ore, chemicals, as well as a small amount of machinery (only 2 
percent of the Soviet exports to Austria). However, neither the list of goods nor 
its implementation fully satisfied the Soviet side. On 26 December 1967, Radio 
Moscow accused the Austrian side of having neither fulfilled its import obliga-
tions to buy natural rubber, tobacco, and tea, nor fully exhausted its import quota 
for coal and iron ore.5 The allegations were justified, as the Soviet-Austrian trade 
balance, indeed, persistently favored the Austrian side. The situation for Soviet 
machinery was especially poor, since for years Austria had not imported enough 
to fulfill the import quota. Many of these goods, Radio Moscow criticized, were 
purchased by Austria from the West, although the latter did not import the same 
quantities of Austrian goods. As a solution, Radio Moscow proposed that Austria 
buy Soviet helicopters and airplanes, and, in return, export pipes for Soviet pipe-
lines. 
Negotiations concerning the use of Austrian pipes for a gas pipeline to Italy, 
between the Soviet natural gas exporting company Soiuznefteksport and a con-
sortium consisting of several companies including Ferngas, VÖEST steel and the 
ÖMV oil refineries had started in 1966. Prior to this, Austria had already declared 
itself willing to import natural gas from the USSR, but had been refused since the 
Soviet capacity was insufficient.6 During the Klaus visit to Moscow in March 1967, 
a deal was concluded for integrating Austria into the Soviet-Italian pipeline pro-
ject; the agreement with Italy had been reached during Prime Minister Kosygin’s 
trip to Rome two months earlier.7 However, since Austria could not produce pipes 
of sufficient diameter (just as the USSR could not), VÖEST had to strike a deal 
with Mannesmann and Thyssen of West Germany for Austrian deliveries of steel 
in return for German pipes.8 The Soviet side repeatedly encouraged the Austrian 
government to organize pipe production in Austria itself, but Waldheim signaled 
that Austria was reluctant to start producing pipes without a Soviet purchase gu-
arantee. The 2.6 billion schillings deal on the delivery of 520,000 tons of West 
German pipes made of Austrian steel was signed in Vienna by the Soviet deputy 
minister of foreign trade, Nikolai Osipov, on 1 June 1968; the Soviet Union paid 
with natural gas and oil. Austria thus became the first West European state to import 
natural gas from the USSR.9 The agreement foresaw gas deliveries for twenty-three 
 5 Sowjetische Vorwürfe, 16 January 1967, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 13847–6/67, Z. 
13847–6/67. Similar allegations had been raised in July 1966. Ibid., GZ. 32503–6/66, Z. 41205–
6pol/66.
 6 Report, 31 May 1966, in AVPRF, 66/45/96/21, 2–6.
 7 Gromyko and Ponomarjow, Geschichte der sowjetischen Außenpolitik 1945 bis 1976, 545– 
547.
 8 Conversations Waldheim with Deputy Prime Minister Kuznetsov and Prime Minister Kosy-
gin, March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110044–6/68, Z. 115353–6pol/68 and Z. 
115779–6pol/68. 
 9 Lobova, “Die Moskauer Perzeption,” 144–146. 
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years, starting with 300 million cubic meters in 1968 and reaching 1.5 billion cubic 
meters per annum in 1971.10
The gas and pipeline agreement was preceded by another on economic-sci-
entific-technical cooperation signed in May 1968 during President Jonas’ visit to 
Moscow, which was followed in July by an agreement on air transport that cleared 
the way for intensified cooperation between Austrian Airlines, which as the first 
Western airline received landing rights in Kiev,11 and Aeroflot, which was granted 
the right to fly from Vienna to Zurich. A new five-year trade agreement, signed in 
1970 and replacing all previous trade agreements, was the first without fixed quotas 
and clearing in freely-convertible currency.12 
On the Austrian side, trade with the Soviet Union was primarily conducted in 
the nationalized sector. The Soviet minister for foreign trade Ivan Kabanov had vi-
sited the state-owned VÖEST as early as in 1955. His visit was followed, in 1960, 
by Khrushchev’s, who proposed several long-term contracts between the Soviet 
side and the steel plant in Linz. The first deal, concerning 10,000 tons of VÖEST 
steel for the USSR, had been signed in 1956. A year later, the company received its 
first delivery of Soviet coal and iron ore.13 In 1963, 45 percent of all Austrian goods 
exported to the USSR were produced by state-owned companies, with VÖEST and 
machine producer Voith the primary exporters.14 According to Soviet data, the sta-
te-owned share of Austria’s exports to the Soviet Union was on average as high as 
60 percent.15 Voith, in 1960, exported 40 percent of its paper-producing machinery 
to the USSR. In 1971, the Linz plant celebrated the delivery of its second million 
tons of steel to the Soviet Union with a ceremony and a bilingual brochure.16 The 
biggest deal landed by VÖEST in these years, however, was the delivery to Bela-
rusian Novo-Lipetsk of an entire steel plant of the “Linz-Donawitz” (LD) type, 
including an oxygen processor and a production site of industrial dolomite, and its 
construction. The deal was worth 36 million dollars and boosted VÖEST’s share 
 10 Archiv der Gegenwart 13957, 1 June 1968. 
 11 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 8 (1968), 233. 
 12 Langfristiges Abkommen über den Waren- und Zahlungsverkehr zwischen Österreich und der 
UdSSR, 5 August 1970, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und 
Europapolitik 2, 149–152.
 13 VÖEST, Die 2millionste Tonne VÖEST-Stahl für die UdSSR: Dvukhmillionaia tonna stali firmy 
VEST dlia SSSR (Linz: no publisher, 1971). 
 14 Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia, 52–54. Other state-owned Austrian companies involved in Soviet 
trade were the Böhlerwerk and Schoeller-Bleckmann steel companies, Chemie Linz, Simmering-
Graz-Pauker railcar construction, the Korneuburg dockyard, and the Elin-Union, a producer of 
electrical goods. 
 15 Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 17–21. In 1968–69 the share of Austrian 
state-owned companies in the Austrian trade with the USSR even reached 73.3 percent of the 
exports and 54.3 percent of the imports. File Offizieller Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzler in der 
Sowjetunion, May 1974, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3.
 16 VÖEST, Die 2millionste Tonne.
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in Austria’s trade with Eastern Europe from 27 to 35 percent.17 The Soviet side, in 
return, stepped up its coal and iron ore deliveries to the Linz steel plant. 
These deliveries, however, added even more to the much-deplored dominance 
of raw materials in Soviet exports. In order to diversify the list of trading goods, 
in 1967 the Soviet Union participated in the trade fairs in Vienna, Graz and Kla-
genfurt, and exhibited, among other things, excavators, machinery, helicopters, sea 
vessels, and Moskvich cars.18 The previous year, the USSR had organized an ex-
position in Austria of Soviet electronics and optics, the first such exposition in a 
capitalist country.19 Austria did not remain inactive either and took part, together 
with about twenty other countries, in all ten international fairs held in Moscow 
in the years 1964–69. Even earlier, in 1963, a special exposition of Austrian ma-
chinery had been shown in the Soviet capital.20 The Austrian disregard for Soviet 
machinery and technology and its lively exporting activities as well as the Soviet 
inability, during the 1960s, to step up deliveries in crude oil and natural gas tended 
to result in a trade imbalance favoring Austria, an imbalance that was nevertheless 
nearly within the framework of the trade agreements. The low attractiveness of 
Soviet goods in the West also troubled Soviet economic relations with other West 
European states.21 It was only in 1971 that the newly built gas pipeline and booming 
Soviet exports of natural gas turned the tide. 
The third significant problem for Soviet-Austrian trade, in addition to the passi-
ve trade imbalance and Austrian unwillingness to purchase little more than raw ma-
terials from the Soviet Union, was Austria’s EFTA membership. At least five times 
between Austria’s accession in 1960 and 1963, the Soviet Union demanded, due 
to its most-favored nation status that had been granted in 1955, the same trading 
conditions as intra-EFTA trade. Austria, naturally, was not allowed to fulfill such 
wishes.22 The USSR, in frustration, raised its tariffs for Austrian goods.23 When 
the Austrian minister of trade Otto Mitterer traveled to the USSR in 1969, he was 
confronted by Kosygin and Patolichev, who bitterly criticized Austria’s preferential 
treatment of the Free Trade Association’s co-members.24 
Despite these problems, due to many efforts in the decade following 1961, So-
viet-Austrian trade doubled.
 17 Sowjetunion heute 11, no. 1 (1965), 18. 
 18 Zhiriakov, SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody, 123. 
 19 Report, 31 May 1966, in AVPRF, 66/45/96/21, 2–6.
 20 Sowjetunion heute 9, no. 42 (1963), 6. 
 21 Bonwetsch, “Sowjetische Westeuropapolitik II,” 183.
 22 Information, [1973], in SBKA, Länderboxen UdSSR, 2. 
 23 Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 22–25.
 24 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 17 July 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 
160920–6/69, Z. 160920.
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Share of  Austrian 
imports
1961 1,122.8 10.0 1.3 1,191.8 13.6 3.1
1962 1,402.4 24.9 1.0 1,138.4 –4.5 2.8
1963 1,612.6 15.0 1.0 1,348.0 18.4 3.1
1964 1,501.4 –6.9 0.8 1,354.2 0.5 2.8
1965 1,485.0 4.0 0.8 1,371.0 1.2 2.5
1966 1,547.2 4.2 0.9 1,267.8 –7.5 2.1
1967 1,545.6 –0.1 1.0 1,271.7 0.3 2.1
1968 1,779.5 15.1 0.9 1,519.0 19.4 2.3
1969 1,784.7 0.3 0.9 1,720.1 13.2 2.3
1970 2,134.1 19.6 0.8 2,067.9 20.2 2.2
1971 1,738.2 –18.2 0.7 2,685.0 29.8 2.6
1972 2,177.6 25.3 0.6 2,621.6 –2.4 2.2
Source: Butschek, Statistische Reihen; Vneshniaia togovlia
Exports in millions of Austrian schillings; changes and shares in percent.
At the twenty-fourth CPSU congress in March–April 1971, Brezhnev and Ko-
sygin mentioned Austria as an important capitalist trading partner, albeit only after 
France, West Germany and Italy.25 For most of the 1960s, however, Britain and 
Finland had been the leading Western trading partners of the USSR, followed by 
Japan. In some years they were even overtaken by the FRG, although its trade with 
the USSR, due to volatile political relations, followed a sort of rollercoaster track.26 
After having ranked sixth in the 1950s, Austria fell back to the rank of ninth and 
even thirteenth of the Soviet Union’s Western partners, and its share in Soviet for-
eign trade declined, from 1.1 percent (1960) to 0.6 percent (1972). This was a result 
of the increasing diversification of Soviet foreign trade during the détente years 
and its shift from neutral to Western partners. A similar development had affected 
Finland’s share in Soviet trade already in the 1950s, falling from 3.6 percent (1955) 
to 2.4 percent (1960). For Austria, compared to its other trading partners the gene-
ral importance of the USSR decreased also. With its roughly three-percent share 
in Austrian foreign trade in 1961 falling to little more than 2 percent in 1972,27 the 
USSR ranked only seventh or eighth among Austria’s trading partners. 
 25 Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU an den XXIV. Parteitag der Kommunisti-
schen Partei der Sowjetunion, Referent: L. I. Breshnew, 30 March 1971, in XXIV. Parteitag der 
Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion 30. März–9. April 1971: Dokumente (Moscow: APN, 
1971), 3–198, 49. 
 26 See Table 5, on page 242. Cf. Eberhard Schulz, Moskau und die europäische Integration (Munich: 
Oldenbourg, 1975), 230–231.
 27 The Soviet share of Austrian exports sank from 3.6 percent in 1961 to 2.4 percent in 1972; the 
Soviet share of Austrian imports from 3.1 percent in 1961 to 2.2 percent in 1972.
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Although Austria was often attacked by the Soviet side for being economically 
less independent from the West than other neutrals, particularly Switzerland and 
Sweden,28 in some economic sectors the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe became 
overwhelmingly important markets for Austria. While the member states of the 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance were the recipient of only 14.6 percent of 
all Austrian foreign trade, on par with EFTA (14.1 percent) but ranking far behind 
the EEC (with 55.5 percent), more than 60 percent of the veneered plates and 40 
percent of the shoes exported by Austria went to Eastern Europe.29 This reliance, 
in the 1980s, was to create problems for Austrian exporting industries.30 With re-
gard to Austrian imports, more than 47 percent of imported cast iron, 33 percent of 
imported iron-ore, and a little less than a quarter of imported coal came from the 
USSR. Even before the Soviet deliveries of natural gas started, Austria had become 
increasingly dependent on Soviet exports of energy sources. In the late 1960s, more 
than 69 percent of Austria’s imports of crude oil came from the USSR.31 
Cultural relations and personal contacts
In the area of cultural relations, the decade of the 1960s saw Austria starting to 
respond to earlier Soviet visits and to intensify cultural activities in the USSR. 
During the late 1950s, the Soviet side had begun to be very active in promoting 
cultural contacts and this continued. In 1961 musicians such as Mstislav Rostrop-
ovich, David and Igor Oistrakh, and Sviatoslav Richter made guest appearances in 
Vienna, the Bolshoi Ballet, with 120 dancers, performed at the Vienna State Opera 
in 1965,32 and in 1967 the Moscow Artists’ Theater MKhAT traveled to Austria. 
Such events had taken place before, but only now did this cultural love affair cease 
to be unidirectional. For years, the Austrian embassy in Moscow had appealed to 
the Ballhausplatz to encourage cultural visits to the land of the soviets. After the 
enthusiast Bischoff died in 1960, the chargé d’affaires Otto Eiselsberg continued 
his pleas, criticizing that “in 1955, in the area of culture as in the question of airline 
connections, Austria had had unique chances it had not known to exploit.”33 Thus, it 
was only after the spectacular tours through the communist empire, profiting from 
Khrushchev’s thaw, of the New York Philharmonic under Leonard Bernstein, a se-
ries of fashion shows by Christian Dior, the Hamburg Theater with Gustav Gründ-
 28 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 November 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, 
GZ. 166927–6/69, Z. 166927.
 29 Report Alekhin, 6 August 1963, in AVPRF, 66/42/87/11, 12–16.
 30 See below, pages 238–239.
 31 Report, 31 May 1966, in AVPRF, 66/45/96/21, 2–6.
 32 Zhiriakov, SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody, 135. 
 33 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 January 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, 
GZ. 70176–6/60, Z. 77276–6/60. On Eiselsberg, see Agstner, Enderle-Burcel, Follner, Öster-
reichs Spitzendiplomaten, 169f.
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gens, and several exhibits of Western paintings and publications that Austrian mu-
sicians and actors followed in greater numbers. It was not until 1962 that a tour 
of the Vienna Philharmonic under Herbert von Karajan took place, a tour that had 
been planned for 1959 but delayed due to disagreements concerning the contract.34 
The orchestra was enthusiastically greeted in Moscow and Leningrad, and its per-
formances of pieces by Mozart, Bruckner, and Johann Strauß were even honored 
by the presence of Khrushchev and Mikoian. The same year the annual tour of the 
Eisrevue was extended to Kiev and Tbilisi, and in 1963 the show was attended by 
more than half a million Soviet visitors.35 In 1965 the Mozarteum Orchestra under 
Bernhard Paumgartner visited the USSR, and in 1967 and 1968, the long-awaited 
trips of the Burgtheater and the State Opera finally took place. 
Also in 1968, in a “demonstratively amicable atmosphere” as noted by 
Waldheim,36 two cooperation agreements, one scientific and the other cultural, were 
signed. Austria had agreed to prepare the agreement, while still under Soviet pres-
sure because of its EEC ambitions. The former included arrangements concerning 
exchanges of delegations and knowledge, support for cooperation between scienti-
fic and technical institutions, the protection of industrial and scientific copyrights, 
and the creation of a joint advisory board to facilitate collaboration.37 The Sovi-
et side, which by then maintained sixty-two cultural agreements world wide and, 
since the 1940s, had fought for the signing of yet another with Austria, regarded 
the cultural agreement’s conclusion, as expressed earlier, “a demonstration of the 
amicable relationship with the concluding country.”38 In 1971, an agreement on 
cooperation was signed between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and its Austrian 
counterpart. 
At the broader level, it was above all the Austrian-Soviet and the Soviet-Aust-
rian friendship societies that struggled to propagate the culture of their respective 
countries. The Soviet side organized Grillparzer, Lenau, Nestroy, Schnitzler, and 
 34 Hinteregger, Im Auftrag Österreichs, 55–58. After the tour, the orchestra was confronted with a 
Soviet request for extra payment of $6,000. Schwierigkeiten und Hemmnise in der Durchführung 
kultureller Projekte, in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 1, File Sprechprogramm Moskau 1962.
 35 Sowjetunion heute 9, no. 30 (1963), 17. 
 36 Report Waldheim to Austrian parliament, 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 110044–6/68, 
Z. 12022–6pol/68. 
 37 Abkommen über die kulturelle und wissenschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Österreich und 
der UdSSR, 22 March 1968, in UdSSR – Österreich, 128–133; Abkommen über die wirtschaft-
lich-wissenschaftlich-technische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR, 24 May 
1968, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik 2, 
146–148. Austria, in 1968 and the early 1970s, signed further agreements on scientifi c and cul-
tural exchange with Romania and Bulgaria. Cf. Paul Ullmann, “Austria and Romania,” in Suppan 
and Mueller, Peaceful Coexistence or Iron Curtain, 456–477, 465; Peter Bachmaier, “Austrian-
Bulgarian Cultural Relations,” ibid., 478–499, 487. 
 38 Conversation Piffl-Per�ević with Romanovskii, 16 November 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-
Pol, GZ. 13850–6/67, Z. 13850–6/67. 
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Zweig festivals in the USSR, as well as countless concerts of Austrian music, and 
even an Austrian film festival. In 1966, the honorary president of the Soviet-Aus-
trian Friendship Society, composer Dmitri Shostakovich, was decorated with the 
Golden Medal of Merit of the Republic of Austria. In 1967, KPÖ leader Koplenig 
was awarded the Lenin Order by the Soviets. The ÖSG, under its president Hugo 
Glaser, organized in 1961 more than 1,000 events promoting the USSR which 
were visited by about 100,000 persons,39 and later managed to bring cosmonauts 
Iurii Gagarin and Pavel Popovich to Austria. Both friendship societies organized 
exhibits, as for instance, an exhibit held in Armenia on the Austrian resistance 
1938–45, and another in Vienna and Innsbruck of photographs of the USSR. The-
se two exhibits were seen by some 23,000 visitors. In September 1961, a friend-
ship soccer match was played between the Soviet and Austrian national teams in 
Moscow. 
In the 1970s, about one percent of all foreign-language students in Austria, i.e. 
about 2,000 high school and 300 university students, studied Russian.40 To promote 
the Russian language, Austria was invited to join the “Russian-language Olym-
pics” that were organized annually in Moscow. In the years 1955 to 1975, Russian 
translations of 125 Austrian books were published in the Soviet Union in more than 
eleven million copies, among them some eight million copies of works by Stefan 
Zweig.41 In Austria, the number of Russian books owned by the Austrian-Soviet 
Society’s libraries (largely donated by the USSR) by 1970 had reached 29,000 vo-
lumes. While the Soviet image among Austrians and the Austrian media (which did 
not have its own correspondents in Moscow until the 1970s and whose delegations 
from time to time were refused Soviet visas for alleged anti-Sovietism42) had been 
dealt a serious blow by the Warsaw Pact’s intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
in the USSR, despite periodical, albeit infrequent, criticism in the press and radio 
about Austrian neo-Nazis, Austria’s anti-Soviet media, its enemies of neutrality 
and allegedly poor living conditions,43 the image of Austria was generally positive. 
Austria was pictured as “a clearly Western-oriented, independent country, which 
nevertheless does not look with hostility at the Eastern world but with kindness.” 
 39 Zhiriakov, SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody, 144. 
 40 Zum Russischunterricht in Österreich, April 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ., Z. 115.490-
6/71.
 41 Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia, 60–63.
 42 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 March 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 
151532–6/69, Z. 153671. In 1958, the visa applications of the Austrian journalists Hugo Por-
tisch and Hans Dichand were refused because of their alleged “anti-Sovietism.” Il’ichev to Zo-
rin, 19 February 1958, AVPRF, 66/37/72/16, [14a]. Of Soviet periodicals, Pravda had permanent 
correspondents in Vienna: from 1951 V. Mikhailov; 1957–62 M. Podkliuchnikov; 1962–66 V. 
Men’shikov; 1966–74 B. Dubrovin, 1974–91 I. Mel’nikov. Stifter, “Das politische Österreich-
bild,” 69. 
 43 Pravda, 17 November 1967; Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 172.
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The Austrian embassy, which had summarized the Soviet attitude in these words, 
considered it “of prime importance to maintain this picture.”44
Nevertheless, personal contacts started slowly and remained sporadic. Allege-
dly due to Austrian “sins of omission,”45 a bilateral student exchange of five Aust-
rians and five Soviets was not implemented until 1961–62 and this quota remained 
until the end of the 1960s. In the 1970s, nine Austrian and nine Soviet university 
students participated annually in the government-sponsored exchange programs.46 
Although tourism grew, it was not without setbacks. In 1959, six hundred Austrian 
tourists had visited the Soviet Union; ten years later the number had quadrupled.47 
However, in 1962 the number of Soviet tourists to Austria was reduced to half, to 
a mere two hundred. When the Austrian embassy investigated the reasons, Soviet 
officials suggested that, since the “Soviet people are not yet mature enough for 
tourism,” new restrictions had to be applied.48
 44 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 8 May 1966, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. 
Berichte Moskau, 785–790. An analysis of all articles related to Austria in Pravda, Izvestiia, Trud, 
and Literaturnaia gazeta shows a “clearly affirmative” picture. Stifter, “Das politische Österreich-
bild,” 234.
 45 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 January 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, 
GZ. 70176–6/60, Z. 77276–6/60. By this time, West Germany already sent three students per an-
num to the USSR. The Austrian-Soviet exchange was agreed upon during the visit of education 
minister Heinrich Drimmel to Moscow in 1961.
 46 Ministerratsvortrag und Wortlaut Kulturabkommen, September 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-
Pol, GZ. 107.781-6/71, Z.117.793-6pol/71.
 47 Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia, 62.
 48 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 16 December 1962, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, 
GZ. 78033–6/62, Z. 78033–6pol/62.

9.  Summary: Soviet Containment and Encouragement; 
Austria’s Ostpolitik and Further “Neutralization”
The year 1972, with the formalization of Austria’s free-trade agreement with the 
EEC and the beginning of the CSCE, relieved Soviet-Austrian relations of two 
burdens, thereby concluding the period begun in 1960–61 that had been overshad-
owed by these two matters: on one hand, by Austria’s ambitions to participate in the 
developing West European integration and the Kremlin’s determination to contain 
these ambitions, and, on the other hand, by Soviet endeavors to encourage the neu-
tral to convoke an all-European conference for sanctioning the postwar status quo. 
The late 1960s had brought Soviet attempts to link the two issues. 
In the end, both the Austrian and Soviet hopes remained unfulfilled. Austria was 
not accepted as an associate of the EEC; in the case of the convocation of the CSCE, 
Finland had to step in, playing the role the Kremlin had most probably conceived 
to be Austria’s. Remarkably enough, both sides’ ambitions and frustrations did not 
result in a deterioration of the bilateral relations. This maintenance of friendly, even 
cordial, albeit sometimes tense, relations was due to the interests and efforts of both 
sides. Austria could not afford to anger the Soviet Union and therefore meticulously 
communicated its plans and the steps it was taking with regard to the EEC to the 
Kremlin. The latter, too, did not want to alienate Austria or jeopardize its goal of 
European détente, and therefore used the small Western neutral as a showcase of 
Soviet friendliness. Even the Soviet intervention in the “Prague Spring,” with its 
propaganda campaign against Austria, did not cause more than a brief interruption 
of these generally friendly relations.
It should be noted, however, that the “special” position Austria had held in Mos-
cow began to be less significant during the 1960s due to the general movement 
towards détente, both within Europe and between the superpowers. While in the 
1950s the neutral had been used to demonstrate that “peaceful coexistence” be-
tween states of different social systems was possible, such a showcase was not 
as necessary during the 1960s. The decline in Austria’s importance was probably 
reinforced by Khrushchev being toppled, but détente, the general diversification 
of East-West relations, and the Soviet interest in dealing with larger industrialized 
trading partners and in reaching out to NATO states were the main reasons for the 
shift in status, as was assessed by Ambassador Haymerle.1 Nevertheless, until the 
 1 Haymerle to Kreisky, 18 March 1964 and 26 October 1964, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, Pol. 
Berichte Moskau. 
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CSCE was actually convened, the Soviet tactic of encouraging the neutral to pro-
mote the idea of a security conference still made Austria an important addressee for 
Soviet diplomacy.
Despite this shift in the USSR’s focus, as a consequence of Soviet policy, Aus-
tria’s “neutralization,” i.e. its becoming more neutral, intensified. This can be seen 
in two aspects: Firstly, in the 1960s the neutral’s Ostpolitik was stepped up under 
Foreign Minister Kreisky and Chancellor Klaus.2 The roots of Austria’s “neighbor-
hood policy” (Nachbarschaftspolitik) went back to the early 1950s, when Austria 
had tried to reestablish its economic links with its Eastern neighbors and to please 
the Kremlin by being gracious to the communist satellites. In 1957, after the Hun-
garian crisis, Mikoian had encouraged the Austrian government to proceed with 
developing friendly relations with the East European states. This encouragement 
was continued in the following years. In April 1960, for instance, the Moscow 
New Times explained that neutrality meant not only abandoning all ambitions of 
participating in the EEC, but also developing the trade ties with Eastern Europe.3 
Sovetskaia Rossiia, on 21 November 1967, called upon the neutrals to maintain 
equal relations with the East and the West.
As a neutral, Austria was a natural addressee for such encouragement. Confront-
ed with the necessity to deal with its Eastern neighbors, and under the influence of 
this Soviet encouragement, it did not take long for the Austrian government, after 
the Soviet crackdown on the Hungarian revolution, to adopt a friendlier attitude 
towards the Kádár regime in Budapest. Throughout the 1960s and 70s, this kind of 
“neighborhood policy” remained Austria’s foreign policy axiom and a priority. In 
the years 1961–75, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania each received nine 
visits by the Austrian president, chancellor, or foreign minister, and the USSR re-
ceived eight.4 This policy actively promoted relations with the East European states 
in order to improve the international climate in general and thus, to widen Austria’s 
maneuvering space and bolster its security. In addition, Nachbarschaftspolitik was 
meant to appease the Soviet Union and create favorable conditions for Austrian 
 2 Cf. Erich Bielka, “Österreich und seine volksdemokratischen Nachbarn,” in idem, Peter Janko-
witsch, Hans Thalberg (eds.), and Reinhold Wagnleitner (red.), Die Ära Kreisky: Schwerpunkte 
österreichischer Außenpolitik (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1983), 195–231; Meier-Walser, Die Außen-
politik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus, 170–171, 179–180, 195; Rathkolb, “Austria’s Ost-
politik in the 1950s and 1960s”; Alexander Jehn, “Nachbarschaftspolitik im Donauraum: Die 
besonderen Beziehungen Österreichs zur Tschechowakei, zu Ungarn und Jugoslawien in der Ära 
Kreisky” (PhD Thesis, Vienna, 1996); Arnold Suppan, “Österreichs Ostpolitik 1955–1989,” in 
Ibolya Murber and Zoltán Fónagy (eds.), Die Ungarische Revolution und Österreich 1956 (Vien-
na: Czernin, 2006), 75–92; Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), Peaceful Coexistence or 
Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and Détente, 1955–1989 
(Vienna: Lit, 2009). 
 3 Malicek, “Die Beziehungen,” 84–85. 
 4 Of Western states, Switzerland received fourteen Austrian visits, the FRG eight, Britain and the 
US each four. Neuhold, “Der Staatsvertrag als Grundlage,” 165. 
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trade. However, not only the USSR wanted Austria to establish these relations. Since 
it was also a tool for displaying “democratic presence” behind the Iron Curtain,5 the 
United States, too, was supportive of Austria’s Ostpolitik. With this aim in mind, 
when Kreisky visited socialist states, he sought the opportunity to give public lec-
tures. Despite these ambitions, Raab, Kreisky and Klaus ‒ much like Berlin mayor 
Willy Brandt ‒ knew what it was like to live under a communist regime, and thus 
all three were realistic enough to understand that they first had to accept the postwar 
reality in order to later, possibly, change it.6 In contrast to the first steps of the FRG’s 
Ostpolitik in the late Adenauer and the Erhard years, which were further burdened by 
the Hallstein Doctrine, the existence of the GDR, and the lingering question of lost 
eastern territories, Austria’s Ostpolitik was wanted and supported by the Kremlin. 
Austria had initiated its neighborhood policy directly with Moscow and was not 
considered strong enough to be a threat to the Eastern bloc’s stability. 
The second major aspect of Austria’s “neutralization,” also brought about by So-
viet policy, at least in part, was a further transformation of Austria’s self-definition 
of neutrality. For a long time, Austria had adhered to the theory that an association 
with the EEC was compatible with neutrality. Changing this goal was a result not 
only of Italian and French resistance and US doubts, but also of persistent Soviet 
warnings and threats concerning the inadmissibility and the possible consequences 
of this step. An even more important shift in Austria’s definition of neutrality hap-
pened roughly around the time of the Warsaw Pact’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
In contrast to Soviet claims concerning the broad tasks of permanent neutrals, Aus-
tria had until then insisted that its neutrality was a military matter that was to be 
achieved chiefly by staying out of military alliances. However, in November 1968 
this notion of “so-called military neutrality” was explicitly rejected by the new for-
eign minister, Kurt Waldheim.7 Shortly thereafter, the new doctrine was presented 
to the Austrian parliament.8 In stressing the “secondary obligations” of permanent 
 5 Bruno Kreisky, “Die österreichische Außenpolitik: Vortrag, Helsinki, 28 Mai 1965,” in idem, Re-
den 1 (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1981), 571–580, 579. On US support, 
see Kofler, Kennedy und Österreich, 30.
 6 André Biever, “L’Autriche et les origines de l’Ostpolitik de la République fédérale d’Allemagne,” 
in Relations Internationales 114 (2003), 213–230. Cf. Gottfried Niedhart, “The East-West Pro-
blem as Seen from Berlin: Willy Brandt’s Early Ostpolitik,” in Wilfried Loth (ed.), Europe, Cold 
War, and Coexistence, 1953–1965, Cold War History 4 (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 285–296; Pe-
ter Jankowitsch, “Das Problem der Äquidistanz: Die Suche der Zweiten Republik nach außenpoli-
tischen Leitlinien,” in Manfried Rauchensteiner (ed.), Zwischen den Blöcken: NATO, Warschauer 
Pakt und Österreich (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 451–495, 467.
 7 Vortrag des Außenministers Dr. K. Waldheim über “Perspektiven der österreichischen Außenpo-
litik” in Wien, 7 November 1968, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 Jahre Österreichische Neutra-
litäts- und Europapolitik 1, 144–146, 145. Cf. Luif, “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality,” 137–138; 
Ginther, Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik, 62–64; Meier-Walser, Die Außenpolitik der monoco-
loren Regierung Klaus, 180–183.
 8 Ginther, “Austria’s Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union,” 79.
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neutrality, Waldheim relied on recent publications by the Austrian lawyers Verdross 
and Verosta. The former, in the second edition of his treatise on Austria’s neutrality, 
dealt comprehensively with the permanent neutral’s peacetime obligation to avoid 
any economic association that might draw it into a conflict, ruled out EEC mem-
bership for a permanently neutral state, and briefly referred to the Swiss neutrality 
doctrine of 1954. Verosta contributed to the latter’s “discovery” by publishing it in 
Austria and presenting it as binding.9 
In lieu of “military neutrality,” the neutral’s task of actively promoting détente 
and peace was underlined. Waldheim’s understanding of neutral policy, thus, was 
much closer to that of the Soviets than any earlier Austrian interpretation. Wald-
heim was treated with striking approval in the Soviet media and his understanding 
that neutrality comprised more than just military obligations was highly praised.10 
Although Klaus continued to reject the Soviet interpretation of “peaceful coexist-
ence” as “a continuation of the ideological struggle” and “an active dissemination 
of ideology,”11 Waldheim, by equating neutrality with an active peace policy, thus, 
from 1968 on, adopted two further key aspects of the Soviet doctrine, anticipating 
the developments of the 1970s. In his book The Austrian Example, he went as far as 
equating “peaceful coexistence” with détente and adopting the Soviet topos of Aus-
tria’s role as being a showcase for the former.12 During the Czechoslovakian crisis, 
Klaus and Waldheim furthermore tried to make public statements more “neutral” 
with regard to the Soviet Union. While the Austrian parliament, in the wake of the 
crisis, reasserted its right of defining neutrality,13 the year 1968 created a “water-
shed” in Austrian neutrality policy,14 and though not publicly acknowledged, it was 
a turning point due, at least in part, to Soviet policy.
 9 Verdross, Die immerwährende Neutralität der Republik (1966), 15–20; Verosta, Die dauernde 
Neutralität (1967), 113–117.
 10 E.g., Polyanov, “Austria, Neutrality, Europe,” 84–88. Cf. Petersson, The Soviet Union and Peace-
time Neutrality, 89. 
 11 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 7 (1967), 224–228, 224; Ginther, Neutralität und 
Neutralitätspolitik, 58; Meier-Walser, Die Außenpolitik der monocoloren Regierung Klaus, 158–
159.
 12 Waldheim, The Austrian Example, 5.
 13 Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität, 150. 
 14 Ginther, Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik, 43, 49, 52. For a discussion of Ginther’s theses, see 
below, pages 254–255. Cf. Helmut Kramer, “Strukturentwicklung der Außenpolitik 1945–2005,” 
in Herbert Dachs et al. (eds.), Politik in Österreich (Vienna: Manz, 2006), 807–837, 816.
III.  DÉTENTE, THE HEYDAY OF 
MULTILATERALISM, AND THE LAST 
PEAK OF THE COLD WAR, 1973–1984
“There is probably no policy so controversial, so subject to contrasting and contradictory treat-
ment and interpretation, as neutrality.” Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States (London: 
Routledge, 1988), 1.
“If an elephant has its foot on the tail of a mouse, and you say that you are neutral, the mouse will 
not appreciate your neutrality. If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side 
of the oppressor.” Archbishop Desmond Tutu

10.  Political Relations and the Rise of Multilateralism
The twenty-fourth CPSU congress in March–April 1971 and the adoption of the 
party’s “Peace Program” marked Brezhnev’s takeover of supremacy in his country’s 
foreign policy. Although the reconciliation with West Germany and the signing of 
the Moscow Treaty of 1970 had briefly reminded Soviet citizens of the Hitler-Stalin 
pact and sparked fears around the country that a new war was imminent,1 détente 
became highly popular in the USSR. Brezhnev, like Gromyko, was convinced that 
a relaxation of international tensions best suited the interests of the USSR and its 
leadership.2 The popularity of détente among the Soviet population strengthened 
the CPSU’s legitimacy, and the USSR’s urgent need for high technology could not 
be met without Western partners and, thus, détente. Furthermore, the escalating 
conflict with the People’s Republic of China made peace on the USSR’s western 
border even more precious. Nonetheless, Brezhnev ‒ who, despite a circle of a 
few young and enlightened thinkers in the Central Committee apparatus, some of 
whom later became Gorbachev’s advisors,3 was surrounded by powerful hawks 
who demanded ever growing sums for the military-industrial behemoth ‒ remained 
convinced that the unrestricted Soviet nuclear build-up that continued during the 
détente years promoted the relaxation of tensions rather than endangered it.
In the West the FRG, which Brezhnev became the first Soviet leader to vis-
it, with its strong economic and financial basis, soon became the main trade and 
détente partner for the Soviet Union. In addition, with first steps at solving the US 
entanglement in the Vietnam War being taken, détente between the superpowers 
dawned. With North Vietnam’s intransigence, the United States had been desperate 
to gain Soviet mediation for a diplomatic solution. The Kremlin, too, was interested 
in a rapprochement with the Western superpower. In 1969, the USSR had declared 
strategic parity with the United States and arms limitation negotiations seemed a 
wise choice. After President Lyndon B. Johnson’s visit to Moscow in 1968 was 
cancelled due to the Warsaw Pact’s invasion in Prague,4 the summit of 1972 wit-
nessed the signing of the SALT-I and ABM treaties and the declaration of the Basic 
Principles of US-Soviet Relations. Back channel diplomacy with the FRG and the 
 1 Edemskiy, “Dealing with Bonn,” 21.
 2 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 225, 203. 
 3 Robert D. English, Russia and the Idea of the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals and the End of the 
Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 119–157. 
 4 Adam Ulam, Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union and World Politics, 1970–1982 (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), 50–51.
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US had brought about something like personal trust between Brezhnev and Chan-
cellor Brandt and, later, US President Nixon. 
An indicator for the friendly international climate was the Conference on Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, one of Brezhnev’s prestige projects, which was 
held in Helsinki and Geneva in 1972–75. But what had been expected to legitimize 
Soviet rule in Eastern Europe, to undermine Western organization, and to usher in a 
new era of East-West trade, also made human rights a growing concern for interna-
tional relations and, in the long term, undermined rather than strengthened détente 
and the legitimacy of communist rule.5 Furthermore, as a consequence of détente 
and the CSCE, East and West became more interdependent. During the 1970s, the 
Western share of Soviet foreign trade rose from 14 to more than 30 percent.6 West-
ern Europe became an importer of Soviet oil and gas and a provider of technology. 
The Kremlin calculated on some political consequences as a result of this interde-
pendence: Oil and gas, Brezhnev revealed to his comrades in 1971, “change our 
possibilities, our relations to all of Europe (and not only to the socialist states where 
we can deliver gas and oil) ‒ with France, with the FRG, Italy. We hold the keys.”7 
What he did not envisage was that, in return, Eastern Europe became dependent on 
Western goods. Those who had no fossil fuels to offer in return, like Poland and 
Hungary, started to rely on Western credit. 
Very much like the Moscow Treaty, détente, in Soviet eyes, was never seen to 
be a result of compromise, but of Soviet strength.8 The CPSU “Peace Program” 
reaffirmed “peaceful coexistence” in its already traditional communist meaning of 
a “specific form of class struggle in the international arena.”9 Convergence be-
tween socialism and liberal capitalism was explicitly ruled out, and it was claimed 
that “for all mankind there is only one future ‒ communism.” The Soviet military 
preponderance in Europe was justified by the large civilian population of Western 
Europe. In general, the Soviet definition of “coexistence” remained a theoretical 
foundation for exactly what communist propaganda accused the West of: a continu-
ation of the Cold War and a policy of “strength” and intimidation.10 
 5 Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism (Princeton: University Press, 2001), 159–184. 
 6 Gromyko and Ponomarjow, Geschichte der sowjetischen Außenpolitik 1945 bis 1976, 559.
 7 Zapis’ soveshchaniia po voprosu doklada TsK KPSS, 3 February 1971, in Kudriashov (ed.), 
General’nyi sekretar’ L.I. Brezhnev, 96–113, 103. 
 8 Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva, 186–187. Cf. L.I. Breshnew, Rechenschafts-
bericht des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion und die nächsten Auf-
gaben der Partei in der Innen- und Außenpolitik, Informationsbulletin Sonderausgabe 1 (Prague: 
Frieden und Sozialismus, 1976), 22. 
 9 Quoted in Michael S. Woslenskij, “Friedliche Koexistenz aus sowjetischer Sicht,” in Osteuropa 
23, no. 11 (1973), 848–855, 855. See also idem “Klassenkampf – Kalter Krieg – Kräfteverhältnis 
– Koexistenz,” in Osteuropa 24, no. 4 (1974), 259–269, 264–265. 
 10 For Western reactions to Voslenskii’s article, see Klaus Mehnert, “Friedliche Koexistenz – Eine 
deutsche Meinung,” in Osteuropa 24, no. 4 (1974), 270–274; and Gerhard Wettig, “Das sowjeti-
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In the wake of 1968, a growing number of Soviet theoreticians of international 
law aimed at theoretically underpinning the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sover-
eignty of the socialist states; they shifted their attention to the differences between 
the sets of laws regulating the relations between capitalist states or capitalist and 
socialist states, on one hand, and those regulating the relations between socialist 
states on the other. This new stage in the Soviet development of the theory of in-
ternational law was marked by the appearance of the second edition of Professor 
Tunkin’s Theory of International Law.11 Despite the Soviet recognition of a single 
universal international law in 1955, the issue of “socialist international law” had 
been lingering in Soviet discussions ever since.12 In the aftermath of the declaration 
of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the thesis was confirmed that neither general interna-
tional law nor “peaceful coexistence” was applicable to relations between socialist 
states. These allegedly formed a higher stage of international relations and fol-
lowed the rules of Socialist Internationalism, which were designed to preserve the 
“achievements of socialism” and foster the transition to communism.13 
The neutrals, which had been able to contribute to a relaxation of tensions but 
not bring it about, remained determined to adhere to détente, as it widened their 
maneuvering room.14 However, in the age of détente and most probably as its con-
sequence, the Soviet interest in neutrality and nonalignment declined. Once the 
USSR had established more friendly relations with the leading Western powers and 
the CSCE was convened, the European neutrals seemed less crucial as mediators 
and promoters of Soviet ideas. In the Third World, the nonaligned movement had 
not achieved the historic shift of power the Soviet Union seems to have expected. 
And last but not least, the “Prague Spring” had shown how feeble the cohesion of 
the Eastern bloc was, and promoting neutrality was seen as endangering this cohe-
sion further. All of these developments were reflected in the decreasing number 
of official statements promoting neutrality and nonalignment. The reports to the 
twenty-fourth (1971), the twenty-fifth (1976), and the twenty-sixth (1981) CPSU 
congresses did not promote neutrality15 and the Diplomaticheskii Slovar’ reduced 
sche Koexistenz-Konzept: Grundlage eines friedlichen Verhältnisses zwischen Ost und West?,” in 
Osteuropa 24, no. 3 (1974), 180–187.
 11 Gregorij I. Tunkin, Völkerrechtstheorie (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1972); Theodor Schweisfurth, 
“Einleitung,” ibid., 9–19, 10–15. 
 12 Schweisfurth, “Entwicklung und ideologische Grundlagen der sowjetischen Völkerrechtstheo-
rie,” 44–46. 
 13 Meissner, Frenzke, Chilecki, Sowjetunion und Völkerrecht 1962 bis 1973, 16. On the genesis of 
the Soviet theory of socialist international law, see Theodor Schweisfurth, Sozialistisches Völ-
kerrecht? Darstellung – Analyse – Wertung der sowjetmarxistischen Theorie vom Völkerrecht 
„neuen Typs“ (Berlin: Springer, 1979), 182–220; on its contents, see ibid., 248–340.
 14 Bernard von Plate, Zur Position und Rolle der Neutralen Staaten in der Entwicklung der Europä-
ischen Ost-West-Beziehungen (Eggenberg: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1975), 4.
 15 XXIV. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion 30. März–9. April 1971: Dokumen-
te (Moscow: APN, 1971); Breshnew, Rechenschaftsbericht [XXV. Parteitag]; XXVI. Parteitag der 
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its coverage of neutrality, in its third edition published in 1971–73, from five pages 
to one. The nonaligned states’ summit in Lusaka in 1970, which was attended by 
fifty-four countries, received only scanty coverage in Soviet media. This was also 
accompanied by a shift in the Soviet understanding of neutrality, whereby the gap 
between permanent neutrality and nonalignment was recognized more explicitly 
than before.16 “Positive” or “active” neutrality was now equated by the USSR with 
neutralism or nonalignment, and proclaimed a characteristic of the emerging na-
tions of the Third World, while permanent neutrality as maintained by Austria was 
no longer seen as a “form of peaceful coexistence.” In addition, the growing as-
sertiveness of the Kremlin convinced Soviet leaders that they should promote the 
interests of the USSR without being assisted by the neutrals, and more attention 
was given in Soviet statements to the differences between the neutral and social-
ist viewpoints. The problems the neutrals had created for the socialist camp at the 
CSCE might have been involved in these tendencies.
The decline in the Soviet interest in permanent neutrality did not mean, how-
ever, that the Soviet criticism of its allegedly improper implementation ceased. 
While in the following years, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland were criticized by 
the Soviet Union for not being neutral enough, paradoxically, Finland, from 1970 to 
1989, was no longer recognized by the Kremlin as being neutral.17 The Soviet tactic 
of including specific political wishes into an ever-growing list of alleged “legal ob-
ligations” of the neutrals continued: A monograph published in 1972 listed, in ad-
dition to the already well-known duty of “peaceful cooperation,” other obligations 
of “neutral policy” such as the support of nuclear-weapon free zones in Europe, 
the struggle against the deployment of foreign (i.e. US) troops in Europe (in par-
ticular the Sixth US Fleet), the struggle for the liquidation of NATO, the recogni-
tion of the GDR, the maintaining of systematic consultations at interparliamentary 
and intergovernmental levels, and economic cooperation with socialist states.18 In 
order to balance out such obligations, the publication named numerous “special 
entitlements” of neutrality, which was praised as the “highest form of sovereignty.” 
These included a “right to jurisdiction,” a “right to honor,” and other trivialities.19 
Likewise, the Soviet tradition continued of criticizing permanent neutrals for their 
unwillingness to fulfill such “obligations” or to recognize specific aspects of Marx-
KPdSU: Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetuni-
on und die nächsten Aufgaben der Partei in der Innen- und Außenpolitik, Berichterstatter: L.I. 
Breshnew, Generalsekretär des ZK der KPdSU, 23. Februar 1981 (Berlin: Dietz, 1981). 
 16 “Neitralitet,” in A.A. Gromyko, I.N. Zemskov, V.M. Khvostov (eds.), Diplomaticheskii slovar’ 2, 
3rd ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1971), 373–374; “Neprisoedineniia politika,” ibid., 379–380; “Neu-
trality,” in A. M. Prokhorov et al. (eds.), Great Soviet Encyclopedia 17, 3rd ed. (New York: Mac-
millan, 1974), 518–519. Cf. Vigor, The Soviet View, 191–194. 
 17 See above, page 170.
 18 Iu. M. Prusakov, Neitralitet v sovremennom mezhdunarodnom prave (Moscow: Znanie, 1972), 60. 
 19 Ibid., 13–14, 20, 28.
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ism-Leninism, such as the theory of “just wars.”20 While it was seen disapprovingly 
“that the European permanent neutrals do not follow the principle of maintaining 
an active peace-loving policy and prefer to remain inactive and stand to the side in 
this regard, contradicting their international legal status,”21 Switzerland had to bear 
the brunt of the criticism. It was attacked for maintaining an army that was con-
sidered too large for a neutral state and for having failed to establish real relations 
with the socialist states. In the Austrian case, the alleged violation of neutrality 
during the Hungarian uprising 1956, violations of the state treaty articles 9 and 12 
regarding neo-Nazism and rearmament, and anti-Soviet propaganda were cited in 
the “book of sins.” Despite such flaws, it was concluded that, “notwithstanding the 
cases of reactionary circles in and around Austria violating its international status 
of neutrality, the latter has passed the examination of time and become one of the 
factors preserving peace in the center of Europe.”22 
Kreisky, “active neutrality,” and Austrian-Soviet relations
In 1970, the Austrian social democrats won the elections and Bruno Kreisky be-
came chancellor.23 Although the Kremlin in general preferred broad and stable coa-
lition governments in Austria, and in 1966 the Soviet press had harshly criticized 
the formation of Klaus’ “unicolored” cabinet, nothing of the like was expressed 
four years later. This was most probably due to the Soviet confidence in Kreisky’s 
planned course. As foreign minister during the late 1950s and the 1960s, Kreisky 
had earned a certain amount of credit among Soviet diplomats for his cautious 
position with regard to Austria’s European ambitions,24 and even prior to that, for 
his commitment to strengthening détente. This is not to say that Kreisky and his 
party were not regularly reproached by Soviet propaganda on ideological grounds, 
for the SPÖ’s reluctance to implement the revolutionary parts of its program, or for 
its critical statements about Soviet policy.25 In a conversation during Khrushchev’s 
visit to Austria in 1960, the Soviet leader had repeated this type of ideological criti-
cism and even accused the Austrian minister of being “an ally of the West” in the 
 20 V.I. Lisovskii, Mezhdunarodnoe pravo (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1970), 428.
 21 Prusakov, Neitralitet v sovremennom mezhdunarodnom prave, 24, 23, 32. 
 22 Ibid., 43, 38. 
 23 For a brief biography, see Wolfgang C. Müller, “Bruno Kreisky,” in Herbert Dachs, Peter Gerlich, 
Wolfgang C. Müller (eds.), Die Politiker: Karrieren und Wirken bedeutender Repräsentanten der 
Zweiten Republik (Vienna: Manz, 1995), 353–365. 
 24 Report Obshchii rynok i Avstriia, 26 September 1966, in AVPRF, 66/45/96/20, 31–37.
 25 G. Ardajew, “Eine Schlappe der österreichischen Revisionisten,” in Neue Zeit, no. 23 (1958), 6–8; 
Vikenti Matwejew, “Wo liegen die Perspektiven?,” ibid., no. 39 (1970), 18–19; W. Tschernous-
sow, “Vokabular von gestern,” ibid., no. 14 (1974), 23; Hinteregger to Austrian MFA, 19 October 
1978, in SBKA, UdSSR 4, Sammelakt. On several occasions, such as on 10 March 1971, in the 
summer of 1976, and in December 1979, Izvestiia and Radio Moscow criticized Kreisky’s anti-
communism.
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Austrian cabinet.26 Kreisky, indeed, had been an anti-communist and an Atlanticist, 
convinced that Containment had fostered détente and that steadfastness was needed 
to counter Soviet pressure (a conviction that had served him well in his clashes with 
Raab, Khrushchev and Gromyko).27 Kreisky’s staunch pro-Americanism seemed 
not to have deterred Soviet diplomacy from using him for certain missions ‒ on 
the contrary: Whenever Khrushchev wanted a secret proposal or other statement be 
communicated or leaked to the US, he felt that Kreisky was the right man for the 
job.28 Moreover, Kreisky’s broad interpretation of his country’s obligations aris-
ing out of neutrality as well as his active promotion of détente dovetailed with 
Soviet expectations concerning Austria’s role. Due to these expectations, Kreisky’s 
international activism, and his friendship with Willy Brandt, the Austrian foreign 
minister had been approached by the Soviet side as a “diplomatic postman” in 
the Berlin crisis ‒ although, as it turned out, without success.29 His image in the 
Kremlin seems nevertheless to have remained undamaged by this letdown. When, 
at the West German social democrats’ conference in Munich in November 1960, 
Kreisky publicly advocated cooperation between socialist and capitalist states, the 
Soviet ambassador, in a letter to Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, rec-
ommended “that Kreisky […] be told in Vienna that he has made a contribution to 
good international relations and that this is very much appreciated.”30 Kreisky had 
also expressed in Munich his personal trust in the sincerity of the USSR’s strategy 
to reach its goals by peaceful means ‒ a belief that he later repeated in an interview 
in which he stated that the Soviet peace initiatives were not just “a communist 
maneuver aiming at the deception” of the West, but “corresponded to the true needs 
and wishes of the Soviet Union.”31 Although Kreisky’s contribution to the solution 
of the Cuban missile crisis was not his own initiative, he nevertheless supported 
journalist Walter Lippman’s proposal of a rocket trade-off between Soviet missiles 
in the Caribbean and US Jupiter missiles in Turkey.32 It comes therefore hardly as 
 26 Kommuniquéverhandlungen, July 1960, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA GZ. 70033–6/60, Z. 79965–
6pol/60. This characterization paralleled the assessment of the US ambassador to Austria, who in 
1961 considered Kreisky to be “the strongest bulwark we have in Austria.” Kofler, Kennedy und 
Österreich, 82.
 27 Höll, “The Foreign Policy of the Kreisky Era,” 36–40; Pape, Ungleiche Brüder, 479–481. Cf. Bru-
no Kreisky, “Neue Perspektiven der politischen Ordnung in Mitteleuropa: Rede vor der Europa-
Union in Basel am 3. April 1968,” in idem, Neutralität und Koexistenz, 124–134, 125. Kreisky’s 
Atlanticism and his critical attitude towards convergency were appreciated by the West German 
conservative diplomat Helmut Allardt, Moskauer Tagebuch: Beobachtungen, Notizen, Erlebnisse, 
3rd ed. (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1973), 295; 387. For his clashes with Raab, Khrushchev, and Gromy-
ko, see above, page 120, 129.
 28 Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: 
Little Brown, 1974), 501.
 29 See above, pages 105–106. 
 30 Soviet embassy Bonn to Soviet MFA, 23 November 1960, in AVPRF, 66/39/79/23, 1–6.
 31 Kreisky, Neutralität und Koexistenz, 122. 
 32 Kofler, “Kreisky – Brandt – Khrushchev,” 179–180. 
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a surprise that the SPÖ, when forming a minority government in 1970, was not 
attacked by the Soviet press and received praise and blessings from even the Aus-
trian communists ‒ something that would not have been possible ten years earlier. 
However, on the occasion of Kreisky’s inauguration, both the Austrian-communist 
Volksstimme as well as Izvestiia issued the traditional warnings that Austria was not 
to deviate from its traditional path of foreign policy.33 
Kreisky’s attitude that an active and, on occasion, mediatory role in interna-
tional politics was of the highest priority and the most effective tool of Austrian 
foreign and defense policy was in alignment not only with Austria’s security inter-
ests as defined by prominent experts in international law,34 but also with the Soviet 
understanding of Austria’s role as a neutral. The growing convergence of Soviet 
and Austrian interests with regard to foreign policy activism was reflected by the 
Austrian government’s adoption of the Soviet thesis that a neutral country “cannot 
be content with the role of merely observing foreign development,” as expressed 
in Kreisky’s 1979 government policy statement.35 Even earlier, his SPÖ ‒ albeit 
unsuspectingly ‒ had subscribed to the concept of “active” neutrality.
In the early 1970s, with progressing détente the expression of “peaceful coex-
istence,” once anathema in the West because of its Janus-faced character and its 
declared aim of promoting the transition of the West to communism, became part 
of the vocabulary in East-West declarations. Notwithstanding a number of Austrian 
gaffes, such as that committed during the 1960 Khrushchev visit, the term had been 
cautiously circumscribed in the West and in UN declarations during the 1960s as 
“peaceful and friendly relations” or even “cooperation,”36 as for instance in the 
UN “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Cooperation among States” of 24 October 1970, which the Soviet side 
claimed to contain the principles of “peaceful coexistence.”37 However, in the wake 
of détente, the term had been adopted by Austrian and other Western diplomats.38 
Kreisky himself, who was well aware that the term was ambivalent and full of 
“meaningless and misleading” interpretations, nevertheless, in the spring of 1968, 
praised “peaceful coexistence” for having ended the Cold War in Europe.39 During 
his visit to Moscow in January 1971, Foreign Minister Kirchschläger claimed that 
“the maxim of Austria’s foreign policy remains peaceful coexistence,”40 the Prin-
 33 Moser, “Die Stellung der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs,” 48.
 34 Cf. Zemanek, “Austria’s Policy of Neutrality,” 20; Neuhold, “The Permanent Neutrality,” 56. 
 35 Quoted in Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 189. 
 36 Lewin, “Grundprinzipien des modernen Völkerrechts,” 74. For a critical analysis of the content 
and development of “peaceful coexistence” from 1956 until the mid-1970s, see Standenat to Aus-
trian MFA, 22 December 1975, in ÖStA, AVA, NL Bielka, File 115. 
 37 Schweisfurth, “Einleitung,” 15–16. 
 38 Ginther, Neutralität, 99–105; Verdross, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, 75–79. 
 39 Bruno Kreisky, “Neue Perspektiven der politischen Ordnung in Mitteleuropa: Rede vor der Euro-
pa-Union in Basel, 3 April 1968,” in idem, Neutralität und Koexistenz, 124–134, 125.
 40 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 11 (1971), 46. Cf. the communiqué ibid., 48. 
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ciples of Relations between the USSR and France of the same year also used the 
once forbidden term, and the Basic Principles of US-Soviet Relations, signed by 
Richard Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972, even stated that there was “no alternative to 
conducting the mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.”41 Kreisky’s 
statement that the alternative to “peaceful coexistence” was “nonexistence”42 ‒ a 
notion that had its genesis in Soviet propaganda ‒ had become mainstream opinion; 
later Austrian diplomats and leaders would repeat the Soviet claim that Austrian-
Soviet relations had been the “first example” of “peaceful coexistence.”43 Kreisky 
himself adopted the Soviet terminology when he stated that “the importance of all 
these [mutual] visits went far beyond the framework of our bilateral relations: By 
means of the Austrian example, peaceful coexistence was demonstrated and further 
détente induced.”44 
With the beginning of the new West German Ostpolitik under Willy Brandt, 
it became easier for Austria to continue its Nachbarschaftspolitik, though it was 
less exclusive.45 Already in 1967 the FRG had offered the “people’s democracies” 
full diplomatic relations, thus, de facto abandoning the Hallstein Doctrine.46 After 
Brandt’s rise to leadership in Bonn, Foreign Minister Rudolf Kirchschläger stressed 
in 1970 that his country was now “in the happy position of no longer having to 
make special mention of Ostpolitik as such.”47 During Kreisky’s chancellorship, 
Austria’s travel diplomacy to Eastern Europe was intensified and the government’s 
center of gravity shifted somewhat in this direction. In the years 1956–69, the Aus-
 41 Quoted in Tunkin, Theory of International Law, 72–73. On the two declarations, cf. Heinz Fiedler, 
“Politische Verträge mit westlichen Staaten und Entwicklungsländern,” in Dietrich Geyer (ed.), 
Osteuropa-Handbuch Sowjetunion Außenpolitik III: Völkerrechtstheorie und Vertragspolitik 
(Cologne: Böhlau, 1976), 194–223, 203–205. On US-Soviet détente, see Sovetsko-amerikanskie 
otnosheniia: gody razriadki, 1969–1976: sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otno-
sheniia, 2007), on the US-Soviet memorandum, cf. Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Confron-
tation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1994), 326–335. 
 42 Bruno Kreisky, Voraussetzungen der Koexistenz (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1960), 9. Cf. 
Mojoryan [Modzhorian], “Neutrality in Present-Day International Law,” 218: “The only alterna-
tive for mankind is peaceful coexistence or catastrophic thermonuclear war.” 
 43 Conversation Kreisky with Kosygin, Vienna, 2 July 1973, in SBKA, Länder, UdSSR 4; Pro-
tokoll über den bilateralen Meinungsaustausch, 12–13 June 1975, in ÖStA, AdR, II-Pol, Z. 
225.18.02/12-II.3/75.
 44 Ansprache Kreisky in Moskau, 28 May 1974, in UdSSR – Österreich, 165–167. Emphasis mine. 
 45 Alexander Jehn, “Nachbarschaftspolitik im Donauraum: Die besonderen Beziehungen Öster-
reichs zur Tschechowakei, zu Ungarn und Jugoslawien in der Ära Kreisky” (PhD thesis, Würz-
burg: 1996). Cf. Bielka, “Österreich und seine volksdemokratischen Nachbarn.”
 46 In 1967, diplomatic relations were established with Romania and Yugoslavia. Loth, Overcoming 
the Cold War, 92–94. On Brandt’s Ostpolitik, cf. Peter Bender, Die Neue Ostpolitik und ihre Fol-
gen (Munich: dtv, 1995); on the GDR’s viewpoint, cf. Mary E. Sarotte, Dealing with the devil. 
East Germany, détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2001). 
 47 Die Presse, 6 June 1970. 
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trian president, chancellor and foreign minister paid 159 official visits to OEEC 
(OECD) states and only 64 to CMEA members, but in the years 1970–84 the score 
had become 153 to 113.48 Although no Austrian chancellor ever challenged Finnish 
president Kekkonen’s record of thirty-one visits to the USSR,49 Josef Staribacher, 
Kreisky’s minister of commerce, paid seventeen official visits to the Soviets, but 
failed to travel to the United States a single time.50 While this record can be ex-
plained, to a certain extent, as being the result of the bilateral trade commission 
sessions, it also reflects a shift in Austria’s economic interests. 
On the bilateral level, during the Kreisky years, which were undoubtedly the 
most active period of Austrian foreign affairs since 1955,51 the exchange of high-
level visits in a demonstratively friendly atmosphere between Moscow and Vien-
na continued. Negotiations dealt with bilateral political, economic, and cultural 
relations as well as exchanges of opinion concerning the international situation, 
détente, disarmament, the UN agenda and the CSCE. 
During Kosygin’s visit to Vienna in July 1973, both sides expressed their wish 
to raise the level of the bilateral cooperation and to intensify the exchange of in-
formation. A number of agreements were signed, including a treaty on economic, 
scientific-technical and industrial collaboration, and a program on bilateral cultural 
and scientific cooperation. With regard to the CSCE, Kosygin expressed the Soviet 
hope for Austrian “cooperation” (i.e. its support for Soviet proposals) and stated 
that the conference would be successful only if all participants “accepted European 
reality as it is,”52 i.e. the existence of the communist bloc and the partition of Ger-
many. The communiqué praised the importance of the state treaty and neutrality for 
détente, the deepening of the bilateral ties, and the open and trusting atmosphere of 
the talks.53 Kosygin’s arrival was interpreted in Vienna as proof that the neutrals’ 
free-trade agreements with the EEC in 1972 had not damaged Soviet-Austrian rela-
tions. During the official talks, the premier had not touched upon the EEC issue; 
only in a press conference, in response to a question posed by a journalist, did 
Kosygin refer to the Soviet-Austrian exchange of memoranda confirming that the 
Austrian arrangement with the Common Market did not contradict neutrality or 
 48 Skuhra, “Austria and the New Cold War,” 123.
 49 Kari Möttölä, “Managing the Finnish-Soviet Relationship: Lessons and Experiences,” in Bo 
Huldt and Atis Lejins (eds.), European Neutrals and the Soviet Union (Stockholm: The Swedish 
Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 35–57, 51.
 50 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 153. 
 51 Höll, “The Foreign Policy of the Kreisky Era,” 53. 
 52 Ansprache Kosygin in Wien, 2 July 1973, in UdSSR – Österreich, 149–152. Cf. Conversations 
Kreisky with Kosygin, Vienna, 2–3 July 1973, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 4.
 53 Offi zieller Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in der Sowjetunion, May 1974, in SBKA, Län-
derboxen, UdSSR 3. The communiqué is printed in Vneshniaia politika 1973, 85–89. See also 
Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 13 (1973), 225–229. Cf. the Soviet draft communiqué 
in Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, Kommuniquévorschlag, 26 June 1973, in ÖStA, 
AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 32.376-6/73, Z. 40.810.
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the state treaty.54 That in the coming years the Kremlin reduced the intensity of its 
demand that neutrals maintain economic equidistance from both economic blocs 
might be attributed to the fact that the USSR, due to exports of natural gas, in the 
1970s achieved an active trade balance with Western Europe.55 On the occasion of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic contacts between Austria 
and the Soviet state, the latter’s prime minister, in his congratulatory telegram, 
characterized the relations as having “passed the test of time” and as being “con-
solidated and multifaceted.”56 On the twentieth jubilee of the signing of the state 
treaty, Radio Moscow mentioned the continuous improvements in the relations and 
stated: “The Soviet Union and the Republic of Austria are, despite differing histori-
cal fates and social systems, united by a wide circle of mutual interests in various 
areas, including politics, economy, and culture.”
Kreisky’s return visit to Moscow from 28 May to 1 June 1974 was primarily 
economically motivated. A slight shadow was cast on the trip ‒ but not, as one 
would have expected, by the presence in the Austrian delegation of the right-wing 
Freedom Party’s chairman and former SS Obersturmführer Friedrich Peter, whose 
unit had taken part in the mass murder of thousands of Soviet Jews during World 
War II.57 The clouds over the meeting were caused by Austrian newspaper reports 
on the Warsaw Pact’s alleged Polarka war plan, which had been revealed to the 
West by a Czech defector, Major General Jan Šejna. The plan foresaw a Warsaw 
Pact attack on Yugoslavia through Austria.58 As usual in such cases, the Eastern bloc 
denied the message and attacked the messenger. Although Kreisky remained firm 
and stated that the Austrian government neither could nor would exert censorship 
on the Austrian media, the negotiations ended positively. Another stumbling block 
was Kreisky’s insistence that the CSCE would not come to a successful conclusion 
if a satisfactory solution for the neutrals’ demands regarding human contacts was 
not found.59 Due to a “diplomatic cold,” which was most probably caused by such 
differences, a meeting with Brezhnev was cancelled on short notice by the Soviet 
 54 Pressekonferenz Kosygin, 5 July 1973, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 32.376-6/73; Protokoll 
über das Arbeitsgespräch mit MP Kosygin, 2–3 July 1973, ibid., Z. 42.521.
 55 Scarlis, Neutralität, 150–152.
 56 Offi zieller Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in der Sowjetunion, May 1974, in SBKA, Länder-
boxen, UdSSR 3.
 57 Peter had already traveled to the USSR at an earlier point in time. Reise von Klubobmann Peter, 
22 Dezember 1972, ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 152.498-6/72, Z. 168.496. In 1970–71, Pe-
ter’s FPÖ had supported Kreisky’s minority government. In 1975, Simon Wiesenthal published 
documents on Peter’s war-time past. Kreisky reacted by accusing Wiesenthal of using “mafia 
methods” and of collaboration with the Nazis. In 1992, Peter left the FPÖ in protest against Jörg 
Haider and the party’s anti-EU line. 
 58 The plan was published in Austrian journals in 1974. Its authenticity, however, remained ques-
tioned. Harrod, “Felix Austria,” 737–740.
 59 Conversation Kreisky with Kosygin, 31 May 1974, in SBKA, NL Thalberg, Depositum 1, Box 2, 
File 3; Scarlis, Neutralität, 119.
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side. Nonetheless, Gromyko praised the “positive role” of the neutrals in preparing 
the CSCE,60 and the bilateral communiqué underlined the quality of the bilateral re-
lations and the importance of the subjects touched upon in the talks. These included 
the agenda of the United Nations, peace enforcing measures, security in Europe, as 
well as arms limitation.61 
When Kreisky went to Moscow in February 1978, he was granted the honor of 
being received by Brezhnev, who remarked that the two sides had found “a com-
mon language.”62 The CPSU secretary used the occasion for repeating the Soviet 
praise for the state treaty being a catalyst for European détente, and stressed that 
on the whole it was in the best interests of small countries to support the CSCE 
process and resist all attempts at the Cold War being re-launched.63 Despite such 
encouragement, Brezhnev did not conclude the meeting with Kreisky without po-
lemicizing against Western insistence on improved standards of human rights, or 
without calling on the chancellor to join the struggle against the deployment of 
US neutron warheads in Europe. In the draft communiqué, the Soviet side made 
an attempt to put Austria at the front of the Soviet propaganda chart against West-
ern rearmament and in favor of Soviet proposals at the Belgrade CSCE meeting. 
The Austrian delegation, however, saw through this tactic, and the Soviet draft 
was modified.64 The CPSU secretary later agreed to hold the SALT-II signing cer-
emony and the summit meeting with Jimmy Carter in June 1979 in the Austrian 
capital. 
In May 1975 and 1980, Andrei Gromyko attended the ceremonies on the oc-
casion of the twentieth and twenty-fifth anniversaries of the signing of the state 
treaty in Vienna.65 Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov visited Austria from 6 to 10 
 60 Quoted in Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia, 102. Cf. Speech Kosygin in the Austrian embassy, May 
1974, in AVPRF, 66/53/114/12, 64–67.
 61 Wortlaut des sowjetisch-österreichischen Kommuniqués, 31 May 1974, in Österreichische Zeit-
schrift für Außenpolitik 14 (1974), 182–186; Vneshniaia politika 1974, 71–76. Cf. Haymerle, 
“Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 170–171; F. Gorjunow, “Ersprießliche Bilanz,” in 
Neue Zeit, no. 23 (1974), 16. 
 62 Conversation Kreisky with Brezhnev, [February 1978], in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3. For a 
summary of Brezhnev’s statement, see pages 330–333.
 63 Cf. Igor Melnikov, “Partner im Alpenland,” in Neue Zeit, no. 7 (1980), 12–13. 
 64 Information, [February 1978], in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 4, File Moskaureise; Aus dem 
sowjetisch-österreichischen Kommuniqué, 9 February 1978, in UdSSR – Österreich, 190–192; 
Vneshniaia politika 1978, 12–15. Cf. Conversation Kreisky with Kosygin, 7 February 1978, in 
SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 4, File Moskaureise.
 65 25 Jahre Staatsvertrag: Protokolle des Staatsaktes (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 
1981); 25 Jahre Staatsvertrag: Protokolle des wissenschaftlichen Symposions (Vienna: Öster-
reichischer Bundesverlag, 1981). Gromyko’s speech is also printed in Vneshniaia politika So-
vetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1980 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 
1981), 67. On Kreisky’s conversation with Gromyko in Vienna in May 1980 on issues concern-
ing Afghanistan, the Near East, and the United States, see Hinteregger, Im Auftrag Österreichs, 
260–263.
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April 1981, in his first (and only66) journey as an incumbent Soviet head of gov-
ernment to a Western country. During his trip, both sides lauded the high level of 
the talks, stating that they were the “result of the permanent efforts of both sides, 
their joint interest in mutually profitable cooperation, and the high esteem held by 
the Soviet and Austrian peoples towards one another.”67 As usual, the state treaty 
and Austria’s neutrality were stressed as positive phenomena, and agreement re-
garding various international issues was emphasized. The resumption of the So-
viet leaders’ habit of choosing Austria as the destination of their first Western visit 
was quite telling with regard to the cooling of East-West relations, since during 
détente Kosygin and Brezhnev had broken with the tradition and chosen France 
instead.68
In the years 1979–83, visits were paid to the USSR not only by the Austrian 
foreign minister, but also by the ministers of defense, of transport and communica-
tions, of trade, commerce and industry, of agriculture and forestry, of social affairs, 
and of building and technology.69 Until then, i.e. from 1955 until 1978, no less than 
twelve mutual visits had been undertaken by the Austrian and Soviet heads of state 
and government, by foreign ministers, as well as party leaders ‒ and this number 
does not include the dozens of trips by various other ministers and delegations. 
In 1981 and 1982, trips were undertaken on the Austrian side by Kirchschläger 
as federal president,70 a parliamentarians’ delegation, four delegations of different 
provincial administrations, a group of VOEST-Alpine representatives and a group 
of Austrian bankers that included the former minister of finance Hannes Androsch 
and the later chancellor Franz Vranitzky.71 
After Kreisky stepped down in 1983, his successor, Fred Sinowatz, was wel-
comed in Moscow a few months later.72 Sinowatz had paid his first foreign visit 
as chancellor to the “people’s democracy” Hungary, a fact that was very well re-
ceived in Moscow. The Hungarian ambassador expressed to his Soviet colleague 
his high opinion of this “intelligent and knowledgeable politician with great diplo-
matic talent,”73 a politician who, at home, never managed to escape the shadow of 
Kreisky and was subjected to mockery about his clumsiness.
 66 Hinteregger, Im Auftrag Österreichs, 236.
 67 Quoted in I.G. Zhiriakov, SSSR i Avstriia posle Khelsinki (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1983), 13. 
Cf. the communiqué, 11 April 1981, in Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia 1981 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1982), 27–30.
 68 Oudenaren, Détente in Europe, 77. 
 69 Neuhold, “Austria and the Soviet Union,” 95. 
 70 See the communiqué, 30 May 1982, in Vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye 
otnosheniia 1982 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1983), 41–43. Cf. Sowjetunion heute 
28, no. 7–8 (1982), 8–11.
 71 Außenpolitischer Bericht (1982), 401–402. 
 72 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 1 (1984), 216–217. 
 73 Conversation Ambassador Efremov with Ambassador Rande, 21 November 1983, in AVPRF, 
66/62/135/8, 4–9. Mikhail T. Efremov was the Soviet ambassador in Austria from 1975 until 
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In general, during the 1970s Soviet-Austrian relations were described by both 
sides as “friendly” or even “excellent.” The passage concerning Austria in Brezh-
nev’s report to the twenty-fifth CPSU congress in 1976 read: “In general, our rela-
tions to the West European countries can be assessed positively. This also regards 
our relations to Great Britain and Italy. In addition we appreciate the traditional 
good-neighborly relations with Finland, the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Bel-
gium and the other European states.”74 An Austrian report listed the characteris-
tics used by the Soviet side to describe Soviet-Austrian relations: multifaceted, 
strong, generally good, ascending, developing well, and successful; the bilateral 
cooperation was characterized as broad, mutually beneficial, and fruitful.75 Brezh-
nev and Kosygin declared themselves “good friends of Austria,”76 and the Soviet 
press regularly repeated the paradigm of Austria being an “example of peaceful 
coexistence.”77
The USSR and Austria on the international stage
While from 1955, Austrian politicians saw international activity promoting mutual 
understanding and détente as a means not only to raise their country’s profile but 
also its security, the Kremlin’s interest in the matter was twofold ‒ first, to promote 
neutrality by boosting Austria’s international prestige, and second, to gain the neu-
tral country’s support for Soviet initiatives. This included, as mentioned above, 
the Soviets drawing on Austria’s good services as a mediator in the Berlin crisis. 
In 1965, the Austrian ambassador in Moscow had been used as a back channel for 
communicating Soviet proposals on Vietnam to the US embassy,78 and in January 
1966, after the British prime minister had announced his intention to hold talks in 
Moscow, a Soviet intermediary asked the Austrian embassy in Moscow to forward 
Soviet proposals regarding an extension of the current pause in the US bombing 
campaign in North Vietnam to Harold Wilson.79 The Soviet side, which had ex-
pressed the wish that the British embassy in Moscow not be informed, demanded 
that the US air raids and all troop transports to South Vietnam be ceased immedi-
ately, with no conditions. If this were done, North Vietnam would be prepared to 
start talks. In light of the recent visit to Hanoi by a Soviet delegation headed by 
1986. For a short biography of Ambassador Efremov who had served as the Soviet ambassador to 
the GDR in 1971–75, see Kudriashov (ed.), General’nyi sekretar’ L.I. Brezhnev 1964–1982, 230.
 74 Breshnew, Rechenschaftsbericht [XXV. Parteitag], 25. 
 75 Bilaterale politische Beziehungen Österreich – Sowjetunion, [1981], in SBKA, Länderboxen, 
UdSSR 5, File Offizieller Besuch des MP der UdSSR Tichonov, April 1981.
 76 Zhiriakov, SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody, 50; 
 77 Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 236. 
 78 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the World (New York: Arnold, 1998), 131. 
 79 Telegram Wodak to Austrian MFA, top secret, 14 January 1966, in ÖStA, AVA, E/1785 Wodak, 
File 99/2; Telegram Bielka to Austrian embassy Moscow, 24 January 1966, ibid. 
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CPSU Presidium member Aleksandr Shelepin, the Austrian embassy considered 
the offer genuine. Wilson communicated his interest in the proposals, despite their 
one-sidedness. Although the British premier’s trip in July brought no success, the 
Soviet side remained interested in Austria’s efforts in the Vietnam War. In March 
1968, most probably on Soviet instructions, Hungarian diplomats arranged a meet-
ing between North Vietnam’s ambassador to Hungary, Hoang Luong, and Foreign 
Minister Waldheim in Vienna. When Waldheim mentioned the meeting in a con-
versation with Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov, the Soviet diplomat en-
couraged Waldheim to continue the Austrian mediation efforts.80 
Another tactic for raising the neutral’s profile and thus the prestige of neutrality, 
and for gaining Austria’s support for Soviet proposals concerned the United Na-
tions. Despite the Kremlin’s variable attitude towards the UN,81 this organization 
was, over the decades, one of the most important forums for Soviet initiatives. 
Prior to the 1960s, the General Assembly had generally been balanced in favor 
of the West. In order to shift this balance of power, the USSR was interested in 
integrating the decolonized states of Asia and Africa into the UN, of which the 
majority were nonaligned. Neutral Austria was also part of this picture. Although 
in December 1955, the USSR, most probably for tactical reasons, had turned down 
a draft resolution outlined by Brazil and New Zealand concerning the admission of 
eighteen countries to the UN, among them Austria, the country was shortly there-
after admitted into the United Nations together with fifteen of these states.82 Both 
sides ‒ Austria as a rule, the Soviet Union since 1955 and particularly following 
1966 ‒ were interested in raising the status of the United Nations, as was expressed 
in joint communiqués.83
 80 Conversation Waldheim with Kuznetsov, 20 March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 
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In order to lift the prestige of neutrality in the UN and to restrain the influence of 
the West in this organization, the USSR supported the Austrian candidacy for host-
ing the headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency (since 1956) and 
of the UN Industrial Development Organization (since 1967), as well as, in 1979, 
for becoming the location for the third seat of the United Nations. It also supported 
Austria’s application for nonpermanent membership in the UN Security Council in 
1973–74, and for Waldheim’s candidacy as UN secretary general in 1971 and 1976. 
In 1960, at the height of his struggle to make the UN more “neutral,” Khrushchev 
even proposed the transfer of the main UN headquarters from New York to Vien-
na.84 This proposal, however, was declined by the Austrian government. Although 
the United States did not agree with the Soviet suggestion to hold the 1955 summit 
in Vienna (so that neutrality would not be promoted for West Germany),85 with 
Soviet consent ‒ and despite Khrushchev’s preference for Helsinki86 ‒ the Austrian 
capital was nonetheless chosen as the site for the Kennedy-Khrushchev summit in 
1961, for the SAL and MBFR talks, for a Brezhnev-Carter summit including the 
SALT-II signing ceremony, for US-Soviet meetings of foreign ministers such as 
between Gromyko and Kissinger in 1975 and Gromyko and Shultz in 1985, another 
meeting between Gromyko and West German foreign minister Hans Dietrich Gen-
scher at the height of the rearmament debate in 1983, a CSCE follow-up meeting 
in 1986–89, and for several major UN conferences. Naturally, some of the regular 
international gatherings commemorating the signing of the state treaty in the Aus-
trian capital were also used for high diplomacy: US Secretary of State Dean Rusk 
discussed the situation in Vietnam when he met with his Soviet colleague in Vienna 
in 1965, and at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the state treaty, Secretary of State 
Edmund Muskie met with Gromyko the first time.87
The Soviet efforts to use Austria to promote communist initiatives, as well as 
to monitor Austria’s viewpoint, included establishing regular bilateral talks that 
aimed at coordinating the two countries’ foreign policies. These efforts to harmo-
nize Soviet and Austrian approaches concerned various international questions, 
both within the United Nations and without. Although Austrian diplomats in the 
1980s insisted that until then there had been only a single Soviet attempt to influ-
ence Austria’s voting in the UN General Assembly,88 it cannot be ignored that, for 
 84 Verclytte, “Austria between East and West,” 113. On Austria’s policy as a nonpermanent member 
in the UN Security Council, see Christian Pellegrini, “Die Rolle Österreichs im Sicherheitsrat der 
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Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, 492. 
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1962–1986 (New York: Times Books, 1995), 139, 456. 
 88 Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 153. This referred to a vote concerning 
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the most part, the intensive bilateral Soviet-Austrian dialog on issues concerning 
the agenda of the United Nations had, from the Soviet side, this very aim: to influ-
ence Austria’s voting. This went back to as early as May 1958, when the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry noted that Austria, during the 1956 and 1957 sessions of the UN 
General Assembly, had, “in a series of important international questions, adopted a 
position undesirable to us.”89 Similar criticism had been voiced by Deputy Foreign 
Minister Valerian Zorin, who, in a conversation with the Austrian ambassador in 
1957, found fault with the voting behavior of Austria regarding the Soviet interven-
tion in Hungary, behavior that, in his eyes, “destroyed the credit Austria had gained 
among the socialist states, who had hoped for more objectivity.”90 Consequently, 
the Soviet embassy in Austria recommended “informing the Austrian government 
in advance of our position on those questions where support from Austria is desir-
able for us.”91 This, the ministry argued, would not only result in Austria adopting 
certain Soviet positions, but would also be conducive to “separating Austria from 
the Anglo-American bloc.” Discussions about the Austrian voting behavior in the 
UN became an issue that was regularly brought up by Soviet officials in their talks 
with the Austrian ambassador. Bischoff reported in 1959: “The Russians, doubt-
lessly, imagine that a solid Austrian policy of neutrality should find its expres-
sion in grosso modo balanced voting at crucial decisions over a certain period of 
time.”92 Indeed, a similar opinion was voiced by Soviet diplomats in the 1960s, 
when they criticized that the Austrian vote was “too often for the West.”93 After 
Austria, together with the majority of the UN General Assembly, had turned down 
the Mongolian proposal to condemn the US-supported landing of Cuban émigré 
forces in Cuba in April 1961, the Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin openly criticized 
the Austrian conduct as having left the course of neutrality.94 Before the session, 
the Soviet ambassador in Vienna had solicited Austrian support for the motion. The 
Soviet criticism was repeated during Chancellor Gorbach’s visit to Moscow. In a 
conversation with Kreisky, Gromyko claimed that the Austrian voting behavior did 
not conform with neutrality ‒ a groundless allegation that was parried by the Aus-
trian minister with his usual response that similar reproaches by certain Western 
states were proof of Austria’s objectiveness.95 
In general, however, the pattern emerged of Soviet diplomats communicating 
in advance which Austrian decision they hoped to see in the impending session of 
the General Assembly, be it for a Soviet draft declaration against Western military 
 89 Lun’kov to Novikov, 26 May 1958, in AVPRF, 66/37/72/13, 9.
 90 Bischoff to Austrian MFA, 16 November 1957, ÖStA, AdR, AVA, NL E/1770: Bischoff, File 126. 
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bases in the Third World in 1966, or for Soviet disarmament initiatives.96 A similar 
habit of alerting the neutral was acquired by other powers as well, in particular the 
United States. When neutrals like Austria and Sweden subscribed to Soviet projects, 
even if in a modified way as was the case regarding a declaration against colonial-
ism in 1960, their support was widely propagandized in communist media.97 Here, 
again, it was not only Austria itself that mattered to Soviet politicians; the small 
neutral was expected to serve as a model for similar Western states. Since Austria, 
due to the alphabetical order that ballots were cast, was among the first countries to 
vote, Soviet diplomats hoped, as was intimated by Gromyko to Waldheim, that its 
voting behavior might exert some influence on other permanent neutrals and small 
Western states.98
Hence, in a growing number of cases, international issues were included on the 
agenda at bilateral Soviet-Austrian meetings. Although the most important Soviet 
attempt to use Austria as a promoter of Soviet ideas, encouraging it to call for 
the CSCE, failed,99 in other cases the Soviet side succeeded. In their March 1968 
meeting, Gromyko pushed Waldheim to publish declarations regarding Vietnam 
and Israel.100 Both issues were included in the communiqué, albeit with modified 
wording.101 When the ministers met in New York later that year, Gromyko showed 
his interest in the Austrian attitude towards the Soviet proposals in the UN General 
Assembly and stated that the USSR expected many countries to follow the Austrian 
example.102 In order to make sure that Austria was aware of the Soviet position on 
various issues, two months later the Soviet minister proposed establishing regular 
consultations between Soviet and Austrian diplomats and political representatives. 
Waldheim agreed to the idea. But while Austria’s opinions hardly had an effect on 
the superpower, these consultations bore the risk of the USSR exerting influence 
on the smaller neutral.103 Austria was the third Western country (following France 
and the United States) to establish such opinion exchanges with Soviet leaders on 
a regular basis.104 
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Through the postwar years, Austria took a friendly position on many occasions 
towards Soviet initiatives. This is not to say that Austria always ceded to Soviet 
pressure. Nevertheless, as outlined above, there were a number of coinciding in-
terests between the two states. In the debate on the question of colonies during 
the fifteenth session of the UN General Assembly, Austria explicitly welcomed the 
Soviet contribution to the subject ‒ but this did not risk the alienation of too many 
countries, since the resolution was adopted by eighty-nine votes with nine absten-
tions. In the UN Economic Commission for Europe, which had repeatedly been 
used by the USSR in its attempt to contain and undermine the EEC,105 Austria 
also supported a number of Soviet proposals.106 Other cases of parallel positions 
existed with regard to the Soviet and Austrian assessments of détente and the Near 
East problem.107 In March 1960, the Austrian parliament welcomed the Supreme 
Soviet’s 1959 initiative for disarmament, and the Austrian government, in many 
joint communiqués with the Soviet government, greeted disarmament as a political 
necessity. After the USSR, in the UN General Assembly in 1959, voted in favor 
of an Austrian-Swiss-Japanese initiative to call for a ban on nuclear tests, Austria, 
in return, 1960 declared its support of the respective Soviet proposal. Austria also 
took a positive stance towards the proposed nonutilization of force108 and nuclear 
nonproliferation, and in 1967 the neutral and the Soviet Union co-authored a draft 
resolution on these matters that was adopted in the twenty-second session of the 
UN General Assembly. 
In some cases, the score was kept even by mutually supporting the other side’s 
candidacies in the UN. After the USSR had promoted Waldheim’s candidacy as a 
UN secretary general, Austria signaled support for the Belorussian candidacy for 
nonpermanent membership in the Security Council.109 On principle, the Austrian 
delegate to the UN General Assembly was instructed to vote according to “factual 
considerations,” rather than with an eye to East-West bloc voting patterns.110 In a 
few cases, Austria voted with the East when the same was done by a large majority 
of states. In general, however, the country supported the West, albeit from the late 
1960s, voting with small Western states rather than with the US. When the Soviet 
Union, in the twelfth session of the General Assembly in 1957, brought forward a 
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draft resolution supporting “peaceful coexistence,” which was opposed by Western 
states due to the ambiguous nature of the concept as a means for fostering the tran-
sition to socialism, an Indian-Yugoslav-Swedish draft that supported the “peace-
ful relations among states,” but avoided the Soviet propaganda term, was adopted 
unanimously. Four years later, Austria ‒ together with the West ‒ rejected another 
attempt to make the idea mandatory. Soviet projects for reforming the United Na-
tions into a more Soviet-friendly organization were also discarded by the European 
neutrals, including Finland.111 Furthermore, Austria did not support proposals spon-
sored by the Soviet Union and its satellites with regard to Cuba and Cambodia. 
In the case of the Soviet military interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Afghanistan, Austria tried to express its disapproval ‒ very much in contrast to 
Finland, which abstained from voting against the Soviet Union in these instances.112 
In 1973–74, Austria gave a positive appraisal of the Soviet proposal on banning 
nuclear weapons, supported another on a global conference on disarmament, but 
abstained from voting in a third case that proposed cutting defense budgets by 10 
percent.113 Throughout the 1960s, Austria abstained from supporting the accession 
of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations. When the risk of doing 
so had diminished, Austria ‒ as one of the first Western countries ‒ recognized the 
People’s Republic of China in 1971 and the GDR in 1973, although in the latter 
case, only after the two German states had signed the Grundlagen treaty.114 Despite 
repeated Soviet interventions, Austrian foreign policy had ‒ out of loyalty to the 
United States ‒ hitherto rejected recognizing the communist regime in Beijing at 
the expense of Taiwan.115 Among the other neutrals, Sweden in particular was ap-
plauded by Soviet propaganda for championing the PRC’s accession to the United 
Nations.
Although Austria’s voting pattern in the UN General Assembly rarely coin-
cided with the Soviet bloc, over the first twenty years of its membership, its voting 
record index, on a spectrum ranging from 0 (i.e. voting with the Soviet bloc) to 
100 (i.e. voting with the United States), fell from 95 (1956) to 63 (1976),116 thus 
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showing a clear weakening of its Western-oriented loyalty and growing independ-
ent-mindedness or “neutrality.” During the same period, this phenomenon can also 
be seen in countries like Ireland (falling from 100 to 80) and Sweden (falling from 
80 to 67). By the early 1980s, the voting pattern of Ireland had declined still fur-
ther (to 68), while Austria’s and Sweden’s voting record remained stable in the 60s 
‒ where Finland had ranked ever since 1956. This deviated notably, on one hand, 
from other small West European democracies that were NATO members, such as 
the Netherlands whose voting coefficient was between 83 and 100; on the other 
hand, however, it was far from the voting behavior of the nonaligned states, with 
Yugoslavia ranging between 9 and 33 and India between 25 and 36. An analysis of 
Austria’s voting patterns in the 1970s demonstrated that the highest affinity exist-
ed with countries like Ireland (89.5/100), Denmark (88.6/100) or Iceland (86/100), 
while the similarity with the United States was intermediate (51.3/100) and with 
the USSR quite low (25.4/100).117 In embattled cases, however, Austria’s voting 
behavior in the 1980s became, in comparison to other neutrals, “conspicuously 
cautious,” with many abstentions.118 In 1978, former vice-chancellor Fritz Bock 
even proposed that Austria abstain from all votes.119 Nevertheless, Austria avoided 
being absorbed by the communist or the nonaligned bloc in the United Nations. 
At the CSCE preparatory talks in Dipoli, Austria tempered its support for the 
Western proposal of parallel talks on MBFR by endorsing the Soviet bid for the Ten 
Principles Guiding the Relations between Participating States.120 Although the So-
viet media’s reaction to the Austrian support of the Western call for talks on MBFR 
had been the hope that the neutral, in the future, would display “more independ-
ence,” certain Austrian activities at the CSCE meetings themselves were highly 
commended by the same media. The steady flow of Soviet propaganda addressing 
Austria and the other neutrals during the CSCE can be interpreted as an attempt, 
by means of praise, encouragement, demands, criticism, or even threats, to influ-
ence their behavior and to induce or suppress certain actions.121 While the Soviet 
representative at the CSCE repeatedly reproached the neutrals for not being active 
enough,122 it seems that, from the Soviet perspective, the desired position of the 
neutrals was to be active promoters of the conference idea itself, but silent support-
record not with the US position, but with the general “Western” one, and only took those cases 
into account in which there was a united position of the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France against the USSR. For further detail on the various cases, see Schlesinger, Austrian Neu-
trality in Postwar Europe, 90–91. 
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schauer Pakt und Österreich (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 451–495, 476.
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 119 Molden, “Die ‘Ost-West-Drehscheibe,’” 754.
 120 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 57; idem, SSSR i Avstriia v 1945–1975 gody, 83. 
 121 Petersson, The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality, 87–90.
 122 Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE, 171. 
 Political Relations and the Rise of Multilateralism 223
ers of Eastern proposals, or at least passive hosts for the negotiations. Thus, Prime 
Minister Kosygin’s visit to Vienna from 2 to 5 July 1973 as well as his trips to the 
two Scandinavian neutrals in the same year served, at least in part, to ensure that 
they would support Eastern proposals and not waver at the CSCE.123 Earlier visits 
by Soviet diplomats, such as the deputy head of the Soviet delegation to Helsinki, 
Lev Mendelevich, had served the same objective.124
The neutrals, however, envisaged their role differently; they promoted their own 
ideas and in some important cases, even supported Western ones. The differences 
between the neutrals and the states of the Warsaw Pact on questions of military 
security, disarmament, confidence building measures (information about armed 
maneuvers), mediation, and human contacts,125 as they developed before and dur-
ing the conference, must have disappointed the Soviet Union. The Soviet side had 
hoped that at least Austria, Sweden and Finland would be less outspoken and more 
manageable than was indeed the case. Most of the neutral and nonaligned (N+N) 
group’s initiatives were annoying to the Kremlin rather than pleasing. Despite So-
viet resistance, human rights issues were included in the famous Basket III of the 
conference, as had been proposed by the Western and neutral states, and all Soviet 
attempts at restricting their legal value by claiming that sovereignty was superior to 
human rights were repulsed. On the other side, Kreisky’s peculiar idea to include 
the Near East issue on the CSCE agenda126 was rebuffed by the Kremlin (and also 
by the West), as were the Swiss proposal concerning a mechanism for a peaceful 
settlement of disputes and Sweden’s and Austria’s drafts regarding military security 
and the idea of not only linking disarmament to the conference, but actually includ-
ing it. In the latter case, the Soviet Union tried to assuage Austria’s disappointment 
by proposing Vienna as a site for MBFR talks.127 When the Soviet strategy to block 
conventional arms control and disarmament negotiations had failed, further Soviet 
tactics aimed at, unsuccessfully, including the neutrals in the talks and thus either 
reassigning such negotiations to the state-to-state level (thereby weakening NATO) 
or putting the blame for refusals on the United States. 
At the signing ceremony of the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet side must have 
been particularly annoyed at three points stressed by Kreisky: the continuing ideo-
logical struggle between communism and liberal democracy, the Western deter-
mination to achieve a breakthrough for democracy, and the right of every country 
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to choose its own political system as declared in the Final Act. Kreisky turned the 
anti-Western orientation of “peaceful coexistence” into an anti-communist one: 
“Hundreds of millions of people live in countries that are strongly linked to the idea of political 
democracy; other hundreds of millions live in countries where the political ideas of communist 
parties have been realized […] It would make little sense to diminish or ignore the fundamental 
differences between these different political systems and societal orders. Therefore it should be 
welcomed that, again and again, it has been shown that coexistence ‒ which we perceive as the 
form of peaceful relations possible today ‒ does not apply to the field of ideology. I welcome this 
clarification, because the Western states are determined to help the idea of democracy to gain a 
breakthrough […].”128
When at a conference in 1976 the chancellor aired the idea that Helsinki might 
exert influence on the public sentiment and social order in the USSR, he was re-
proached by Soviet propaganda.129
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11.  A Thorn in the Side: Personal and Cultural Contacts
Soviet dissidents, the Jewish exodus from the USSR, and the Austrian media
During the Kreisky era, what tensions that arose in Soviet-Austrian relations came 
mainly from Austrian media reports about the fate of Soviet dissidents. Various 
hardships in the USSR also weighed on its Jewish population, thus influencing 
many of them to emigrate.1 The maltreatment of critical intellectuals in the Eastern 
bloc and the restrictions on Soviet citizens who were willing to emigrate created 
an uproar among their West European and North American colleagues. Austrian 
intellectuals, in an open letter to Kosygin, protested against the “drastic steps taken 
by the Soviet government, such as imprisonment, deportation and confinement in 
psychiatric wards, against citizens who use their right for analyzing and criticizing 
the current conditions.”2 Among the signatories of the appeal were journalists and 
the newspaper editors Paul Blau, Fritz Csoklich and Günther Nenning, writer Hilde 
Spiel, artists, a few trade unionists, and members of parliament, including Heinz 
Fischer. Most of them were social democrats or had no party affiliation; however, 
a number of conservative university professors, such as Erich Streissler, also sup-
ported the initiative. A second appeal by social democrats and trade unionists such 
as Anton Benya, Bruno Pittermann, Franz Probst and Felix Slavik, which aimed at 
pressuring Soviet authorities to allow Jewish citizens to emigrate, was dismissed by 
Soviet diplomats as “Zionist propaganda.”3 
Trying to support Soviet dissidents was not without risk. After the Austrian For-
eign Ministry intervened on behalf of two dissidents who had been sentenced to 
death, employees at the Austrian embassy in Moscow were subject to Soviet cri-
ticism.4 When an Austrian exchange student in the USSR was accused by Soviet 
authorities of having tried to smuggle refugees out of the country, he could only be 
saved from imprisonment by another intervention.
 1 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 186–188; Natan Sharansky with Ron Dermer, The Case for Democracy: 
The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror (Green Forest: Balfour, 2006), 112–123.
 2 APA, 3 July 1970, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 80916-6/70, Z. 89223.
 3 Quoted in Wodak to Kirchschläger, Streng Vertraulich, 2 June 1971, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-
Pol, GZ. 105.880-6/71, Z.113.202.
 4 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 20 January 1971, Copy, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-
Pol, File Informationen für Herrn Botschafter Dr. Halusa; Karl Vogelmann, 18 August 1971, ibid., 
GZ. 106.113-6/71, Z.116.855.
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During and after the CSCE meetings in 1973–75, freedom in the USSR dimi-
nished considerably. The Soviet regime lost no time in cracking down on human-
rights activists and groups who had been inspired by the Helsinki declaration.5 In 
October 1977, Soviet physicist and dissident Andrei Sakharov appealed to all sig-
natory states of the Helsinki agreement to protest the restrictions imposed by com-
munist regimes on free emigration. In several letters to the prime ministers Kosygin 
and Tikhonov, Kreisky intervened on behalf of Soviet dissident (and later Israel’s 
minister) Anatolii (Nathan) Shcharanskii,6 imprisoned human-rights activist Ida 
Nudel,7 the family of ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev, as well as other people eager to 
emigrate. The much-adored dancer had settled in Vienna, after defecting from his 
country.8 In 1982 alone, the number of hardship cases pending in Soviet-Austrian 
negotiations reached sixty. Austria, according to its ambassador in Moscow, was 
the only Western state, whose interventions were answered by the Soviet govern-
ment.9 However, the success of the Austrian efforts was “disappointing,”10 as seen 
in the Soviet handling of Kreisky’s appeal to Soviet leader Iurii Andropov to let im-
prisoned dissident Iurii Orlov emigrate to Austria. On Andropov’s order, the official 
letter was intentionally left unanswered by the Kremlin.11 Due to his engagement 
for Soviet dissidents, a public lecture by Kreisky in Moscow was cancelled and 
the chancellor was criticized in the Soviet press.12 Responses of this kind were not 
unusual: When the Canadian prime minister, Pierre Elliott Trudeau, wrote a letter 
to Andropov on behalf of Anatolii Shcharanskii, Andropov, the former chief of the 
KGB and of hundreds of political prisons, labor camps and isolators who had sta-
ged the prosecution of countless dissidents, ordered: “Reply to the Canadian: ‘We 
 5 Svetlana Savranskaya, “Human Rights Movement in the USSR after the Signing of the Helsinki 
Final Act, and the Reaction of the Soviet Authorities,” in Leopoldo Nuti (ed.), The Crisis of Dé-
tente in Europe: From Helsinki to Gorbachev, 1975–1985 (London: Routledge, 2009), 26–40; 
idem, “Unintended Consequences: Soviet Interests, Expectations, and Reactions to the Helsinki 
Final Act,” in Oliver Bange and Gottfried Niedhart (eds.), Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation 
of Europe (New York: Berghan, 2008), 175–190.
 6 SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 5.
 7 Kreisky to Tikhonov, 19 November 1982, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 7.
 8 Hannes Leidinger and Verena Moritz, Russisches Wien: Begegnungen aus vier Jahrhunderten 
(Vienna: Böhlau, 2004), 190. 
 9 Liedermann to Austrian MFA, On Soviet-Austrian Relations, 23 November 1985, in ÖStA, AVA, 
NL E-1736: Bielka, File 115. For the full text, see pages 333–338.
 10 Information Austrian MFA, 7 October 1982, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 7.
 11 Kreisky to Andropov, 5 July 1983, in RGANI, 89/28/26, 5. A note to Andropov originating from 
the Central Committee apparatus recommending leaving Kreisky’s intervention without an an-
swer bears the handwritten words “Soglasen [I agree]. Andropov.” Information for Andropov, 29 
July 1983, ibid., 89/37/38, 2.
 12 Oliver Rathkolb, “International Perception of Austrian Neutrality,” in Günter Bischof, Anton 
Pelinka, and Ruth Wodak (eds.), Neutrality in Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies 9 (New 
Brunswick: Transaction, 2001), 69–91, 81; Ginther, Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik, 72. 
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don’t need to prove our humanity, Mr. Prime Minister. It is part of the very nature 
of our society.’”13
Such claims notwithstanding, from 1945 to 1968, 8,296 Soviet Jews had left 
their country for Israel. In the early 1970s, despite the rising emigration fees, the 
exodus accelerated, with 13,711 leaving in 1971 and 34,733 in 1973.14 The United 
States tried to pressure the Soviet regime into letting all people willing to emigrate 
do so. Most Jewish emigrants from the USSR left via Austria. In 1960, only 106 
people had used this route, but by the early 1970s the numbers had risen steeply, to 
13,082 in 1971 and 31,804 in 1973, and thus almost all the Soviet Jewish emigrants 
of these years.15 From 1960 until 31 August 1973, a total of more than 72,000 Jews 
had emigrated from the Soviet Union by traveling to Austria. But after three immi-
grants and one customs officer were kidnapped in Austria in September 1973 by 
Palestinian terrorists, the Viennese government agreed to close the transit camp of 
the Jewish Agency in Schönau. However, a new procedure was found to enable Je-
wish migrants leaving the USSR to enter Austria with transit visas and, from 1977, 
their number rose again, in 1979 surpassing its previous high point. In 1980, due 
to new Soviet restrictions, the number dropped again significantly, with emigration 
resuming its rise only after Gorbachev’s perestroika, reaching an all-time high of 
71,000 in 1989 alone.16 From 1955 to 1989, a total of more than 200,000 Jews from 
the USSR passed through Austria.17
The sad fate of the Soviet dissidents and Soviet Jewish population did not 
remain unnoticed by Austrian journalists, who did their best to make the Aus-
trian public aware of the urgent situation. In 1974, Erhard Hutter, the Austrian 
Broadcasting Corporation’s (ORF) representative, who in February 1972 had re-
ceived his accreditation as the first ‒ and, in the early 1970s, the only ‒ per-
manent Austrian correspondent in Moscow,18 filmed the documentary Zwischen 
 13 Quoted in Dmitri Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire: The Seven Leaders Who Built the Soviet 
Regime (New York: Free Press, 1998), 374. 
 14 B. Morozov (ed.), Evreiskaia emigratsiia v svete novykh dokumentov (Tel-Aviv: Ivrus, 1998), 
169; 230. 
 15 SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 7. Cf. O.V. Budnitskii and O.V. Belova (eds.), Evreiskaia emigrat-
siia iz Rossii 1881–2005 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2008).
 16 Außenpolitischer Bericht (1989), 431.
 17 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 407. Other sources give the total as having been 270,199 peo-
ple in the years 1968 through 1986. Rathkolb, “International Perception of Austrian Neutrality,” 
82. Cf. Eduard Stanek, Verfolgt, verjagt, vertrieben: Flüchtlinge in Österreich (Vienna: Europa, 
1985); Vladimir Vertlib, Osteuropäische Zuwanderung nach Österreich 1976–1991 unter be-
sonderer Berücksichtigung der jüdischen Immigration aus der Sowjetunion (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1995). The total number of Soviet Jews leaving 
for Israel in the years 1945–1974 was 99,500; in the years 1975–1980 it was 153,500. Morozov, 
Evreiskaia emigratsiia, 16.
 18 Information Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Zl. 12.285–PI/73, 25 June 
1975, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 2. Up to the 1970s, Austrian journalists, such as Otto 
Schulmeister and Hugo Portisch, visited the USSR mainly as members of journalist delegations. 
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Nobelpreis und Irrenhaus [Between the Nobel Prize and the Madhouse] about 
the forced hospitalization of dissidents in psychiatric wards.19 In the USSR, both 
officials and the media were outraged. An internal report of the Soviet embassy 
in Austria criticized Hutter’s production as having “a nonobjective character and 
containing unjustified criticism […] It must not be ignored that recently Austrian 
television has joined the campaign for the ‘protection of human rights in socialist 
countries.’”20 The Soviet Foreign Ministry filed a complaint with the Austrian 
embassy, and finally in 1978 Hutter was expelled from the USSR on charges 
of anti-Sovietism and smuggling.21 An Austrian protest that the Soviet measures 
violated the Helsinki Final Act was rejected by the Soviet embassy.22 During his 
visit to Moscow in December 1978, Foreign Minister Pahr raised the issue, but 
met with no success. Complaints about human rights abuses in the Soviet Union 
were far from rare, and in May 1977 Brezhnev told all Soviet ambassadors that 
these complaints were part of an “anti-Soviet campaign under the false mask of 
defending human rights.”23 To historian Vladislav Zubok, it seems that “Soviet 
leaders, products of Stalinist political culture, simply could not understand why 
[Western politicians] paid so much attention to the fate of individual dissidents.”24 
They ordered their mouthpieces to fight back against Western leaders and jour-
nalists ‒ and did not consider the consequences this would have on the bilateral 
relations with the West. Being attacked by Soviet media, Austrian journalists, on 
their side, increasingly posed the question whether the Austrian government was 
perhaps too friendly and obedient towards Moscow, and not being rewarded by 
the big neighbor.25 
Meanwhile, the Novosti Press Agency (APN) and the Soviet embassy in Vien-
na had launched a counter campaign, and, in the first three months of 1977, sent 
out no less than twenty-three APN bulletins in up to four hundred copies each, 
in order to “neutralize the massive anti-Soviet propaganda” and to whitewash the 
Soviet treatment of dissidents.26 The Austrian-communist Volksstimme, which had 
gained notoriety for providing Soviet media falsified accusations against the Aus-
Austrian newspapers relied on correspondents from the German media; Heinz Lathe, and later, 
Uwe Engelbrecht of the Kölner Anzeiger wrote for Die Presse. During the 1980s, the USSR 
maintained nine permanent correspondents in Austria. Information Medienwesen in der UdSSR, 
in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6, File Staatsbesuch Kirchschläger, May 1982. 
 19 File Offi zieller Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzler in der Sowjetunion, May 1974, in SBKA, Län-
derboxen, UdSSR 3.
 20 Soviet embassy Vienna to Soviet MFA, 24 June 1977, in AVPRF, 66/56/120/31, 34–40.
 21 Archiv der Gegenwart, 22113, 12 October 1978; File Arbeitsbesuch der Herrn Bundeskanzlers in 
der SU, 6 February 1978, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 4. 
 22 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 18 (1978), 288.
 23 Quoted in Volkogonov, Autopsy for an Empire, 282. 
 24 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 256. 
 25 Molden, “Die ‘Ost-West-Drehscheibe’,” 759–760.
 26 Soviet embassy Vienna to Soviet MFA, 8 July 1977, in AVPRF, 66/56/120/31, 41–43.
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trian government and for its noncritical neo-Stalinist stance, had dismissed earlier 
Western reports about the Soviet regime’s campaign against dissidents, in parti-
cular Andrei Sakharov, as “anti-Soviet hysteria”;27 it now joined the Soviet media 
campaign in defense of the Soviet human rights record. 
The Hutter affair petered out, Otto Hörmann was appointed Hutter’s successor, 
and some friendly signs in the area of media politics appeared. Austrian journalists, 
from 1976 on, were granted one-year multiple-entry visas to the USSR,28 and in 
February 1982 a cooperation agreement between the ORF and the Soviet Gostele-
radio was even signed. 
However, problems continued as long as human rights violations in the USSR 
persisted and the Soviet regime was afraid of having the truth exposed about its 
treatment of dissidents. The sensitive reaction of the Soviet regime to criticism 
from abroad had already long put strain on Soviet-Austrian relations. Not only du-
ring the crises of 1956 and 1968 did Soviet diplomats demand that Austrian repre-
sentatives “suppress this kind of campaigns” and “hostile acts.”29 This systematic 
pressure was aimed at effectively silencing foreign criticism of Soviet policy; the 
communist doctrine of neutrality, which included abstaining from hostile propa-
ganda as one of the obligations of a permanently neutral state, served as a pretext 
for such interference. In the 1970s and 80s, the critical Austrian journalists Barbara 
Coudenhove-Kalergi and Paul Lendvai, who reported on communist human-rights 
violations, were repeatedly attacked in the Soviet press as being anti-Soviet.30 On 
26 January 1983, Izvestiia charged the Austrian media with the defamation of the 
Soviet Union, and Ambassador Helmut Liedermann was called into the Soviet mi-
nistry to be told that Austrian news coverage allegedly “aimed at creating a feeling 
of hostility in Austria against the Soviet Union and its policies.”31 A few weeks 
later, a Soviet diplomat lamented that Soviet-Austrian relations would be excellent, 
if only Austrian media reports were not so “problematic.”32 
In 1980, Austria’s relations with East European dissidents even spilled over into 
the sphere of Soviet-Austrian cultural relations, with the USSR refusing to grant the 
necessary visas to the Czech dissident and actor Pavel Landovsky, who was sche-
duled to join the Vienna Burgtheater company on its tour to Moscow. In the end 
 27 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 3 September 1973, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, 
GZ. 30.205-6/73, Z. 44.485. 
 28 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 112. 
 29 See, e.g., Vorsprache des sowjetischen Botschafters, 22 August 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-
Pol, GZ. 152.678-6/69, Z. 162.361-6/pol/69; Telegram Wodak to Austrian MFA, 29 May 1970, 
ibid., GZ. 80916-6/70, Z. 87195, Protokoll über den bilateralen Meinungsaustausch, 12–13 June 
1975, ibid., Z. 225.18.02/12-II.3/75.
 30 Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 131.
 31 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 1 February 1983, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 
6.
 32 Aktenvermerk Hinteregger, 25 February 1983, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6.
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the theater cancelled its trip.33 The Soviets were again outraged when the Vienna 
International Festival 1981 staged a play by Czech dissident Vaclav Havel. To re-
taliate, the Soviet side withdrew its participation in the festival. After the affair had 
calmed down, the Burgtheater finally traveled to Moscow in 1982 (albeit without 
Landovsky), and two years later the Kirov theater company toured Austria. 
Cultural exchange, tourism, and the image of the other
Despite these and other34 problems, there were also friendly developments in cultu-
ral relations. The June 1969 visit of the Soviet minister of cultural affairs to Austria 
ensured that cultural relations did not suffer from the Czechoslovakian crisis. In 
May 1972 Ekaterina Furtseva’s Austrian counterpart, Fred Sinowatz, returned her 
visit. Each year Soviet-Austrian cultural exchange was specified by a memorandum 
on specific projects. In 1982, the agreement between the two academies of sciences, 
which had come into effect ten years earlier, was renewed. 
In general, the Kreisky era was characterized by a considerable intensification 
in bilateral cultural exchanges ‒ even though the Austrian embassy in Moscow 
criticized that Austria’s cultural export was hindered by many obstacles, whereas 
the “Soviet Union, as a matter of course, expects all means of presenting its culture 
to be placed at its disposal in Austria.”35 The major emphasis clearly rested on high 
culture.36 In 1971 the Bolshoi and Staatsoper companies toured through Austria and 
the USSR, respectively, in the following year the Albertina and Pushkin Museums 
exchanged traveling exhibits, and in 1974, the Vienna Symphony performed in the 
Soviet Union for two weeks. This tour led to a positive assessment by the Soviet 
Ministry of Culture, namely, that nowadays “the Austrian authorities pay a lot of at-
tention to cultural contacts with the Soviet Union.”37 Musicians from both countries 
participated in festivals organized by the other side, such as the Wiener Festwochen 
and the Soviet Haydn festival in 1982. A year earlier, an Austrian tragicomedy 
about a passive Austrian bystander who unintentionally became a resister against 
the Nazi regime, Der Bockerer, was a contender in the Moscow film festival com-
petition. The number of exchange students was, in the 1970s, doubled from five to 
ten students from each country annually, each staying for nine months, and in the 
 33 Hinteregger, Im Auftrag Österreichs, 250. Cf. Kulturelle Beziehungen, May 1982, in SBKA, Län-
derboxen, UdSSR 6, File Staatsbesuch Kirchschläger.
 34 In 1973, the director of the State Opera, Rudolf Gamsjäger, in a conversation with the Soviet am-
bassador in Austria, Aristov, complained that the Soviet Goskontsert agency had until then either 
declined or ignored Austrian proposals for a second tour of the State Opera to the USSR. Aristov 
to Furtseva, 15 January 1973, in AVPRF, 66/52/111/6, 2.
 35 Liedermann to Austrian MFA, On Soviet-Austrian Relations, 23 November 1985, in ÖStA, AVA, 
NL E-1736: Bielka, File 115. For the full text, see pages 333–338.
 36 Neuhold, “Austria and the Soviet Union,” 103. 
 37 Soviet Ministry of Culture to Soviet MFA, 7 May 1974, in AVPRF, 66/53/114/12, 107–114.
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early 1980s, increased to twelve apiece. Moreover, from each side, four professors, 
three language teachers, and four language students were given the chance to study 
and do research in the other country for up to nine months.38 These numbers were, 
however, still very low in comparison with other bilateral exchanges. From the mid-
1970s, the Austrian Institute for Telecommunication Engineering regularly worked 
together with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 1982, a conference was convened 
on the history of bilateral relations between Austria and the USSR.39 Among the 
Austrian participants were some revisionist historians who avoided harsh criticism 
of past Soviet policies. In the next years, Soviet research on Austria was intensi-
fied through the work of the analyst Abdulkhan Akhtamzian, who was based at the 
Moscow State Academy of International Relations, and by the historian and politi-
cal scientist Ivan Zhiriakov.40 Millions of copies of books by Austrian authors such 
as Zweig, Josef Roth, Rilke, Musil, Doderer, Csokor, as well as by more contem-
porary authors such as Bachmann, Frischmuth, Handke and Hochwälder continued 
to be published in Russian and were regularly exhibited in the USSR.41
Soviet and Austrian culture continued to be presented to the wider public by the 
Austrian-Soviet Society, under its president Anton Sattler and secretary Margaretha 
Klug, and the Soviet-Austrian Friendship Society, under its president Petr Alek-
seev, Izvestiia’s editor in chief.42 Since the communists in the ÖSG were no longer 
perceived as a political threat by Austrian officials, the minister for education and 
culture, Herta Firnberg, accepted the honorary presidency of the society. In 1979, 
the ÖSG headquarters were visited by the federal president, Rudolf Kirchschläger, 
who became a frequent honorary guest and speaker at the ceremonies and sympo-
siums sponsored by the society. From 1974, the two societies regularly organized 
Austrian days in the USSR and Soviet days in Austria. Regional partnerships were 
established between Austrian provinces and Soviet republics such as Burgenland 
and Moldavia, Upper Austria and Ukraine, and Vorarlberg and Armenia; sister 
city partnerships were concluded between Dushanbe and Klagenfurt, Tbilisi and 
Innsbruck, as well as other cities.43 In 1980, Austrian days were held in Ukrai-
ne, and in 1982, Uzbek days in Austria. In 1977 the ÖSG organized 1,149 events 
 38 File Offi zieller Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzler in der Sowjetunion, May 1974, in SBKA, Län-
derboxen, UdSSR 3; Kulturelle Beziehungen, May 1982, ibid., UdSSR 6, File Staatsbesuch 
Kirchschläger.
 39 Historikersektion der ÖSG (ed.), Österreich und die Sowjetunion 1918–1955: Beiträge zur Ge-
schichte der österreichisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen (Vienna: ÖSG, 1984).
 40 Abdulchan Achtamsjan, “Die Sowjetunion und Österreich in der Zeit der Vorbereitung und des 
Abschlusses des Staatsvertrages 1945–1955,” in Historikersektion, Österreich und die Sowjetuni-
on, 131–144; Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia; idem, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia.
 41 Kulturelle Beziehungen, May 1982, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6, File Staatsbesuch Kirch-
schläger; Sowjetunion heute 26, no. 11 (1980), 15. 
 42 Sowjetunion heute 27, no. 1 (1981), 14–15.
 43 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 112, 162; File ÖSG, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 4. 
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with 578,413 visitors;44 in 1979 the focus was on the upcoming Olympic Games in 
Moscow, which were promoted in traveling exhibits with twenty-nine stations all 
over Austria.45
The ÖSG regularly organized so-called Friendship Trains, bringing young peo-
ple to the land of the soviets. In the early 1970s, about 5,000 Austrians visited the 
USSR annually. Soviet tourism in Austria reached approximately the same num-
bers, with roughly half of the Soviet visitors traveling on the Danube on cruise 
boats chartered by Inturist. These tourists stayed for an average of five days. Soviet 
tourists arriving by bus stayed an average of twelve days in Austria, four of them 
in Vienna.46 By the end of the 1970s, the number of Soviet arrivals in Austria had 
climbed to more than 23,000 and overnight stays to more than 96,000 per annum. 
With the end of détente these numbers fell significantly. In 1982, the USSR ranked 
only twenty-ninth as the country of origin of tourists visiting Austria, falling even 
lower than such countries as Egypt, South Africa, or Mexico.47
In an opinion poll during the late 1970s, the Soviet Union ranked eighth (the 
same ranking as Hungary) of the countries and organizations Austrians wanted 
their homeland to have good and close relations with ‒ behind the FRG, Swit-
zerland, the United States, Italy, international organizations, Yugoslavia, and the 
Scandinavian countries.48 Without the promotion of active cultural exchange and 
without détente in general, such a result could hardly be explained given the ne-
gative image of the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia and of the maltreatment of 
Soviet dissidents.
The dearth of official controversies did not mean, however, that the Soviet Uni-
on fully approved of Austria’s political system and politics: While Kreisky and 
Sinowatz were usually portrayed in a favorable manner,49 Soviet media in the late 
1970s and early 1980s still reported disapprovingly about Austrian capitalism and 
“social partnership,” highlighting the high rate of unemployment, and criticizing 
Austrian social democracy as compromising too much.50 This apparently seemed 
necessary to the Soviet leadership inasmuch Austria was a capitalist state and, 
therefore, by definition according to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, necessarily had 
to suffer from social tensions and crises.51 On 8 January 1983, Pravda charged Aus-
tria with being too tolerant with regard to neo-Nazis.52 Since the 1940s the Soviet 
 44 Annual report ÖSG on 1977, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 4.
 45 Annual report ÖSG on 1979, ibid.
 46 Information über den Touristenverkehr, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3.
 47 Information Wirtschaftsbeziehungen, May 1982, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6, File Staats-
besuch Kirchschläger.
 48 Neuhold, “Austria and the Soviet Union,” 100.
 49 Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 190, 199. 
 50 Lobova, “Die Moskauer Perzeption,” 115. Cf. Pravda, 6 October 1976. 
 51 Information, Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Zl. 12.285–PI/73, 25 June 
1975, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 2. 
 52 Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 23 (1983), 33.
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press had repeatedly pointed out the threat of neo-Nazism. Particularly during the 
phase of Austria’s EEC ambitions in the 1960s and when the neo-Nazi NDP was 
founded in Austria in 1967, Radio Moscow and Izvestiia had accused Austria of 
tolerating neo-Nazism, and they continued to do so whenever it seemed approp-
riate to issue a warning towards the Austrian government.53 Interestingly, Soviet 
and Austrian-communist attacks against the FPÖ as an allegedly pan-German and 
neo-Nazi party, which had been repeatedly named in Soviet media as one of the 
forces responsible for Austria’s striving towards the EEC, began to be fewer after 
1968.54 In the mid-1970s, internal Soviet reports and its media sharply criticized 
both the existence of approximately thirty organizations with allegedly neo-Nazi 
leanings and the Austrian government’s argument that banning them would make 
it more difficult to monitor their members’ activities.55 Further Soviet concern was 
expressed about annual gatherings of former Sudeten Germans in Austria.56 The 
demonstrations in Vienna against NATO rearmament by members of the Austrian 
anti-war movement were praised by Soviet media,57 but not a word was said about 
the marches against the Soviet war in Afghanistan.
The 1972 riots against bilingual town signs being erected, on the order of Kreis-
ky, in Slovene and German-speaking Carinthian communities were described in 
the Soviet press as an “alarming sign of an anachronistic nationalism” of the Ca-
rinthian German-speaking population.58 Until then, the fate of the Slovene minority 
in southern Austria had not been an issue in Soviet-Austrian relations. Despite the 
fact that in 1949 the USSR had made sure that an article concerning the protection 
of the ethnic minorities in Austria was included in the state treaty,59 the most the 
Soviet ambassador undertook in this regard was to hand over Slovene complaints 
about Austria’s nonfulfillment of the resulting obligations. When representatives of 
the Slovene minority, one year after the signing of the state treaty, filed a protest 
with the Austrian government about the insufficient implementation of the article, 
the Soviet side decided “not to take any further steps” but “to carefully watch over 
 53 Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 172. Cf. G. Nikolajew, “Die Neonazis in Österreich,” in 
Neue Zeit, no. 37 (1969), 30–31.
 54 Moser, “Die Stellung der Kommunistischen Partei Österreichs,” 59.
 55 Report, 28 April 1975, in AVPRF, 66/54/115/13, 34–35. Cf. I. Melnikow, “nicht verharmlosen!,” 
in Neue Zeit, no. 2 (1979), 14. 
 56 Telegram Austrian embassy New York to Austrian MFA, 24 September 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, 
BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 164.082–6/69, Z. 164.089; Radio Moscow, 24 May 1977.
 57 Y. Kalugin, “Facts and Figures: Austria,” in International Affairs, no. 1 (January 1984), 141. 
 58 Information, Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Zl. 12.285–PI/73, 25 June 
1975, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 2.
 59 Stourzh, Um Einheit und Freiheit, 155–161. Cf. Franz Matscher, “Die Minderheitenregelungen 
im Staatsvertrag,” in Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), The Austrian 
State Treaty 1955: International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Verlag der 
Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005), 783–819.
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the implementation” of the relevant matters.60 In the spring of 1957, the Soviet am-
bassador handed over a further Slovene protest addressed to the four powers about 
Austria’s laxness in protecting the rights of the Slovene minority.61 
Three years after the bilingual signs had been forcefully removed by Austrian 
nationalists, the Soviet embassy, in an internal report, stated that conditions for 
the Slovene-speaking minority in Carinthia, which had been discriminated against 
by Austria for decades, had not changed. They had been defamed and provoked, 
not only by Carinthian Heimat organizations and the right-wing FPÖ, but also by 
the nationalist wing of the conservative People’s Party and even by the social de-
mocrats’ provincial branch. Thus, the embassy stated, the anti-Semitic attacks by 
Carinthian nationalists and social democrats against Kreisky that had followed his 
order regarding the bilingual signs were the “peculiar finale of a development of 
which his own party is also guilty.”62 However, the Soviet side was reluctant to side 
openly with Yugoslavia, which, on its side, was involved in quarrels with Bulgaria 
over questions concerning Macedonia. Furthermore, the nonregulation of the Ca-
rinthian problem provided the Soviet Union a lever over the governments of both 
Yugoslavia and Austria. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugosla-
via, the issue, due to the populist stance of Carinthia’s provincial administration 
and the passivity of the Austrian government, is, in 2010, still unresolved.
 60 Timoshchenko to Lapin, 23 June 1956, in AVPRF, 66/35/66/24, 9. A copy of the note of protest 
ibid., 10. 
 61 Conversation Lapin with Figl, 28 March 1957, in AVPRF, 66/36/68/10, 12–14.
 62 Report Romanov, On the state treaty and the Slovene minority, 18 April 1975, in AVPRF, 
66/54/115/13, 1–30.
12.  Booming, but not Enough: Economic Relations 
Soviet-Austrian relations in the 1970s were clearly concentrated on economic 
questions. This was due, at least partially, to the fact that, for the Austrian side, 
economic relations did not develop as well as might have been expected. The main 
legal framework had been formed by a five-year trade agreement signed in 1970. 
During Kosygin’s visit in 1973, the first ten-year program on economic, scienti-
fic-technical, and industrial cooperation was agreed upon, and in 1975 a ten-year 
agreement on the exchange of goods and payments followed. On the occasion of 
Kreisky’s 1978 trip to Moscow, a memorandum on the expansion of bilateral trade 
and economic cooperation was signed, which led to the conclusion of the 1981–90 
long-term program on development and broadening of economic cooperation.1 In 
1985 this agreement was extended for another decade. In addition to these bilateral 
treaties, from 1975 the USSR, concurrent to its aim of negotiating an agreement 
between the CMEA and the EC,2 pressed Austria to start negotiations on a treaty 
with the Eastern economic bloc.3
Industrial cooperation was overseen by the Soviet-Austrian Mixed Commission 
for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, founded in 1968. It met annu-
ally under the chairmanship of the two countries’ ministers for foreign trade. The ag-
reements signed in 1973 and 1975 on scientific, technical, and industrial cooperation 
made such bilateral projects easier.4 Again, Austria (after Finland and France) was 
among the first Western countries to sign agreements on long-term economic and 
scientific cooperation with the USSR.5 Areas of cooperation included the building 
of industrial plants and infrastructure, Soviet participation in the planning of power 
stations and oil refineries in Austria, and Austrian contributions to the planning and 
construction of Soviet freeways, steel plants, paper mills, and chemical factories, as 
 1 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 105–106. 
 2 Mueller, “Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration,” 651–657.
 3 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 27 April 1981, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6. 
 4 Abkommen über die Entwicklung der wirtschaftlichen, wissenschaftlich-technischen und indu-
striellen Zusammenarbeit zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR, 1 February 1973; Programm zur 
Vertiefung der österreichisch-sowjetischen wirtschaftlichen, wissenschaftlich-technischen und 
industriellen Zusammenarbeit, 3 July 1973; Langfristiges Abkommen über den Waren- und Zah-
lungsverkehr zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR, 30 May 1975, in Mayrzedt and Hummer, 20 
Jahre österreichische Neutralitäts- und Europapolitik 2, 153–164. Cf. Max Fälbl, “Die öster-
reichisch-sowjetischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen: Zum Besuch des Außenhandelsministers des 
UdSSR, N. S. Patoli�ev, in Österreich,” in Österreichische Osthefte 15, no. 1 (1973), 12–19.
 5 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 105. 
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well as factories for food, machine-building, wood-working, and rail construction. 
Among the first Austrian companies to cooperate with Soviet firms were the sta-
te-owned steel producers VOEST-Alpine and Schöller-Bleckmann, Chemie Linz, 
and the machine-building factories Haid, Plasser & Theurer, and Voith. Although it 
might have been perceived an affront to other beer brewing areas such as Bavaria 
and Bohemia, it was the Austrian beer brewery Schwechater that negotiated with the 
Soviet breweries “Stepan Razin” and “Krasnaia Bavaria” [Red Bavaria] and provi-
ded them needed equipment.6 In 1978, five or six Austrian companies were involved 
in joint Austrian-Soviet projects, but by the 1980s the numbers had risen to more 
than a hundred. They were involved in ventures with a volume of 300 million schil-
lings.7 Between 1980 and 1985, 204 Austrian patents were registered in the USSR, 
and, respectively, 300 Soviet patents in Austria. In order to carry out financial tran-
sactions, an office of the Soviet Donaubank opened in Vienna in 1974. 
In 1981 alone, more than one hundred Austrian companies presented their pro-
ducts at seventeen international exhibits and fairs in the USSR. Austria continued 
chiefly to sell finished or semi-finished products and capital goods such as boats, 
factory equipment, and machinery (35.5 percent of Austrian exports to the USSR 
in 1974), iron, steel and metal products (23.6 percent), chemicals and pharmaceu-
ticals (10.5 percent), textiles, shoe leather and rubber products (9.5 percent), con-
sumer goods (8.9 percent),8 and from 1982, wheat. Some 75 percent of the Soviet 
deliveries consisted of energy sources such as gas, oil, and coal, as well as vari-
ous types of ore, pulp, and wood. In 1968, the USSR began to sell natural gas, 
and by 1971 the volume had reached 1.5 billion cubic meters per annum. In 1973, 
Austria expressed its interest in increasing gas imports to 4.5 billion. The Soviet 
side was ready to increase deliveries to 2.5 billion in return for Austrian pipes 
and material for pipelines, and in 1974, 1975, and 1982 protocols were concluded 
concerning additional deliveries. Moreover, in 1974 Austria signed a contract for 
Soviet uranium deliveries to supply Austria’s first nuclear power plant ‒ a pro-
ject that, due to a negative referendum, in the end was aborted. Another field of 
Soviet-Austrian bartering was a 1975–79 deal between VOEST-Alpine and the 
USSR concerning Austrian deliveries of sheet steel in return for 700,000 tons of 
Soviet iron ore per annum.9 By 1979, VOEST-Alpine’s exports of sheet steel to 
 6 Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology to Soviet MFA, 30 April 1974, in AVPRF, 
66/53/114/12, 96–102.
 7 Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia, 136–137. Cf. Gregor Riedl, “Die Entwicklung und Bedeutung der 
Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen Österreich und der Sowjetunion im Zeitraum von 1965 bis 
1980” (MA Thesis, Vienna, 1983). 
 8 Report Soviet embassy Vienna to Soviet MFA, 18 April 1974, in AVPRF, 66/53/114/12, 27–31.
 9 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 4 January 1980, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 5. 
In the negotiations during Kosygin’s visit, the Soviet side had offered 350,000 tons of iron ore and 
750,000 tons of coal per annum. Report Soviet embassy Vienna to Soviet MFA, 18 April 1974, in 
AVPRF, 66/53/114/12, 27–31.
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the USSR had reached 252,000 tons for automobile production, and 129,000 tons 
for pipes.10
Altogether, Soviet-Austrian trade in the 1970s was characterized by a sharp incre-
ase in the exchange of goods. The first half of the decade was the heyday of Austria’s 
Osthandel, which grew faster than Austrian exports to OECD countries. In the 1960s, 
it had taken ten years for Soviet-Austrian trade to double. However, in the 1970s, 
only five years were needed for it to double, and by 1984, Soviet-Austrian trade had 
quadrupled. Within one decade, Soviet imports of Austrian machinery even quintu-
pled.11 Nevertheless, the Soviet share of Austrian trade remained relatively constant. 
Of Austrian imports, it ranged between 1.9 percent in 1973 and 6.2 percent in 1981, 
on average about 3.8 percent; as a receiver of Austrian exports, the USSR remained 
between 2.8 (1976) and 4.5 percent (1984). Of the destinations of Austria’s exports 
to CMEA states, in this period the USSR fell from number one to number four (be-
hind Hungary, Poland and the CSSR). This was reflected by the fact that the Austrian 
share in the imports of non-Soviet CMEA states, which reached about 5 percent in 
the 1970s, was higher than the Austrian share in Soviet imports (below 1 percent).12 
However, of the East European countries, from which Austria imported goods, the 
USSR, due to its exports of energy sources, remained in first position.13
















1973 1,776.6 –18.4 0.5 2,650.7 1.1 1.9 –874.1
1974 3,511.8 97.7 0.9 4,423.7 66.9 2.6 –911.9
1975 3,762.2 7.1 0.8 5,543.8 25.3 3.4 –1,781.6
1976 4,244.6 12.8 0.7 7,533.2 35.9 3.7 –3,288.6
1977 4,607.9 8.6 0.9 8,422.2 11.8 3.6 –3,814.3
1978 5,375.8 16.7 0.8 8,870.6 5.3 3.8 –3,494.8
1979 6,822.4 26.9 1.0 10,269.3 15.8 3.8 –3,446.9
1980 6,177.3 –9.5 0.9 13,262.4 29.1 4.2 –7,085.1
1981 7,719.0 25.0 0.9 20,854.9 57.2 6.2 –13,135.9
1982 9,409.7 21.9 0.9 16,866.7 –19.1 5.1 –7,457.0
1983 10,782.3 14.6 1.3 14,856.0 –11.9 4.3 –4,073.7
1984 14,072.9 30.5 1.3 19,625.3 32.1 5.0 –5,552.4
Source: Butschek, Statistische Reihen; Vneshniaia togovlia
Exports in millions of Austrian schillings; changes and shares in percent.
 10 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 7 March 1980, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 5.
 11 A. Podkopayev, “International Economic Cooperation USSR – Austria,” in International Affairs, 
no. 2 (February 1984), 145–147, 146. 
 12 OECD Economic Outlook 28 (1980), 125. On the Austrian share in Soviet imports, see below, 
pages 240– 241.
 13 Information Bundeskanzleramt, Zl. 72.535/30–7/74, 15 May 1974, in SBKA, Länderboxen, 
UdSSR 3.
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The soaring growth had two main reasons and did not come without problems. 
The first reason was Brezhnev’s attempt to solve economic problems by importing 
Western technology. From the twenty-fourth congress of the CPSU in 1971 un-
til 1975, Soviet foreign trade grew by 186 percent, with its focus on Western 
countries;14 the Western share of Soviet foreign trade rose from 14 percent in 1970 
to 34 in 1980.15 The second reason was the growing Austrian need for Soviet natu-
ral gas and other fuels, whose imports jumped from 4,155 million schillings in 1975 
(with total Austrian imports from the USSR worth 5,544 million) to 18,661 million 
in 1981 (with total Austrian imports worth 20,855 million). 16
Austria’s dependency and trade deficit
The first problematic tendency resulting from this development was Austria’s gro-
wing dependency. In the 1970s, more than 95 percent of Austrian imports of natu-
ral gas and more than 66 percent of Austria’s annual consumption came from the 
USSR. In addition, Austria imported 79 percent of its coal and 53 percent of its 
electricity from the CMEA, making it the OECD country with the highest energy 
dependency on the Eastern bloc.17 In 1982, the fourth agreement on Soviet natural 
gas deliveries was signed, covering the period until 2000.18 For Hanspeter Neuhold, 
professor of international relations, these figures raised “the question of whether 
Austria’s dependence on East European energy is so heavy that it also constitu-
tes a political problem and may pose a threat to the country’s security in crisis 
situations.”19 In the political discourse, Neuhold cautioned, such questions weren’t 
tackled seriously enough by political leaders. As opinion polls of 1981 indicate, 
Austrians were aware of their dependency. However, 79 percent considered this de-
pendency unavoidable and 78 percent expressed the opinion that it did not restrict 
Austria’s freedom of action. In 1985, Helmut Liedermann, the Austrian ambassa-
dor to Moscow, also recommended diversifying Austria’s energy imports ‒ without 
much success, as it turned out.20 Today Austria still imports more than 60 percent 
of its natural gas consumption and more than 90 percent of its natural gas imports 
from Russia. 
 14 Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War II (New York: Mac-
millan, 1992), 281. 
 15 Hauke, “Handelspolitik und Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen,” 219. 
 16 Cf. Information Austrian Ministry for Trade and Industry, Zl. 21.198.6/4–II-6/78, January 1978, 
in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3. 
 17 Skuhra, “Austria and the New Cold War,” 131.
 18 Podkopayev, “International Economic Cooperation USSR – Austria,” 146. 
 19 Neuhold, “Austria and the Soviet Union,” 101f. Cf. Harald Glatz, “Abhängigkeit im Bereich von 
Rohstoffen und Energie,” in Helmut Kramer et al., Österreich im internationalen System: Zusam-
menfassung der Ergebnisse und Ausblick (Vienna: Braumüller, 1983), 118–127.
 20 Liedermann to Austrian MFA, On Soviet-Austrian Relations, 23 November 1985, in ÖStA, AVA, 
NL E-1736: Bielka, File 115. For the full text, see pages 333–338.
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In addition, the dependence of many Austrian exporting industries on the Soviet 
market, as had developed in the 1960s, increased. This led to problems as well, 
as many businesses in neutral countries relying on the “secure” export of their 
products to the East became less competitive in the West,21 running thereby into 
existential problems once the Soviet orders ceased to be regular. A special case stu-
dy for this kind of development was the Korneuburg ship building industry, which 
over the previous thirty years had sold its large sea vessels almost exclusively to the 
USSR,22 among them more than 160 barges, ships, and cruise boats, including the 
famous “Anton Chekhov” riverboat.23 When Soviet orders slowed, the state-owned 
shipyards suffered a downturn; they were sold and, in 1993, closed down.24 Ano-
ther example of this kind of dependence was a pipe plant in Kindberg, which also 
produced almost exclusively for the Soviet market and was, from the late 1980s, 
left without orders.25
A second problematic development in Soviet-Austrian trade during the Kreisky 
era was that the balance turned steadily against Austria. Until 1970, due to several 
clearing agreements, trade had been generally balanced, with a slight tilt against 
the USSR. The trade agreement signed in 1970 was the first to have no fixed quo-
tas and to clear in freely convertible currency. During the oil crisis of the 1970s, 
the agreement did not provide Austria any protection against skyrocketing energy 
prices. Between 1970 and 1974, the price of oil increased by almost 200 percent 
and the price of natural gas was quick to follow. Whereas in 1970, the USSR had 
charged Austria 485 million schillings for 931,000 tons of oil, in 1974 the price 
had more than doubled to 1.3 billion schillings for only 841,000 tons.26 The same 
tendencies affected the price of natural gas. In 1975, Austria had spent 1.5 billion 
schillings on natural gas imports from Russia; by 1981 it had become 11 billion.27 
As a consequence, during the two oil crises 1973–74 and 1980–81, the value of 
Soviet exports to Austria jumped some 66.9 percent and 57 percent respectively. 
While Austria’s exports jumped an even higher margin (in 1974 some 97 percent) 
and Austrians were able to shift their exports somewhat to products with a higher 
value added, including chemicals, increasingly they lagged behind Austrian energy 
imports. In 1977, Austrian imports from the USSR were 1.8 times higher than Aus-
trian exports, in 1982 it was even 2.7 times. The exploding Austrian trade deficit 
 21 Bengt Sundelius, “Dilemmas and Strategies for the Neutral Democracies,” in idem (ed.), The 
Neutral Democracies in the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 11–32, esp. 18.
 22 Hinteregger, Im Auftrag Österreichs, 238. 
 23 Zhiriakov, SSSR – Avstriia, 134. 
 24 Stefan Wunderl, “Die Geschichte der Schiffswerft Klosterneuburg” (MA Thesis, Vienna, 2008). 
 25 Liedermann to Austrian MFA, On Soviet-Austrian Relations, 23 November 1985, in ÖStA, AVA, 
NL E-1736: Bielka, File 115. For the full text, see pages 333–338.
 26 Resch, “Der österreichische Osthandel,” 535. 
 27 Hubert Isak, “Österreichs Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen,” in Renate Kicker, Andreas Khol, Hans-
peter Neuhold (eds.), Außenpolitik und Demokratie in Österreich: Strukturen – Strategien – Stel-
lungnahmen (Salzburg: Neugebauer, 1983), 259–288, 268.
240 Détente and the Last Peak of the Cold War, 1973‒1984 
with the Soviet Union28 of more than 3.8 billion schillings (1977) became the main 
topic of Kreisky’s visit to the Kremlin in 1978.29 While Brezhnev dismissed the 
deficit as temporary and ‒ in comparison with Austria’s trade deficit with the FRG 
‒ small, Kreisky and Staribacher aimed at scouting out Soviet orders. Although the 
chancellor was accompanied by a large delegation of industrialists, the trend re-
mained unchanged: Austria continued to import more, and more expensive, Soviet 
gas, but was unable to sell enough goods to compensate for these energy purchases. 
The second oil crisis in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979 reinforced 
this trend. From 1979 to 1981 the Austrian trade deficit almost quadrupled, to 13.1 
billion schillings.
This was, at least in part, a consequence of the Soviet cutback on imports of 
Western machinery in the second half of the 1970s.30 Another reason was Austria’s 
inability to adapt to a growing competitiveness in Soviet foreign trade. In 1960 and 
due to the compensation for the economic provisions of the state treaty, neutral 
Austria had possessed a good position among Western countries as a trading partner 
of the USSR. When détente started to bear fruit and the USSR liberalized its foreign 
trade, the pressure of competition among West European trading partners of the 
USSR grew. This was correctly recognized by the Austrian side:31 its importance 
as a Western partner of the Soviet Union sank, and the country’s share in Soviet 
foreign trade dropped in comparison to other Western states. In the second half of 
the 1960s, France had extended large loans to the USSR, thus becoming an impor-
tant Western trading partner of the Kremlin. By the 1970s, West Germany, which 
in 1970 had concluded an agreement on selling 1.2 million tons of large-diameter 
steel pipes for pipelines in return for buying Soviet natural gas, had already sur-
passed France considerably.32 In 1972, the FRG became (again, for the first time 
since 1960) the most important Western trading partner of the USSR ‒ a position 
it would develop and uninterruptedly defend until 2009. Particularly on the Soviet 
import market for iron, steel, and chemicals, Austrian exporters had to cede to Wes-
tern competitors, mostly from West Germany, France, and Italy. While Soviet-Aus-
trian trade in 1955 had reached roughly the same volume as that between the Soviet 
Union and West Germany, the latter in 1973 was more than six time bigger. The 
Austrian share in Soviet imports from OECD countries plunged from 4.3 percent in 
1965 to 1.7 percent in 1976. This was paralleled by a decline in the importance of 
 28 Ilse Korenjak, “Die Entwicklung des österreichisch-sowjetischen Außenhandels 1955 bis 1982” 
(MA Thesis, Vienna, 1983), 104. 
 29 Conversation Kreisky with Kosygin, 7 February 1978, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3; Kre-
isky with Brezhnev, ibid; Staribacher Diary, 6–8 February 1978, in SBKA. 
 30 Hanson, The Rise and the Fall of the Soviet Economy, 156. 
 31 File Offi zieller Besuch des Herrn Bundeskanzler in der Sowjetunion, May 1974, in SBKA, Län-
derboxen, UdSSR 3.
 32 Loth, Overcoming the Cold War, 106; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy since World War 
II (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), 127–128.
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other neutral states like Sweden and Finland, whose shares in Soviet imports from 
OECD countries also dropped, from 3.5 to 1.7 percent and from 17 to 9.9 percent 
respectively. In contrast, the share of West Germany and the United States, which 
had formerly been considered hostile countries to the USSR, rose from 10.9 to 19.6 
percent and from 3.3 to 12.8 percent.33 
Although it fell significantly after the Austrian post-state treaty deliveries to 
the Soviet Union were over, the Austrian share in Soviet imports, over the 1970s, 
remained around 0.8 percent. As the table and the diagram below indicate, this 
was much less than the share of leading Western exporters such as the FRG, where 
between 3.1 (1970) and 7.3 percent (1975) of all Soviet imports originated, France 
(2.3 to 3.2 percent), and Italy (1.9 to 3 percent). The Austrian share was also much 
smaller than that of other neutral or nonaligned states such as Finland (2.6 to 4.1 
percent) or Yugoslavia (2.1 to 4.8 percent). This does not call into question the 
obvious fact that Austria’s share in Soviet imports was often larger than the shares 
of other Western economies of comparable size. Particularly in the 1960s and the 
1980s, Austria thus ranked higher than Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland (which 
prior to the creation of a bilateral trade commission in 1973 had developed almost 
no trade with the USSR34), despite having been surpassed by Sweden in the 1970s 
and by all of them in 1975.
Disadvantages to Austrian trade were a consequence of this international trend 
resulting from détente. These were reinforced by various factors, one being high 
Austrian prices. The Austrian Ministry of Trade, which had warned of a “shorta-
ge of orders” from the mid-1970s, had to concede that in many cases, the bids of 
Austrian companies, such as tenders for pipes or for pipe cleaning machinery, had 
not been competitive enough. Negotiations on new Soviet orders were therefore 
“disappointing”; the Soviet side estimated the value of Soviet orders not secured 
in 1976–77 by Austrian firms due to their lack of competitiveness at 100 million 
rubles.35 In the case of a gas purification plant bought by the USSR in 1978, the 
Italian offer was some 20 percent less than the Austrian one.36 In another case, the 
USSR accepted France’s bid for a reprocessing plant for natural gas. Such disad-
vantages seem to have been made even worse by a lack of coordination and skill, as 
well as by the negligence of Austrian companies to attempt to overcome the rising 
obstacles. On the occasion of his 1976 trip to the Soviet Union, Minister of Trade 
Staribacher was, in his own words, “exasperated” with the low quality of informa-
 33 Various statistics, Austrian Ministry for Trade and Industry, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3; 
Eberhard Schulz, Moskau und die europäische Integration (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1975), 230–
231.
 34 Scarlis, Neutralität, 151.
 35 Information, Austrian Ministry for Trade and Industry, Zl. 21.198.6/4–II-6/78, January 1978, in 
SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 3. 
 36 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 26 January 1978, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 
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tion material prepared by a major Austrian company that had hoped to secure some 
Soviet orders.37 As Ambassador Hinteregger pointed out, many Austrian firms sent 
junior managers to Moscow, who had no chance of making direct contacts with 
Soviet decision makers. In addition, in the negotiations on a Soviet-West European 
pipeline, Austria had not prepared a careful plan with regard to pipes, gas, and 
loans.38 His successor Liedermann stated sarcastically that in order to gain Soviet 
orders it was no longer sufficient to rely on the “Vine Louse Effect,” which had 
characterized Soviet-Austrian relations in 1955.39
When the USSR announced in 1978 that the Olympic Village for the 1980 
Games would be built exclusively by Soviet companies, and all efforts to establish 
a joint venture to assemble Soviet Lada Taiga and Niva cars in Austria failed,40 the 
Austrian embassy expressed its “disappointment” that Austria ‒ despite the incre-
ase in bilateral trade ‒ had not received a major Soviet order for more than fifteen 
years.41 In particular, the embassy complained about the Soviet “discrimination” 
against Austria as compared to West Germany, whose fine trading position with 
the USSR had not been harmed by its boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games ‒ a 
fact that should be considered by those who, for trade reasons, oppose boycotting 
mass events that are used for political purposes such as the Olympic Games despite 
violations of human rights in the organizing country.
 37 Staribacher Diaries, 16–21 July 1976, in SBKA.
 38 Amtsvermerk Hinteregger, 14 October 1981, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6; Hinteregger, 
“Erinnerungen an Moskau,” 247.
 39 Liedermann to Austrian MFA, On Soviet-Austrian Relations, 23 November 1985, in ÖStA, AVA, 
NL E-1736: Bielka, File 115. For the full text, see pages 333–338. According to a 1955 cartoon 
by E. H. Köhler, the Austrian delegation in April 1955 had won Soviet consent to signing the state 
treaty by performing the Heurigen song “Die Reblaus” (“The Vine Louse”). Simplicissimus, no. 
17 (1955), 3. Cf. http://www.demokratiezentrum.org/wissen/galleries/zum-staatsvertrag-gallery.
html?index=1058.
 40 Hinteregger, “Erinnerungen an Moskau,” 249–250. Talks on the project had been a major focus of 
Foreign Minister Willibald Pahr’s visit to Moscow in December 1978. Österreichische Zeitschrift 
für Außenpolitik 18 (1978), 299. On the visit, cf. W. Jelagin, “Entspannungsfördernd,” in Neue 
Zeit, no. 52 (1978), 17. 
 41 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, July 1980, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6.
13.  The Final Peak of the Cold War
The final peak of the Cold War had many causes. During the years of détente, the 
Soviet Union had continued the arms race and annually assigned about 8 percent of 
its GDP and 16.5 percent of its budget for the armed forces and weaponry; if one 
includes indirect costs related to the military industry, altogether 40 percent of the 
country’s budget was spent on military build-up.1 In the decade following 1972, 
the USSR built more than 4,100 ground-based and sea-launched Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles, whereas the United States produced about 920. While Soviet 
dissidents criticized the “ruinous super-militarization”2 of their country and saw 
the signs of a deepening economic and societal crisis, the ailing Brezhnev, addicted 
to tranquillizers and on the edge of physical and mental collapse, “followed the 
lead of the military.”3 His gerontocratic successors Iurii Andropov, who in a brief 
period at the helm of the Kremlin staged a new wave of persecution of dissidents, 
and Konstantin Chernenko, who was not fit for any political initiatives at all, did 
nothing to avert the imminent breakdown. 
In the West, the USSR was again perceived as a menace. New heavy and flexible 
Soviet intermediate-range “Pioneer” missiles, the so-called SS-20, which were de-
ployed from 1976 by the hundreds in Eastern Europe, led to NATO’s Double-Track 
Decision to offer arms limitation talks to the Warsaw Pact and, if they failed, to 
deploy new Western missiles. The violations of human rights in the Soviet Union, 
in particular the issue of Jewish migration, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, and 
the invocation of martial law in Poland, which were all followed by Western sanc-
tions against the Eastern regimes, contributed to the breakdown of détente. This 
was marked by the US refusal to ratify SALT-II and a sharp upsurge in Soviet anti-
Western propaganda, in particular against Jimmy Carter and the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) of his successor Ronald Reagan.4 Further nails were hammered into 
détente’s coffin in the fall of 1983, when the Soviet air force shot down a civilian 
South Korean airplane, leaving all 269 people on board dead, and when the Soviet 
delegation walked out of the arms control negotiations in Geneva.
In Soviet statements of the early 1980s, it was repeated that “peaceful coexist-
ence” was not to be mistaken for “détente,” but rather “a specific instrument of the 
 1 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 208, 242, 277. 
 2 Quoted in Wolkogonow, Die sieben Führer, 282. Cf. ibid., 341–343, 359–361, 389, 413.
 3 Georgi Arbatov, The System: An Insider’s Life in Soviet Politics (New York: Times, 1992), 201–
203.
 4 Ulam, Dangerous Relations, 226, 271. 
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class struggle.”5 While the end of détente was attributed to “subjective factors” 
such as “the sharp upswing of militaristic and aggressive tendencies in the policy 
of the USA,”6 no reference was made to the Soviet arms build-up or to the interven-
tions in Poland and Afghanistan. In particular, the latter invasion of a nonaligned 
country strained the USSR’s relations not only with the Western world, but also 
with the Third World ‒ a consequence that had been foreseen by Gromyko, who 
in a Politburo session in early 1979 voiced his concern that in the case of a Soviet 
intervention, “all the nonaligned countries will be against us.”7 Indeed, the So-
viet invasion was condemned by the UN General Assembly by a tenfold majority. 
Brezhnev, who in the wake of the 1979 nonaligned states’ summit in Havana had 
identified its participants as “natural allies” of the Soviet Union,8 made a clumsy 
attempt at mending fences by sending greetings to the nonaligned countries and 
claiming that “the development of the friendship and cooperation with the nona-
ligned countries, which are one of the most important links in the joint front in the 
peoples’ struggle for peace and freedom, was and remains the principal position of 
the Soviet Union.”9 The deterioration of Soviet relations with the neutral and nona-
ligned states contained another inconvenience: the Kremlin had hoped that they 
would support the West European “peace movement’s” struggle against Western 
rearmament (the Eastern side of the arms race had escaped most Western activists’ 
attention). Andropov, in his report to the Central Committee plenum on 14–15 June 
1983, tried to encourage the neutrals and, even more, the “peace movement” to 
increase activities against Western rearmament.10 
In publications by Soviet experts, the neutrals were invited to contribute to the 
denuclearization of Western and Central Europe, to an end of the Western embargo 
against the USSR, and, in general, to a “Europeanization” of European affairs,11 
i.e. the elimination of the US presence in Western Europe and the yielding of West 
European states to neutralization. These strategies were accompanied by the Soviet 
definition of permanent neutrality and nonalignment being adapted. While earlier 
Soviet publications had attempted to activate the permanent neutrals by blurring the 
 5 A. Gromyko, “V. I. Lenin i vneshniaia politika Sovetskogo gosudarstva,“ in Kommunist 59, no. 6 
(1983), 11–32, 26.
 6 D. Tomashevsky, “Lenin’s Concept of Peaceful Coexistence and the Imperialist Challenge,” in 
International Affairs, no. 5 (May 1982), 3–13.
 7 Quoted in Zubok, A Failed Empire, 260. 
 8 Hakovirta, “East-West Tensions,” 205. 
 9 Privetstvie L. I. Brezheva neprisoedinivshimsia stranam, 9 February 1981, in Vneshniaia politika 
Sovetskogo Soiuza i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia 1981 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 
1982), 11. 
 10 Plenum TsK KPSS 14–15 iiunia 1983g.: Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politiches-
koi literatury, 1983), 130. 
 11 Viktor A. Kremenyuk, “The European Neutrals and Soviet-American Relations,” in Hanspeter 
Neuhold and Hans Thalberg (eds.), The European Neutrals in International Affairs, Laxenburg 
Papers 7 (Vienna: Braumüller, 1984), 93–103, 99–101.
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differences between permanent neutrality and nonalignment, the fourth edition of 
the Diplomatic Handbook dropped the notion of “positive neutrality,”12 which pre-
viously had been used for expanding the peacetime obligations of the permanently 
neutral states by theoretically linking the neutrals with the nonaligned states.
For the European neutrals, the new Cold War brought new dilemmas. Their 
maneuvering space became more restricted and they came increasingly under pres-
sure, both domestically and internationally. The West and the domestic Right criti-
cized the neutral’s lack of solidarity with Western ideals and human rights, while 
the East and the domestic Left tended to criticize neutral governments as still dis-
playing too much cohesion with the West.13 When the United States, as a result of 
the new peak in the Cold War, stepped up the COCOM high technology embargo, 
many West European states and the neutrals, in contrast to the 1940s, insisted on 
preserving economic links to the communist states.14 Therefore, US attempts to 
block a Soviet gas pipeline project from Urengoi to Western Europe failed ‒ a 
failure that was celebrated by communist propaganda as a victory. From the Soviet 
side, pressure on the neutrals was increased, particularly in the north, by military 
build-up in the Murmansk region and by frequent violations of Swedish airspace 
and territorial waters. This culminated in the “Whiskey on the rocks” crisis of 1981, 
when a Soviet submarine of the so-called Whiskey Class, armed with nuclear tor-
pedoes, became trapped by an underwater rock two kilometers from a Swedish 
naval base. While spying was one of the objectives of such Soviet intrusions, they 
also aimed at demoralizing the neutral’s efforts in self-defense and at “emphasiz-
ing the futility of military defense for small powers.”15 The Swedish initiative to 
include the northwestern USSR into a proposed Nordic nuclear-weapons free zone 
(a project that Khrushchev and Brezhnev had encouraged since 1959) was rejected 
by the Kremlin indignantly.16 
 12 “Neitralitet,” in A. A. Gromyko et al. (eds.), Diplomaticheskii slovar’ 2, 4th ed. (Moscow: Nauka, 
1985), 271–272; “Neprisoedineniia dvizhenie,” ibid., 277–278. 
 13 Karl E. Birnbaum, “East-West Relations and the Position of the European Neutrals,” in Bo Huldt 
and Atis Lejins (eds.), European Neutrals and the Soviet Union (Stockholm: The Swedish Insti-
tute of International Affairs, 1985), 1–6; Sundelius, “Dilemmas and Strategies for the Neutral 
Democracies,” 11; Neuhold, “The Neutral States of Europe,” 127.
 14 John W. Young, “Western Europe and the End of the Cold War, 1979–1989,” in Melvyn P. Leffler 
and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War III: Endings (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2010), 289–310, 296.
 15 Andrén, “Swedish-Soviet Relations: An Overview,” 78 (quotation), 69, 74–75; Gunnar Jervas, 
“Sweden in a Less Benign Environment,” in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), The Neutral Democracies in 
the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 57–74, 66.
 16 Scarlis, Neutralität, 167. On the NWFZ, cf. Hentilä, “The Soviet Union, Finland, and the ‘Nort-
hern Balance,’” 251; Lev Voronkov, Non-Nuclear Status to Northern Europe (Moscow: Nauka, 
1984), 93–134.
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Finland was also put under Soviet pressure by being invited to hold joint military 
exercises with the USSR.17 In addition, the country (and the Kremlin) had to master 
the retirement of Kekkonen (after twenty-five years in power) and the USSR de-
manded the continuation of the “Paasikivi-Kekkonen Line of Finnish-Soviet friend-
ship” under his successor Mauno Koivisto.18 In the United Nations, the Finnish rep-
resentative abstained from voting on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, while 
condemning (together with Sweden) that of the United States in Grenada.
Due to growing Soviet pressure, it does not come as a surprise that the majority of 
the Swedish population which had entertained friendly feelings towards the Eastern 
superpower during most of the 1970s, perceived it by the early 1980s as unfriendly 
or even a permanent threat to peace. In addition, in an opinion poll, 40 percent spoke 
out in favor of Sweden being assisted by NATO in the case of a Soviet threat, while 
only 4 percent advocated soliciting Soviet assistance against a threat by NATO. 
The Swiss government, too, was “alarmed by the fact that, in their eyes, the Soviet 
Union took advantage of the period of détente and of the political weakness of the 
United States after the Vietnam disaster and increased her armaments.”19 In contrast 
to some Austrian, Swedish, and even West German politicians, the Swiss minister 
of defense, Georges André Chevallaz, saw NATO’s Double-Track Decision as a 
legitimate and necessary response to the insecurity created by Soviet policy. Pierre 
Aubert, the Confederation’s minister of foreign affairs, was similarly critical of the 
numerous communist violations of the Helsinki declaration. In response to grow-
ing international tension, Switzerland remained committed to upholding its military 
capabilities and, at the Stockholm Conference for Disarmament in Europe, rejected 
Yugoslav and Swedish proposals for reducing all armed forces close to borders and 
for creating a Central European nuclear-weapons free zone. In his memoirs, Andrei 
Gromyko did not hide his contempt for the Swiss position.20
To boycott or not to boycott?
In Austria’s foreign policy a shift was perceivable during the late Kreisky years 
and under his successor Fred Sinowatz. The 1968 student revolts and the protests 
against the US intervention in the Vietnam War had brought a mood swing within 
many West European societies, in particular within leftist student organizations 
and social democratic parties. A more left-wing foreign political posture was con-
sidered desirable, and the tone moved away from a balanced Atlanticism towards 
 17 Jacobson, Finnland im neuen Europa, 80.
 18 Raimo Väyrynen, “Adaptation of a Small Power to International Tensions: The Case of Finland,” 
in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), The Neutral Democracies in the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 
1987), 33–56, 39–42, 48, 52.
 19 Hans Vogel, “Switzerland and the New Cold War,” in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), The Neutral Democ-
racies in the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 95–116, 107. 
 20 Gromyko, Memories, 225.
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an uncritical support of the “anti-imperialist” movements of Mao, Ho Chi Minh, 
and Che Guevara. Those who favored this shift knew little and cared less about the 
Eastern bloc and its dissidents, about containment or deterrence. An Italian student 
slogan of 1968 read: “We are not with Dub�ek, we are with Mao.”21 Although they 
voiced their criticism against US interference in East Asia and Nicaragua, they 
kept a remarkably low profile regarding the Soviet invasions of Czechoslovakia 
and Afghanistan or the declaration of martial law in Poland. While they organized 
demonstrations against the counterdeployment of Pershings and cruise missiles in 
Western Europe, the preceding Soviet deployments of SS-20s in the East had not 
been protested with similar vigor.
Olof Palme, neutral Sweden’s social democratic prime minister, criticized US 
policy harshly and sent aid to the communist North Vietnamese government, moves 
that were followed by Soviet praise22 and the withdrawal of the US ambassador 
from Sweden. In contrast, Kreisky, who had been perceived a bulwark of pro-
Western steadfastness in the 1960s, refrained for the most part from excessive anti-
Americanism. Nonetheless, from the late 1970s, a growing distance of Kreisky to 
the United States could be discerned. The chancellor, who in 1986 intimated to Gor-
bachev’s assistant Vadim Zagladin that he considered Ronald Reagan “the worst US 
president ever,”23 was critical not only of US interventions in Central America, but 
also of the economic sanctions that the United States had invoked immediately after 
the communist regime had imposed martial law in Poland, as well as of NATO’s 
Double-Track Decision. After Kreisky’s retirement in 1983, the shift to the left 
reached the Foreign Ministry, which was taken over from the diplomat Willibald 
Pahr by the left-wing party officer Erwin Lanc.24 Nicaragua became a focus of so-
cial democratic foreign activism, the Sandinista regime being uncritically supported 
with a loan of 72 million schillings and with visits by high-ranking delegations and 
enthusiastic “brigades,” while the Nicaraguan opposition was ignored.
In the General Assembly session of 1981, Foreign Minister Pahr had classified 
“the illegal [Soviet] occupation of Afghanistan” as a “heavy burden on the policy of 
détente.”25 This did not mean, however, that the Austrian government was prepared 
to join the resulting Western boycott of the Eastern bloc. When Lanc’ successor 
Leopold Gratz traveled to Poland, in 1984, he continued a tradition in Austrian-East 
 21 Quoted in Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 390. 
On the “Peace Movement,” see ibid., 591. 
 22 Scarlis, Neutralität, 102; Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 164.
 23 Conversation Zagladin with Kreisky, 9 September 1986, in Gorbachev Fond (hereafter: GF), 
4840. 
 24 Robert Kriechbaumer, Zeitenwende: Die SPÖ-FPÖ Koalition 1983–1987 in der historischen 
Analyse, aus der Sicht der politischen Akteure und in Karikaturen von Ironimus (Vienna: Böhlau, 
2008), 440, 459–470.
 25 Erklärung von Außenminister Dr. Willibald Pahr vor der 36. Generalversammlung der Vereinten 
Nationen, 1 October 1981, in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 21 (1981), 353–356, 
355. 
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European relations by breaking the isolation of Poland that had been imposed by the 
West after the introduction of martial law. Similarly, Kirchschläger had visited Po-
land a few weeks after the regime’s massacre of demonstrating workers in Danzig in 
1971, and when the Eastern bloc’s first independent trade union went on strike, Kre-
isky warned the Polish workers not to obstruct the delivery of Polish coal to Austria.26 
After the banning of “Solidarity” and the declaration of martial law in 1981, Kreisky 
had given the Polish opposition movement a cold shoulder,27 and Foreign Minister 
Pahr publicly cautioned the West about invoking sanctions against the communist re-
gimes in Warsaw and Moscow. While martial law was still in force, Austria received 
the Polish vice-premier Mieczyslaw Rakowski. The economic sanctions by the West 
against the communist regime in 1981 were never supported by Austria nor was the 
flight boycott against the Soviet Union after flight KAL 007 was shot down. In the 
latter case, Austria, France and Greece were the only Western countries that did not 
join the boycott.28 Although the leaders of the GDR and Bulgaria, Erich Honecker 
and Todor Zhivkov, due to the new Cold War, cancelled their trips to the FRG in 
1984, Sinowatz agreed to visit the communist states. The 1980 Olympic Games in 
Moscow were boycotted by a number of Western countries due to the Soviet inva-
sion in Afghanistan. Despite this boycott and a call from humanitarian NGOs not to 
participate, Austria joined the games and was praised for this decision by Gromyko.29 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the twenty-sixth CPSU congress in Febru-
ary 1981 lauded “Austria, Sweden, Belgium, Cyprus and several other European 
states” as being Western countries that the USSR maintained “successful relations 
with,”30 though only after US policy and NATO had been castigated and the col-
laborations with France, West Germany, Finland, Turkey and Greece had been 
praised. Gromyko told Gratz in October 1984 that relations were good. As Am-
bassador Mikhail Efremov assured his Austrian counterpart Gerald Hinteregger, 
Andropov considered Austria “our friend.”31 On the Austrian side, Sinowatz even 
 26 Klaus Bachmann, “Poland and Austria,” in Arnold Suppan and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), Peace-
ful Coexistence or Iron Curtain? Austria, Neutrality, and Eastern Europe in the Cold War and 
Détente, 1955–1989 (Vienna: Lit, 2009), 354–383, 376; Molden, “Die ‘Ost-West-Drehscheibe,’” 
763, 766.
 27 Joanna Gajdek, “Der mittelbare Nachbar: Österreichvorstellungen in Polen 1970–1995,” in Oliver 
Rathkolb, Otto M. Maschke, and Stefan August Lütgenau (eds.), Mit anderen Augen gesehen: In-
ternationale Perzeptionen Österreichs 1955–1990, Österreichische Nationalgeschichte 2 (Vienna: 
Böhlau, 2002), 651–675, 661. Cf. Franz Loidl (ed.), Pressestimmen zu Dr. Kreiskys Äußerungen 
über„Solidarność“ und die Kirche in Polen und Österreich (Vienna: Katholische Akademie, 1982). 
 28 Skuhra, “Austria and the New Cold War,” 128; Neuhold, “Austria and the Soviet Union,” 110. 
 29 Conversation Kreisky with Gromyko, 17 May 1980, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6.
 30 XXVI. Parteitag der KPdSU: Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen 
Partei der Sowjetunion und die nächsten Aufgaben der Partei in der Innen- und Außenpolitik, 
Berichterstatter: L.I. Breshnew, Generalsekretär des ZK der KPdSU, 23. Februar 1981 (Berlin: 
Dietz, 1981), 34. 
 31 Aktenvermerk Hinteregger, 25 February 1983, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6; Österreichi-
sches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 1 (1984), 199. 
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characterized the Austrian-Soviet relations as “excellent” and “unstrained by any 
problems.”32 In an interview with Manfred Scheuch of Austria’s Arbeiter-Zeitung 
in 1983, Tikhonov commended neutrality in general and Soviet-Austrian relations 
in particular, but rejected the newspaper editor’s assessment that Soviet actions, 
too, might have contributed to the recent exacerbation of international relations.33 
Trade or embargo?
The cooling down of East-West relations after 1979 did not harm Austrian foreign 
trade with the USSR; on the contrary, its importance strengthened, and Austria, 
one more (last) time, was able to benefit from its role as a “bridging factor.”34 
The following rain of Soviet orders seems to have been a consequence of a con-
versation between Kreisky and Gromyko in May 1980, in which the chancellor 
had expressed his desire to reduce the Austrian trade deficit with the USSR.35 The 
Soviets voiced their rising interest in Austrian technology in 1980, and in the fol-
lowing year, VOEST-Alpine received an order for an optics factory worth 370 mil-
lion schillings and Voith for a paper mill worth 940 million. As well, ten tugboats 
worth 570 million and three passenger boats worth 822 million were ordered from 
the Korneuburg docks.36 While these deals, though large, could not be considered 
exceptional, Tikhonov, on his trip to Austria in 1981, brought a Soviet order for 
800,000 tons of oil pipes from VOEST-Alpine worth 14 billion schillings ‒ a com-
modity that, due to the Cold War, could not be purchased on Western markets.37 The 
same year, the Linz plant, whose transactions with the USSR had reached 3.8 bil-
lion schillings per year, delivered its fourth million tons of steel plates and had re-
ceived its twentieth million tons of coal.38 In March 1982, VOEST-Alpine obtained 
an order to build in Zhlobin in the Belarus SSR, together with the Soviet company 
Metallurgimport, a steel plant with the capacity of producing 500,000 tons of sheet 
metal and 200,000 tons of crude metal per annum. The plant was opened by Chan-
cellor Sinowatz in November 1984.39 
 32 Quoted in Lobova, “Die Moskauer Perzeption,” 135; Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 77.
 33 Sowjetunion heute, no. 11 (1983), 4–5. 
 34 Andrea Komlosy, “Österreichs Brückenfunktion und die Durchlässigkeit des Eisernen Vorhan-
ges,” in Gertrude Enderle-Burcel, Dieter Stiefel, and Alice Teichova (eds.), Zarte Bande: Öster-
reich und die europäischen planwirtschaftlichen Länder, MÖSTA Sonderband 9 (Innsbruck: Stu-
dienverlag, 2006), 73–105, 96–97, 103. 
 35 The author’s interview with Ambassador Hinteregger, 23 June 2009. Cf. idem, Im Auftrag Öster-
reichs, 260–263. 
 36 Bilaterale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen UdSSR – Österreich, [1981], in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 
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Due to such stimulus, the Austrian share in Soviet imports recovered and rose 
from 0.9 (1981) to 1.3 (1983) and even to a high of 1.6 percent (1990). In 1985, 
it ranked between the United Kingdom and Italy. This was, nevertheless, still far 
below the leading Western trading partner of the USSR, the FRG, and other neutral 
and nonaligned states such as Finland and Yugoslavia.40 From the Austrian per-
spective, exporting to the USSR regained in importance. In 1983, Austria sent 12.1 
percent of its exports to the Soviet Union. Other OECD countries sent an average 
of 3.3 percent of their exports to the USSR, with Finland’s 27.7 percent, however, 
forming an exceptional peak.41 Of all destinations of Austrian exports, the USSR 
ranked sixth; of the countries of origin of Austrian imports, the USSR ranked third. 
Austria also continued to export strategic goods such as high-quality steel and 
technology to CMEA states, for which the neutral was increasingly criticized by the 
United States, from 1982, for violating the COCOM embargo and accused of aid-
ing East European countries to circumvent the same.42 The accusations eased after 
Kreisky’s visit to the United States in 1983 and significant Austrian concessions.43 
At the same time, however, Soviet warnings were delivered that Austria should 
not give in to US demands.44 Since Austria itself depended on high-technology 
imports from the United States, it reluctantly bowed to COCOM demands. The 
Austrian role in Western high technology exports to the Eastern bloc seems to have 
been overestimated; in 1981, US studies showed the Austrian share at 1.8 percent, 
much less than the CMEA imported from West Germany (28.9 percent), Japan 
(21.8 percent), France and Italy (11.8 and 9 percent), and even less than from Fin-
land (7 percent), Sweden (4.5 percent), or the United States (3.3 percent).45 During 
1983, the US government reached understandings on restrictions of re-exporting 
US high technology with neutral countries, including Austria, Finland and Swe-
den. Switzerland refused to adhere formally to these agreements, but nonetheless 
restricted its exports to communist countries. In 1984, the Austrian foreign trade act 
was amended for the same reason. When in 1988 the COCOM embargo lists were 
unofficially adopted by the Austrian government, the last peak of the Cold War was 
nevertheless already over.46
 40 Hauke, “Handelspolitik und Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen,” 220–221.
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14.  Summary: Declining Soviet Interest in Neutrality 
despite Austria’s Efforts
The decade from 1973 through 1982 was undoubtedly the most relaxed in Sovi-
et-Austrian postwar relations: There was no major Soviet armed intervention in 
Austria’s neighborhood and no Eastern propaganda campaign against alleged de-
viations from neutrality. Soviet satisfaction about having finally accomplished the 
convening of the CSCE contributed to this relaxation, as did the Soviet relief at 
the neutrals having become neither members nor associates of the EC, but merely 
having signed agreements on free trade. The Soviet attitude towards West Euro-
pean integration relaxed somewhat as well, although this was a rather tactical move 
aimed at fostering détente. In general, the Soviet resistance to the steadily growing 
European Community was not given up.
Once the CSCE had been convened, the general importance of neutrality and 
the neutrals for Soviet policy, as well as of Austria in particular, was reduced. This 
seemed to be, on one hand, a result of the international sea change: Détente had 
established direct and, from the Soviet perspective, relatively fruitful contacts with 
Western states such as Italy, France, the FRG, and later, even the United States. 
Hence, the neutrals were no longer needed to promote Soviet proposals. With the 
fragility of the Eastern bloc in mind, the Soviet Union even scaled back attempts 
of undermining the Western alliance by luring its members into some kind of neu-
tral nirvana, and neutrality was promoted by the Kremlin less aggressively than in 
earlier years. On the other hand, the behavior of the neutrals at the CSCE did not 
exactly reflect what the Soviet Union had hoped for, and the Kremlin reacted by 
assigning them a less important role.
During the late Brezhnev years, Soviet diplomacy in Europe, in general, lost some 
of its impetus and many diplomatic conversations lacked content. The Kremlin had 
always put great emphasis on the propaganda value of mutual visits and bilateral com-
muniqués and used the visits of guests from Western and neutral states for promoting 
its agenda. The Austrian side, however, seems neither to have been clear about its 
goals nor to have addressed them consistently enough to the Kremlin ‒ probably out 
of fear of straining the delicate Soviet mood.1 Once there were no landmark goals to 
be achieved and no further results in the rapprochement between the “states of dif-
ferent social systems” to be celebrated, the lack of substance became quite apparent.
 1 Liedermann to Austrian MFA, 23 November 1985, in ÖStA, AVA, NL Bielka, File 115. For the 
full text, see pages 333–338.
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Nonetheless, both Soviet and Austrian actors seemed interested in letting their 
relations appear as friendly as possible. What bilateral tensions that did arise came 
mainly from human rights violations in or by the USSR and from Austrian media 
reports about and protests against them. The Soviet leadership seemed prepared to 
test the bilateral relationship by expelling Austrian journalists and demanding that 
no criticism of the Soviet Union be published. While in the 1950s and 60s, some 
Austrian politicians had been ready to try to moderate the Austrian public opinion 
about the USSR, in general, Kreisky rejected such attempts.
The last phase of the Cold War brought two developments for the neutral de-
mocracies. On one hand, the systemic need for their bridge building activities rose. 
On the other, the rising tension level also restricted their maneuvering space and 
their opportunities for third-party intervention.2 Austria tried to keep its options 
open by not joining the Western embargo and boycott, thus helping the communist 
regimes out of their isolation.
Already before the last peak of the Cold War had reached its climax, the drift of 
Austria’s neutrality from the Swiss towards the Finnish model, as had begun in the 
aftermath of 1956 and been reinforced in 1968, was continued. The idea of “armed 
neutrality” and Austria’s obligation for self-defense against external aggression as 
stipulated in the neutrality law of 1955 was increasingly treated by Kreisky and 
Foreign Minister Kirchschläger as obsolete.3 In Kreisky’s interpretation of neutral 
policy, military deterrence became less important than global travel diplomacy, dis-
armament, criticism against US interventions (although during martial law in Po-
land and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, his stance was much less outspoken), 
and the Near East problem.4 While this reorientation of Austria’s foreign policy 
towards global activism was mainly seen as the strategy of a weak international 
actor to secure its independence,5 it was accompanied by the parallel weakening of 
its previous interpretation of neutrality and the tendency to transform features of 
Austria’s foreign policy into obligations of neutrality6 ‒ thus becoming still closer 
to the Soviet understanding of neutrality. 
This type of tendency in Austria’s practice of neutral policy sparked quite a lot 
of discussion. In a monograph by the professor of international law Konrad Ginther, 
published in 1975, it was claimed that the Austrian government had, already in the 
late 1960s, given up the initial concept of neutrality, based on the Swiss model, in 
 2 Sundelius, “Dilemmas and Strategies for the Neutral Democracies,” 19; Skuhra, “Austria and the 
New Cold War,” 119
 3 Ginther, Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik, 122. 
 4 Paul Luif, “Austria’s Permanent Neutrality ‒ Its Origins, Development, and Demise,” in Günther 
Bischof, Anton Pelinka, Ruth Wodak (eds.), Neutrality in Austria, Contemporary Austrian Studies 
9 (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2001), 129–159, 137–138. 
 5 Höll, “Kleinstaaten,” 169. 
 6 Franz Cede, “Österreichs Neutralität und Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Beitritt zur Europäischen 
Union,” in Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 36, no. 4 (1995), 142–148, 143.
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favor of a more Soviet-friendly interpretation and that the Austrian interpretation 
of neutrality approached the Soviet “peaceful coexistence” policy.7 As indications 
for this development, Ginther analyzed Austrian political declarations of the period 
from 1955 to 1973 and cited the sinking importance being given to armed neutrality 
and neutrality’s legal foundations by Waldheim, Kreisky, and Foreign Minister Ru-
dolf Kirchschläger; furthermore he criticized the invocation of the neutral country’s 
permanent political obligation to an “active peace policy” as a surrogate for armed 
defense, which reflected the Soviet thesis of “peaceful coexistence,” and, instead 
of a status that was legally defined, the creation of a “myth of positive neutrality 
equaling peace and security” that was legally vague and ideologically predisposed, 
despite being politically influential and universally applicable. 
Similar criticism of Kreisky’s interpretation of neutral policy was brought for-
ward by the Christian-democratic professor of international law Felix Ermacora, 
who rejected the thesis that the “secondary obligations” of permanent neutrality, 
i.e. the obligation to avoid any measures that might render maintaining neutrality 
impossible in the case of war, were legally binding. He argued that the theory of 
“secondary obligations” had been construed by German lawyers in the interwar 
period with the aim of justifying, ex post facto, Germany’s violation of Belgian 
neutrality in World War I. After World War II and still remembering Nazi Germany 
pressure on Switzerland, the thesis had been adopted first in the Swiss doctrine, 
which he classified as “politically predetermined” and unable to “withstand sci-
entific critique,”8 and then by Austrian lawyers Verdross and Verosta. While Er-
macora conceded, however, that observing the “secondary obligations” in peace-
time was a matter of prudence, he claimed that, in order not to limit the neutral’s 
freedom of action, such obligations had to be defined as restrictively as possible. 
Following this line of thinking, Ermacora considered the thesis that neutrality was 
incompatible with EEC membership as also having been politically predetermined. 
In addition, he criticized Kreisky having adopted the thesis that a “good foreign 
policy” and not the readiness to defend the country was the best guarantee for neu-
trality. By subscribing to the Swiss doctrine and augmenting it with Soviet theses, 
Austrian leaders and lawyers, in Ermacora’s eyes, had contributed to bloating the 
neutral’s legal obligations, reducing its freedom of action, and to underpinning So-
viet demands.9
The Austrian ambassador to Moscow also recommended that the government 
“counter more consistently” the Soviet attempts at “blurring the limits of interna-
tional law and foreign policy,” attempts that were perceived as harmful to Austria’s 
 7 Konrad Ginther, Neutralität und Neutralitätspolitik. Die österreichische Neutralität zwischen 
Schweizer Muster und sowjetischer Koexistenzdoktrin (Vienna: Springer, 1975), 143–155. 
 8 Felix Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität (Frankfurt: Metzner, 1975), 123, 73–74, 80, 
117–118. 
 9 Ibid., 19, 114, 123, 137, 167–172. 
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interests.10 Such passivity, Ambassador Helmut Liedermann warned, might lead 
to Soviet claims regarding legal obligations resulting from neutrality being inter-
nationally recognized. In addition, it was suggested that the Austrian government 
should not let itself be blinded by “empty phrases” about the state treaty and neu-
trality, but be more articulate in communicating to Moscow its own interests and 
needs ‒ something that had been neglected so that the delicate bilateral relationship 
would not be strained.
More general charges of “neutralism” were made by the oppositional ÖVP, 
which accused Kreisky in the late 1970s of neglecting the country’s traditional 
bonds to the West, while appeasing the East.11 In particular, the eastward shift of 
the travel diplomacy of Kreisky and his ministers, and his harsh criticism of US 
policy in contrast to his lack of outspokenness regarding Soviet actions had raised 
concerns among more pro-Western Austrians.
Some of Ginther’s and Ermacora’s theses aroused criticism and consternation 
in the diplomatic and political establishment, and officials in the Foreign Ministry 
discarded them as “completely wrong.”12 They were rejected by Karl Zemanek13 
and Alfred Verdross, who argued that a “permanently neutral state […] cannot re-
strict itself to being an island of peace by staying away from international conflicts, 
but must conduct an active policy of neutrality with the aim of contributing to 
the consolidation of general peace and international security.”14 Verdross moreover 
made it clear that the Western understanding of “peaceful coexistence,” as had been 
adopted by many states and the United Nations, differed significantly from the So-
viet understanding and excluded ideological matters. 
While all sides in the scholarly debate emphasized that Austria’s neutrality 
should not be understood as a free ticket for carelessness and isolationism, Austrian 
opinion polls of the late 1970s and early 80s underlined the effects of a consider-
able mental “neutralization”: Austria was seen by 75 percent as “zone of peace” 
between the alliances, 55–63 percent deemed it unlikely that war would affect Aus-
tria, and 17–31 percent even felt that this was impossible at all. When asked what 
the main guarantor for peace was, 75 percent named neutrality; only 10 percent 
expected the Bundesheer to be able to deter a potential aggressor.15 More than 50 
 10 Liedermann to Austrian MFA, 23 November 1985, in ÖStA, AVA, NL Bielka, File 115. For the 
full text, see pages 333–338.
 11 Kriechbaumer, Die Ära Kreisky, 266–267. 
 12 Ginther, “Austria’s Policy of Neutrality and the Soviet Union,” 67, 83 note 5. 
 13 Karl Zemanek, “‘Zeitgemäße’ Neutralität?,” in Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik 16 
(1976), 355–367, 356, 362–363; idem, “‘Zeitgemäße’ Neutralität? – Schlussbemerkungen,” ibid. 
17 (1977), 134–136, 135.
 14 Verdross, Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs, 48, 73–79; quotation ibid., 73. 
 15 Ferdinand Trauttmansdorff, “Österreichs Außenpolitik als Sicherheitspolitik,” in Renate Kicker, 
Andreas Khol, and Hanspeter Neuhold (eds.), Außenpolitik und Demokratie in Österreich: Struk-
turen – Strategien – Stellungnahmen (Salzburg: Neugebauer, 1983), 235–258, 241–245, 250.
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percent were against acquiring defense missiles.16 With regard to ideological neu-
tralism, which had been consistently rejected by Austrian leaders since 1955, 52 
percent spoke out in favor thereof; supported by 30 percent was the idea of passing 
a law restricting freedom of speech, if opinions were expressed that contained criti-
cism of a foreign power; and a majority was against official interventions in cases 
of civil rights movements being suppressed in the USSR or other cases of human 
rights violations.17 Only 44 percent welcomed a foreign policy that aimed at sup-
porting such groups in Eastern Europe.18
 16 Harrod, “Felix Austria?,” 290.
 17 Hanspeter Neuhold, “Österreichs Außenpolitik in den Ost-West-Beziehungen,” in Renate Kicker, 
Andreas Khol, Hanspeter Neuhold (eds.), Außenpolitik und Demokratie in Österreich: Strukturen 
– Strategien – Stellungnahmen (Salzburg: Neugebauer, 1983), 290–320, 318–319.
 18 Nils Andrén, “Looking at the Superpowers,” in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), The Neutral Democracies 
and the New Cold War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 160–181, 163. 

IV.  THE AFTERMATH, 1985–1991
“The content of n[eutrality] changed in every historical epoch according to the influence of eco-
nomic, social, and political conditions of the given epoch, in particular the character of war.” 
“Neitralitet,” in A. Ia. Vyshinskii (ed.), Diplomaticheskii slovar’ 2, 1st ed. (Moscow: Gospolitiz-
dat, 1950), 230–234, 230.

15.  The End of the Cold War, European Integration, 
and the Obsolescence of the Special Relationship
The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev did not bring immediate change to international 
politics ‒ at least none that was discernable to foreign observers. In his first years in 
power, the Soviet leader rather pursued limited goals such as improving the inter-
national climate, building mutual trust, stopping the nuclear arms race and torpedo-
ing the American SDI project.1 However, while the Soviet economic and societal 
crisis was obscured by Gorbachev’s energetic personality and optimism, the seeds 
of ideas such as common principles of humanity and global interdependence were 
about to fundamentally alter international relations and contribute to the end of 
the Cold War. The decline in international tensions, as could be felt from 1987,2 
affected the small and neutral powers in two ways: On one hand, their maneuver-
ing space increased; on the other, the attention that was given to the neutrals by the 
superpowers decreased.
Gorbachev, Austria’s EC application, and the disintegration of the USSR
When President Kirchschläger traveled to Moscow to attend Konstantin Chernenko’s 
funeral in 1985, he was received by Mikhail Gorbachev, who expressed his satis-
faction with Austria’s role in international politics, particularly détente.3 Despite 
such assurances, Austria was not important enough to be the first Western coun-
try visited by the new Soviet leader, who, like Brezhnev before him, went first to 
France. He consulted the French president François Mitterrand before his planned 
meeting in November with US president Ronald Reagan in Geneva for negotiations 
on arms’ limitations. No breakthrough was achieved at the summit. 
Internal repercussions in Austria over the debate concerning the role of Presi-
dent-elect Kurt Waldheim in the German Wehrmacht during the deportations and 
mass killings of Jews in Greece in World War II, and the rise of the FPÖ as a right-
wing, anti-establishment and anti-immigrant movement under the leadership of 
Jörg Haider did not affect Soviet-Austrian relations ‒ although both were noted in 
 1 Archie Brown, “The Gorbachev Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in Melvyn P. Leffler 
and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War III: Endings (Cambridge: 
University Press, 2010), 244–266. 
 2 Anthony D’Agostino, Gorbachev’s Revolution, 1985–1991 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 
117–118. 
 3 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 2 (1985), 214. 
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the Kremlin. In the Soviet media, Vranitzky was depicted as “capable technocrat,” 
Haider as a “far right, openly pro-German nationalist,” a “multi-millionaire,” and 
the “leader of the neo-Nazis.”4 In the Waldheim affair, former Chancellor Kreisky, 
in 1986, warned the CPSU official Vadim Zagladin to be cautious in handling the 
case of the newly elected Austrian president5 (whom Kreisky himself had promoted 
for the position of a UN secretary general fifteen years earlier). When Waldheim, in 
1990, asked Gorbachev for a meeting, the Soviet leader’s aide Anatolii Cherniaev 
recommended that he not be received.6 Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership, in con-
trast to the US administration’s decision to put the Austrian president on a “watch 
list,” did not publish any official statement concerning Waldheim and remained 
appreciative of his actions as Austrian foreign minister from 1968 to 1970 and the 
secretary general of the United Nations Organization from 1971 to 1982. 
Soviet-Austrian bilateral political relations continued to be as cordial as they 
had ever been. When Sinowatz met Gorbachev in April 1986, both sides expressed 
full support for the Helsinki process. The “excellent and amicable” relations7 were 
also not strained by the Soviet reluctance to inform its neighbors of the dangerous 
effects of the nuclear catastrophe in Chernobyl. In the fall of 1988, an agreement on 
timely information in the case of nuclear accidents was signed, and a month later, 
a contract on the joint “Austromir” space mission was concluded.8 Sinowatz’ suc-
cessor, Franz Vranitzky, underlined his approval of perestroika when he received 
his Soviet colleague Nikolai Ryzhkov in Vienna in 1987.9 Soviet foreign minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze traveled to Vienna in November of 1986, January and March 
of 1987, and October of 1988; his Austrian counterpart, Alois Mock, returned the 
visit in September of 1988, and Vranitzky followed in October of 1988, accompa-
nied by a delegation of no less than eighty representatives of Austrian companies. 
In a single year, 1988, six members of the Austrian government were received in 
Moscow.10 
It soon became clear, however, that the more intense Soviet-Western negotia-
tions became, the less important Austrian mediation or promotion of Soviet ideas 
was. The sinking geopolitical importance of Austria for the Kremlin was mirrored 
by the Soviet media, which in earlier decades had repeatedly praised Austria’s role 
in “peaceful coexistence” and détente, and from time to time had criticized certain 
aspects of Austrian policy. In the Gorbachev years, however, the media signaled its 
 4 Quoted in Lobova, “Die Moskauer Perzeption,” 124–125; Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 
214. 
 5 Conversation Zagladin with Kreisky, 9 September 1986, in GF, 4840. 
 6 Cherniaev to Gorbachev, 11 November 1990, in GF, 2/1. I am grateful to Prof. Oliver Rathkolb 
for granting me access to his copy of this document.
 7 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 4 (1987), 179. 
 8 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 154.
 9 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 4 (1987), 222. 
 10 Außenpolitischer Bericht (1988), 588. 
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lack of interest in Austria, and a growing de-ideologization could be noted. Most 
ideological assertions disappeared with regard to Austria, its social democracy and 
the “social partnership” were increasingly depicted positively, and its economy, 
social insurance and school system were even portrayed as promising models.11 
Bilateral meetings were increasingly shaped by an issue that had overshadowed 
Soviet-Austrian relations during the 1960s and that resurfaced in the late 1980s. 
When the conservative People’s Party again became part of a governing “grand co-
alition” with the social democrats in 1987, they advocated the country’s application 
for full membership in the European Community, albeit with reservations regard-
ing the country’s neutrality. This option had been considered possible by certain 
legal experts since the 1960s, in particular by Michael Schweitzer.12 Since article 
223 and 224 of the EEC Treaty of 1957 contained a sort of neutrality clause that 
provided the possibility of a member to deviate, for reasons of national security, 
from the rules of the community as established by the treaty, some international law 
experts rejected the majority opinion of their colleagues that EEC membership and 
neutrality were incompatible.13 Moreover, Schweitzer and his colleague Waldemar 
Hummer stressed that the EC of the 1980s was not as supranational as the EEC of 
the early 1960s, which is why they considered a neutral’s membership in the EC 
possible. Among other facts and documents that served as evidence for the new 
standpoint, the lawyers cited, most ironically, the Soviet-Austrian trade agreement 
of October 1955, which mentioned the possibility that any of the contracting parties 
might conclude a customs union with a third country. With this new legal advice 
supporting the compatibility thesis in their hands, by 1989 the People’s Party’s 
leadership had managed to convince their reluctant coalition partner of the desir-
ability of this option. The social democrats had moved in this direction only slowly. 
In 1987, the SPÖ chairman, Chancellor Vranitzky, had ruled out EC membership 
as incompatible with neutrality,14 thus following a decade-old Soviet (and, in fact, 
also Austrian) line of argumentation; by October 1988, in Moscow, he conceded 
that “as long as the two military-political blocs exist in Europe,” membership in the 
EC would violate neutrality.15 The chancellor spoke out against “rushing into” the 
community and pledged that the conservation of neutrality would be a prerequisite 
for Austria’s possible entry into the EC.16
 11 Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,” 53, 122; Lobova, “Die Moskauer Perzeption,” 116. 
 12 Schweitzer, Dauernde Neutralität, 241–242, 246–247, 291–292. 
 13 Waldemar Hummer and Michael Schweitzer, Österreich und die EWG: Neutralitätsrechtliche 
Beurteilung der Möglichkeit einer Dynamisierung des Verhältnisses zur EWG (Vienna: Signum, 
1987), 295. 
 14 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 4 (1987), 178. 
 15 Ibid. 5 (1988), 311–312. 
 16 Conversation Gorbachev with Vranitzky, 11 October 1988, in GF, 1/1. I am grateful to Prof. Oli-
ver Rathkolb for granting me access to his copy of this document. Cf. Lobova, “Die Moskauer 
Perzeption,” 107.
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However, in Moscow, the possibility of conserving neutrality when joining the 
EC was strongly questioned by many “orthodox” Soviet officials, who still con-
sidered the community to be the economic branch of NATO. This attitude was to 
be found among “old thinkers” in the Central Committee apparatus and the Soviet 
Foreign Ministry, including the head of the Third European Department, Aleksandr 
Bondarenko, whose department was responsible for German-speaking countries. 
The Soviet ambassador to Bonn, Iulii Kvitsinskii, stated at a party conference in 
1988 that “more and more European states may begin to be sucked into the EEC, 
and via the EEC into NATO.”17 Nevertheless, the Soviet side, due to Gorbachev’s 
“new course” of reduced interference in foreign countries’ internal affairs, and par-
ticularly in consideration of the rapidly intensifying debate in Soviet think tanks 
on the correct attitude towards the community,18 did not rule out rapprochement 
in Austrian-EC relations completely. The Austrian ambassador Herbert Grubmayr 
reported that several informal groups in the Soviet Foreign Ministry had emerged, 
one even advocating Austria’s entry into the EC in order to render the organization 
less dominated by NATO countries and have Austria promote neutrality within it.19 
In November 1987, the deputy director of the Institute for World Economy and In-
ternational Relations (IMEMO) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Vladimir She-
naev, told Austrian journalists that their country’s relation to the EC was frequently 
discussed in Moscow. The decision, Shenaev stated, had to be made by Austria 
itself, but the country had to retain its neutral status. As long as Austria’s integration 
was only “political and economical,” it was considered compatible with neutrality; 
only military integration was unacceptable.20 
This position was the most liberal stance that had yet been communicated, and 
some weeks later the Soviet ambassador in Austria, Gennadii Shikin, even felt the 
need to deny reports that his government was supporting Austria’s application for 
EC membership. He repeated his position of January 1987,21 namely, that the USSR 
understood Austria’s economic situation and its desire for rapprochement with the 
EC.22 But when considering the development of the EC towards political integra-
tion, full membership by Austria had been ruled out by the USSR. In May 1988, 
the new director of IMEMO, Evgenii Primakov, repeated that Austria’s entry into 
the EC would be “problematic with regard to neutrality.”23 An even more critical 
position was reflected in two major academic studies in 1987 and 1988. Ivan Zhiri-
 17 Quoted in Zubok, “The Soviet Attitude,” 42. 
 18 Mueller, Die UdSSR und die europäische Integration, 659.
 19 Grubmayr, “In zwei Wochen gehst Du nach Moskau,” 147. This idea had been launched by Aus-
trian circles in the late 1950s, but rejected by the USSR. See above, page 140.
 20 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 4 (1987), 260. 
 21 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 624–626.
 22 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 5 (1988), 251. Cf. Gerhard Kunnert, Öster-
reichs Weg in die Europäische Union (Vienna: Österreichische Staatsdruckerei, 1993), 109.
 23 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 5 (1988), 274. 
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akov assessed that economic relations with the EC would not be profitable for the 
Austrian economy and recommended Osthandel; a dissertation by Oleg Ermakov 
underlined that Austria’s relations to the FRG had already reached an intensity that 
made it difficult for Austria to maintain sovereignty and neutrality, and that integra-
tion into the EC would render this completely impossible.24
Against this background, the Soviet reaction during Vranitzky’s visit to Moscow 
in October of 1988 was awaited with great interest. Before the trip, Izvestiia on 31 
August and Trud on 25 September had set an ambivalent tone by, on one hand, 
reporting on Austrian popular doubts about their leaders’ “spookily” naive attitude 
towards the EC, and, on the other, underlining the difference between the EC and 
NATO and expressing understanding for Austria’s ambitions.25 Still in September, 
Shevardnadze had warned his Austrian counterpart Alois Mock in Moscow that 
Austria joining the EC might tilt the balance of forces in Europe.26 In his conversa-
tion with Vranitzky on 11 October, Gorbachev acknowledged that economic inte-
gration was an objective process. However, he opined that it was unavoidable for 
integration not to affect the political sphere and therefore it would make it impos-
sible for Austria to observe neutrality. If Austria were to stay out of the EC, Gor-
bachev stated, its importance as a neutral country would grow.27 When the Soviet 
leader questioned the concept of “limited sovereignty” within the EC, Vranitzky 
‒ according to the Soviet protocol ‒ pledged that Austria would counteract any 
attempts at achieving closer military-political or economic structures in Western 
Europe. If this was meant sincerely, it clearly contradicted the EC’s goal, outlined 
in the 1957 Rome Treaty, to form an “ever closer union.” In any case, given the tra-
ditional Soviet aversion to “closed Western blocs,” this pledge must have sounded 
good in Soviet ears. While Gorbachev did not exert any pressure, Prime Minister 
Ryzhkov, in his talk with Vranitzky, made it clear that Austria’s admission into the 
EC would be perceived by the USSR as a violation of neutrality.28 
Although it had not succeeded in convincing the Soviet side of its standpoint 
(if it had tried at all), in the summer of 1989 the Austrian government sent a letter 
to Brussels asking for admission into the EC while reserving its neutrality. Some 
EC member states’ leaders that considered the creation of the European Economic 
Area a priority and Austrian neutrality an impediment for the EC’s common foreign 
and security policy were not pleased at all. Belgian foreign minister Mark Eyskens 
 24 I. Zhiriakov, “Sovetsko-Avstriiskie otnosheniia i problema bezopasnosti i sotrudnichestva v Evro-
pe 1945–1986” (PhD Thesis, Moscow, 1987), 50; O. Ermakov, “Vneshniaia politika Avstrii i 
razvitie sovetsko-avstriiskikh otnoshenii v 80ye gody” (PhD Thesis, Moscow, 1988), 17. 
 25 Stifter, “Das politische Österreichbild,”101–102. 
 26 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 5 (1988), 304. 
 27 Conversation Gorbachev with Vranitzky, 11 October 1988, in GF, 1/1. 
 28 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 624–626, 587, 617–619. Cf. Otto Klambauer, Der Kalte Krieg 
in Österreich: Vom Dritten Mann zum Fall des Eisernen Vorhanges (Vienna: Ueberreuter, 2000), 
166. 
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even proposed discussing Austria’s neutrality and admission into the EC with the 
Soviet Union ‒ thus implicitly questioning the country’s sovereignty and maturity 
as a foreign-policy actor. The Soviet position also remained unchanged. An aide-
mémoire, handed over to the Austrian government by the Soviet ambassador on 20 
August, stated that the participation of a neutral state in a Union “that will pursue a 
common foreign and security policy […] would lead to a loss of real possibilities to 
implement its neutral policy,” policies to which Austria continued to be obliged.29 
While praising Austrian neutrality as the “most precious political asset the repub-
lic owns” and a “major factor for stability and mutual trust in Europe,” the Soviet 
memorandum expressed “concern” about Austria’s application for EC member-
ship. Moreover, the Soviet side underlined its hope that Austria would stick to ear-
lier commitments as well as, if the conservation of the country’s neutrality within 
the EC turned out to be impossible, that the Viennese government would give up 
its integration efforts. This moderate formulation implied that, under certain condi-
tions, neutrality and EC membership might be compatible, thus marking a return to 
Shenaev’s relatively liberal position of 1987. 
The dismissive stance of both the USSR and the EC eased once the dimensions 
of the changes of 1989 had become clear. On 27 June 1989, Alois Mock and his 
Hungarian counterpart Gyula Horn cut a hole in the barbed wire at the Austro-Hun-
garian border that had been part of the Iron Curtain between Eastern and Western 
Europe. The opening of the border allowed thousands of East Germans to flee their 
country to the West, triggering the breakdown of the communist regimes in East 
Berlin, then Prague, and then of the Eastern bloc altogether.30 Following the open-
ing of the Berlin Wall in November and the fall of the communist regime in Prague, 
in December the fence at the Austro-Czech border was also cut. 
It took a bit of time for the Ballhausplatz to realize that not only the Iron Curtain, 
but also a window of opportunity for Austria had opened. On 27 October 1989, the 
astonished Ambassador Grubmayr communicated to Vienna a declaration made by 
Gorbachev in Helsinki, in which it had been stated that all countries were entitled to 
decide independently which international organizations they wanted to join. Grub-
mayr felt that, from now on, this could serve as a point for defending Austria’s EC 
ambitions.31
Although some hardliners in the Soviet Foreign Ministry and Central Commit-
tee apparatus feigned ignorance of Gorbachev’s statement, such an Austrian strat-
 29 Soviet aide-mémoire to the Austrian government, 10 August 1989, in Michael Gehler, Österreichs 
Weg in die Europäische Union (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2009), 285–287.
 30 On the revolutions of 1989, see Timothy Garton Ash, We the People: The Revolutions of ’89 
Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague (Cambridge: Granta Books, 1990); Jacques 
Levesque, The Enigma of 1989: The USSR and the Liberation of Eastern Europe. (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997).
 31 The author’s interview with Ambassador Grubmayr, 15 July 2009. Cf. Grubmayr, “Streiflichter 
aus meiner Moskauer Zeit,” 270. 
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egy turned out to be unnecessary. Three reasons for this change can be extrapolated: 
Gorbachev realized that the USSR did not have the power to prevent Austria from 
joining the EC; the Soviet attitude towards the EC had changed in 1988 towards 
cooperation; and the Kremlin began to appreciate the value of having a reliable 
neutral country in the EC. When the social democrat and former foreign minister 
Erwin Lanc told Zagladin in January of 1990 that Austria could not join the EC 
since this would hamper neutrality,32 he was repeating an argument that even the 
Soviet leader himself was about to abandon. Lanc also reproduced the ancient So-
viet propaganda thesis that the EC, a “child of the Cold War,” had been founded “to 
tie Europe to NATO.” In contrast to this type of Austrian statement, the director of 
the Institute for European Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Vitalii Zhur-
kin, who came to Vienna for a lecture in May 1990, declared that the good relations 
between Austria and the USSR would be the basis for Soviet consent of Austria’s 
integration into the EC.33 
However, it was only after the Soviet prime minister, Valentin Pavlov (who later 
joined the communist putsch against Gorbachev), had reminded Austria in June 
1991 of its obligation to neutrality and after the putsch itself that the Soviet presi-
dent told Vranitzky on 30 September 1991: “I see this step [i.e. Austria’s entrance 
into the EC] as a sovereign step of Austria ‒ as a normal element of the European 
process. You can freely decide yourselves what and when you want it.”34 During the 
conversation, the Austrian chancellor had merely informed Gorbachev about the 
start of the Austrian-EC negotiations on full membership without asking for Soviet 
approval.35 As Vranitzky declared afterwards, the Soviet-Austrian talks, in contrast 
to earlier meetings, had not touched on neutrality at all. A year earlier, in November 
1990, Austria had already used the window of opportunity to declare certain articles 
of the Austrian state treaty regarding defense (among others, the missile ban) obso-
lete ‒ after the 2+4 Treaty had lifted similar restrictions on Germany, and Finland 
had also unilaterally declared certain provisions of its peace treaty obsolete. None 
of the signatory powers rejected this move.36 
 32 Conversation Zagladin with Lanc, 22 January 1990, in GF, 7250. 
 33 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 7 (1990), 131.
 34 Quoted in Klambauer, Der Kalte Krieg, 190. Only parts of the Soviet protocol have been released 
to date. Cf. Conversation Gorbachev with Vranitzky, 30 September 1991, in GF, 1/1. I am grateful 
to Prof. Oliver Rathkolb for granting me access to his copy of this document. See also Bauer, 
Russische Umbrüche, 68.
 35 Letter Friedrich Bauer to the author, 7 September 2009. Cf. the Austrian protocol of the Conver-
sation Gorbachev with Vranitzky, Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, Z. 3.5/49-A/91, 
4 October 1991. I am grateful to Ambassador Bauer for granting me access to his copy of this 
document.
 36 Helmut Türk, “Die Wende 1989/90 und die Obsoleterklärung einiger Artikel des Staatsvertrages,” 
in Arnold Suppan, Gerald Stourzh, and Wolfgang Mueller (eds.), The Austrian State Treaty 1955: 
International Strategy, Legal Relevance, National Identity (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen 
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In the meantime, the disintegration and economic crisis of the Soviet Union had 
become apparent. In February 1990, Peter Jankowitsch, the former Austrian for-
eign minister, after a visit to Moscow and talks with members of the CPSU central 
committee and with the opposition, expressed concern “about the growing tensions 
within the Soviet Union,”37 and in May, after the Lithuanian declaration of inde-
pendence, Foreign Minister Alois Mock even considered the situation in the USSR 
to be dangerous. The Soviet crackdown on the Baltic independence movements38 
in January 1991 was criticized only mildly: Vranitzky stated he was convinced 
that Gorbachev, who had earned historic recognition for “fighting inhumane com-
munist structures,” was not changing his mind and “marching in the old direction,” 
and Mock said that Gorbachev had obviously made the decision under pressure by 
hardliners and the military.39 When Soviet violence and human rights violations in 
the Baltics continued, the Austrian ambassador to Moscow was ordered to ask the 
Soviet government for an explanation. 
The uncertain situation within the USSR was reflected in public opinion polls 
in Austria that were conducted from November 1990 to January 1991 among 2,000 
Austrian citizens: 15 percent believed that the Soviet Union would soon turn into 
a liberal democracy, whereas 47 percent expected the current unstable situation to 
continue; 26 percent did not believe that the Union would be preserved, but 8 per-
cent feared a return to authoritarianism in Russia.40 Only 7 percent of all respond-
ents were confident that the Soviet Union would be able to transform into a func-
tioning market economy without Western help, 73 percent believed that Western 
assistance would be crucial, and 15 percent expected that the transformation would 
fail. The percentage of those who believed that the Soviet position in world politics 
would remain the same, and those who believed that it would lose in importance 
was 39 each.
After the communist putsch in Moscow in August 1991,41 Waldheim, Vranitz-
ky, and Mock signaled their concern and expressed their hope that all democratic 
and political achievements within the USSR and Europe would be preserved. The 
Austrian government’s declaration of 21 August, however, proved to be a grave 
misjudgment. In the two days that had passed since the overthrow, the Russian 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2005), 821–837. During his visit to Vienna in October 1990, Edu-
ard Shevardnadze, the Soviet foreign minister, had given green light for the Austrian initiative. 
 37 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 7 (1990), 112. 
 38 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 279–283. On the Western reaction, see Kristina Spohr Readman, 
“Between political rhetoric and realpolitik calculations: Western diplomacy and the Baltic inde-
pendence struggle in the Cold War endgame,” in Cold War History 6, no. 1 (2006), 1–42.
 39 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 8 (1991), 70–71, 76.
 40 Hanspeter Neuhold and Paul Luif (eds.), Das außenpolitische Bewusstsein der Österreicher: Ak-
tuelle internationale Probleme im Spiegel der Meinungsforschung (Vienna: Braumüller, 1992), 
202–203; 364; see also Waltraut Urban, “Die Veränderungen in Osteuropa,” ibid., 1–26. 
 41 On the putsch, see John B. Dunlop, The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire (Prince-
ton: University Press, 1993), 186–255.
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government and the international community had, after some hesitation, reacted 
resolutely: Russian president Boris El’tsin’s call for a general strike against the 
usurpers was followed by hundreds of thousands of Russians; US president George 
Bush expressed support for El’tsin and declared that the United States still regarded 
Gorbachev the legal and legitimate head of state; the EC ministers froze all nonhu-
manitarian economic aid for the USSR; and demonstrators in support of democracy 
in the USSR gathered in front of the Soviet embassy in Vienna. In contrast, the 
Austrian coalition spoke out against “sterile agitation” and called on the “Soviet 
leadership” to solve all problems strictly by nonviolent means and to respect inter-
national obligations.42 The wording of the declaration, addressing the putschists as 
new “leadership” and avoiding any judgment of the putsch, was harshly criticized 
by the oppositional FPÖ and Green parties as an act of “anticipatory obedience.” 
The Austrian declaration of 21 August was even more embarrassing in view of the 
fact that El’tsin as well as the leading Western powers had already condemned the 
putsch two days earlier. 
Although the putsch disintegrated after three days and Gorbachev returned to 
power on 22 August (which Vranitzky called the happiest day of the year), the 
breakup of the USSR could not be stopped. On 22 December, Alois Mock acknowl-
edged that the formation of the Community of Independent States (CIS) was an 
important step. Mikhail Gorbachev, who would resign as Soviet president three 
days later, was praised for having achieved the generally peaceful dissolution of the 
Eastern bloc and transformation of the USSR. 
Humanitarian aid and economic relations
A month earlier, Vranitzky had received the special envoy of Russian president 
El’tsin, Sergei Stankevich, and criticized the reluctant stance of the biggest Western 
economies to financially support the Soviet Union. Among Western leaders, Gor-
bachev’s unclear economic strategy indeed had left the impression that the USSR 
would turn out a bottomless pit. However, it was wrong, Vranitzky stated, to invite 
Gorbachev to the G7 session in London in July and then pose the introduction of 
capitalism as a precondition for Western help. The chancellor assured Stankevich 
that Austria would be ready if Russia needed food.43 An opinion poll revealed that 
25 percent of the Austrians favored helping Russia as actively as possible; 23 per-
cent were not sure, while 40 percent wanted to leave such efforts to the EC.44 De-
spite this high percentage of reluctant persons in this poll, Austrians had donated 
five billion schillings for the victims of a major earthquake in Armenia in Decem-
ber 1988. The disaster had led to a wave of Western help for the Soviet population 
 42 Wiener Zeitung, 20 and 21 August 1991, 1–2. 
 43 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 8 (1991), 109. 
 44 Gehler, Österreichs Außenpolitik, 593. 
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‒ something that was only too readily forgotten in Russia, when in the 1990s and 
2000s, the notion of Western hostility was again spread by the official media. A vil-
lage built by the Austrian Red Cross in Leninakan was inaugurated by Josef Riegler 
in 1990. In April 1991, the Austrian vice-chancellor, in Minsk, handed over fifty 
million schillings for victims of the Chernobyl disaster.45
In the economic sphere, the Gorbachev era had seen a steady decline of Soviet-
Austrian relations. Trade fell from 32.5 billion schillings in 1985 to 17 billion in 
1987, while the Austrian deficit in bilateral trade turned quickly into a Soviet one. A 
major cause was the economic crisis in the Soviet Union and sinking energy prices. 
From 1980 to 1988, the prices of oil and natural gas fell by 58 and 41 percent re-
spectively. In 1981, the value of Soviet exports to Austria decreased by 19 percent, 
in 1986 even by 30 percent.46 The Soviet share in Austrian exports fell from its 
all-time high of 6.2 percent in 1981 to 3.8 percent in 1985 to 1.9 percent in 1991, 
in Austrian imports, from 4.4 percent to 1.6 percent.47 By 1989, the Soviet debt to 
Austria had risen to 44.3 billion schillings (making Austria the fifth-largest for-
eign creditor after West Germany, Japan, Italy, and France48), and Austria granted 
the USSR a loan of one billion schillings.49 The structure of Soviet-Austrian trade 
remained relatively unchanged, with Soviet deliveries of natural gas and orders of 
Austrian machinery prevailing. 
















1985 13,409.9 –4.9 1.2 19,150.9 –2.4 4.4 –5,741.0
1986 10,483.1 –21.8 1.3 12,497.0 –34.7 3.1 –2,013.9
1987 8,503.1 –18.9 1.0 8,501.3 –32.0 2.1 1.8
1988 11,022.2 29.6 1.1 8,633.1 1.6 1.9 2,389.1
1989 11,473.4 4.1 1.4 8,522.3 –1.3 1.7 2,951.1
1990 10,075.1 –12.2 1.6 10,242.2 20.2 1.8 –167.1
Source: Butschek, Statistische Reihen; Vneshniaia togovlia
Exports in millions of Austrian schillings; changes and shares in percent.
Nonetheless, the era saw a rapid rise in the number of joint ventures. The first 
such venture was launched in the presence of Austrian minister of trade Robert 
Graf in 1987 and oversaw the construction of a paper mill by Voith and a Soviet 
 45 Außenpolitischer Bericht (1991), 681. 
 46 Resch, “Der österreichische Osthandel,” 550. 
 47 Butschek, Statistische Reihen.
 48 Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in 
Statecraft (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 259.
 49 Außenpolitischer Bericht (1989), 625. 
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company.50 The next year, fifteen joint ventures were registered, in 1989 sixty-nine, 
and in 1991 approximately 250.51 Among Austrian companies involved were the 
producer of trucks, Steyr-Daimler-Puch, and VOEST-Alpine Industrieanlagenbau, 
which in 1988 received a Soviet order for expanding the metallurgical plant of 
Zhlobin in the Belarus SSR. There were collaborative projects on biotechnology, 
information and communication technology, and protection of the environment. At 
least fourteen projects included construction on Soviet soil, such as a winter sports 
resort built by Austrian companies in Gudauri, Georgia.
Human contacts, scientific and cultural cooperation
In the scientific, cultural, and humanitarian sphere, cooperation flourished during 
the Gorbachev years. In July 1990, Alois Mock, at the opening of a diplomacy 
seminar in Salzburg, praised the Soviet leader, without whom the generally peace-
ful changes in East-West relations and in Eastern Europe would not have been 
possible. Exchanges of teachers and students were intensified. In June 1989, pupils 
from Moscow stayed in Vienna for a number of weeks, living and going to school 
with Austrian colleagues, and on the Austrian side, the prestigious Schottengym-
nasium high school participated in the exchange by sending some of its students to 
Moscow.52 The following year, eighty pupils from Lithuania visited Austria, while 
young athletes from Georgia were coached at a training camp in Tyrol.53 After the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, many of these exchange programs were dis-
continued and young people were deprived of this channel for meeting foreign 
colleagues and broadening their mental horizons. An excellent means of reducing 
narrow nationalist views was lost.
The newly established interchurch relations remained uneasy. Even after vis-
its by the archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal Franz König, to Moscow in 1980 and 
1988 and his initiatives to foster dialog by means of his Vienna-based Pro Oriente 
Forum, founded in 1964 for this very purpose, the Russian-Orthodox Church re-
mained reserved.54 The Armenian Church, however, developed cordial relations to 
the Catholics.
In 1987 and 1990, new agreements on cultural cooperation were signed. An ex-
hibit in Moscow of Austrian fin-de-siècle paintings, including Gustav Klimt’s “The 
Kiss,” attracted 150,000 visitors,55 an Austrian movie festival in the Soviet capital 
 50 Österreichisches Jahrbuch für internationale Politik 4 (1987), 248. 
 51 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 158; Außenpolitischer Bericht (1991), 683.
 52 Außenpolitischer Bericht (1989), 626. 
 53 Zhiriakov, Sovetskii Soiuz – Avstriia, 162. 
 54 Hinteregger, “Erinnerungen an Moskau,” 254–256. König’s second trip had been strongly sup-
ported by Bruno Kreisky in his conversation with Gorbachev’s aide Zagladin. Conversation Zag-
ladin with Kreisky, 9 September 1986, in GF, 4840.
 55 Außenpolitischer Bericht (1990), 634. 
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more than 300,000.56 When in 1988, the performance in Moscow of the popular 
Austrian folk-music show “Musikantenstadl” was broadcast throughout the USSR 
on television, it was watched by millions of Soviet citizens. Later that year, the 
talk show “Café Central” was also televised from Moscow. The most spectacular 
scientific collaboration was the Austromir program, which started in October 1991. 
Austrian cosmonauts Clemens Lothaller and Franz Viehböck participated in a So-
viet space flight project and conducted several tests, some of them with Austrian 
equipment. The Austromir cooperation, which had been agreed upon during Vran-
itzky’s 1988 visit to the USSR, had been preceded by bilateral cooperation in the 
“Vega” space project. Austria was the first and only Western country to participate 
in such a Soviet space flight program, and Austromir became the last major scien-
tific cooperation between Austria and the USSR.
* * *
The end of the Cold War had caused a major change in the international arena: 
The superpowers intensified their direct contacts, the Soviet bloc disappeared, a 
reunified Germany emerged as a player on the European field, the former Soviet 
satellites demanded entrance into NATO and the EC, and talks of a “unification of 
Europe” became frequent. In this environment, the role of neutral mediators sank. 
In the Austrian case, this sea change led not only to a loss of mediatory importance 
but also to a fundamental change of policy: the end of respecting Soviet interpreta-
tions of neutrality and the decision to join the European Community. 
The following reinterpretation of Austria’s neutrality became more visible in 
1990–91 with the measures taken by the United Nations in response to the Iraqi 
occupation of Kuwait. The right for transporting military equipment and for over-
flights was granted to the US-led coalition and the ban on such transports was lifted 
for UN operations.57 In addition, Austria declared the missile-ban resulting from 
the state treaty obsolete. All these steps marked a sharp deviation from the hitherto 
valid Verdross Doctrine of comprehensive neutrality and the advent of what experts 
later christened the “Avocado Doctrine” ‒ the reduction of neutrality “to its hard 
core.”58
 56 Ibid. (1986), 641. 
 57 Manfred Rotter, “Von der integralen zur differentiellen Neutralität,” in Europäische Rundschau 
19, no. 3 (1991), 23–36; Gehler, Finis Neutralität, 28.
 58  Cede, “Österreichs Neutralität und Sicherheitspolitik,” 143.
“Thus it will always happen that he who is not your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst 
he who is your friend will entreat you to declare yourself with arms.” Nicolò Machiavelli, The 
Prince, translated by W. K. Marriott (1515, 1908), chapter xxi.

Conclusions
The late Gorbachev years marked the end of a distinct era in Soviet-Austrian rela-
tions, an era that had begun in 1955 with the final negotiations on the state treaty 
and its subsequent conclusion. It was one of the most intense and, for the most 
part, friendliest periods in bilateral relations between Vienna and Moscow. With the 
consolidation of blocs, the emergence of thermonuclear weapons, and the declining 
acceptability of a war between the superpowers, “peaceful coexistence” had been 
declared as a strategy to reduce tensions while continuing the international struggle 
in the areas of ideology, science, economy and society by nonviolent means. From 
1955 on, after Austria had been chosen by the Kremlin as a model for this coex-
istence, the Soviet leadership had adopted a patronizing stance towards Austria, 
which, on its part, was relieved to be freed of the postwar quadripartite occupation. 
The price for the Soviet withdrawal was neutrality, which reflected the Kremlin’s 
interests and, in fact, had been promoted by the USSR in the Austrian case as a 
means for keeping the country, which had hitherto been a “secret ally of the West,” 
out of NATO, separating it from its traditional Western patrons, controlling and 
influencing its foreign policy, and for making it a promoter of neutrality and Soviet 
proposals in the West. In order to make neutrality attractive to the West, the Krem-
lin was determined to present Austria as an “example” for the benefits a Western 
state might reap from becoming neutral.
The communist approach towards peacetime neutrality was subject to Soviet 
interests in a double sense. First, the USSR advocated neutrality or neutralization 
when this was beneficial to the motherland of socialism, since under certain condi-
tions neutrality can have “nonneutral” consequences. When these consequences 
favored the USSR, as in the case of Lithuania in 1920 or Austria in 1955, neu-
trality was welcomed. When they were displeasing to the Soviet leaders, pledges 
of neutrality were ignored by the Kremlin, as in the case of Finland during the 
Brezhnev era. It also seems possible to draw the conclusion that the neutralization 
of nonsocialist states was promoted by the Soviet government when chances for 
soon gaining preponderance in that country were low. Secondly, the communist 
interpretation of neutrality was also linked to Soviet interests. Neutralizing a coun-
try was seen as a means to draw it nearer the socialist bloc, not only keep it away 
from the opposing one. This aim was to be achieved through a special neutrality 
doctrine, which included responsibilities that, if fulfilled, were likely to foster the 
neutral’s rapprochement with the East. This doctrine was comprised of a few rights 
for the neutral but also many duties, including the obligation not to join NATO or 
the EEC, as well as to promote Soviet diplomatic goals, to maintain friendly rela-
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tions with the East, and to curb criticism of Soviet policy. Many of these concepts 
had been adopted by the nonaligned countries, and the Soviet government strove to 
make them binding for the European neutrals too, through tutelage, propaganda and 
the spreading of communist theories of international law. As their authors readily 
acknowledged, neutrality meant different things at different times, and the various 
Soviet interpretations of the neutrals’ obligations were always formulated in ac-
cordance with the prevailing political agenda. While in the 1950s, the containment 
of NATO and other pro-Western alliances and blocs seems to have been the main 
function of neutrality from the Soviet point of view, through the 1960s the promo-
tion of decolonization by the nonaligned states and of an all-European summit by 
the neutrals gained importance. Once détente was achieved, the role of the neutrals 
diminished, and it remained so except during the last peak of the Cold War, when 
their value for Soviet policy again rose rather briefly. 
The Soviet aim to neutralize certain areas did not only apply to the neutral and 
nonaligned states. Indeed, some scholars argue that it was a Soviet strategy to grad-
ually neutralize all of Western Europe, and that the Kremlin, “through a combina-
tion of blandishment, pressure, and looming military superiority, [sought] to pro-
mote a change of policy and outlook in Western Europe that would assure Soviet 
hegemony in Eastern Europe and set the stage for effective political preeminence 
over Western Europe as well.”1 It seems quite evident that Moscow was interested 
in undermining the stability of the Western bloc, be it NATO, the EEC, or the Euro-
pean-American partnership. In fact, Soviet foreign policy encouraged the adoption 
of neutrality or at least of neutralist policies and postures in all of Western Europe. 
Since this Soviet fostering of neutrality and neutralism never included the promo-
tion of a neutral group, one may draw the conclusion that neutrality, in Soviet eyes, 
was also a strategy for fragmenting the opposing bloc without creating a new one. 
The neutrals were used as tools in this Soviet strategy ‒ as role models and 
promoters of neutrality. In order to spread neutrality and neutralism in the West 
and to make it attractive to West European states, the USSR granted the neutrals 
special privileges. This included demonstratively friendly treatment of the neutrals 
and economic benefits, as well as praise for neutrality in general and the individual 
neutrals in particular. Applause for a neutral meant, first and foremost, praise for 
and the promotion of neutrality or neutralism. Moreover, treating the neutrals in a 
friendly manner was an easy way for improving the image of neutrality and, in fact, 
of the USSR abroad. 
Since the USSR wanted the neutrals to embody and promote a specific Soviet ap-
proach to neutrality, it attempted to push the neutrals’ understanding and practice of 
neutral policy in this direction. Neutrality provided the Kremlin a lever over the neu-
 1 George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Finlandization: Soviet Strategy or Geopolitical Foot-
note?,” in idem (eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe (New York: Praeger, 1978), 
3–16, 4. 
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trals, and Soviet leaders and propaganda consistently claimed the right, by referring 
to the communist teachings of neutrality to tell the neutrals what to do and what not. 
Soviet praise, criticism and warnings were voiced in official and media statements, 
which created a sort of “verbal straitjacket” for the neutrals.2 Since their neutrality 
was not as “total” as the Kremlin wished, they were from time to time criticized for 
this defect. As neutrality gave the USSR a measuring stick for evaluating their poli-
tics, any unwanted act was attacked as being at odds with neutrality. This included 
things such as Switzerland’s refusal to ban nuclear weapons, Sweden’s maintaining 
a strong army, and Austria’s, Sweden’s and Switzerland’s striving to reach an as-
sociation agreement with the European Economic Community. These policies were 
harshly condemned in Soviet statements. On the other hand, desired behavior was 
encouraged and praised, such as Finnish proposals for nuclear-weapons free zones, 
Swedish criticism of US policy, and efforts to call for an all-European summit. Even 
the “old familiar tune” of the ritualistic and seemingly redundant annual articles 
commemorating the Finnish-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, the Austri-
an state treaty in May and declaration of neutrality in October, which were time and 
again invoked as sanctified and value-laden symbols, albeit amorphous ones, served 
a certain aim: They were written not for Soviet eyes but for those of the respective 
neutral’s embassy, and meant to underline the say the USSR claimed to have in the 
respective country’s matters and remind its government of the Soviet watchdog, 
thus promoting desired behavior and limiting undesired. 
However, the practical use of Soviet published opinion was not only aimed at 
the neutral itself, but also its international environment: Whenever it seemed neces-
sary to praise Soviet détente policy, set the tone for a friendly exchange of opinions, 
or promote neutrality, Austria and Finland were extolled as a models of “peaceful 
coexistence”; whenever it seemed necessary for Soviet policy to diminish their 
attraction for Eastern Europe or to communicate Soviet displeasure, warnings and 
fantastic accusations were published, such as during the Hungarian and Czecho-
slovakian crises when Austria was depicted as a playground of villains or enemies, 
or after the “Prague Spring,” when the Soviet recognition of Finland’s neutrality 
was withdrawn. It is therefore not entirely correct to say that the international envi-
ronment did not affect Soviet relations to the neutrals. It is rather the case that the 
Soviet Union, in general, wanted to contain long-term effects of international crises 
on the usability of neutrality and the neutrals as a model.
This applied especially to Austria, which was chosen by the USSR as a show-
case for the benefits of neutrality and “peaceful coexistence.” The small country on 
the border between East Central and Western Europe was an unlikely partner for 
the Eurasian superpower. That Austria became the Soviet choice was most prob-
ably due to the fact that the USSR had been involved in the multilateral state treaty, 
and promoted and subsequently recognized Austria’s neutralization. Both, the state 
 2 Petersson, The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality, 97, 48. 
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treaty and neutrality, were more directly connected to the USSR than, for instance, 
Swiss or Swedish neutrality. Nonetheless, Austria was linked less tightly to the 
Soviet Union than was Finland, another Soviet “showcase of sorts,”3 through the 
Finnish-Soviet Friendship Treaty. In 1955, Austria declared its intention to follow 
the Swiss rather than the Finnish model. In order to reinforce the Soviet claim of 
authority, communist voices covered up the fact that Austrian neutrality was not 
stipulated in the state treaty. They also chose to ignore that even earlier, the Western 
allies had agreed on Austria’s neutrality if self-chosen and that all sides consented 
to the declaration of neutrality. Instead, Soviet politicians and media stressed the 
importance of the bilateral Soviet-Austrian Moscow memorandum as a basis for 
the state treaty and neutrality. There was some historic truth in this interpretation: 
After the USSR had obstructed negotiations for years, the actual breakthrough on 
the state treaty and neutrality was achieved by Austrian and Soviet delegations, 
outlined in a bilateral quid-pro-quo, and only then reported to the West. Such in-
terpretations aimed at sustaining the tacit claim of a “special” Soviet-Austrian re-
lationship and the Soviet right to interpret Austria’s neutrality ‒ either because of 
the Soviet participation in the forming of the state treaty or the Moscow memoran-
dum. However, from the point of view of international law, this claim was clearly 
rejected by Austrian experts. A similar struggle over the authority to interpret the 
state treaty and neutrality concerned the role of the USSR, on one hand, and that of 
the Western powers, on the other, in the treaty negotiations: When Austrian state-
ments did not adopt the official Soviet version that the treaty had been concluded 
largely thanks to Soviet efforts, the Soviet side voiced displeasure through official 
channels as well as the media. While this kind of feud about historical truth might 
seem insignificant, it characterized the constant, albeit low-key, Cold War about 
who held the final authority to interpret the world. This was a struggle that affected 
Soviet-Austrian relations as well. Since historical facts are often used to strengthen 
legal claims, these discussions were anything but irrelevant.
The struggle for the right to define Austria’s obligations as a neutral was fought 
in the media and in public statements. Experts of international law, both Soviet and 
Austrian, joined this debate. On both sides, their interpretations reflected the shifts 
in high level policy. Soviet lawyers sought to theoretically substantiate an ever-
growing list of alleged neutrality obligations. While in general, Austrian experts re-
jected such demands, many of them, including the most influential, tended towards 
increasing the neutrals’ obligations. Only after Gorbachev had brought a change to 
the world’s image of the Soviet Union did those experts who advised a limited defi-
nition of the “secondary obligations” of the neutrals gain predominance in Austria. 
Although this was often claimed by Soviet leaders and experts, the successful 
development of Soviet-Austrian relations was not just because of parallel interests. 
In general, the two partners followed rather divergent aims. Keeping the neutral 
 3 Hanhimäki, “The Lure of Neutrality: Finland and the Cold War,” 262.
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country out of the Western blocs such as NATO and the EEC and detaching it 
as far as possible from the West, particularly from West Germany (the Anschluss 
trauma) and the United States, Austria’s postwar patron, was a paramount goal of 
the Kremlin. This implied that the Kremlin aimed at making the country “as neutral 
as possible” (following the Finnish rather than the Swiss example). Making Austria 
more neutral in the Soviet sense, i.e. separating it from the US, making it protest 
Western overflights, ruling out its membership in NATO, the ECSC or the EEC, and 
even seeing it possibly fighting Western blocs, was the leitmotiv of Soviet policy 
towards Austria. Among the Soviet aims was also to keep Austria militarily weak 
‒ a reflection not only of the Soviet teachings of neutrality, but also of a certain 
distrust vis-à-vis the neutral. At least in this regard, the role of neutralization had 
not changed since the times of Machiavelli.4 Periodic Soviet demands that Austria’s 
neutrality be “total,” comprising not only abstention from NATO but also complete 
symmetry or equidistance in political and economic relations and even in public 
opinion, were to serve this aim. In the words of a leading Austrian diplomat and 
ambassador to Moscow, over the years the USSR “took regular steps to influence 
Austria’s decision-making.”5 It attempted to mold Austria’s interpretation of neu-
tral policy, as well as to shift that interpretation from a permanent to a positive one 
and thus, to “Finlandize” it. 
To Austria this seemed neither possible nor desirable. The neutral was inter-
ested in retaining its independence from the Eastern bloc; it did not want to be 
Finlandized.6 While the Kremlin wanted Austria’s neutrality to be “total,” Austria 
 4 Kreisky repeatedly referred to Machiavelli’s neutrality thesis. See, e.g., Bruno Kreisky, Die Her-
ausforderung: Politik an der Schwelle des Atomzeitalters  (Düsseldorf: Econ, 1963), 116. Cf. 
Gerald Stourzh, “Some Reflections on Permanent Neutrality,” in August Schou and Arne Olav 
Brundtland (eds.), Small States in International Relations, Nobel Symposium 7 (Stockholm: 
Almquist & Wiksell, 1971), 93–98, 96. For the “Orvellian dimensions” of “total” neutrality, see 
ibid.
 5 Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 175. 
 6 The term “Finlandization” emerged in West Germany during the 1960s to describe the process 
of gradual implementation of self-censorship and submission to Soviet wishes in a Western de-
mocracy. A volume published in the late 1970s listed the following features of Finlandization: “1) 
responsiveness in foreign policy to Soviet preferences; 2) avoidance of alliance with countries 
deemed by the Soviet Union to be competitors or rivals; 3) acceptance of neutrality in peace or 
war; 4) abstention from membership in regional and international groupings considered unfriend-
ly by Moscow; 5) restraint over the media in one’s country to muffle or minimize criticism of the 
USSR, so as to avoid possible provocation; 6) compensatory gestures in commercial and cultural 
contacts with the USSR, extending to treaties and diplomatic consultations, to offset disparities 
in the relationship with the USSR, on the one hand, and West European countries, on the other; 
and 7) openness to penetration by Soviet ideas and media. In other words, the term Finlandization 
describes the behavior of a country whose foreign policy and domestic politics are strongly con-
ditioned by a conscious desire to mollify and maintain friendly relations with Moscow, at the ex-
pense if need be of close ties with formal allies and traditional friends or of its own sovereignty.” 
George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Finlandization,” 5.
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was and remained a Western-minded parliamentarian democracy. It did not give up 
its principles of free speech, but, in general and despite increasing self-censorship, 
rather defended their implementation, even under Soviet criticism. There was, un-
til 1967–68, an Austrian political aim running directly counter to Soviet interests: 
Austria’s rapprochement with the EEC. For a number of reasons, the USSR tried to 
block this ‒ and, at least until 1987, did so successfully. 
Other aims of the two countries, however, proved better reconcilable. One was 
the Soviet aim of making its relations with Austria a model of “peaceful coexist-
ence” and of demonstrating that these friendly relations were possible mainly due 
to neutrality. The Soviet attitude towards Austria was, thus, to a large extent defined 
by the Soviet view of neutrality in general and “by the utility and value of Austria 
as a showcase” and promoter of the benefits of neutrality.7 Soviet propaganda pre-
sented Soviet-Austrian relations as proof not only of the possibility of “peaceful 
and mutually beneficial relations and cooperation between countries of different 
political systems,” but also of the correctness of Soviet policy and of the successes 
of neutrality. The Soviet interest in promoting such coexistence and neutrality in 
the West was compatible with the Austrian interest in lowering the Cold War’s 
intensity and fostering détente. While both sides followed different aims in promot-
ing détente and while the Soviet strategy of “peaceful coexistence” had more goals 
than just relaxing international tensions, it was clear to most Austrian governments 
that it was easier to maintain neutrality and independence in times of détente. Aus-
tria was also intent on normalizing its relationship to the superpower in the East, 
the signatory of the state treaty that had made it particularly hard to conclude the 
same. Together with the state treaty and normalization of bilateral relations came 
the chance of developing contacts and economic cooperation, and Austria proved 
eager to do so in order to increase the country’s wealth and security. 
Furthermore, both sides were interested in Austria conducting an “active” pol-
icy of neutrality, including international mediation and contributions to détente: 
the Kremlin because it was interested in fostering the international attraction of 
neutrality by entrusting neutrals with honorable tasks, such as being “diplomatic 
postmen”8 in the Berlin crisis or the Vietnam War. Given the confrontation between 
the two global blocs, the Soviet Union was moreover determined to use Austria for 
promoting Soviet political initiatives in the West, particularly with regard to disar-
mament, détente, and the convocation of the CSCE. The Austrian government was 
willing to fulfill some of these wishes, because it was keen on gaining international 
 7 Report Haymerle, 22 June 1963, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 67129–6/64, Z. 75215–6/64. 
See also Haymerle to Kreisky, 12 December 1961, ibid., Pol. Berichte Moskau; Karasek to Kreis-
ky, 9 April 1963, ibid.; and “Die Beziehungen Österreichs zur Sowjetunion: Vortrag Gesandten 
Haymerles vor dem vom Herrn Bundesminister ins Leben gerufenen vertraulichen außenpoli-
tischen Kreis,” 6 July 1964, in ÖIZG, NL 72: Fuchs, DO 834, File 45. These reports provide a 
comprehensive interpretation of Soviet-Austrian relations.
 8 Wodak to Bielka, 14 February 1966, in ÖStA, AVA, E/1785 Wodak, File 99/2.
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recognition and, thus, security. Consequently, both sides were interested in raising 
the country’s international prestige. This seems to have been at the core of the oft-
invoked parallelism of Soviet and Austrian interests. Since the United States shared 
this interest, Austria was able to perform this role on the international stage. 
In particular, Raab’s Ostpolitik and Kreisky’s ambitions to foster détente and 
dialog dovetailed with Soviet wishes to rely on Austria as an icebreaker for ending 
the Eastern bloc’s political and economic isolation. Austrian diplomacy was well 
aware of this fact, stating that “from Moscow’s point of view, Austrian neutral poli-
cy is to foster a relaxation of tensions and the international dialog.”9 This obviously 
included Austria serving, on many occasions after various international crises from 
1956 until 1983, as a door-opener and helping Soviet and East European regimes to 
escape the isolation into which they had fallen by virtue of their own policy. While 
Austria’s Ostpolitik was highly appreciated by the United States as well, albeit for 
different reasons, the neutral’s circumventing of the Western embargo against the 
East was less to their liking.
From the Soviet perspective, Austria was also to act (and did act) as a scout for 
developing East-West trade. It was to provide the Soviet Union with goods that 
could not be purchased in other Western countries because of the lack of economic 
agreements or Western restrictions, including machinery, consumer goods, or pipes 
for pipelines. In particular, until East-West trade intensified in the 1960s, Austria 
was, very much like Finland, “the best [Western] shopping center in the neighbor-
hood” for the Soviets.10 While Austrian hopes were ultimately disappointed that 
it might be chosen as a hub for USSR trade with Western Europe or natural gas 
exports, for the Soviet Union, the small, stable, and increasingly wealthy country 
with its Osthandel ambitions also served as a surrogate for Switzerland (to which 
the Soviet Union developed close relations only in the 1970s) and as a case study 
for Western economy. During their visits to Austria, Soviet leaders not only exam-
ined steel plants, power stations and farms, but also the kitchen and wine cellar of 
the Imperial Hotel in Vienna.11 
Soviet policy towards Austria not only endorsed Austria as an international actor 
and had a generally friendly tone of communication, but it also sponsored numer-
ous high-ranking visits. An Austrian internal report of 1968 stated: “Austria, since 
the conclusion of the state treaty, enjoys a privileged position in Moscow. This was 
not even changed by Austria’s clear democratic policy during the Hungarian crisis 
1956. Symptomatic for the good shape of Austrian-Soviet relations are the numer-
ous exchanges of visits.”12 A special characteristic of travel diplomacy was that 
whenever East-West relations cooled off, and particularly after international crises, 
 9 File Staatsbesuch Kirchschläger, May 1982, in SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 6. 
 10 Jacobson, Finland, 72. 
 11 Haymerle, “Die Beziehungen zur Großmacht im Osten,” 185–186. 
 12 Information Sowjetunion, March 1968, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol, GZ. 17042–6/67, Z. 
31717–6/67.
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Soviet leaders granted Austria the ostensible honor of being the first Western des-
tination of official trips (Mikoian after the Hungarian crisis of 1957, Khrushchev 
after the failed Paris summit of 1960, Patolichev after the Czechoslovakian crisis of 
1968, Tikhonov in 1981), or of being the first Western guest received in the Kremlin 
(Raab after Hungary in 1958, Maleta after Prague in 1969). In contrast, whenever 
détente was imminent Soviet leaders went to other Western countries first, mostly 
to France (Kosygin in 1966, Brezhnev in 1971, Gorbachev in 1985). With regard 
to Austria’s international position, it seems remarkable that the frequency of Aus-
trian visits to Moscow was much higher than to the Western signatories of the state 
treaty, with whom the neutral’s social, political and economic values and goals had 
more in common. In order to raise the propagandistic value of such bilateral meet-
ings, the Soviet side insisted on publishing lengthy communiqués. These hailed the 
state treaty, neutrality and the friendly bilateral relations between the USSR and 
Austria, and stressed Austrian concord with Soviet policies. While Soviet diplo-
mats and leaders repeatedly attempted to talk their Austrian colleagues into making 
statements that were designed to support Soviet initiatives or condemn US or Israe-
li policy, conflicting views between the two sides were usually not reflected in this 
type of official documents. Moreover, Soviet leaders regularly (ab)used their meet-
ings with Austrian politicians for excessive lecturing in anti-American propaganda.
Since public praise and public criticism were among the most effective Soviet 
means of promoting neutrality in the West, and also of shaping the neutral’s poli-
tics, Austria was given more attention in the Soviet press than comparable Western 
states.13 This can be attributed to the above-mentioned use of the Soviet media as a 
semi-official mouthpiece for issuing warnings against undesirable actions such as 
rapprochement with the Common Market, for identifying alleged “foes of neutral-
ity” within Austria and without, such as neo-Nazism, the FRG, the United States, 
NATO and the EEC, and for communicating encouragement regarding the convo-
cation of the CSCE. Most of the Soviet attacks were, as Deputy Foreign Minister 
Semenov confessed, published “prophylactically”14 ‒ apparently without concern 
whether they entailed interference in the neutral’s domestic affairs. In some of these 
articles on Austria, its Communist Party, due to a political custom in the Soviet 
bloc, received more attention than it might have deserved if considering its actual 
share of the Austrian vote. In return, the KPÖ played the role of a tool of Soviet 
propaganda and watchdog of Austria’s neutrality and pro-Soviet orientation. Fab-
ricated KPÖ charges against the Viennese government, which were meant to in-
timidate as well as provide evidence for Soviet accusations, were repeated by the 
Soviet media without being verified. Also due to the Soviet practice of using the 
 13 In the years 1956–85, the average annual numbers of articles concerning the neutral states in the 
main Soviet daily newspapers were: Finland 18; Austria 13; Sweden 4; and Switzerland 2. Peters-
son, The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality, 8. 
 14 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 14 November 1969, in ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, Pol. 
Berichte Moskau.
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Western world as a dark backdrop against which life under the communist regime 
shone more brightly, Soviet media depictions of the Austrian political, social and 
economic system were distorted. But despite these systemic drawbacks, the Soviet 
media coverage of Austria was usually, as the Austrian embassy noted, “marked-
ly friendly and inspired by the effort to depict it [=Austria] as a peaceful, open-
minded country, which is capitalist but nevertheless relatively progressive and not 
malevolent.”15 Not the same can be said with regard to the Austrian media coverage 
of the USSR and its general image, which seems to have suffered particularly from 
the Soviet bloodshed in Hungary, the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia, and 
the oppression of Soviet dissidents. While the Kremlin was never shy in handing 
out criticism, the communist regime was sensitive if criticized itself and repeatedly 
demanded that the Austrian government suppress such statements. Nonetheless, it 
might be of interest to the analyst of international relations that the frank Austrian 
words about Soviet behavior in 1956 and the Soviet warnings against Austrian neo-
Nazis or joining the EEC do not seem to have lastingly affected the friendly official 
relations between the two sides as long as they were interested in maintaining them. 
The result of the various interests and policies of both sides, some parallel or 
complementary and others conflicting, was a special relationship between the two 
countries that, for the most part, was demonstratively friendly, even when it was 
disrupted by the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia or overcast 
by Austria’s ambitions to associate with the EEC. A certain role in the development 
of Soviet-Austrian relations seems to have been played by the personal relation-
ship and empathy that appeared to develop particularly between Khrushchev and 
Mikoian (the latter being, on the occasion of bilateral meetings, frequently referred 
to as “the Austrian” by his Politburo colleagues) on one hand and Raab on the other. 
Due to the USSR’s central role in creating and shaping Austria’s neutrality and to 
the equally important role neutrality played in defining Soviet policy towards Aus-
tria, it has been suggested that the Soviet-Austrian relationship might be regarded 
as a “neutrality partnership.”16 Indeed, this would be an appropriate description, 
only if the concept of “partnership” did not imply voluntariness, equal rights, or a 
shared Weltanschauung.
It can be said that this relationship, particularly in the second half of the 1950s, 
differed fundamentally from Soviet relations to any other Western or neutral coun-
try. While the Soviet attitude towards neutralism and the neutrals was merely a 
sideshow (albeit from time to time an important one) of Soviet policy towards 
Western Europe and the Third World, as a group the neutrals were so heterogeneous 
and the Soviet relations with them differed to such a degree “that it is hardly valid to 
speak of a Soviet design for dealing with them as a group.”17 There were significant 
 15 Austrian embassy Moscow to Austrian MFA, 16 January 1967, ibid., II-Pol, GZ. 13844–6/67, Z. 
15037–6/67.
 16 Ermacora, 20 Jahre österreichische Neutralität, 118. 
 17 Hakovirta, “The Soviet Union and the Varieties of Neutrality,” 569.
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differences between the neutrals, such as the legal basis of their neutrality, their 
geo-strategic locations, the level of their international activities, their economic 
interdependence with the Eastern bloc, and their ability to defend themselves. The 
USSR had a much greater leverage over Austria and Finland, whose neutrality was, 
as a result of the Soviet role in the postwar settlement with these two countries and 
in the genesis of their postwar status, linked to the Soviet Union. They were located 
at the Soviet (bloc’s) border, militarily weak, and exposed to Soviet pressure. It is 
also clear that the Austrian and Finnish cases were similar in having a relatively 
fresh experience of neutrality, which proved susceptible to external influences, par-
ticularly from the Soviet side. Of all the neutral states in Europe, Finland had by 
far the highest rate of economic and political exchanges with the Soviet Union and 
was, by virtue of these factors as well as its geographic proximity, the most vulner-
able to Soviet interference. Within most parameters, Soviet-Austrian relations can 
be compared rather to the Soviet-Finnish than to Soviet-Swedish or Soviet-Swiss 
relations, which barely existed. Indeed, Soviet officials referred not only to Austria 
as a model for other Western states, but also to Finland as a model for Austria. 
Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to ignore the fact that the Kremlin’s leverage and 
interference in Austrian affairs were significantly lower than in the case of Finland, 
and Austria’s maneuvering space was much wider; no Soviet “night frost” or “note 
crisis” was staged against Austria, and Austrian self-censorship never reached the 
degree found in Finland.
Austria thus avoided being Finlandized, as did Western Europe, and, accord-
ing to some accounts, even Finland.18 For the most part, Austria’s trade patterns 
remained firmly oriented towards OECD countries, and the CMEA’s share in Aus-
tria’s trade was as low as 8–15 percent. Austria reserved the right of interpreting its 
neutrality and, in general, did not yield to Soviet demands, although over time it 
is clear that it did adopt certain Soviet features of neutralism. But the Soviet hopes 
of Finlandizing Austria or “neutralizing” all of Western Europe turned out to be in 
vain. 
It should be noted that, at least in part due to Soviet “stick and carrot” policy, the 
Austrian interpretation of neutrality changed over the years. It is clear that Austria’s 
neutral policy was never determined exclusively by its governments and lawyers 
but also by the surrounding world, and the Soviet Union played a paramount role 
in this regard. It seems understandable that a small neutral country, with no allies 
backing it, is more susceptible to pressure of this type from great powers than 
would be a member of an alliance. Gradual tugging by a large power may, over 
time, lead to new interpretations and understandings in a small country, and persist-
ent pressure erodes the autonomy of a small state’s decision-making. Since Austria 
had never officially or legally defined its “neutrality doctrine,” the interpretation 
 18 George Maude, “Has Finland been Finlandized?,” in George Ginsburgs and Alvin Z. Rubinstein 
(eds.), Soviet Foreign Policy Toward Western Europe (New York: Praeger, 1978), 43–65, 62.
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thereof fluctuated. In contrast to its original interpretation of neutrality, Austria 
drifted in the direction of the Soviet understanding and even adopted a few charac-
teristics of Finnish neutrality.19 These included taking initiatives that were expected 
to please the USSR as well as self-censorship ‒ although these were implemented 
to a much less pronounced extent than in Finland. Austria also had much stronger 
economic ties with the East than had, for example, Switzerland. In addition, Austria 
lacked the Swiss or Swedish determination to create a strong deterrent and neglect-
ed armed defense, relying rather, as did Finland, on notions of “active” neutrality 
as a tool for achieving security. Whether neutrality would have indeed protected the 
small country located on the battle line between the blocs if a general war between 
the Warsaw Pact and NATO had broken out is, however, highly doubtful. 
The progressive adoption of Soviet interpretations (and Finnish characteris-
tics) of neutrality by Austrian politicians is demonstrated in their ideas concerning 
economic integration, public opinion and “active” neutrality, the downgrading of 
armed neutrality and self-defense, as well as the reluctance to express Austrian 
interpretations. It seems questionable that Austria’s neutral policy would have de-
veloped the way it did, i.e. that the country protested US overflights or abandoned 
Western integration, without the presence of the Soviet watchdog. Furthermore, 
Austria’s readiness to speak out openly for freedom, human rights, and democracy 
in Eastern states became increasingly “neutralized” after the country’s courageous 
declarations against the Soviet bloodshed in Hungary in 1956. This growing “neu-
tralization,” which paralleled repeated Soviet protests against foreign criticism, can 
be seen in the rather cautious Austrian reactions to the Soviet crackdown on Czech-
oslovakia in 1968, to the invasion in Afghanistan in 1979, to the introduction of 
martial law in Poland in 1981, to the Soviet downing of a Korean passenger aircraft 
in 1983, and even to the abortive communist putsch in the Soviet Union in 1991. 
While in 1956 the Austrian army had been ordered to defend the country’s borders, 
in 1968 it was instructed to stay away from the same. In contrast to earlier promises 
to the West and in contrast its own declaration of neutrality, the Austrian govern-
ment consistently neglected the country’s defense, choosing instead to rely on an 
“active” foreign policy ‒ thus reflecting Soviet notions about the futility of the 
Western neutrals’ self-defense and their mission to foster détente. It seems likely 
that this “neutralization” was a result of, among other factors, repeated Soviet calls 
for a more pro-Soviet version of neutrality, Soviet warnings as well as encourage-
ment. These constant reprimands led to self-censorship, self-restriction, and retreat 
into the Schrebergarten of virtual security. Today Austria’s “mental neutralization” 
might be seen in the country’s reluctance to join the Western alliance and/or step up 
self-defense, a lack of solidarity with the victims of aggression, human rights viola-
 19 Cf. Bengt Sundelius, “Introduction,” in idem (ed.), The Neutral Democracies in the New Cold 
War (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 1–10, 7: “Inspired by the example of Swiss neutrality, the Aus-
trian version has over time developed in the direction of the […] Finnish type.” 
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tions, or political pressure, and a general unwillingness to get involved in foreign 
affairs.20 
Since Soviet relations to Austria were designed to fulfill a distinct function in 
the international environment, they were subject to changes in this environment. In 
the late 1950s and early 60s, Austria was not only praised by the Soviet Union as 
a model of “peaceful coexistence,” but was also repeatedly asked by the USSR to 
offer its services, as for example in the German question, the Berlin crisis, the Vi-
etnam War, and the convocation of the CSCE. Some fifteen years later, détente had 
materialized, the Berlin crisis and the Vietnam War had been settled, and the CSCE 
was on its way. Willy Brandt and, later, Richard Nixon became trusted partners of 
the Kremlin, and Austrian mediatory services were no longer needed. Similarly, 
Austria’s pioneering position in trade with the USSR was lost during détente, as the 
Soviet Union began to develop its economic ties to other, larger Western states such 
as Italy, France and West Germany. While in the 1950s and 60s, the Kremlin had 
used Austria as a tool for neutralizing Western Europe, these efforts were scaled 
back after 1968. This is not to say that Austria immediately became irrelevant once 
détente started. The neutral country’s services and support were still needed at the 
CSCE, in the United Nations, and during the last phase of the Cold War. However, 
while the number of bilateral exchanges of opinion rose, their political significance 
fell. Gorbachev’s new policies and the sea change in East-West relations in the late 
1980s made the special relationship between the USSR and Austria obsolete. Once 
the Cold War was over, there was no longer any need for this “good example of 
peaceful coexistence.”
 20 Neuhold, “The Permanent Neutrality,” 59, speaks of an “alarming degree of ignorance” with 
regard to security issues. The Cold War was seen by the Austrian public as a conflict that did not 
affect Austria. Manfred Rotter, “Unter Wahrung der Neutralität,” in Zukunft, no. 1 (1990), 5–11, 
10; Oliver Rathkolb, Die paradoxe Republik: Österreich 1945 bis 2005 (Vienna: Zsolnay, 2005), 
42–46. Rathkolb argues that Austrians tend to equate their country’s small size and neutrality with 
security and wealth and not to exhibit solidarity in security issues. In a 2004 survey, 15 percent 
of questioned Austrians responded that their country should not come to the help of another EU 
member state if it were attacked. Ibid., 423. 
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Document 1: Conversation A. Mikoian – J. Raab, Vienna,
24 April 1957 
Besprechung im Bundeskanzleramt am 24.IV.1957
Anwesend:
von sowjetischer Seite: 
Erster Stellvertretender Vorsitzender des Ministerrates der UdSSR, A. I. MIKOJAN
Stellvertretender Außenhandelsminister F. N. KUMYKIN
Botschafter I. L. ILJITSCHOW
Botschafter S. G. LAPIN
Botschaftsrat W. I. Klotschek
von österreichischer Seite:
Bundeskanzler Ing. Julius RAAB
die Bundesminister Dr. Ing. FIGL, Dr. KAMITZ, Dr. BOCK, HELMER, Ökono-
mierat THOMA, Ing. WALDBRUNNER
die Staatssekretäre Dr. KREISKY und GRUBHOFER
Leitende Beamte des Bundeskanzleramtes,
des Bundeskanzleramtes-Ausw[ärtige] Angelegenheiten,
der Ressortministerien
Der Bundeskanzler begrüßte den Stellvertretenden Ministerialpräsidenten Mikojan 
namens der Bundesregierung und im eigenen Namen. 
Mikojan: Ich, möchte zunächst nochmals danken für die liebenswürdige Ein-
ladung und bin beauftragt, Ihnen die herzlichsten Grüße des Vorsitzenden des 
Präsidiums des Obersten Sowjets, Woroschilow, zu übermitteln, ferner des Herrn 
 Ministerpräsidenten Bulganin und meiner Kollegen Chruschtschow und Malenkow.
Bundeskanzler Raab: Ich bitte Sie, diese Grüße ebenso herzlich zu erwidern. Ich 
erinnere mich mit Vergnügen an die Zeit, da wir in Moskau mit allen diesen Herren 
beisammen waren.
Mikojan: Ich möchte heute die Gelegenheit ergreifen, um gewisse Fragen zu 
besprechen. Die Neutralität Österreichs anerkennen wir und wir wollen keine Ein-
mischung in österreichische Angelegenheiten vornehmen, wir wünschen auch, daß 
dies niemand tun möge. Es mag dies eine bloße Deklaration sein, aber jede Dekla-
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ration, die ausgesprochen wird, muß auch durch die Tat unterstrichen werden. Jeder 
will nachprüfen, ob den Worten die Taten folgen. Darin liegt für niemand etwas 
Beleidigendes. Wenn wir kritisch untersuchen, so haben wir den Eindruck, daß Sie 
keinen Grund haben, uns Vorwürfe zu machen. Wenn etwas gegen uns vorliegt, 
bitte ich es in freundschaftlicher Weise zu sagen. Dies ist eine sehr wichtige Be-
dingung und Voraussetzung dafür, daß sich kein Unmut anhäuft. Man soll Gefühle 
nicht verbergen, sondern sofort aussprechen. Ich habe schon gestern gesagt, daß die 
Erklärung der Neutralität durch das österreichische Parlament große Bedeutung im 
internationalen Leben hat. Es ist dies ein großer Beitrag des österreichischen Volkes 
zur Sache des Friedens. Wir haben dies geschätzt und schätzen es jetzt noch. Da ich 
aber mit Ihnen in freundschaftlichem Gespräch beisammen bin und kein Diplomat 
sein will, kann ich als Gast offener sagen, was ich denke. Wir sind mit einigen Taten 
und Worten Österreichs in der letzten Periode nicht ganz zufrieden. Wir schreien 
nicht, weil wir nicht die Beziehungen verschlechtern wollen und hoffen, daß dies 
alles nur vorübergehend ist und daß gewisse Dinge wieder beseitigt werden, wenn 
sich die Kontakte bessern. Einige dieser Fragen betreffen die Beziehungen zur So-
wjetunion direkt. Sie sind mit der Neutralität verbunden. Ihre Neutralität ist noch 
jung. Sie befindet sich erst in Stadium der Reife.
Uns hat der Zwischenfall an der Grenze mit dem sowjetischen Soldaten sehr 
mißfallen. Wir verstehen schon, daß solche Unfälle vorkommen können, es ging 
uns aber sehr nahe, daß der österreichische Gendarm nicht nur nicht bestraft, son-
dern noch ausgezeichnet wurde. Ich denke, daß dies nicht in Interesse des öster-
reichischen Volkes und seiner Beziehungen zu uns gelegen ist. Ungarn ist sowohl 
unser wie auch Ihr Nachbar. Wir haben engere Beziehungen zu Ungarn als Sie 
auf Grund des Warschauer Paktes, wir sind mit unseren Militäreinheiten nahe an 
Ihrer Grenze postiert. Es ist uns daher nicht ganz gleichgültig, welche Beziehungen 
Sie zu Ungarn haben. Aber es ist für uns sehr wichtig, daß sich die Beziehungen 
zwischen Ihnen und Ungarn wieder bessern. Wir wollen die Interessen des österrei-
chischen Volkes verstehen und sie auch wahrnehmen. Wir können nicht verstehen, 
welches Interesse Österreich haben sollte, sich in ungarische Angelegenheiten ein-
zumengen. Die Ereignisse in Ungarn waren eine große Sache und wir wollen ihre 
Ursachen hier nicht weiter untersuchen. Eines kann man aber sagen, nämlich daß 
gewisse österreichische leitende Organe, besonders die Polizei, sich hätten ruhiger 
betragen können.
Wenn man vom Standpunkt der Neutralität ausgeht, dann hat Österreich eini-
ge Schritte unternommen, die wir nicht billigen konnten. Solche Schritte waren 
die Untersagung des Weltgewerkschaftsbundes und des Weltfriedensrates. Bei uns 
kann niemand glauben, daß diese Organisationen eine Bedrohung der Souveränität 
Österreichs bedeutet haben. Man sagt bei uns eher, daß dies eine amerikanische 
Einstellung der Österreicher war. Ich hoffe, daß Minister Helmer meine Worte nicht 
so auffaßt, daß wir uns in innere österreichische Angelegenheiten einmengen. Ich 
hoffe, daß niemand daran zweifelt, daß wir von Österreich nichts wollen. Wir wol-
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len nur, daß Österreich unabhängig und neutral bleibt und Beziehungen zu allen 
Ländern pflegt. Wir wollen Österreich nicht in irgendeinem Block sehen, weil Ös-
terreichs Rolle als neutraler Staat für den Frieden nützlicher ist als irgendetwas 
anderes. Es ist nicht richtig, daß der Osten keine Beziehungen zum Westen haben 
wolle und einen eisernen Vorhang aufrichte. Wir lassen Leute von allen Ländern 
zu uns herein, auch solche, die gegen uns eingestellt sind. Viele von ihnen, die als 
Gegner zu uns kommen, kehren zurück als weniger heftige Gegner.
Die Ereignisse in Ägypten und Ungarn haben den Prozeß der Entspannung der 
Weltlage unterbrochen. Aber jede schlechte Sache hat auch ihre guten Seiten. So 
haben auch diese Ereignisse eine Probe aufs Exempel gemacht, ob ein Frieden 
von Seiten Amerikas und Rußlands gewünscht wird oder nicht. Wenn eines die-
ser beiden Länder den Krieg gewollt hätte, wäre ein neues Inferno unvermeidlich 
gewesen. Aber beide haben sich überzeugt, daß keiner von ihnen den Krieg wolle, 
und das dient nun dazu, daß der unterbrochene Prozeß wieder fortgesetzt werden 
kann. Das State Department hat den Austausch von Delegationen wieder aufge-
nommen. Auch die Engländer haben wieder begonnen, die Kontakte wieder [sic] 
aufzunehmen. Wir ergreifen alle Maßnahmen, um die Entspannung zu verstärken 
und unsere Bemühungen in der Frage der Abrüstung sind wohl genügend bekannt, 
ebenso wie die Vorschläge von unserer Seite. Man hat uns früher beschuldigt, daß 
unsere Vorschläge nur propagandistischer Natur seien, aber diese Beschuldigungen 
erhebt heute niemand mehr. Man sieht nun doch ein, daß unsere Vorschläge doch 
[sic] ernsthaft gemeint sind. Wir sind dafür, daß die Atomwaffen verboten wer-
den. Es gibt in London einen Vorschlag [von] Stassen, daß man die Erzeugung der 
Atomwaffen einstellen solle, aber die bereits vorhandenen Waffen sollen gelagert 
und die Versuche fortgesetzt werden. Wir sind der Überzeugung, daß man auch die 
vorhandenen Waffen vernichten und die Versuche einstellen muß. Die Amerikaner 
und Engländer sind anscheinend noch nicht so weit, um zu einem Abkommen ge-
langen zu können. Wir haben einseitig unsere Armee um 1,800.000 Mann gekürzt. 
Wir wären Dummköpfe, wenn wir einseitig die Atomwaffen und die Versuche ein-
stellen würden. Aber in den anderen Fragen hat man den Eindruck, daß etwas vor-
wärts geht. Man hat von westlicher Seite den Vorschlag auf Reduktion auf je l ½ 
Millionen Mann gemacht. Als wir uns einverstanden erklärt haben, hat man aber 
zurückgezogen. Jetzt schlägt Stassen eine Reduktion auf 2 ½ Millionen Mann vor 
und beantragt auch das Rüstungsbudget um 10–15 Prozent zu kürzen. Wir kön-
nen diesen Vorschlag als ungenügend nicht annehmen, aber er ist wenigstens ein 
Beweis dafür, daß man die Rüstung nicht erweitern will. Vom Westen wurde viel 
von Kontrolle gesprochen und seinerzeit der Plan [von] Baruch vorgeschlagen. Es 
ist ein positiver Schritt, daß dieser Plan zurückgezogen worden ist. Von ameri-
kanischer Seite wurde auch örtlich unbegrenzte Kontrolle durch Luftaufnahmen 
vorgeschlagen. Davon ist jetzt auch nicht mehr die Rede. Wir halten den neuen 
Vorschlag, daß man mit einer begrenzten Abrüstung in Zentraleuropa durch Re-
duzierung der Landstreitkräfte und Luftüberwachung beginnen sollte, für positiv 
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und realistisch. Wenn man mit einem großen Abrüstungsprogramm nicht begin-
nen kann, dann eben mit einem kleineren. Wenn ein Gebiet von 800 km diesseits 
und jenseits der Elbe entmilitarisiert würde und die Militärstärke verringert werden 
könnte, wäre dies ein sehr bedeutender Schritt zum Frieden. Wenn beide Blöcke 
sich mit einer solchen Land- und Luftkontrolle einverstanden erklären, so wird 
ein plötzlicher Krieg unmöglich sein. Wenn man sich davon überzeugt, daß sich 
dieser erste Schritt bewährt, kann man weitere Schritte der Entspannung gehen. Ich 
hege die Hoffnung, daß die österreichische Regierung diese unsere Bestrebungen 
mit Sympathie verfolgt, und zwar deshalb, weil viele andere Staaten dies auch tun. 
Unsere Vorschläge sind aufrichtig, sachlich und realistisch.
Bundeskanzler Ing. Raab:
Da ich von dem Rechte eines offenen Gespräches Gebrauch machen möchte, 
komme ich zunächst zurück auf unsere Gespräche in Moskau. Unser Bestreben 
war es damals, die Neutralität Österreichs in der Verfassung festzulegen. Wir haben 
bei Unterzeichnung des Staatsvertrages unserem Parlament ein Verfassungsgesetz 
vorgelegt, welches vom Parlament mit der entsprechenden Mehrheit beschlossen 
wurde. Der Gedanke der Neutralität ist heute im österreichischen Volk fest veran-
kert und es gibt wenig Gegenstimmen. Das Volk hat erkannt, daß unsere damalige 
Entscheidung eine richtige war. Es ist Pflicht der Regierung und des Volkes, sich 
strikte an dieses Verfassungsgesetz zu halten, und ich glaube auch, daß man keine 
Klagen dagegen vorbringen kann. Wir haben bei den Vereinten Nationen immer 
getrachtet, bei den Abstimmungen unserer Rolle als neutraler Staat gerecht zu wer-
den. Das werden wir auch in Zukunft so halten. Was der Herr Ministerpräsident als 
Anklagen vorgebracht hat, kann man höchstens als läßliche Sünden bezeichnen. 
Der erste Fall: Der Gendarm hat nach den österreichischen Gesetzen gehandelt, 
sein Vorgehen wurde gerichtlich genau untersucht. Die Auszeichnung hat er nicht 
wegen des Vorfalls bekommen, sondern für die Pflichterfüllung durch lange Zeit. 
Wir haben selber eine Reihe von Verlusten gehabt durch Schüsse, die von drüber 
der Grenze [sic] herübergekommen sind. Wir werden den Fall nochmals untersu-
chen und vielleicht auch den Gendarmen versetzen, um den Vorfall aus der Welt 
zu schaffen.
Was nun Ungarn anbelangt, so haben wir keinen Stacheldraht gezogen. Wir wa-
ren jahrhundertelang in einem Staat beisammen und es bestehen zwischen unseren 
Staatsbürgern viele familiäre Bindungen. Wir haben uns sehr darüber gefreut, als 
die Ungarn den Stacheldraht entfernten und als der Reiseverkehr verdichtet wur-
de. Wir haben ein innigeres Verhältnis mit Ungarn sehr begrüßt. Wir haben uns 
in keiner Weise um die inneren politischen Verhältnisse Ungarns gekümmert. Wir 
haben in der Folge festgestellt, daß im Osten verschiedene Auffassungen über den 
Kommunismus geherrscht haben und daß dies zu Wirren geführt hat. Wir haben 
den Ausbruch der Revolution in Ungarn aus den Zeitungen gelesen. Wir haben 
damals einen Appell gerichtet, die Kampfhandlungen einzustellen, weil bei der-
artigen Kämpfen immer Unschuldige zum Handkuß kommen. Wir haben keinen 
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Kontakt gehabt mit Leuten, die den Aufstand gemacht haften, wir kennen sie nicht, 
wir hatten nur plötzlich tausende und tausende Flüchtlinge aufzunehmen, die über 
die Grenze kamen. Wir wurden verschiedentlich beschuldigt, Waffen geliefert zu 
haben. Ich möchte hier klar feststellen, daß Österreich keinerlei Waffen nach Un-
garn geliefert hat.
Mikojan: Vielleicht haben aber andere Staaten das österreichische Territorium 
zu Waffenlieferungen benützt.
Bundeskanzler Raab: Nein, das war nicht der Fall. Wir haben unsere Neutra-
lität nicht verletzt. Österreich war stets bestrebt, die Flüchtlinge möglichst rasch 
von der Grenze wegzubekommen, um Zwischenfälle zu vermeiden. Es sind fast 
180.000 nach Österreich gekommen und nur ein ganz geringer Teil davon ist nach 
Ungarn zurückgekehrt. Österreich hat für die Versorgung dieser Flüchtlinge große 
finanzielle Opfer gebracht. Wir sind nach wie vor dafür, daß sich unser Verhältnis 
zu Ungarn bessert. Bei uns kann jeder in unser Land herein oder hinaus, wie er will.
Die Auflösung der zwei Organisationen erfolgte nach den österreichischen Ge-
setzen, weil sie eine einseitige Politik verfolgt haben und wir dies nicht von Öster-
reich aus geschehen lassen wollten. Es steht ihnen der Rekurs an unsere Gerichte 
offen.
Was der Herr Ministerpräsident über die Abrüstung gesagt hat, so werden Sie 
in uns immer Leute finden, die jede Abrüstung, jedes Verbot der Atomwaffen un-
terstützen werden. Wir werden keinen Anlaß vorübergehen lassen, für den Frieden 
einzutreten. Wir haben keine Atomwaffen und wollen sie auch gar nicht. Das ganze 
Problem ist eine Auseinandersetzung zwischen den beiden Blöcken, von uns wird 
immer der Ruf nach Abrüstung erklingen.
Ich mochte noch einige Bemerkungen anfügen. Es betrifft dies die Lieferun-
gen von Öl und Waren. Diese sind während der ersten zwei Jahre ordnungsge-
mäß durchgeführt worden und ich stelle mit Vergnügen fest, daß die Abnahme von 
Ihrer Seite sachlich einwandfrei erfolgt ist. Wir haben heuer im Winter Schwie-
rigkeiten mit der Heizölversorgung gehabt und danken Ihnen für Ihr Entgegen-
kommen. Was die anderen Lieferungen anbelangt, jene der 150 Millionen Dollar, 
so stelle ich fest, daß das erste Jahr voll ausgeliefert ist, das zweite ist ziemlich 
fertig, und für das dritte Jahr sind schon Aufträge für die halbe Summe hinausge-
geben worden. Die Übernahme und die Rückstellung der Wechsel erfolgte klag-
los und ziemlich rasch, wofür wir ebenfalls dankbar sind. Wir haben aber hier 
eine Bitte vorzutragen, von der ich hoffe, daß Sie sie bewilligen werden. Wir ha-
ben in der Warenlieferung außer der 1 Million Tonnen Erdöl für die Erdölgebie-
te noch weitere 200.000 Tonnen vorgesehen. Ich möchte ersuchen, ob wir nicht 
statt dieser 200.000 Tonnen andere Waren liefern könnten, weil wir im eigenen 
Lande Schwierigkeiten mit der Heizölversorgung haben. Ich habe schon gestern 
über den Handelsvertrag gesprochen, ob wir diesen nicht ausweiten könnten. Die 
Schwierigkeiten bestehen vor allem darin, daß wir nur Ware gegen Ware tauschen 
können. Rußland könnte doch auch ein wenig dafür zahlen. Zusammenfassend 
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möchte ich sagen, daß wir auf dem Boden unserer Verträge stehen, daß wir alles 
machen wollen, um den Frieden zu sichern.
Mikojan: Was die konkreten Fragen betrifft, so möchte ich sagen, daß die Auf-
klärungen nicht ganz befriedigend waren. Was der Herr Bundeskanzler über Ös-
terreichs Politik in der Zukunft gesagt hat, bin ich zufrieden. Österreich hat doch 
Interesse an der Freundschaft mit Ungarn.
Bundeskanzler Raab: Die ungarischen Minister sollen uns nicht als Schuldige 
hinstellen.
Mikojan: Wenn die Österreicher aber doch schuldig sind? Treffen Sie sich doch 
mit ihnen, damit Sie sich aussprechen können.
Bundeskanzler Raab: Sie sollen nicht Ihre Popularität auf unsere Kosten zu er-
reichen versuchen.
Mikojan: Sagen Sie es Ihnen doch.
Bundeskanzler Raab: Wir sind dafür, daß wieder normale Verhältnisse mit Un-
garn geschaffen werden.
Mikojan: Was die Lieferungsverpflichtungen anbelangt, kann ich feststellen, 
daß Österreich sie korrekt erfüllt hat und daß noch kein einziger Grund zu einer 
Kritik vorhanden war. Wir können nur für die gewissenhafte Erfüllung danken. 
Was ich aus den Veröffentlichungen über die österreichische Wirtschaft entnom-
men habe, so kann man den Eindruck gewinnen, daß sich Österreichs Wirtschaft 
günstig entwickelt hat. Je besser die Wirtschaft Österreichs und der Welt ist, desto 
sicherer ist die Sache des Friedens und desto besser unsere Beziehungen. Was die 
konkrete Frage betrifft, möchte ich sagen: durch das Abkommen ist festgesetzt 
worden, daß die Mengen und die Auswahl der Waren zu spezifizieren wären. Was 
1957 betrifft, haben wir schon planmäßig eingeteilt. Ich glaube nicht, daß man 
etwas umstoßen kann. Was nun 1958 anbelangt, halte ich es nicht für ausgeschlos-
sen, Gespräche über den Austausch von Warenpositionen durchzuführen. Was den 
Handel betrifft, entspricht er nicht den Möglichkeiten, die wir haben. Selbstkri-
tisch möchte ich sagen, daß der größere Teil der Schuld an unserer Außenhandels-
organisation liegt. Wir sollten beide Maßnahmen ergreifen, daß wir den Handel 
steigern.
Bundeskanzler Raab: Im Herbst könnten wir neue Handelsvertragsverhandlun-
gen beginnen.
Mikojan: Es wäre vorteilhafter, einen mehrjährigen Handelsvertrag abzuschlie-
ßen, da dieser stabiler ist.
Ich werde gerne meiner Regierung weitergeben, daß Österreich seine Verpflich-
tungen aus dem Staatsvertrag einhalten und seine Neutralität wahren wird.
Zum Abschluß möchte ich den Herrn Bundeskanzler offiziell einladen, nach der 
Sowjetunion zu kommen, und zwar noch heuer, wenn es aber nicht gehen sollte, im 
nächsten Jahr. Es steht ihm frei, von seinen Regierungsmitgliedern mitzunehmen, 
wen er will. Meine Einladung gilt auch für den Herrn Vizekanzler, entweder mit 
dem Herrn Bundeskanzler oder gesondert. Ich würde mich auch freuen, den Herrn 
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Außenminister bei uns begrüßen zu können und wir würden auch den Herrn Staats-
sekretär Dr. Kreisky gerne bei uns sehen
Bundeskanzler Ing. Raab: Ich danke für die freundliche Ein ladung und werde 
trachten, ihr sobald wie möglich nachzukommen.
Source: ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol., GZ. 215.864–pol/57, Z. 222.278–pol/57.
Document 2: Personal letter N. Bulganin – J. Raab,
8 January 1958
Sehr geehrter Herr Bundeskanzler!
Die Sowjetregierung richtete am 10. Dezember 1957 an die Regierung Öster-
reichs sowie an die Regierungen der anderen Mitgliedstaaten der Vereinten Natio-
nen eine Note, in der sie ihrer tiefen Besorgnis über die gegenwärtige internationale 
Lage Ausdruck verlieh und eine Reihe von Vorschlägen machte, die zur Einstellung 
des „kalten Krieges“ und des Wettrüstens sowie zur Befreiung der Völker von der 
Gefahr eines Atomkrieges beitragen sollten.
Nach diesem Appell der Sowjetregierung traten in der Weltpolitik einige Ereig-
nisse ein, die noch dringender von allen an der Erhaltung des Friedens interessierten 
Staaten schnelle Maßnahmen für die Sicherheit der Völker erfordern, damit diese 
ohne Furcht vor dem morgigen Tag leben können. Man kann doch die Tatsache nicht 
unbeachtet lassen, dass auf der Dezembertagung des NATO-Rates, obgleich sich 
auch nüchterne Stimmen bei der Beurteilung der gegenwärtigen internationalen 
Lage vernehmen ließen, Beschlüsse gefasst wurden, die eine weitere Intensivierung 
des atomaren Wettrüstens sowie die Schaffung von Atom- und Raketenbasen auf den 
Territorien der Mitgliedstaaten der NATO vorsehen. Es ist leicht einzusehen, dass 
die Durchführung dieser Beschlüsse, insbesondere die Schaf fung von Abschussba-
sen für Raketen in Italien die Souveränität und die Sicherheit des neutralen Öster-
reich ernstlich bedrohen würde. Diese Beschlüsse können nur zu einer Verschärfung 
des „kalten Krieges“, zu einer Vergrößerung der Kriegsgefahr und zu einer weiteren 
Vertiefung des gegenseitigen Misstrauens der Staaten untereinander führen.
Eine solche Entwicklung in den internationalen Beziehungen ruft bei den Völ-
kern berechtigte Beunruhigung hervor, was vor allem darin zum Ausdruck kommt, 
dass jetzt fast überall die Forderung nach notwendigen dringlichen Maßnahmen zur 
Gesundung der internationalen Lage erhoben wird.
Wir stellen mit Genugtuung fest, dass die von der Sowjetunion in ihren Noten 
an die Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten der UN unterbreiteten Vorschläge, die das 
Ziel verfolgen, durch gemeinsame Anstrengungen eine Abschwächung der inter-
nationalen Spannung zu erreichen, in vielen Ländern der Erde, darunter auch in 
Österreich, positiv aufgenommen wurden und immer ausgedehntere Unterstützung 
finden. Besonders weitgehende Anerkennung findet der Gedanke an Unterredun-
gen der Staatsmänner des Ostens und des Westens auf höchster Ebene.
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In Anbetracht dessen richtete die Sowjetregierung an die Regierungen der Mit-
gliedstaaten des Nordatlantik-Paktes und an die Teilnehmerstaaten des Warschauer 
Vertrages den Vorschlag, im Laufe der nächsten zwei bis drei Monate eine Konfe-
renz der führenden Staatsmänner unter Beteiligung der Regierungschefs abzuhal-
ten. Auf dieser Konferenz wären in erster Linie die aktuellsten und dringlichsten 
Fragen zu erörtern, wie das Problem der Abrüstung – darunter die Frage des Ver-
zichtes auf die Anwendung von Kernwaffen und der Ein stellung der Kernwaffen-
versuche –, den Abschluss eines Nicht angriffspaktes zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten 
der NATO und des Warschauer Vertrages, die Schaffung einer atomwaffenfreien 
Zone in Europa, die Einstellung der Kriegspropaganda, die Förderung der interna-
tionalen Handels-Probleme, an deren Lösung auch Staaten interessiert sind, die an 
diesen oder anderen Gruppierungen nicht beteiligt sind.
Die Sowjetregierung misst der Tatsache große Bedeutung bei, dass gegenwärtig 
eine ganze Reihe von Staaten, die militärischen Gruppierungen fernstehen und eine 
Politik der Neutralität betreiben, aktiv für eine Abschwächung der internationalen 
Spannung und für eine Regelung der ungelösten Streitfragen auf dem Verhand-
lungswege eintreten. Deshalb ist die Sowjetregierung der Ansicht, dass eine Teil-
nahme solcher Staaten an einer Konferenz führender Staatsmänner auf höchster 
Ebene einen positiven Einfluss auf den Gang der Verhandlungen und auf die Fas-
sung von Beschlüssen zur Sicherung des Friedens und der Förderung einer breiten 
internationalen Zusammenarbeit haben könnte.
Unserer Meinung nach, Herr Bundeskanzler, könnte das neutrale Österreich, 
das im Herzen Europas zwischen den beiden Mächtegruppierungen gelegen ist und 
schon allein auf Grund dieses Umstandes an der Erhaltung des Friedens interes-
siert sein muss, einen wesentlichen Beitrag zur Abschwächung der internationalen 
Spannung und zur Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens in den Beziehungen zwischen 
den Staaten leisten. Man wird daher den Worten des Herrn Bundespräsidenten 
Österreichs, A. Schärf, in seiner Neujahrsbotschaft nur beipflichten können, dass 
Österreich auf Grund seiner Neutralitätspolitik jetzt mit anderen Staaten zusam-
menarbeiten kann, „wenn es um den Dienst am Frieden geht, den die Menschheit 
so heiß ersehnt“.
Selbstverständlich sind wir uns bewusst, Herr Bundeskanzler, dass sich auf ei-
ner solchen Konferenz nicht auf einen Schlag sämtliche ungelöste Probleme, wel-
che gegenwärtig die Völker der Erde so tief beunruhigen, bereinigen lassen. Jedoch 
bestehen alle Voraussetzungen dafür, um sich über die dringlichsten Fragen zu ver-
ständigen, deren Lösung einen guten Anfang für eine Milderung der internationalen 
Spannung darstellen würde.
Wir sind der Auffassung, dass zur Erreichung dieses erhabenen Zieles am bes-
ten die Einberufung einer Konferenz auf der Ebene der Regierungschefs beitragen 
würde, die, mit weitgehenden Vollmachten ausgestattet, mit dem größten Erfolg die 
akuten Fragen, welche die internationale Läge komplizieren, erörtern und die not-
wendigen Bedingungen für die Wiederherstellung des Vertrauens und die Sicherung 
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eines dauerhaften Friedens schaffen könnten. Eine Konferenz der Regierungschefs 
ist umso zweckmäßiger, als keine Sicherheit darüber besteht, dass die Einberufung 
einer Konferenz auf Außenministerebene zu positiven Resultaten führen würde, 
da bereits jetzt einige in Betracht kommende Teilnehmer an einer Konferenz auf 
solcher Ebene sich gegen Verhandlungen aussprechen.
Zusammen mit diesem Schreiben übermittle ich Ihnen, Herr Bundeskanzler, die 
Vorschläge der Sowjetregierung zu den Problemen der Abschwächung der interna-
tionalen Spannung, die auf einer solchen Konferenz erörtert werden könnten.
Wir haben mit großer Genugtuung ihre [sic] Rede vom 5. Jänner ds. J. zur 
Kenntnis genommen, in der Sie Verhandlungen zwischen den Staaten des Westens 
und des Ostens zur Sicherung des Friedens bereits in der ersten Hälfte des Jahres 
1958 als zweckmäßig bezeichneten und erklärten, dass Österreich gern an solchen 
Verhandlungen teilnehmen würde. Diese Ihre Äußerung berechtigt zu der Hoff-
nung, dass die österreichische Regierung die Vorschläge der Sowjetregierung mit 
entsprechender Aufmerksamkeit prüfen, einer Teilnahme an der vorgeschlagenen 
Konferenz der Staatsmänner günstig gegenüberstehen und an der Einberufung und 




Уважаемый господин Федеральный Канцлер,
Советское правительство обратилось 10 декабря 1957 года к правительству 
Австрии, так же как и к правительствам других стран-членов ООН, с нотой, 
в которой выразило свою глубокую озабоченность нынешним состоянием 
международной обстановки и внесло ряд предложений, направленных к тому, 
чтобы содейство вать прекращению „холодной войны“, прекращению гонки 
вооруже ний и избавлению народов от угрозы атомной войны.
После этого обращения Советского правительства в мире про изошли 
события, которые еще более настоятельно требуют от всех государств, 
заинтересованных в сохранении мира, принятия неот ложных мер по 
обеспечению безопасности народов с тем, чтобы они могли жить без страха 
за свой завтрашний день. Ведь нельзя пройти мимо того факта, что на 
декабрьской сессии Совета Северо атлантического союза, хотя и раздавались 
трезвые голоса при оценке существующей международной обстановки, 
однако вместе с тем были приняты решения, предусматривающие дальнейшее 
усиление гон ки ядерных вооружений, создания атомных и ракетных баз на 
тер риториях государств-членов НАТО. Нетрудно видеть, что осущест вление 
этих решений, в частности, создание площадок для запуска ракет в Италии, 
подвергало бы серьезной угрозе суверенитет и безопасность нейтральной 
Австрии. Эти решения не могут не вести к обострению „холодной войны“, 
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усилению военной опасности и дальнейшему усилению взаимного недоверия 
государств друг к другу.
Такое развитие в международных отношениях вызывает закон ную тревогу 
у народов, что находит свое выражение прежде всего, в том, что сейчас 
почти повсеместно выдвигаются требования, о необходимости принять 
безотлагательные меры по оздоровлению между народной обстановки.
Мы с удовлетворением констатируем, что предложения, вы двинутые 
Советским Союзом в нотах правительствам стран-членов ООН, имеющие 
целью общими усилиями достигнуть ослабления между народной 
напряженности, были встречены положительно и находят сейчас все более 
широкую поддержку во многих странах мира, в том числе и в Австрии. 
Особенно широкое признание встречает идея переговоров государственных 
деятелей Востока и Запада на самом высоком уровне.
Учитывая это, Советское правительство направило правительствам 
государств-членов Северо-атлантического союза и государств-участников 
Варшавского договора предложение провести в течение ближайших двух-
трех месяцев совещание руководящих деятелей го сударств с участием глав 
правительств. На совещании предлагается обсудить в первую очередь наиболее 
актуальные и назревшие во просы, такие как проблема разоружения, в том 
числе вопросы об отказе от применения ядерного оружия и о прекращении 
его испы таний, заключение пакта о ненападении между государствами-
участ никами НАТО и Варшавского договора, создание в Европе зоны, сво-
бодной от атомного оружия, прекращение пропаганды войны, содей ствие 
развитию международной торговли и некоторые другие вопро сы, в решении 
которых заинтересованы также и государства, не участвующие в тех или иных 
группировках.
Советское правительство придает большое значение тому, что в настоящее 
время целый ряд государств, стоящих в стороне от военных группировок 
и проводящих политику нейтралитета, активно выступает за ослабление 
международной напряженности, за урегули рование нерешенных спорных 
вопросов путем переговоров. Вот по чему Советское правительство считает, 
что участие таких госу дарств в совещании руководящих деятелей на самом 
высоком уров не могло бы оказать положительное влияние на ход переговоров 
и принятие решений, имеющих целью обеспечение мира и развитие широкого 
международного сотрудничества.
По нашему мнению, господин Канцлер, нейтральная Австрия, которая 
расположена в центре Европы между двумя группировками держав, и уже 
в силу одного этого не может быть не заинтересованa в сохранении мира, 
своим участием в этом совещании могла бы внести существенный вклад 
в дело по ослаблению международной напряженно сти и восстановления 
доверия в отношениях между государствами. Нельзя не присоединиться 
поэтому к словам Федерального Президента Австрии господина А.Шерфа в 
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его новогоднем послании, что Австрия в результате проведения ею политики 
нейтралитета может теперь со трудничать с другими государствами, „если 
речь идет о службе делу мира, которого страстно желает человечество“.
Разумеется, господин Канцлер, мы отдаем себе отчет в том, что на таком 
совещании невозможно решить за один раз все неуре гулированные проблемы, 
глубоко волнующие ныне народы мира. Однако имеются все предпосылки, 
чтобы договориться по наиболее неотлож ным вопросам, решение которых 
положило бы хорoшее начало ослабле нию международной напряженности.
Мы полагаем, что достижению этой благородной цели лучше всего 
содействовал бы созыв совещания на уровне глав правительств которые, 
обладая широкими полномочиями, смогли бы с наибольшим успехом 
подвергнуть обсуждению назревшие вопросы, осложняющие международную 
обстановку, и создать необходимые условия для вос становления доверия 
и обеспечения прочного мира. Совещание глав правительств тем более 
целесообразно, поскольку нет уверенности в том, что созыв совещания на 
уровне министров иностранных дел приведет к положительным результатам, 
имея в виду, что уже теперь некоторые возможные участники совещания на 
таком уровне высказы ваются против переговоров.
С этим письмом я направляю Вам, господин Канцлер, предложе-
ния Советского правительства по вопросам ослабления международ ной 
напряженности, которые могли бы быть обсуждены на таком сове щании.
Мы с большим удовлетворением ознакомились с Вашей речью от 5 
января с.г., в которой Вы говорите о целесообразности проведе ния уже в 
первой половине 1958 года переговоров между государства ми Запада и 
Востока по обеспечению прочного мира и заявляете, что Австрия будет 
охотно участвовать в таких переговорах. Это Ваше выступление позволяет 
надеяться, что правительство Австрии с долж ным вниманием изучит 
предложения Советского правительства, благожелательно отнесется к 
участию в предлагаемом совещании государственных деятелей и со своей 
стороны будет содейство вать созыву и успеху такого совещания.
С искренним уважением, 
Н. Булганин
8 января 1958 года.
Source: ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol., GZ. 227.665–pol/57, Z. 227.678–pol/57; GZ. 544.297–pol/58, 
Z. 544.588–pol/58.
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Document 3: Conversation N. Khrushchev – A. Schärf and
B. Kreisky, Moscow, 13 October 1959
Amtsvermerk über Mitteilungen des Herrn Bundesministers betreffend Be-
sprechungen zwischen dem Herrn Bundespräsidenten und Ministerpräsidenten 
Chrusch tschow vom 13. Oktober 1959. 
Das Gespräch, das nur für etwa 20–30 Minuten vorgesehen war, dauerte mehr 
als eineinhalb Stunden. Es enthielt viele positive Aspekte. Der Ministerpräsident 
befleißigte sich eines sehr maßvollen und überhaupt nicht agitierenden Tones.
Diskutiert wurden folgende Themata:
1. Österreichische Neutralität.
Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow warf der österreichischen Delegation vor, 
daß Österreich seine Neutralität einseitig auslege, weil es die DDR nicht aner-
kannt hat.
Darauf erklärte der Herr Bundesminister, daß es sich bei Neutralität um kein 
absolutes Prinzip handle, im übrigen Österreich in Übereinstimmung mit den Mos-
kauer Vereinbarungen dem Beispiel der Schweiz folge, die diplomatische Bezie-
hungen auch nur mit der BRD und nicht mit der DDR unterhalte. Beide Staaten ha-
ben lange gemeinsame Grenzen mit der BRD, die allen jenen Staaten, die Pankow 
anerkennen, mit dem Abbruch diplomatischer Beziehungen gedroht habe. Dies 
könne sich jedoch weder die Schweiz noch Österreich leisten, beide Staaten folgen 
in dieser Frage dem Utilitätsprinzip.
Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow erklärte hierauf, daß die BRD eine Botschaft 
in Moskau unterhalte, obwohl die Sowjetunion mit der DDR diplomatische Bezie-
hungen habe, worauf der Herr Bundesminister replizierte, daß Bonn sich gegenüber 
der Sowjetunion eben aus dem Utilitätsprinzip eine Ausnahme von seiner übrigen 
außenpolitischen Praxis gemacht habe; hierauf erklärte der sowjetische Minister-
präsident lachend, er wolle die Sache nicht bis zur völligen Klarheit weiterführen.
2. Deutschlandproblem.
Nach Ansicht Ministerpräsident Chruschtschows ist für die Sowjetunion eine 
Lösung in Europa nur akzeptabel, wenn einem bürgerlichen Westdeutschland ein 
sozialistisches Ostdeutschland gegenübersteht, die miteinander einen Wettstreit 
auf dem Gebiete der friedlichen Koexistenz führen. Auf diese Art soll der Klas-
senkampf in Deutschland weitergeführt werden. Man werde bis auf weiteres mit 
zwei deutschen Staaten rechnen müssen. Als Realist müsste man annehmen, daß 
kein Staat den anderen von der Überlegenheit seines Systems überzeugen kön-
ne. Chruschtschow erklärte etwa wörtlich: „Wir sind Kommunisten. Glauben Sie 
denn wirklich, daß wir ein Land, das sich wie die DDR im Prozeß der sozialisti-
schen Umwandlung befindet, wieder ausliefern werden? Es ist doch undenkbar, 
daß wir die DDR nicht unterstützen werden.“ (Nach Besprechungen von Camp 
Davis [recte: Camp David] bestehe keine Aussicht auf Wiedervereinigung. Der 
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gegenwärtige status quo in Deutschland werde bis auf weiteres perpetuiert wer-
den.*) 21
Bezüglich des Berliner Problems erklärte Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow, daß 
diese Frage ohne Gewalt und unter Berücksichtigung des Prestiges aller Beteiligten 
gelöst werden müsse. Der Osten sei bereit, den zwei Millionen Westberlinern alle 
Garantien, beispielsweise auch im Rahmen der UNO, zu geben. Es müsse jedoch 
das Prinzip anerkannt werden, daß das Territorium Westberlins als Teil der DDR 
angesehen werde [sic]. Bonn habe in Westberlin nicht zu suchen. Daß Westberlin 
als ein Teil der BRD betrachtet werde, sei völlig unannehmbar.
Die Sowjetunion werde versuchen, mit beiden Deutschland einen Friedensver-
trag zu schließen. Falls dies jedoch nicht möglich sein sollte, werde die Sowjetuni-
on einen Vertrag mit der DDR allein schließen und erwarte, daß diesem Friedens-
vertrag auch die anderen Mächte beitreten werden. Chruschtschow hofft, daß die 
Westmächte in dieser Beziehung nicht dieselben Dummheiten machen werden wie 
Molotow bezüglich des japanischen Friedensvertrages, dem die Sowjetunion be-
kanntlich nicht beigetreten ist und in dem nach Ansicht Chruschtschows eigentlich 
nichts enthalten sei, was die Sowjetunion nicht unterschreiben hätte können. Im ge-
genwärtigen Zeitpunkt sei allerdings ein Betritt der Sowjetunion zum japanischen 
Friedensvertrag äußerst schwierig.
3. Österreichischer Staatsvertrag.
Außer dem oben erwähnten Angriff gegen Molotow in Angelegenheit des japa-
nischen Friedensvertrages sprach Chruschtschow auch im Zusammenhang mit dem 
Abschluß des österreichischen Staatsvertrages über seine Gegensätze zu Molotow. 
Chruschtschow habe Molotow etwa zweite Hälfte 1954 gefragt, ob er (Molotow) 
den Krieg wünsche, denn nur unter dieser Voraussetzung könne sich Chruscht-
schow die weitere Anwesenheit sowjetischer Truppen in Österreich, die einen Keil 
in der Richtung Frankreich vortreiben, erklären. Es habe in der Folge eine große in-
nerpolitische Auseinandersetzung gegeben. (Chruschtschow ist der Mann, der den 
österreichischen Staatsvertrag gebracht hat+). 
4. Abrüstung.
Chruschtschow sprach über die Sinnlosigkeit des Weiterrüstens. (Nach Ansicht 
des Herrn Bundesministers decken sich die Anschauungen Chruschtschows über 
das beiderseitige Vernichtungspotential mit denen der führenden Staatmänner der 
USA.) Chruschtschow habe Eisenhower mitgeteilt, daß er mit dem relativ geringen 
Aufwand von 30 Milliarden Rubel genügend atomare und thermonukleare Waffen 
erzeugen könne, um damit den Westen zu vernichten. Chruschtschow brachte die-
 *) Aus meinen Aufzeichnungen geht nicht eindeutig hervor, ob es sich bei diesem Klammersatz 
um eine Mitteilung Chruschtschows an die österreichische Delegation oder um eine persönliche 
Lagebeurteilung des Herrn Bundesministers handelt. [Footnote in the original].
 +) Auch bei diesem Satz bin ich mir nicht im klaren, ob es sich hiebei um eine Äußerung Chru-
schtschows oder eine Bemerkung des Herrn Bundesministers über Chruschtschow gehandelt hat. 
[Footnote in the original].
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se Zahl in eine Relation mit den im Laufe des Siebenjahresplanes zu erzielenden 
Einsparungen auf dem Energiesektor durch die Umstellung von Kohle auf Erdgas. 
Chruschtschow führte weiter aus, daß der gegenseitige Sättigungsgrad an atomaren 
Rüstungen bald erreicht sei und daher für die Großmächte das Aufrüsten bzw. die 
Erhaltung des Vernichtungspotentials immer billiger und nicht teurer kommen wer-
de. Hingegen werden die Rüstungen auf dem konventionellen Sektor teuerer und 
nicht etwa billiger werden.
Eiselsberg, m.p.
Source: ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol., GZ. 236.711–pol/59, Z. 249.522–pol/59.
Document 4: Conversation A. Gorbach – N. Khrushchev, Moscow, 29 June 1962
Protokoll über die Unterredung einer österreichischen Regierungsdelegation unter 
Führung von Bundeskanzler Dr. Alfons Gorbach mit dem sowjetischen Minister-




















Leiter der 3. Europäischen Abteilung Ilitschow
Leiter der Presseabteilung im Außenministerium Samjatin
Botschafter Awilow
Botschaftsrat Iljuchin, 3. Europäische Abteilung
Beginn der Unterredung: 10 Uhr
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Ende der Unterredung: 13 Uhr
Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow: Ich möchte zuerst unseren Gästen das Wort 
erteilen. Sie können sprechen, so viel sie wollen und was sie wollen. Das ist die 
sozialistische Demokratie.
Bundeskanzler Gorbach: Wir sind zu Ihnen gekommen, weil wir den Wunsch 
hatten, uns mit Ihnen bekannt zu machen und die Kontakte meines Vorgängers 
fortzusetzen. 
Wir haben keine Wünsche vorzubringen, aber wenn wir einen haben, so ist es 
der, daß das Vertrauensverhältnis, das zwischen Österreich und Rußland besteht, 
nicht erschüttert wird, sondern durch diese Aussprache eine Unterstreichung er-
fährt.
Ich glaube, daß diesem Vertrauen am besten gedient ist, wenn man alle Fragen 
mit aller Offenheit bespricht, damit man weiß, wie man dran ist und das Gefühl der 
Ehrlichkeit sich der anderen Seite mitteilt. 
Ich würde es sehr begrüßen und möchte den Herrn Ministerpräsidenten bitten, 
uns seine Meinung über die weltpolitische Lage zu entwickeln, da dies von großem 
Interesse für uns wäre. Sodann möchten wir einige Fragen besprechen, die unsere 
eigenen Interessen berühren, soweit auf sowjetischer Seite Fragen bestehen, sind 
wir bereit, alle diese zu diskutieren. 
Chruschtschow: Wir schätzen eine solche Stellungnahme sehr, in der Sie sagen, 
daß Sie die guten Beziehungen zwischen unseren beiden Staaten hochhalten. Wir 
haben, wie Sie wissen, die besten Gefühle für das österreichische Volk und stellen 
auch keinerlei Ansprüche gegenüber dem österreichischen Volk, mit Ausnahme ei-
nes einzigen Anspruches: in Frieden und Freundschaft zu leben und daß Österreich 
neutral bleibe und dementsprechend seine Politik führe, sowohl innen- als auch 
außenpolitisch, um auf diese Weise die Neutralität zu stärken und dem Frieden zu 
dienen.
Wenn Sie den Wunsch äußern, daß wir zuerst unsere Meinung über die interna-
tionale Lage darlegen, so sind wir damit einverstanden. Dieser Wunsch entspringt, 
wie mir scheint, dem Standpunkt der Neutralität.
Ich habe sohin mit zwei Kapitalisten zu tun, ich begann die Kontakte mit ihrem 
Vorgänger Raab, der von sich sagte, er sei ein ganz kleiner Kapitalist, und nun mit 
Ihnen, Herr Bundeskanzler, der Sie sein Werk fortsetzen.
Ich werde mich bemühen, die internationale Lage so darzustellen, wie ich sie 
sehe. Es ist dies nicht meine persönliche Meinung, sondern dieser Standpunkt ist 
auch jener der sowjetischen Regierung.
Wie soll man nun an die Beurteilung der internationalen Lage herangehen? Ich 
glaube, man kann von einer guten und einer schlechten Seite ausgehen.
Das schlechte ist, daß sich die Teilung der Welt immer mehr vertieft. Die Gren-
zen zeichnen sich immer stärker ab und die Kräfte auf beiden Seiten wachsen im-
mer mehr. Was aber alarmierend und gefährlich ist, ist, daß ein solcher Streit wohl 
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nicht in eine militärische Auseinandersetzung münden könnte, wo der eine Teil ge-
winnen und der andere Teil verlieren würde. Denn heute sind die modernen Mittel 
des Krieges auf die völlige Vernichtung gerichtet. Wenn früher vielleicht der Krieg 
so geführt wurde, wie Sie es gestern im Ballett sahen, wo man mit dem Messer 
durch persönliche Geschicklichkeit einige Feinde überwinden konnte, heute kön-
nen ganze Millionen Menschen vernichtet werden.
Unsere Experten sagen hinsichtlich der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die sich 
am aggressivsten gegenüber den sozialistischen Ländern gebärdet, daß eine 50 
Millionen-Tonnen-Bombe das ganze Land vernichten könne. Dieselbe Lage be-
steht hinsichtlich Frankreich, Italien und anderen Ländern. Auf der anderen Seite 
gibt es dieselben Mittel der Vernichtung. Der Unterschied ist nur, daß bei uns in 
irgendwelchen Urwaldwinkeln irgendwelche Menschen überbleiben würden. Bei 
den Franzosen, Deutschen und Engländern würde nichts überbleiben.
Amerika ist heute nicht mehr das ferne Land über dem Ozean. Wir können Mil-
lionen-Tonnen-Bomben auf Amerika werfen und alle Industrie- und Verwaltungs-
zentren vernichten. Die amerikanischen Militärs sagen eine Dummheit, wenn sie 
behaupten, daß wir weniger Bomber haben als sie. Wir werden bald überhaupt kei-
ne Bomber mehr haben, da diese Waffe schon veraltet ist, wie etwa die Kavallerie 
gegenüber den Tanks. Als ob wir nicht verstünden, daß unsere Flugzeuge nicht bis 
in die USA gelangen können, ebenso gelangen die amerikanischen Flugzeuge nicht 
bis in die UdSSR. Die Raketen jedoch gelangen ans Ziel. Obwohl wir bereits die 
Möglichkeit haben, Raketen abzuschießen, können wir nicht behaupten, daß dies 
eine 100%ige Möglichkeit ist. Darum ist die Raketenwaffe noch immer eine furcht-
bare Waffe. Wir haben solche Vorräte an Nuklearwaffen und Raketen, daß mit ei-
nem Schlag Europa und alle Länder mit NATO-Basen vernichtet werden können. 
Wir nehmen das schlimmste an und halten uns deshalb nicht für unverletzlich. Wir 
nehmen daher an, daß auch der Gegner über solche Vernichtungswaffen verfügt.
Bei einer solchen Lage wäre es angebracht, Verständnis und Vernunft zu zeigen. 
Diese Vernunft sehen wir bisher nicht. Das Wettrüsten geht weiter, die Atomtests 
werden weitergeführt und es ist so, daß durch die Fortsetzung dieser Tests durch die 
Amerikaner auch wir dazu gezwungen sind.
Sie stellen uns unakzeptable Bedingungen für die Einstellung der Tests. Die 
nationalen Mittel, die Versuche zu überwachen und zu verfolgen, sind ausrechend. 
Die Amerikaner wollen Inspektoren in unser Land schicken, das können wir frei-
lich nicht akzeptieren.
Seit dem Ende des Weltkrieges sind 17 Jahre vergangen und es gibt noch keinen 
Friedensvertrag mit Deutschland. Die Verhandlungen, die wir mit den USA in die-
ser Frage geführt haben, haben keine schlechten Ergebnisse erzielt und gegenseiti-
ges Verständnis gefunden. Es bleibt nur eine Frage: West-Berlin.
Wir sind der Meinung, daß in der Frage West-Berlin solche Bedingungen ge-
schaffen werden müssen, die zur Entspannung zwischen Ost und West führen, und 
dafür müßte eine freie Stadt Berlin geschaffen werden und die Besatzungstrup-
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pen abgezogen werden. West-Berlin ist heute ein Zankapfel und vom militärischen 
Gesichtspunkt für den Westen kein Vorteil, auch wenn dort Truppen stehen. Die 
12.000 Mann, die heute dort sind, haben keine militärische Bedeutung. Folglich 
will der Westen diesen Brückenkopf für aggressive Handlungen gegen den Osten 
behalten. Der Freund unseres österreichisches Gastes, Herr Brandt, treibt eine völ-
lig unvernünftige Politik. Seine Reden sind unvernünftig. In seiner letzten Rede 
spricht er von einem Seelenkrieg. Wie uns ein Repräsentant der Bundesrepublik 
sagte, trocknet West-Berlin aus, und wenn die internationale Spannung bleibt, hat 
West-Berlin keine Aussicht auf Entfaltung. Es bedarf eines Zuflusses an Kapital. 
Man muß den Bewohnern Zuversicht geben, daß sie leben können. Wenn die drei 
westlichen Okkupationsmächte bleiben, sind wir gezwungen, eine Politik zu füh-
ren, die unserer Unzufriedenheit Ausdruck gibt.
In Berlin gibt es mehr Todesfälle als Geburten. Das Kapital fließt ab, die Intelli-
genz sieht keine Möglichkeiten und wandert ab. Der Westen behauptet, eine solche 
Politik sei im Interesse der West-Berliner. Das Gegenteil ist der Fall. Es ist gegen 
die Interessen der West-Berliner und dient nur den Interessen der aggressiven re-
vanchistischen Kreise. Das ist die Lage zwischen Ost und West.
Wir sind noch eine gewisse Zeit lang bereit, Gespräche über diese Fragen zu 
führen. Doch die Plattform dafür wird immer enger und enger. Man kann sagen, 
daß sie bereits sehr eng geworden ist. Wir sind mit dem Verbleiben von Militär in 
West-Berlin nicht einverstanden. Wir werden den Friedensvertrag unterzeichnen, 
und die militärische Verbindung mit West-Berlin abbrechen. Wir werden keine 
Blockade erklären, die Verbindung für den Transport von Lebensmitteln und die 
übrige Versorgung wird bleiben. Unsererseits wird die Nichteinmischung gewahrt 
bleiben.
Man droht uns mit Krieg. Ich glaube, daß diese Drohung unbedacht ist. Der 
Westen kann uns nicht drohen und sagen, wir werden euch bei den Ohren nehmen, 
wenn ihr den Vertrag unterzeichnet, dafür ist ihre Hand zu kurz. Wir haben selbst 
eine längere Hand.
Unsere Position ist folgende: Liquidierung der Überreste des Weltkrieges. Wir 
kämpfen für eine Unterzeichnung des Friedensvertrages. Das ist die moralische 
Seite, eine sehr starke Seite. Und wenn wir den Friedensvertrag unterzeichnet ha-
ben, so würden die anderen durch unsere Truppen, die an der Grenze stehen, durch-
brechen müssen. Das heißt, daß sie die Aggressoren sein werden.
Wenn die anderen, wie sie sagen, zwei Millionen Menschen verteidigen wollen 
und dafür die ganze Welt in einen Nuklearkrieg stürzen wollen, dann ist klar, wel-
che Seite im Recht und welche im Unrecht ist. Ich kann freilich für Verrückte keine 
Garantie übernehmen. Vielleicht hat der Westen bereits den Verstand verloren und 
beginnt einen Krieg. Aber eines stärkt uns in unserer Auffassung: Wenn uns der 
Westen droht mit dem Krieg, dann wird er selbst die Früchte ernten.
Jetzt zur Frage der Abrüstung:
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Wir sind in aufrichtigster Weise bereit, auf die Abrüstung einzugehen. Aber die 
Amerikaner wollen keine Abrüstung sondern eine Kontrolle der Rüstung. Wir sind 
gegen das. Wir sind für kontrollierte Abrüstung, aber gegen eine Kontrolle der Rüs-
tung. Wenn wir eine Kontrolle der Rüstung sowohl von der einen als auch von der 
anderen Seite haben, wird der Krieg noch früher beginnen. Jetzt wissen wir nicht 
genau, worüber der Westen verfügt, und der Westen weiß nicht genau, worüber 
wir verfügen. Wir lesen diverses Geschwätz über das, was wir angeblich haben. 
In Wirklichkeit wissen sie im Westen einen Dreck darüber, ebenso wenig wissen 
wir. Das ist nicht schlecht, das müssen wir so beibehalten. Wenn wir es wissen 
würden, so würden beide Seiten versuchen, ihre militärischen Kräfte nachzuziehen, 
um den anderen zu übertreffen. Das ist unvermeidlich, und vielleicht liegt auch 
die Versuchung darin, von irgend einer Seite den Krieg zu beginnen. MacNamara 
hat unlängst eine Auffassung vertreten, die keiner Kritik standhält. Er sagte, daß 
man bei einem Nuklearkrieg die Bomben nicht auf Städte und Industriezentren 
werden solle, sondern nur auf militärische Ziele. Was heißt das, etwa, daß man 
auf Enten schießen soll? Es handelt sich doch um Atom- und Wasserstoffbomben. 
Diese haben einen unglaublichen Wirkungsradius. Woher sollte ich auch wissen, 
wo die Rüstungszentren der Amerikaner liegen und ebenso kann auch die andere 
Seite nicht wissen, wo wir unsere Zentren haben. Wir wissen, wo Washington, New 
York, Chikago [sic], Pittsburgh usw. liegen. Wenn also ein Krieg beginnt, kann man 
die Amerikaner nicht von dem Versuch abhalten, einen Schlag auf die Lebenszen-
tren zu führen. Daher ist die Auffassung von MacNamara eine Art Schlafmittel 
für die öffentliche Meinung. Was MacNamara gesagt hat, dient dazu, um die Psy-
chologie der Öffentlichkeit an die Möglichkeit eines Kernkrieges zu gewöhnen, 
und den Kampf der Öffentlichkeit gegen eine solche Aggression zu schwächen. 
Der Mensch soll an den Gedanken gewöhnt werden, daß dieser Krieg gar nicht so 
furchtbar sei. Das ist ein sehr gefährlicher Weg, und wir werden ihn entlarven.
Obzwar die Presse des Westens behauptet, daß die Hand des Westens zu einem 
gentlemen’s-agreement entgegengestreckt sei, halten wird das für etwas anderes. 
Wenn einmal ein Krieg entsteht, wird er umfassend sein und alles vernichten. Das 
ist die Situation, sie zeigt ein bewölktes Bild. Aber sie hat auch eine gute Seite für 
uns, da die Amerikaner keine Übermacht haben. Wir haben dieselben Waffen und 
auch in derselben Menge, wie unser Gegner, und was die Raketenwaffen betrifft, 
sind wir überlegen. Unsere militärische Grundlage basiert auf Raketen und nicht 
auf Bombenflugzeugen, wie im Westen.
Unsere Aussichten im wirtschaftlichen Wettbewerb mit dem Westen sind hoff-
nungsreich. Das ökonomische Wachstum ist größer bei uns als im Westen. Der 
Westen verliert von Jahr zu Jahr Positionen, wir wachsen und gewinnen. Doch das 
ist weder für den Westen noch für den Osten gefährlich. Das ist friedlicher Wettbe-
werb, das ist Koexistenz. Das ist der Kampf zweier Systeme, welches von beiden 
produktiver ist, welches siegen wird.
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Dieser Sieg geht nicht über die Leichen der Menschen. Im Gegenteil: bei die-
sem Kampf erzielt jede Seite Gewinn, weil sowohl der Kapitalismus als auch der 
Sozialismus wachsen wird. Doch unsere Tempi der Entwicklung sind größer. Die-
sen Wettbewerb halten wir für vernünftig. Der Westen zeigt jedoch diese Vernunft 
nicht und versteht sie auch nicht. Der Westen führt eine Politik der Diskriminierung 
in den wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen. Der Amerikaner treibt mit uns faktisch kei-
nen Handel. Ist das vernünftig? Jetzt betreiben die europäischen Länder die Poli-
tik des Gemeinsamen Marktes. Auch das ist Diskriminierung. Hier gibt es wenige 
wirtschaftliche Hebel, sondern es sind Hebel, die im Interesse einer politischen 
Aggression in Bewegung gesetzt wurden. Man kann auch Handel treiben ohne Ge-
meinsamen Markt. Ein wirklich gemeinsamer allgemeiner Markt, dessen Grenzen 
die unseres Planeten sind, für einen solchen gemeinsamen Markt sind wir. Wir sind 
jedoch gegen einen gemeinsamen Markt, der durch politische Ziele beschränkt ist. 
Das ist eine heilige Allianz gegen die Länder des Sozialismus. Man versucht es 
schönzufärben mit der Behauptung, er hätte nur wirtschaftliche Ziele. Aber selbst 
die Organisatoren sagen, daß der politische Aspekt über den wirtschaftlichen und 
handelsmäßigen überwiegt. Wir werden mit allen uns verfügbaren Mitteln dagegen 
ankämpfen.
Was die wirtschaftliche Seite des Gemeinsamen Marktes betrifft, möchte ich 
sagen, daß wir ihn nicht fürchten. Wir vermögen Handel zu treiben und können den 
Konkurrenzkampf aushalten. Diese Seite der Frage beunruhigt uns nicht. Wir ver-
fügen sowohl über einen unermeßlichen Markt als auch über unbeschränkte Quel-
len an Rohstoffen und menschlicher Arbeitskraft. In der Frage der Entwicklung der 
Wissenschaft und Technik sind der Sowjetunion keine Grenzen gesetzt. Amerika ist 
das führende Land des Kapitalismus; doch hat es bisher bezüglich der Weltraum-
flüge nicht das erreicht, was wir erreicht haben, und Weltraumflug, das bedeutet die 
Verdichtung der Gehirnenergie. Wir sind die ersten gewesen. Amerika hat nur drei 
Erdumkreisungen gemacht, wir siebzehn. Jetzt kann man freilich das wiederholen, 
was bereits gemacht wurde. Columbus war der erste, der nach Amerika kam, nach 
ihm kamen Millionen anderer Menschen. Columbus verbleibt in der Geschichte, 
das nachherige Kommen der vielen anderen kann niemand mehr in Erstaunen ver-
setzen.
Ich sagte, daß es eine schlechte und eine gute Seite der gegenwärtigen Situa-
tion gibt. Die schlechte ist, daß wir wie auch die anderen gleichsam blind einem 
Abgrund des Krieges zustreben. Je mehr wir unsere Rüstung steigern, desto näher 
kommen wir dem Abgrund. Denn bereits jetzt haben Tausende von Menschen un-
mittelbar mit Raketen und Atombomben zu tun, und es kann jeden Augenblick pas-
sieren, vielleicht ohne böse Absicht, sondern nur durch einen psychischen Defekt, 
daß eine Rakete ausgelöst wird und der Krieg beginnt. Unsere Militärs erzählen 
eine Anekdote: Ein Rekrut der Raketentruppen wird zur Bedienung der Waffe an-
gelernt. Aber der junge Mann besitzt noch nicht die nötigen militärischen Fähigkei-
ten. Er hat sich auf einem bestimmten Platz nicht so umgewendet, wie er sollte. Der 
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Offizier fragte ihn: Warum hast du dich nicht so umgedreht, wie es sich gehört? Für 
dich ist es nur ein kleiner Fehler, aber Holland existiert nicht mehr, da du auf einen 
Knopf gedrückt hast beim Umwenden. – Dieser Fehler konnte darum geschehen, 
weil der Rekrut nicht genügend gebildet war, und solche Menschen gibt es viele. 
Nicht alles hängt von der Regierung ab. Von uns hängt der Befehl ab, ob ein Krieg 
begonnen werden soll oder nicht. Aber Fehler können auch so passieren. Das ist das 
Gefährliche an der Lage.
Mit Bezug auf die Wirtschaft, Kultur und Wissenschaft sind wir in einem Stadi-
um des ständigen Aufstieges, und hier werfen wir der alten kapitalistischen Welt den 
Fehdehandschuh entgegen: Wenn sie von der Richtigkeit ihre Systems überzeugt 
ist, warum muß es Krieg geben? Laßt uns friedlichen Wettbewerb treiben. Wenn 
ihr System wirtschaftliche und moralische Vorzüge hat, so wird es siegen. Aber wir 
sind der Ansicht, daß wir eure Erben sein werden. Laßt uns diesen Streit ohne Krieg 
entscheiden. Laßt die Zeit, die Geschichte entscheiden, sie ist der beste Richter.
Unsere innenpolitische Lage ist eine sehr gute. Unsere Wirtschaft ist im Wach-
sen begriffen. Wir haben freilich noch nicht alles ausgenützt. Unsere Möglichkeiten 
sind größer als der gegenwärtige Ausnutzungsgrad. Auch die Landwirtschaft ist im 
Steigen begriffen, und wenn wir jetzt harte Worte über die Landwirtschaft sagen, so 
nicht deshalb, weil sich die Landwirtschaft nicht entwickelt, sondern deshalb, weil 
die Landwirtschaft dem erforderlichen Tempo der Entwicklung nicht entspricht. 
Das wichtigste ist hier, daß Stalin seinerzeit eine unrichtige Politik gegenüber der 
Landwirtschaft betrieben hat, da er die landwirtschaftliche Frage nicht richtig be-
griffen hat. Wir müssen dafür die Rechnung bezahlen. Und es gelingt uns nicht 
immer, denn wir haben mit Stalin lange gelebt und gearbeitet und manche Män-
gel sind geblieben. Wir machen alle Anstrengungen, um uns von diesen Mängeln 
zu befreien. Ich glaube, daß wir in den nächsten Jahren im landwirtschaftlichen 
Sektor eine starke Position erreichen werden. Hiefür sind die wirtschaftlichen, die 
technischen und die wissenschaftlichen Möglichkeiten vorhanden. Es sind dies un-
begrenzte Möglichkeiten. Wir können also hinsichtlich der Erzeugung von Lebens-
mitteln unsere Bevölkerung auf das Fünffache anwachsen lassen und sie dennoch 
ernähren.
Sie werden nun in unserem Land eine Reise unternehmen und selbst sehen, 
wieviele Wälder, wieviele Sümpfe es noch gibt, und das alles können wir melio-
rieren. Wir haben niedrige Ernteerträge. Das ist schlecht, aber das ist auch unsere 
Reserve. Denn wenn wir heute zehn Zentner ernten, und im Westen sind es dreißig 
Zentner, so haben wir die Möglichkeit, die Erträge auf das Dreifache zu steigern. 
Ich betrachte das als ermutigend. Zu dieser Steigerung auf das Dreifache brauchen 
wir nicht viel: eine Verbesserung der landwirtschaftlichen Technik, der Düngung, 
der Schädlingsbekämpfung. Das ist ohne weiteres möglich, und das werden wir 
auch erreichen.
Es wird im Westen davon geredet, daß Rußland durch eine schwere Krise geht. 
Aber diese Leute werden eine schwere Enttäuschung erleben. Der amerikanische 
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Farmer Garst war mehrere Male bei mir zu Besuch, und ich war bei ihm. Er ist ein 
kluger Mann, ein sehr reicher Mann, versteht etwas von der Landwirtschaft und ist 
sehr vernünftig. Ich las Garsts Brief, in dem er schreibt: „Ich glaube, Sie sind auf 
dem richtigen Weg, aber Sie müssen mehr Kapital in die Landwirtschaft investie-
ren.“ Das ist richtig. Wir bezahlen dafür, daß Stalin der Landwirtschaft Kräfte ent-
nahm, aber keine gab. Er war ein schlechter Wirtschafter: Er wollte reiten, ohne das 
Pferd zu füttern. Er hat das eben nicht verstanden. Stalin hat viel Gutes, wirklich 
Gutes, aber auch Schlechtes getan. Wirklich gut war, daß er ein ergebener Marxist 
war, mit seinem ganzen Wesen, und doch war er hart wir eine Eiche.
Er hat viel Schaden dem Land und der Partei verursacht. Deshalb haben wir ihm 
gegenüber ein zwiespältiges Gefühl. Das eine Gefühl ist, daß wir unter seiner Füh-
rung Großartiges erreicht haben, und das andere Gefühl, daß wir ohne seine Füh-
rung noch mehr erreicht hätten. Ich sage es manchesmal zu meinen Genossen: Ich 
sah, daß eine Entscheidung schlecht war, aber ich hatte keinen Einfluß auf Stalin. 
Damals dachte ich: Welche Kraft hat der Staat und welche Kraft der Marxismus-
Leninismus, daß trotz der idiotischen Gesetze Stalins das Land weiterwuchs.
Sehen Sie doch selbst: Der ganze Bestand unserer Armee wurde bei Beginn des 
Krieges vernichtet, und trotzdem haben wir gewonnen. Wenn alle diese Leute am 
Leben geblieben wären, hätten wir Hitler sogleich zu Pulver zerrieben. Wir mußten 
die Ukraine verlassen, das reichste Land unseres Staates.
Das ist die Situation. Wir schauen ermutigt in die Zukunft. Der Kernwaffen-
krieg ist in demselben Grad für die Gegner gefährlich wir für uns. Wenn ein Krieg 
begonnen werden sollte, wird es uns schlecht gehen, aber auch der Gegner wird 
nicht geschont. Wenn jedoch der gesunde Menschenverstand siegt und der Krieg 
vermieden wird, dann können wir der Zukunft entgegensehen und mit der ganzen 
Welt in Wettbewerb treten. Und wir sichern den Völkern unter dem Sozialismus 
eine bessere Zukunft als unter dem Kapitalismus.
Ich weiß nicht, ob ich nun alles über die Lage gesagt habe.
Mikojan: Du hast alles gesagt, und gut gesagt.
Bundeskanzler: Ihre realistische [sic] Einschätzung der Weltlage ist nicht ohne 
Eindruck auf mich geblieben.
Wenn wir auch ein kleiner Staat sind, sind wir doch täglich mit diesen Fragen 
konfrontiert und müssen uns mit den Problemen des Gleichgewichts des Schre-
ckens befassen. Viele Leute fragen sich: Hat es überhaupt einen Sinn, sich in der 
Wirtschaft zu betätigen, für die Zukunft zu planen, ist nicht alles umsonst, wenn 
ein Krieg kommt.
Wir können als kleiner Staat nur eines tun: Bei uns, wo wir leben, Ordnung 
halten, zu arbeiten und wenn es darauf ankommt, unsere Stimme zu erheben und 
für den Frieden einzutreten. Wir begrüßen alle Bestrebungen, die dem Frieden die-
nen und haben alle Maßnahmen, die Sie, Herr Ministerpräsident, diesbezüglich 
unternommen haben, mit großer Sympathie begrüßt. Auch in den internationalen 
Organisationen haben wir uns bei den Fragen der Abrüstung nicht der Stimme ent-
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halten, sondern haben aktiv unsere Stimme erhoben. Wir sind initiativ gewesen, 
damit wir einen Stabilitätsfaktor im Sinne der Neutralität in unserem Raum auf-
rechterhalten können. Dafür ist es unerläßlich, daß wir den Lebensstandard erhal-
ten können.
Es ist bei uns sehr wichtig, daß die Leute mit dem Hirn denken und nicht unter 
dem Einfluß von Magenkrämpfen Entscheidungen treffen. Und darum überprüfen 
wir alles, was geeignet ist, im Rahmen der Neutralität und im Rahmen der Ver-
pflichtungen des Staatsvertrages unsere Wirtschaft zu erhalten und den Lebens-
standard zu heben, und die Diskriminierung zu verhindern, Herr Ministerpräsident, 
Sie kennen die Lage. Wir exportieren große Mengen von Waren in Märkte, die wir 
sonst nicht absetzen könnten.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Das, was der Herr Ministerpräsident gesagt hat, war 
sehr klar und eindrucksvoll. Ich habe schon die Ehre gehabt, Ihre Darlegungen 
bereits bei vier Konferenzen, die wir gehabt haben, zu hören. Doch gibt es hier 
einige Dinge, bei denen ich mir nicht klar geworden bin, wie diese Probleme gelöst 
werden sollen. Es sind dies meiner Ansicht nach folgende:
1. Abrüstung: Die Formulierung ist sehr einleuchtend, nämlich, daß man nicht 
die Rüstung kontrollieren soll, sondern die Abrüstung. Aber bei dem großen Miß-
trauen, daß es auf beiden Seiten gibt, erhebt sich die Frage: Wie kann man abrüs-
ten, wie kann man den anderen überzeugen, daß man abgerüstet hat? Ist es nicht 
notwendig, ein Exempel zu statuieren, indem man gewisse kontrollierte Bereiche 
schafft und mit der Kontrolle der Abrüstung beginnt, um sich zu überzeugen, ob ein 
solches System funktioniert oder nicht.
2. Berlin: Ich verstehe eine Reihe von Argumenten, aber eines verstehe ich nicht: 
Die West-Berliner stützen sich auf die Anwesenheit der Westmächte. Wie soll man 
die Furcht von den Berlinern nehmen, wenn das westliche Militär weggeht? Davon 
habe ich mich selbst überzeugt, das ist eine Tatsache.
3. Wie soll der große Weltmarkt aussehen ohne Grenzen? Wie sollen die Wa-
renlieferungen bezahlt werden? Das sind alles sehr komplizierte Dinge, die sehr 
eingehender Studien und Prüfungen bedürfen.
4. Ergänzend zum Herrn Bundeskanzler möchte ich noch sagen: Was die wirt-
schaftliche Entwicklung betrifft, stellen wir uns diese in Österreich so vor: Ein Teil 
der ungeheuren Stärke der Sowjetunion liegt in dem gigantischen Wirtschaftsge-
biet. Was die Ressourcen betrifft, hat die Sowjetunion bereits heute einen Markt 
von 200 Millionen Menschen und mehr. Die meisten Leute fassen die europäische 
Integration so auf, daß es in Europa so werden soll, wie in der Sowjetunion, näm-
lich ein einziger großer Markt. Es gibt Leute, die den Gemeinsamen Markt als 
politisches Ziel sehen. Aber primär geht es darum, einen Markt zu schaffen, wie es 
ihn in den USA und in Sowjetunion schon lange gibt.
Wenn Herr Chruschtschow gesagt hat, daß er den Wettstreit wünscht und der 
kapitalistischen Welt den Fehdehandschuh zuwirft, so möchte dazu sagen, daß der 
Westen kein rein kapitalistisches System mehr ist, sondern eine Mischform. Durch 
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die Integration wird ein großer Markt geschaffen. Dies ist ein Teil der Auseinander-
setzung. Wenn wir uns nicht für den friedlichen Wettbewerb vorbereiten, werden 
wir unterliegen.
Chruschtschow: Als Sie von unserer Bevölkerung sprachen, haben Sie 200 Mil-
lionen gesagt und 20 Millionen unterschlagen.
Was den Kapitalismus betrifft, möchte ich sagen, daß sich die Reformisten der 
gleichen Methode bedienen wollen, wie der Gelehrte Woronow, der eine Theorie 
der Verjüngung der Menschen ausgearbeitet hat. Sie nehmen also an, daß Ihr Kapi-
talismus nach dieser Methode verjüngt worden ist?
Bundesminister Kreisky: Ganz im Sinne der marxistischen Analyse wurden 
neue Elemente entwickelt, die vor 100 Jahren noch nicht vorhanden waren. Es 
entstanden neue Eigentumsformen, eine neue Sozialpolitik, neue Grundsätze zwi-
schen Kapital und Arbeit, neue Elemente hinsichtlich der Arbeitskräfte. Das alles 
gab es vor 100 Jahren noch nicht.
Chruschtschow: Nun zu den einzelnen Fragen.
1. Abrüstung: Was die Idee der Schaffung eines Vorfeldes zur Erprobung des 
Vertrauens betrifft, sind wir damit einverstanden. Wir würden bereit sein, eine Kon-
trolle über die Streitkräfte in Deutschland zu akzeptieren. Wir schlugen vor, 800 km 
nach Westen und Osten von einer bestimmten Linie einen Bereich zu schaffen, in 
dem alle Waffen unter Kontrolle gestellt werden. Man hätte Vertreter der Kontroll-
organe bei allen Waffengattungen, das wäre gut. Durch eine 800 km-Zone wäre ein 
plötzlicher Angriff schon ausgeschlossen. Unser Vorschlag ging dahin, die Kont-
rolle auf alle Häfen, Flugplätze, Eisenbahnknoten und wichtige Straßenkreuzungen 
zu erstrecken. Wenn eine solche Entscheidung getroffen würde, könnte keine Seite 
einen plötzlichen Angriff unternehmen, weil Truppenverschiebungen ohne Wissen 
des Gegners nicht möglich wären. Die Luft, die Erde, Eisenbahnen und Straßen 
und das Meer würden im ganzen Land, das heißt auch in der Sowjetunion, unter 
Kontrolle stehen. Wir sind weit gegangen in dieser Richtung, um Verständnis und 
eine vernünftige Lösung zu finden. Es wurde jedoch alles abgelehnt.
Außenminister Gromyko: Unser Vorschlag war im Detail 800 km nach Westen 
und sogar einen größeren Bereich nach dem Osten, um die Amerikaner zu befrie-
digen.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Es hat ein einziges Kontrollorgan nach dem Krieg ge-
geben, das wirklich funktioniert hat: die Vier im Jeep. Das hat nur funktioniert, weil 
man ein sehr intelligentes System angewandt hat: Jeder hat bei sich selber kontrol-
liert, aber die drei anderen haben darauf gesehen, daß er tatsächlich kontrolliert. 
Auf diese Weise wurden auch Erwägungen der Souveränität respektiert.
Chruschtschow: Ich bin 1946 in Wien gewesen und habe alle vier Sektoren be-
sucht. Ich konnte überallhin ungehindert passieren. Wenn die Leute heute ehrlich 
wären, dann würde es keine Überfälle geben. Die von uns vorgeschlagene Kon-
trolle über die Verbindungswege, Flugplätze usw. paralysiert die Möglichkeit ei-
nes Überfalles. Die Amerikaner aber wollen eine Kontrolle über die Rüstung, sie 
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wollen nämlich durch Spionage alles erfassen, vor allem die Möglichkeit und die 
Chancen des Gegners für Überfälle. Dafür sind wir nicht. Wir sind dafür, wenn 
tatsächlich die volle Abrüstung akzeptiert wird.
Für den Vorschlag MacNamaras, nur militärische Objekte anzugreifen, müßte 
man wissen, wo sich diese befinden. Das kann man nur durch Spionage erfahren. 
Als Eisenhower 1955 in Genf den Vorschlag der „offenen Himmel“ machte, sagte 
er etwas für die Militärs sehr Wichtiges: Er sagte mir auf die Frage, wozu dies gut 
sei, fragen Sie nur Ihren Schukow, der wird Ihnen schon sagen, warum dies wichtig 
ist. Das ist militärische Offenheit, wenn auch nicht sehr diplomatisch. Er sagte das, 
was er dachte. Bei diesem Gespräch war auch Rockefeller anwesend, er war sein 
Berater. Das ist Spionage. Das ist vorteilhaft für jene Seite, die den Krieg anstrebt. 
In dieser Frage ist unser Standpunkt sehr klar.
2. Die Angst der Berliner: Was kann ich dazu sagen? Wenn man jemanden 
schreckt, indem man sagt, daß ich ihn auffressen will, und ich sage, daß dies nicht 
wahr ist, da ich mich nicht von Menschen ernähre, wie kann ich das beweisen? Wir 
sagen zu den Berlinern, wir brauchen Berlin nicht. Was bedeuten 3 Millionen Men-
schen für uns? Bei uns ist der jährliche Zuwachs 3 ½ Millionen. Für unsere Männer 
ist das die Arbeit einer Nacht. Wir sagen das, aber man sagt Nein: Wir fürchten 
euch, wir wollen Waffen und Streitkräfte. Dagegen kann man keinen Disput führen, 
weil es unvernünftig ist. Wenn sie uns nicht glauben, soll die UNO ihnen Truppen 
hinstellen. Die argumentieren, daß sich niemand in die inneren Angelegenheiten 
Berlins einmischen soll. Sie sagen, nicht die UNO, sondern wir, die USA, England 
und Frankreich machen das. Dann beginnen wir eben, uns Gedanken zu machen, 
wozu für sie die Truppen dort notwendig sind? Seinerzeit sind sie als unsere Alliier-
te dort hingekommen, jetzt sind sie dort als unsere Gegner. Daher haben wir guten 
Grund, diesen Truppen zu mißtrauen und ebenso den Ländern, die Truppen in West-
Berlin haben. Daher wäre es das vernünftigste, dort UNO-Truppen einzusetzen.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Auch für die Zufahrt?
Chruschtschow: Das ist eine andere Frage. Die Schweiz ist ein Binnenland und 
einen Zugang gibt es nur auf Grund von Vereinbarungen mit anderen Ländern. 
Nach Österreich haben Zugang nur solche Länder, die entsprechende Abkommen 
abgeschlossen haben. Die Türkei kann nicht direkt zu euch, sondern muß sich mit 
anderen Ländern einigen. Das gilt auch für Amerika und die Sowjetunion. Auch wir 
können mit Österreich keinen direkten Kontakt haben, sondern nur mit Erlaubnis 
Ungarns und der Tschechoslowakei.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Bei Berlin ist die Situation anders. Ein freies Berlin 
wäre die Schaffung eines Staates in einem anderen Staat. Es muß ja Sicherheiten 
geben, wie man zu ihm kommen kann, sonst ist es keine echte Freistadt.
Chruschtschow: Die Frage des Zuganges besteht, das bestreiten wir nicht. Aber 
es gibt eine Praxis in der Welt, daß man, um Zugang zu einem Staat zu erhalten, mit 
jedem Staat eine Vereinbarung schließen muß, über dessen Gebiet man gehen muß, 
um dorthin zu gelangen. Die DDR ist ein souveräner Staat, ein Zugang ist nur mit 
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ihrer Zustimmung möglich. Es kann keine internationale Kontrolle der Zugänge 
geben. Die Amerikaner haben sich das ausgedacht, aber die Deutschen haben schon 
Einspruch dagegen erhoben und wir sind gegen das eine und das andere. Jetzt kont-
rolliert die DDR gemeinsam mit uns die Zugänge. Warum sollten wir unsere Rechte 
aufgeben und sie einer internationalen Kommission überantworten? Das wird nur 
dann sein, wenn sie uns zwingen, zu kapitulieren. Das ist ohne Krieg nicht möglich. 
Wir werden unsere Rechte verteidigen und auch die Rechte der DDR.
Wir wollten die Situation des Präsidenten der USA erleichtern. Er hat eine un-
vernünftige Rede gehalten, und eine internationale Kontrolle gefordert. Wir woll-
ten seiner Person eine Aufmerksamkeit erweisen und schlugen deshalb ein interna-
tionales Organ nicht über die Kontrolle für Zugänge, sondern ein Arbitrage-Organ 
für Streitfälle bezüglich der Zugänge vor.
Bundeskanzler: Ich glaube, das verstanden zu haben. Sie wünschen ein freies 
Berlin und wollen, daß die Frage der freien Zufahrt in einem Vertrag mit der DDR 
geregelt wird. Wären nun die Vertragspartner ein freies Berlin und auf der anderen 
Seite die DDR?
Chruschtschow: Ich weiß nicht, welche internationale Praxis hier besteht, aber 
Partner müßte jedes Land sein, das über die DDR nach Berlin gelangen will. Ich 
glaube, daß West-Berlin einen Status hätte, der durch Vertrag bestimmt ist: Unab-
hängigkeit und Garantie des Zuganges der ganzen Welt. Dieser Vertrag müßte mit 
der Unterschrift der DDR versehen sein, es wäre also nicht für jeden Fall separat zu 
unterschreiben. Aber die anderen Länder, die über das Territorium der DDR nach 
Berlin gelangen wollen, müßten mit dieser Abkommen abschließen. Das diskrimi-
niert in keiner Weise, das ist eine allgemeine Praxis. Wir wollen, daß diese Praxis 
auf West-Berlin ausgedehnt wird.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Damit kein Mißverständnis entsteht, möchte ich sa-
gen, daß wir nicht so vermessen sind zu glauben, die Frage lösen zu können. Es 
geht uns nur um Verständnis der Frage; darum sprechen wir mehr über Berlin als 
über Laos, weil uns Berlin näherliegt.
Chruschtschow: Das ist verständlich, auch wir sprechen mehr über Berlin als 
über Laos.
Bundeskanzler Gorbach: Um nach Berlin fahren zu können, ist ein Visum erfor-
derlich. Damit erhebt sich aber die Frage der Anerkennung der DDR.
Chruschtschow: Hier kann ich Ihnen nicht helfen. Als ich in Amerika war, ha-
ben wir unter anderem auch über die Frage der Anerkennung gesprochen. Ich habe 
damals gesagt, Amerika hat uns 16 Jahre lang nicht anerkannt. Die Amerikaner 
antworteten darauf: Aber Ihr Zar hat Amerika 26 Jahre nicht anerkannt. Ich sagte 
Ihnen, unser Zar war eben ein Trottel, warum muß man diese Dummheiten wieder-
holen? Es ist hier eine Analogie zur Anerkennung der DDR.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Ich verstehe eines nicht. Es würde eine gewisse Min-
derwertigkeit im Status von West-Berlin bestehen. Über den Zutritt nach Österreich 
entscheidet Österreich, über den Zutritt in die DDR entscheidet die DDR. Aber 
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West-Berlin wäre von einem dritten Staat abhängig. Es wäre als keine wirklich 
freie Stadt, nicht im Sinne einer Vollwertigkeit.
Chruschtschow: Sie widersprechen sich selbst und der Praxis. Um nach London 
zu gelangen, muß ich mit Dänemark ein Abkommen über die Erlaubnis zum Über-
fliegen des Territoriums treffen. Das machen wir auch, das ist normal. Wenn wir da 
nicht machen würden, wäre das abnormal und würde die Souveränität verletzen.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Aber es gibt viele Möglichkeiten nach England zu ge-
langen, nicht nur über Dänemark.
Chruschtschow: Ich nenne Ihnen ein anderes Beispiel, die Mongolei. Wenn ein 
amerikanischer Botschafter dorthin gesendet wird, muß sich Amerika mit uns oder 
den Chinesen einigen, sonst kommt er nicht nach Ulan-Bator. Wollen Sie vielleicht 
den Vorschlag machen, einen internationalen Weg über unser Territorium zu legen? 
Das ist kein realistischer Vorschlag.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Die jetzige Lage West-Berlins ist aber so, daß eine 
freie Zufahrt aus dem Westen besteht. Warum sollte man diese Lage verschlechtern?
Chruschtschow: Der jetzige freie Zugang besteht nur auf der Basis des Okkupa-
tionsregimes. Das ist ein Überbleibsel des Krieges. Die drei Mächte benützen dies 
für ihre Ziele. Damals waren sie unsere Alliierten, jetzt sind sie unsere Gegner. Da-
her können wir weiterhin eine solche Lage nicht dulden. Um sie dieses Rechtes zu 
entkleiden, werden wir den Friedensvertrag unterzeichnen. Sie werden ihre Kraft 
verlieren, wie der Tschorno Mor (= legendäre Gestalt), der seine Kraft verlor, als 
man ihm den Bart abschnitt.
Die Amerikaner haben eine solche Operation mit uns schon mit Japan gemacht. 
Sie haben einen Friedensvertrag unterzeichnet, nicht aber wir. Sie haben uns unse-
rer Rechte entkleidet, und unsere Vertreter mußten aus Tokio weg.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Das wollen Sie also mit den Engländern, Franzosen 
und Amerikanern machen?
Chruschtschow: Ja.
Bundeskanzler Gorbach: Wir dürfen nicht vergessen, daß Berlin eine kleine In-
sel ist. Es handelt sich um zwei verschiedene Systeme. In kurzer Zeit müßte Berlin 
von der DDR, das es umschließt, aufgesogen werden. So wird es von den anderen 
auch offenbar gesehen.
Chruschtschow: Das verstehe ich. Aber wieviel Jahre hat die Sowjetunion exis-
tieren müssen in kapitalistischer Einkreisung? Die kapitalistische Welt wollte unser 
gesellschaftliches System liquidieren. Sie haben aktive Maßnahmen ergriffen, und 
die Amerikaner, Franzosen, Engländer, Japaner haben ihre Truppen geschickt. Die 
Deutschen sind bis zum Kaukasus gelangt. Aber alle haben wir zerschlagen.
Zu den West-Berlinern sagen wir: Wir wollen uns nicht in die inneren Verhält-
nisse einmischen, aber wenn die West-Berliner selbst ein anderes System wollen, 
so kann ich keine Garantie geben, daß das bisherige weiterbesteht. Beim Treffen 
mit Kennedy in Wien sagte dieser, man solle eine Garantie des status quo in der 
Welt geben. Wir sind unter bestimmten Bedingungen damit einverstanden. Da je-
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des Land seine volle Souveränität haben soll, muß es über seine soziale Ordnung 
selbst entscheiden. Kennedy war damit nicht einverstanden, er sprach von innenpo-
litischer Infiltration. Ich sagte, was sollen wir tun? Sollen wir Gendarmen spielen? 
Wenn ein Volk seine Struktur verändern will, sollen wir sagen: nein, das dürft ihr 
nicht? Das ist die Logik eines Verrückten.
Mikojan: Es könnte auch sein, daß in Österreich einmal die Mehrheit eine sozi-
alistische Ordnung will.
Chruschtschow: Oder es könnte auch sein, daß in Österreich einmal die Bour-
geoisie die Oberhand behält und den sozialistischen Partner aus der Koalition hi-
naustreibt. Was sollen wir tun: Gendarmen schicken? Die Amerikaner haben auch 
einmal gegen England revoltiert und haben gekämpft. Sollte man die Gendarmen 
schicken, um den Engländern zu helfen? Die Angst vor dem Kommunismus nimmt 
den Leuten den klugen Menschenverstand.
Wir schlagen daher das Vernünftigste vor, das niemandem Schaden zufügen 
kann und das Prestige beider Seiten wahrt. Wir unterzeichnen einen Friedensver-
trag und werden die Lage fixieren, die sich als Resultat des Zweiten Weltkrieges 
ergeben hat. Was kann man Vernünftigeres wünschen? Aber bisher wurde keine 
Vereinbarung erreicht.
Wir wissen, daß der Westen die sozialistische Ordnung in der DDR liquidieren 
will. Das verstehe ich. Sogar in der UdSSR will der Westen diese Ordnung liqui-
dieren. Wir wollen in der BRD die sozialistische Ordnung errichten, das wäre die 
gerechteste Lösung. Aber das ist ein rein subjektiver Wunsch. Man muß die Lage 
realistisch einschätzen und in der ganzen Welt realistische Lösungen suchen. Wir 
sind dafür, daß jedes Land selbst zu entscheiden hat. Wir wollen uns nicht in die 
inneren Angelegenheiten der kapitalistischen Länder einmischen.
Bundeskanzler: Aber wie entscheidet das Volk? Durch die freien Wahlen?
Chruschtschow: Es ist nicht immer so, daß Wahlen sozialpolitische Fragen ent-
scheiden können. Es gibt auch Revolutionen, und die Ergebnisse derselben werden 
dann erkannt. Oder nehmen Sie das Beispiel Pakistan: In demokratischen Wahlen 
wurde ein Präsident gewählt. Dann kamen die Generale und setzten ihn ab. Jetzt ist 
ein General Präsident. Oder zum Beispiel die Türkei oder die lateinamerikanischen 
Staaten. Entscheidet wirklich alles das Parlament? Das entscheiden oft Halsab-
schneider. Je mehr Halsabschneider es gibt, desto eher erkennt sie Amerika an. Alle 
Welt erkennt den Zaren (Schah) an. Wie kam er auf den Thron? Sein Vater kam, ließ 
Köpfe rollen und proklamierte sich zum Schah. Er diente bei Budjonnj, der Halsab-
schneider, und dann sagte er, er sei von Gott eingesetzt. Aber wir sagen, das ist An-
gelegenheit der Perser. Es kann auch dem jetzigen Schah passieren, daß sein Kopf 
abgeschlagen wird. Er war unser Gast hier, und wir haben auf sein Wohl getrunken.
Wir Kommunisten wollen, daß das Volk die Entwicklung der menschlichen Ge-
sellschaft auf der Grundlage der demokratischen Basis weiterführe. Aber nehmen 
Sie z.B. die Demokratie in Frankreich. Vor de Gaulle haben die Kommunisten 110 
Abgeordnete im Parlament. Jetzt stimmen für die Kommunistische Partei mehr 
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Franzosen als früher. Aber Abgeordnete sind jetzt um ein Zehntel weniger als frü-
her. Was ist das für eine Demokratie? Wird das französische Volk damit einverstan-
den sein? Ich will mich nicht einmischen, aber das ist eine Machination mit den 
Stimmen.
Die Geschichte ist an Beispielen reich. Auch bei uns hat es eine solche Lage ge-
geben. Die Arbeiter und Bauern hatten sechs Abgeordnete in der Duma, die Kapi-
talisten und Gutsbesitzer die große Mehrheit. Was sollten wir machen? Einzig das, 
was Lenin gemacht hat. Auch andere Völker können dies tun. Wenn das Parlament 
nicht die Rechte gibt, kann das Volk auf die Straße gehen und sich die Rechte holen. 
Die demokratischeste Art zur Macht gelangt: Wir haben 4 Jahre lang mit den Füßen 
gestimmt. Wir haben unsere eigene Reaktion und die ganze Welt, die unserer Reak-
tion half, besiegt. Unser russischer Bauer hat das alles auf seinem Buckel ertragen. 
Das ist Abstimmung, das ist Demokratie. Das wollen wir jedem Volk zuerkennen.
4. Weltmarkt und europäischer Markt
Ein Weltmarkt bedeutet, daß alle ihre Produkte auf der Basis des gegenseiti-
gen Vorteils mit den Ländern ihrer Wahl austauschen können. Wir haben gute Ge-
schäftsverbindungen mit Ihnen: Sie verkaufen uns Ihre Produkte, wir verkaufen 
Ihnen unsere. Sie kaufen bei uns, was für Sie vorteilhaft ist und umgekehrt. Das 
haben wir nicht erfunden, sondern das hat die Geschichte uns überliefert. Wir ha-
ben z.B. einen sehr guten Handel mit Italien. Heute kommt Kossygin von dort zu-
rück und wird wahrscheinlich gute Ideen mitbringen. Wenn die Preise entsprechend 
sind, werden wir wahrscheinlich bei FIAT die Errichtung einer Traktorenfabrik mit 
einem jährlichen Ausstoß von 100.000, vielleicht sogar 120.000 Traktoren in Auf-
trag geben. Wenn die Preise vorteilhaft sind, werden wir eben nicht kaufen. Wir 
treiben heute einen guten Handel mit Japan und Westdeutschland, unser Handel 
mit Frankreich und England ist auch nicht schlecht. Ein einziges Land treibt keinen 
Handel mit uns: die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. Wer hat einen Nutzen von 
einer solchen Politik? Sie gereicht uns und den Amerikanern zum Nachteil, und 
zwar wirtschaftlich und politisch. Das ist Diskriminierung.
Jetzt schlägt auch die EWG eine solche Politik ein, und es hebt sich die Frage, 
wofür? Sie betreibt gleichfalls Diskriminierung. Ihre Politik ist gegen die schwach 
entwickelten Länder gerichtet. Wir werden dagegen ankämpfen und jene Kräfte 
unterstützen, die sich gegen eine solche Diskriminierung wehren.
Wir fürchten diesen Block weder in wirtschaftlicher, noch in politischer Hin-
sicht. Einen politischen Block gibt es heute schon, daher wird sich aus dem Zusam-
menschluß der EWG in politischer Hinsicht keine Änderung ergeben. Allerdings 
wird daraus eine weitere Forcierung der Spannung entstehen, und dagegen werden 
wir ankämpfen. Wir glauben, daß diese Politik unvernünftig, aggressiv und voller 
Risken ist.
Etwas ganz anderes ist ein allgemeiner Weltmarkt: Er gibt jedem Land die Mög-
lichkeit, ohne Diskriminierung seine wirtschaftlichen Quellen auszunützen. Wie 
könnte diese von uns eingenommene Position eine schlechte sein?
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Bundeskanzler: Bei unserem kürzlichen Staatsbesuch in Frankreich hat General 
de Gaulle auch über die EWG gesprochen und dabei ausdrücklich festgestellt, daß 
diese kein gegen den Osten gerichtetes Instrument sei. Er könne sich vielmehr vor-
stellen, daß die EWG sich als ein Instrument zur Belebung des Ost-West-Handels 
erweisen könne.
Chruschtschow: Bezüglich dessen, was ich vorhin über Frankreich gesagt habe, 
möchte ich Sie bitten, daß das nicht die Presse gelangt, da ich unsere Beziehungen 
nicht verschlechtern will. Davon hätte niemand einen Nutzen. Das, was ich über 
die reaktionäre Konstitution Frankreichs gesagt habe, könnte ich genauso gut de 
Gaulle selber sagen. Er wird besser wissen, warum er die Verfassung geändert hat, 
um einer Minderheit der Bevölkerung die Mehrheit im Parlament zu verschaffen. 
Aber das ist eine Angelegenheit der Franzosen. Sie sollen sich selbst zurechtfinden, 
intelligent genug sind sie dafür.
Als Hitler und Mussolini die Achse begründeten, sagen sie, daß dies für den 
Frieden sei. Als Hitler Österreich schluckte, sagte er, daß dies den Frieden in Euro-
pa festige. Österreich war wohl damit nicht einverstanden?
Bundesminister Kreisky: Wir haben bei dem Gespräch mit General de Gaulle 
den Eindruck gehabt, daß das, was er über den Osthandel sprach, sehr ehrlich ge-
meint war. De Gaulle spricht nicht viel über Wirtschaft, weil sie ihn nicht interes-
siert. Deshalb ist es umso bemerkenswerter, daß er ausführlich über die EWG und 
den Osthandel sprach. Er bezeichnete die EWG ausdrücklich als wirtschaftliche 
und nicht als politische Vereinigung. Ich fragte ihn, ob wir all dies bei unserem 
kommenden Besuch in Moskau Herrn Chruschtschow sagen könnten? De Gaulle 
bejahte dies und fügte hinzu, daß wir auch sagen sollten, Frankreich habe gleich-
falls den Staatsvertrag unterzeichnet und auch Frankreich habe ein eminentes In-
teresse an der Aufrechterhaltung der Unabhängigkeit und Neutralität Österreichs.
Chruschtschow: Ich habe sehr angenehme Gespräche mit de Gaulle geführt und 
denke an ihn mit Hochachtung. Was allerdings die politische Weltanschauung be-
trifft, sind wir Leute entgegengesetzter Pole. Trotzdem können wir nicht umhin, 
uns gegenseitig zu achten. Was de Gaulle in Algerien macht – ich weiß nicht, ob 
irgendjemand anderer dies machen könnte. Dieser Beitrag muß anerkannt werden. 
Der Gesinnungsgenosse unseres österreichischen Gastes, Herr Guy Mollet, könnte 
so etwas nicht tun.
Bundesminister Kreisky: Da haben Sie recht.
Chruschtschow: Wir haben hier im gleichen Raum mit Guy Mollet im Sommer 
1956 Gespräche geführt. Wir haben ihm geraten: Löst doch die algerische Frage. 
Er sagte darauf: Wir können es nicht machen, das Algerien frei wird. Frankreich 
würde dadurch seine Größe verlieren und Algerien würde von den Amerikanern 
geschluckt werden. Ich entgegnete ihm, daß Vietnam 7 Jahre lang gekämpft hat und 
seine Freiheit errungen hat und daß sich auch die Algerier 7 Jahre durchkämpfen 
werden, um schließlich die Freiheit zu erringen.
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Wir müssen de Gaulle die gebührende Achtung erweisen, da er ungeachtet sei-
nes hohen Alters und seiner politischen Einstellung den Geist der Zeit verstanden 
hat. In anderen Fragen sind wir jedoch völlig verschiedener Meinung.
Ich weiß nicht, was Ihnen de Gaulle zur Frage des Gemeinsamen Marktes ge-
sagt hat, aber ich glaube, daß er den Gemeinsamen Markt anders auffaßt, als er es 
gesagt hat. In dieser Gemeinschaft überwiegt der politische Charakter den ökono-
mischen. Sie wissen das selbst sehr gut, und wenn Sie daheim bei sich über diese 
Frage sprechen, sagen Sie das auch. Und in dieser Auffassung stimmen wir mit 
Ihnen überein.
Wir sprechen die Bitte aus: Laßt uns unsere Beziehungen gut bauen und gebe 
Gott, daß Sie nicht in diese Gemeinschaft eintreten, denn das wäre ein schwerer 
Schlag für Österreich und seine Neutralität.
Österreich hat sich in der Welt eine gute Position durch seine Neutralität erwor-
ben. Eine solche Sache würde der Neutralitätspolitik ein Ende machen. Das wäre 
eine Art von Anschluß, und damit eine direkte Verletzung des Staatsvertrages, den 
wir auch unterschrieben haben. Schauen Sie sich den Text an: Dort steht es genau 
geschrieben. Der Staatsvertrag wurde nicht nur von uns sondern auch von Ihnen 
unterzeichnet.
Österreich wäre sodann an einen Block angeschlossen, der gegen uns eine be-
stimmte Haltung einnimmt.
Unsere Position in dieser Frage ist folgende: Österreich muß verstehen, seine 
geographische Lage richtig zu beurteilen. Dieser geographischen Lage entspricht 
am besten der von uns gemeinsam unterzeichnete Staatsvertrag und die auf Grund 
dieses Vertrages geführte Politik. Die anderen Länder, die den Staatsvertrag mitun-
terzeichnet haben, sollen mit Verständnis eine solche Politik unterstützen.
Wir sind gegen eine Diskriminierung des Handels Österreichs mit anderen Län-
dern. Wenn die westlichen Länder eine solche Politik der Diskriminierung stützen, 
würden sie gegen den Staatsvertrag verstoßen und damit auch gegen die Politik 
der Neutralität sein, die durch den Staatsvertrag begründet wurde. Das würde be-
deuten, daß durch einen Druck wirtschaftlicher Natur das Wesen des Staatsver-
trages verändert würde. Es würde sich eine andere Lage ergeben und auch unse-
re Beziehungen würden sich ändern. Das wollen wir nicht. Wir wünschen dem 
österreichischen Volk Wohlergehen und Entfaltung. Sie grenzen an sozialistische 
Länder, und eine Weiterführung der Politik der Neutralität würde dem entsprechen 
und Österreich würde den richtigen Platz als neutrales Land finden. Das ist das 
beste.
Wieviele Jahre leben wir schon mit den Afghanen in Nachbarschaft. Unsere ge-
meinsame Grenze ist mehr als 2000 km lang. Wir sind freilich politisch und wirt-
schaftlich viel stärker als Afghanistan. Doch wir haben damit keinen Mißbrauch 
getrieben. Der König von Afghanistan hat keinerlei Forderungen gegen uns, und 
auch wir haben keine gegen ihn. Staatlich gesehen sind wir extreme Pole. Aber 
es ist ein selbständiger Staat und wir achten die Unverletzlichkeit dieses Staates. 
 Conversation A. Gorbach – N. Khrushchev, Moscow, 29 June 1962 317
Auch auf Afghanistan wird ein gewisser Druck ausgeübt, doch führt der Staat sei-
ne Politik mit Vernunft. Wenn es den Afghanen gelingt, trotz dieses Druckes eine 
vernünftige Politik zu führen, muß es auch Österreich möglich sein, seine Politik 
der Neutralität vernünftig und kraftvoll weiterzuführen. Wenn sie eine andere Po-
sition einnehmen, haben sie die Politik der Neutralität verlassen und sich in eine 
Gemeinschaft unserer Gegner begeben. Wir würden dies mit großem Bedauern 
zur Kenntnis nehmen. Wir würden dies so ansehen, daß das was mein Freund, der 
„Kleinkapitalist“ Raab, gebaut hat, von meinem zweiten Freund Gorbach bereits 
wieder zerstört wurde.
Bundeskanzler: Die Ausführungen des Herrn Ministerpräsidenten waren sehr 
bemerkenswert. Wir waren sehr interessiert daran, daß dieses Gespräch zustande 
kam, weil Fragen besprochen wurden, die österreichische Interessen unmittelbar 
berühren. Das Wirksamwerden der EWG ist außerhalb unserer Kompetenz gele-
gen. Wir wurden dadurch vor neue wirtschaftspolitische Realitäten gestellt.
54 % unseres Außenhandels gehen in die EWG. Wenn die EWG durch Großbri-
tannien erweitert wird, wird sich dieser Prozentsatz bis 62 % erhöhen. Wir bitten 
um Verständnis dafür, daß wir uns Sorge darüber machen, wie wir unsere Waren 
weiterhin in die Länder exportieren können, weil am 1. Juli eine neue Zollsenkung 
wirksam wird, die es noch schwieriger machen wird, die Zollbarrieren zu über-
winden. Es ist uns darum zu tun, ein tragbares wirtschaftspolitisches Konzept mit 
Ihnen zu besprechen, wie wir unsere Waren weiterhin in diese Länder ausführen 
können.
Wie in allen unseren außenpolitischen Entscheidungen gelten auch hiebei fol-
gende Prinzipien, und ich möchte mit allem Nachdruck bitten, daß uns hier Ver-
trauen geschenkt wird: Als oberster Maßstab hat zu gelten eine strikte Einhaltung 
der von uns freiwillig übernommenen immerwährenden Neutralität und die Loya-
lität gegenüber den Verpflichtungen aus dem Staatsvertrag ebenso wie den von uns 
eingegangenen internationalen Verpflichtungen. Für Österreich ist dies der feste 
Rahmen, den wir nicht überschreiten werden. Solange wir, die wir hier sitzen, die 
politischen Geschicke Österreichs bestimmen, wird dies das Gesetz unseres Han-
delns sein.
Chruschtschow: Wir wollen Ihnen in der Entwicklung Ihrer Handelsbeziehun-
gen mit allen Ländern der Welt nicht im Wege stehen. 54 % bzw. 62 % Ihres Han-
dels haben Sie mit diesen Ländern. Wir wollen selbst mit diesen Ländern Handel 
treiben und gute Handelsbeziehungen haben. Uns beunruhigt, sollten Sie Mitglied 
dieser Gemeinschaft werden, daß Sie in diesem Fall Ihre Unabhängigkeit verlieren 
würden und daß Sie dann die NATO-Politik betreiben müßten. Denn dieser Wirt-
schaftsblock ist ein Instrument der NATO. Dies sind nicht meine Worte, sondern 
sie wurden von den Organisatoren der EWG geprägt. Das hat auch Kennedy gesagt 
und Hallstein und andere maßgebende Leute. Das ist deren Politik, und wenn Sie in 
diese eintreten, so verlieren Sie die Möglichkeit, Ihre Politik der Neutralität weiter-
hin zu verfolgen. Diese Länder sollen Ihre Situation begreifen und mit Ihnen wei-
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terhin einen Handel treiben in einer so vorteilhaften Art wie bisher. Wir wünschen, 
daß Sie Handel nicht nur mit uns treiben, sondern auch mit anderen Ländern. Diese 
Länder sollen das verstehen.
Bundeskanzler: Damit kein Mißverständnis entsteht, möchte ich noch sagen, 
daß wir ausdrücklich erklärt haben, daß eine Mitgliedschaft bei der EWG wegen 
unserer Neutralität nicht in Frage kommt. Was wir wollen, ist, im Gespräch mit den 
Ländern Wege zu suchen, um jene Begünstigungen zu bekommen, damit unsere 
Waren in diese Länder exportiert werden können, aber nicht um den Preis von po-
litischen Gegenleistungen. Es handelt sich darum, vorerst mit diesen Ländern darü-
ber Gespräche zu führen, wobei wir uns auf die Prinzipien unserer Politik, nämlich 
die Neutralität und Loyalität gegenüber dem Staatsvertrag und den internationalen 
Verpflichtungen berufen werden. Es ist keine Rede von einem Eintritt, sondern von 
einem Gespräch darüber, welche Möglichkeiten für die Aufrechterhaltung unseres 
Handels mit diesen Ländern bestehen.
Chruschtschow: Wir müssen freilich auch mit Verständnis die Situation Ihres 
Landes betrachten. Die Schaffung des Gemeinsamen Marktes ist eine reale Tatsa-
che, und Sie müssen freilich Handel treiben. Wir verstehen, daß Sie ohne Handel 
nicht leben können. Und es ist natürlich, daß Ihre Bemühungen dahin gehen, eine 
solche Situation zu erreichen, in der Ihr Handel mit diesen Ländern keinen Schaden 
leidet. Wir werden das mit Verständnis verfolgen. Doch das dürfte nicht den Staats-
vertrag verletzen oder die Politik der Neutralität.
Wir möchten gerne die gleichen Möglichkeiten, die Sie mit dem Gemeinsamen 
Markt haben. Diese gleichen Möglichkeiten wollen wir mit Ihnen haben.
Bundeskanzler: Meinen Sie hier die Meistbegünstigung?
Chruschtschow: Ich sagte, wir wollen gleiche Möglichkeiten Ihres Handels mit 
der EEG und der Sowjetunion.
______
Hier wurde die Unterredung wegen des Zeitablaufes abgebrochen. Ministerpräsi-
dent Chruschtschow schlug vor, das Gespräch nach Möglichkeit nach dem Mittag-
essen fortzusetzen, bzw. die beiden Außenminister damit zu betrauen, wobei jedoch 
das Ergebnis ihrer Unterredung von den beiden Regierungschefs zu genehmigen 
wäre.
Source: SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 1.
Document 5: Conversation N. Khrushchev – B. Pittermann, Moscow,
17 September 1962 
Protokoll der Besprechung des Herrn Vizekanzlers mit Ministerpräsident Chruscht-
schow am 17. September 1962
Anwesend waren:
Von sowjetischer Seite:
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Der Erste Stellvertretende Ministerpräsident A. N. Kossygin
der Leiter der 3. Europäischen Abteilung im sowjetischen Außenministerium I. I. 
Iljitschow
der 2. Sekretär der Protokollabteilung im MID L. S. Tschernyschow
und Dolmetsch W. N. Popow
Von österreichischer Seite:
ao. und bev. Botschafter Dr. Heinrich Haymerle
Legationsrat Dr. Franz Karasek 
Ministerialoberkommissär Dr. Fischer 
Attaché Dr. Bukowski
Einleitend begrüßte Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow den Herrn Vizekanzler. Der 
Herr Vizekanzler überbrachte seinerseits die Grüße des Herrn Bundespräsidenten, 
des Herrn Bundeskanzlers, des Herrn Altbundeskanzlers Raab und anderer öster-
reichischer Persönlichkeiten sowie „seit gestern auch die des Schachtes Nr. 31 in 
Donezk“. Minister präsident Chruschtschow brachte seine Freude über den Be such 
des Herrn Vizekanzlers zum Ausdruck.
[…]1 23
Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow: Im gegenwärtigen Augen blick ist es sehr 
schwer, die Weltlage richtig einzuschätzen, weil es so viele Imponderabilien gibt. 
Dies gilt insbesondere für Amerika. Es ist wie auf einer Hasenjagd, wo der Hase 
ständig Haken schlägt und Sprünge macht, die niemand erwartet. So dauert es lan-
ge, bis der Jäger ihn erlegen kann. Sehen Sie, und darum ist es schwer, die interna-
tionale Lage zu charakterisieren. Die USA hat die labilsten und inkonsequentesten 
Politiker. Ihre Politik ist weitgehend von ihrer momentanen Stimmung, von der 
Laune des Augenblicks bestimmt. Die Amerikaner wetteifern miteinander, wer am 
lautesten durch unanständiges Benehmen Gestank erzeugen kann. Es ist zwar kei-
ne diplomatische Ausdrucksweise, dafür aber umso deutlicher. Verantwortungslose 
Schreihälse, die da brüllen, man müsse Kuba erobern, eine Blockade verhängen, 
sowjetische Schiffe versenken usw. Sind das noch normale Menschen oder Irrsin-
nige? Was heißt Blockade? Das wäre doch Krieg! Jetzt fahren unsere Schiffe nach 
Kuba. Wir haben unseren Kapitänen Befehl gegeben, wenn man sie stoppt, nicht 
stehen zu bleiben, und wenn man auf sie schießt, zurückzuschießen. Deshalb ha-
ben wir unsere U-Boot-Flotte in Kampfbereitschaft gesetzt, und wenn man unsere 
Schiffe angreift, so werden unsere U-Boote eingreifen. Wir haben zwar schwache 
Seestreitkräfte, aber dafür eine starke U-Boot-Flotte. Das alles würde aber Krieg 
bedeuten. 
Präsident Kennedy hat jetzt auf einer Pressekonferenz Erklärungen abgegeben, 
einerseits über die große Verantwortung, die auf seinen Schultern liegt, andererseits 
 1 Six pages on economic relations omitted. 
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daß er, wenn es sich als notwendig erweisen sollte, in Kuba eingreifen werde. Aber 
wer gibt ihm ein Recht dazu? Ihm gefällt die innere Ordnung in Kuba nicht. Wir 
haben die Türkei und Persien als Nachbarn, Zwischenruf Kossygin: Westberlin, 
und dort herrscht der Kapitalismus, was uns auch nicht paßt, trotzdem können wir 
deshalb diese Länder nicht angreifen. Wo kämen wir hin, wenn Gewalt vor Recht 
ginge? Wenn Gewalt Recht wäre, würde die Welt zu einem Irrenhaus. Das würde 
zur Auflösung der UNO und schließlich zu einem Weltkrieg führen.
Wir sind heute ein relativ starker Staat. Trotzdem versuchen wir nicht, auf an-
dere Länder einen Druck auszuüben, sondern sind bestrebt, unsere Beziehungen zu 
anderen Ländern auf der Grundlage der Gleichberechtigung zu erhalten. So haben 
wir uns beispielsweise sehr bemüht, unsere Beziehungen mit Finnland zu verbes-
sern. Finnland ist ein kleines Land; die Stadt Leningrad allein hat schon so viele 
Einwohner wie ganz Finnland. Das bedeutet aber keineswegs, daß wir Finnland 
gegenüber eine Politik der Beleidigungen, Demütigungen und Demonstrationen 
unserer Macht führen, so etwas wäre ausgesprochen sinnlos. Weil wir das nicht tun, 
sind heute unsere Beziehungen mit Finnland besser als mit irgendeinem anderen 
Land. Wir haben auch unseren militärischen Stützpunkt in Finnland aufgegeben, 
weil er unsere Beziehungen mit Finnland nur stören würde. Könnten wir etwa die 
Aufrechterhaltung eines Stützpunktes vor der Hauptstadt Finnlands damit rechtfer-
tigen, daß Finnland uns eventuell angreifen könnte? Das wäre doch eine unsinnige 
Erklärung! Wer würde uns je glauben, daß Finnland die Absicht hatte, uns anzu-
greifen? Selbst wenn Finnland das wollte, könnte es dies nicht tun, und genau so 
Kuba: Wer soll glauben, daß Kuba allen Ernstes die USA bedroht? Wie wäre so 
etwas überhaupt möglich? Wie kann denn ein Hase einen Löwen fressen? Und 
wie können 7 Millionen Kubaner die USA erobern? Selbst wenn Castro so etwas 
wollte, könnte er es nicht!
Was die Amerikaner aufführen, ist die Politik eines Räubers. Ihr Standpunkt 
gegenüber diesem kleinen Land ist: Du willst mich fressen, daher fresse ich lieber 
Dich. Nur haben sich jetzt die Zeiten geändert.
Schauen Sie uns an und unsere Beziehungen zu unseren Nachbarstaaten. Eben 
erst war der König von Afghanistan bei uns. Wir haben eine 2500 km lange Grenze 
mit Afghanistan, aber keinen Konflikt mit diesem Land, und was uns betrifft, wird 
es einen solchen auch in Zukunft nicht geben. Wir sind fest entschlossen, mit Af-
ghanistan in Freundschaft zu leben, und ich glaube, das wollen auch die Afghanen. 
Wir sind Kommunisten, Afghanistan ist ein Königreich, aber wir glauben, daß die 
innere Ordnung Innenangelegenheit eines jeden Landes ist und mischen uns da 
nicht ein. Jetzt arbeiten so viele von unseren Ingenieuren dort, aber ich habe bisher 
keine Beschwerde gehört, daß sie sich irgendwie gegen die afghanische Regierung 
betätigen. Das hat mir im übrigen auch der König von Afghanistan bestätigt, mit 
dem ich zusammen jagen war.
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Jetzt haben wir auch begonnen, unseren Konflikt mit Persien beizulegen und es 
scheint, daß es zu einer Verbesserung unserer Beziehungen mit diesem Land kom-
men wird. Auch unsere Beziehungen zu der Türkei werden immer besser.
Mit Ihnen haben wir alle Probleme gelöst. Seit dem Abschluß des Staatsvertra-
ges entwickeln sich unsere Beziehungen normal. Wir wollen mit allen Ländern in 
Frieden leben, das ist unsere Parole. Wenn aber die Amerikaner Kuba überfallen, 
zwingt uns dies, die Grenze zwischen Krieg und Frieden zu überschreiten. Und 
dann werden wir uns die schwachen Stellen, die Achillesferse, der Amerikaner aus-
suchen und da ist vor allem Berlin. Berlin ist längst ein militärischer Stützpunkt der 
NATO, wie sehr auch die Amerikaner, Engländer und Franzosen beteuern, daß sie 
ihre eigenen Truppen dort stationiert haben.
Stikker selbst hat erklärt, daß gegebenenfalls Nato-Truppen Westberlin zu Hilfe 
kommen würden! Das ist doch der beste Beweis dafür, daß Westberlin eine Nato-
Base [sic] ist.
Neben Westberlin gibt es aber auch noch andere Orte, wo wir unser Verhält-
nis zu den Amerikanern einer Überprüfung unterziehen könnten. Im übrigen ist ja 
Amerika selbst heute nicht mehr unverwundbar! Die Zeiten sind vorbei, in denen 
der Atlantische Ozean eine unüberschreitbare Barriere gebildet hat, dazu ist heute 
die Raketentechnik schon viel zu weit entwickelt. Die heutige Waffentechnik und 
insbesondere die Atom-U-Boote kennen keine Grenzen. Deshalb ist es auch über-
holt, sich auf Flugzeugträger zu stützen, wie dies die Amerikaner tun. Ich habe 
ihnen schon oft gesagt, daß diese Flugzeugträger längst veraltet sind und nur ein 
Mittel sind, Geld aus der Staatskasse zu pumpen. (Zwischenruf Vizekanzlers: Und 
die Stahlwerke zu beschäftigen!) Wir haben auch vor fünf Jahren von Stalin zu 95 
% fertige Kreuzer übernommen, aber wir haben sie zerlegt und eingeschmolzen. 
Wir legen jetzt unser Hauptgewicht auf unsere U-Boot-Flotte. Wir haben jetzt U-
Boote, die mit Raketen mit einer Reichweite bis zu 3000 km ausgestattet sind; was 
kann uns da die amerikanische Flotte noch anhaben? Gar nichts! Wenn sie uns 
angreifen sollten, werden wir ihnen mit unserer U-Boot-Flotte die gebührende Ant-
wort erteilen! Aber das bedeutet Krieg und darum sind wir dagegen. Wir werden, 
soweit das von uns abhängt, nie und gegen niemanden Krieg anfangen. Wenn das 
aber vom Kapitol in Washington abhängt und gewisse Leute dort die Oberhand 
bekommen, dann ist ein Krieg durchaus möglich. Deshalb ist es sehr schwer, jetzt 
Genaues zu sagen, letzten Endes hängt alles von Kennedy ab. Wird er so viel ge-
sunden Menschenverstand und Willenskraft haben, sich diesen Leuten energisch 
entgegenzustellen? Wenn ja, wird es keinen Krieg geben, wenn nein, wenn er Kuba 
angreifen sollte, dann ist ein Krieg unvermeidlich. Kuba ist ein souveräner Staat, 
und eine Verletzung seiner Souveränität würde die Grundlagen der internationalen 
Politik berühren. Der Fall Kuba übersteigt die Bedeutung des Landes Kuba. Sollen 
wir etwa eine Politik des Treuebruches und gewalttätigen Angriffes hinnehmen? 
Keineswegs! Wir werden Gewalt mit Gewalt beantworten. Wir haben genügend 
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Mittel hiefür. Kennedy selbst weiß das sehr genau, das hat er mehrmals betont. 
Deshalb glaube ich auch, daß bei ihm schließlich die Vernunft siegen wird. 
Vizekanzler Pittermann: Hat er die Kraft?
Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow: Ich kann dafür nicht bürgen. Darin liegt eben 
die Gefahr! Ich sage Ihnen ganz offen, die Politik Kennedys ist elastischer als die 
Eisenhowers, aber ich hatte ein sichereres Gefühl, als noch Dulles neben Eisen-
hower war. Dulles war zweifellos in allen seinen Gedanken ein Antikommunist, 
aber er hätte nie einen Krieg begonnen. Wir haben ihn in dieser Hinsicht auf die 
Probe gestellt. Als er gestorben war, sagte ich, wir werden noch an ihn denken. Auf 
ideologischem Gebiet war er zweifellos unser Feind Nr. 1, wie Sie im Westen zu 
sagen pflegen. Er war ein Meister der Dialektik und ging oft bis an die Grenze des 
Krieges, aber diese Grenze hat er nie überschritten! Dulles war ein sehr fester, aber 
vorsichtiger Politiker. Er war alt, er war erfahren und, wie ich schon sagte, einer 
der ausgeprägtesten Gegner des Kommunismus. Wenn er daher einmal sagte, bis 
hieher und nicht weiter, sonst gibt es Krieg, so glaubte man ihm das. Eisenhow-
er stellte sich natürlich immer hinter ihn, aber praktisch war nicht Dulles unter 
Eisenhower, sondern eher umgekehrt. Eisenhower war sicherlich auch gegen den 
Krieg, das glaube ich ihm ohne weiteres. Jetzt ist er in der Opposition und für die 
amerikanische Politik nicht mehr verantwortlich, und jetzt stürzen sich die Repub-
likaner wie eine Hundemeute auf Kennedy. Wird Kennedy genug Knüppeln finden, 
um diese Hunde zu verjagen und den Frieden zu erhalten? Ich möchte dafür nicht 
garantieren. Darum muß man die Weltlage als sehr labil bezeichnen, und das vor 
allem im Hinblick auf die Lage in USA! Das amerikanische Volk ist zweifellos ge-
gen den Krieg, spielt aber in der amerikanischen Politik keine Rolle. Dort sind vor 
allem die zwei Parteien, die gegeneinander kämpfen, wie zwei Fliegen, die man in 
ein Glas setzt. Wer von den beiden besser oder schlechter ist, weiß ich nicht. Bei-
de fürchten den Kommunismus, aber die Leidenschaft eines Verrückten kann zum 
Krieg führen. Sehen Sie, so beurteilen wir die Lage. Ob es einen Krieg geben wird 
oder nicht, ist schwer zu sagen. Weil jetzt die Amerikaner so ein Geschrei machen, 
haben wir unsere Streitkräfte in Kampfbereitschaft gebracht. Wir wollen hoffen, 
daß dieser Schritt nicht notwendig war. Was würde ein Krieg den Amerikanern 
bringen? Nur Zerstörung! Niemanden würde ein Krieg etwas anderes als Zerstö-
rung bringen. Wissen Sie, wenn ein Staat von vernünftigen Politikern geleitet wird, 
kann man vorhersagen, wie er sich verhalten wird, aber für die Amerikaner kann 
selbst der Teufel nicht garantieren. Jetzt hat Kennedy 150.000 Reservisten einberu-
fen lassen. Wozu, frage ich? Was hat er davon? 150.000, 300.000, eine Million, das 
ist doch alles bei einem Atomkrieg ganz gleich! Wir leben doch nicht mehr in der 
Zeit der Napoleonischen Kriege, als man mit Bajonetten kämpfte! In einem neuen 
Krieg würde man nicht einmal mehr mit Kanonen kämpfen, sondern nur mehr mit 
Atomwaffen. Sehen Sie, das muß man begreifen. Ein neuer Krieg wird nicht mehr 
Mann gegen Mann geführt, sondern gegen Industriezentren und Großstädte, und 
so etwa ist es kein Spiel für Kinder mehr. Soll er 150.000 Mann einberufen, wir 
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können 300.000 Mann einberufen, glauben Sie nicht, daß wir das können? Aber 
was haben wir davon? Das würde doch für unsere Streitkräfte keine echte Stärkung 
bedeuten, denn heute wird militärische Macht doch nicht mehr nach Bajonetten 
gezählt! So etwas kostet nur Geld. Deshalb haben wir unsererseits auch keine zu-
sätzlichen Truppen einberufen. Wir stützen uns hauptsächlich auf unsere Raketen, 
unsere Luftabwehr und unsere U-Boote, das genügt. Gott gebe uns, daß alles gut 
vorbeigeht.
Was die Frage Westberlin betrifft, halten wir es nicht für angebracht, vor den 
amerikanischen Kongreßwahlen Gespräche hierüber zu beginnen. Damit wollen 
wir bis nachher warten. Das heißt natürlich nicht, daß wir genau am 7. November 
anfangen wollen, an dem Tag haben wir Feiertag, aber nachher können wir unsere 
Kontakte mit den Westmächten wieder aufnehmen und unsere Gespräche fortset-
zen, freilich alles unter der Voraussetzung, daß die Amerikaner keinen Krieg wegen 
Kuba beginnen. Ein Krieg auf Kuba, ein Angriff auf unsere Schiffe ist so viel wie 
ein Angriff auf uns! Hoffen wir aber, daß das nicht der Fall sein wird und daß die 
Vernunft siegt. Ich glaube an den gesunden Menschenverstand Präsident Kenne-
dys; er hat auf mich einen sehr guten Eindruck gemacht. Vielleicht war das auch die 
Besonderheit der Wiener Atmosphäre, aber ich habe den Eindruck gewonnen, daß 
er ein zwar junger, aber sehr kluger und verständnisvoller Mensch ist. Wird er aber 
imstande sein, diese schwierige Lage zu meistern, um seiner Opposition wirksam 
entgegenzutreten? Das wird eine schwere Prüfung für ihn! Wenn aber alles gut geht, 
und kein Krieg wegen Kuba ausbricht, und man uns nicht provozieren wird, glaube 
ich, daß wir die Frage Westberlin für einen späteren Zeitpunkt aufschieben können. 
Vielleicht für die zweite Novemberhälfte, vielleicht fahre ich dann selbst zur UNO-
Sitzung. Das ist noch nicht sicher, aber es ist nicht ausgeschlossen. Vielleicht kann 
ich auch dort selbst mit Kennedy zusammentreffen, wenn die Lage uns das ermög-
lichen sollte, und wir könnten einen ausgiebigen Meinungsaustausch miteinander 
haben. Aber auch das ist noch ungewiß. Wenn wir aber zu keinem Verständnis 
über Berlin gelangen sollten, dann werden wir einen Friedensvertrag mit der DDR 
abschließen, dann werden wir praktisch alle Verbindungen kontrollieren und die 
militärischen Zugänge der Westmächte sperren. Das wird keine Blockade für die 
Westberliner Bevölkerung bedeuten; die Westberliner werden nach wie vor freien 
Zutritt zu ihrer Stadt haben. Wir werden aber auf dem Standpunkt stehen, daß mit 
der Unterzeichnung eines Friedensvertrages mit der DDR der Kriegszustand auf 
dem Territorium der DDR zu Ende und das Recht der Westmächte auf Stationie-
rung ihrer Truppen außer Kraft getreten ist. Wir sind jedoch nach wie vor zu einer 
Verständigung mit der anderen Seite bereit. Ich habe unseren Standpunkt auf dem 
Weltfriedenskongreß dargelegt. Den gleichen Standpunkt nehmen wir auch heute 
ein, und ich glaube, daß dieser Standpunkt der einzig mögliche und vernünftige ist. 
Kennedy selbst und andere Regierungschefs haben erklärt, daß sie diese Zustände 
nicht für normal halten, und Kennedy sagte mir, das ist eine Erbschaft, die man ihm 
hinterlassen hat. Das ist aber keineswegs etwas, was man nicht ändern kann. Wenn 
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es uns nicht gelingen wird, das Problem Westberlin zu lösen, so werden wir immer 
am Rande eines Krieges schweben. Westberlin bedeutet für uns nichts und auch für 
den Westen nichts, es ist nur ein Krisenherd. Was bedeutet es denn wirklich für die 
Westmächte? Gar nichts! Sie behaupten, sie wollen die Freiheit der Westberliner 
sichern, aber das wollen wir doch auch! Niemand bedroht diese Freiheit! Um was 
geht es also? Wenn es nach uns geht, ziehen wir alle Truppen zurück und beseitigen 
damit diesen Krisenherd.
Ich erkläre hiemit, daß wir nach wie vor zu Kompromissen bereit sind. Ein sol-
cher Kompromißvorschlag wäre die vorläufige Stationierung von UNO-Truppen in 
Westberlin als Garantie für die Freiheit der Westberliner. Was könnten wir ihnen 
noch vorschlagen, um beide Seiten zu befriedigen? Aber wenn sie hiefür absolut 
kein Verständnis haben, werden wir eben doch den Friedensvertrag mit der DDR 
abschließen, und dann wollen wir sehen, ob sie um ihren Korridor nach Westberlin 
kämpfen werden.
Zwei Fragen sind es also, von denen die Weltlage abhängt, Kuba und Berlin. 
Werden wir durchkommen, und wie? Kuba ist ein souveräner Staat und Mitglied 
der UNO, was auf ihm vorgeht, ist seine innere Angelegenheit. Daß sich Amerika 
in die Innenangelegenheiten eines fremden Staates einmischen will, berührt die 
Interessen aller übrigen souveränen Staaten. So entstand die ganze Kuba-Frage. 
Die USA und Kuba sind Mitglieder der Vereinten Nationen. Wenn die USA die 
Grundsätze der UNO beherzigen und sich nicht in die Innenangelegenheiten ande-
rer Staaten einmischen, so wird es keine Kuba-Krise geben.
Und noch einmal zur Frage Westberlin. Ich habe schon einmal gesagt, daß ich 
für die beste Lösung den Abschluß eines Friedensvertrages, die Schaffung einer 
freien Stadt Westberlin und die Aufnahme der DDR sowie der Bundesrepublik 
in die UNO halte. Vorübergehend können auch UNO-Truppen Westberlin statio-
niert werden, wobei wir volle Garantien für die Verbindungen geben, so wie etwa 
auch zwischen der Schweiz und den übrigen Staaten, auch solchen, an die sie nicht 
grenzt, Verbindungen bestehen.
Kossygin: Genau so bei Österreich.
Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow: Ja, auch Österreich, hat Verbindungen mit 
allen Ländern, aber eben auf Grundlage von internationalen Verträgen. Einige be-
sonders Kluge erklären, man muß einen Korridor durch die DDR nach Westberlin 
schaffen. Diesen Neunmalklugen antworte ich, daß wir dies ablehnen, weil wir 
keinen Präzedenzfall schaffen wollen. So haben die Amerikaner die Mongolei an-
erkannt. Dorthin kann man nur durch die Sowjetunion oder durch China kommen. 
Heißt das jetzt, daß die Amerikaner jetzt die Einräumung eines Korridors durch die 
Sowjetunion zur Mongolei verlangen können? (Chruschtschow klopft sich auf die 
Stirn und auf sein Gesäß) Man muß eben unterscheiden zwischen dem Körperteil, 
auf dem man sitzt, und dem, mit dem man denkt, aber bei manchen Leuten dürften 
diese Unterschiede nicht so klar bestehen. Und nicht nur Staatsmänner müssen die-
sen Unterschied machen, sondern auch die Leute, die unter ihnen stehen.
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Trotzdem hoffe ich, daß es keinen Krieg geben wird. Man kann viel schwätzen, 
aber man solle sich genau überlegen, bevor man auf gewisse Knöpfe drückt.
Besonders laute Schreier sind Adenauer und de Gaulle, die sich eben getroffen 
haben, um die alte deutsch-französische Liebe neu zu beleben. Das wird aber kei-
ne Liebes heirat, sondern nur eine Vernunftsehe. De Gaulle will Adenauer an sich 
drücken und dadurch seine Stellung in Europa stärken, und Adenauer möchte das 
gleiche, für Westdeutschland wieder einen Weg in die Weltpolitik finden. Keiner 
der beiden bringt dem anderen jedoch eine echte Zuneigung entgegen, ihre Umar-
mungen und Küsse sind alles Berechnung. Ich bin aber überzeugt, daß, wenn sich 
die Weltlage so entwickelt, daß wir vor der Wahl stehen, Krieg oder Frieden, de 
Gaulle und Adenauer sich auf jene Kreise stützen, die einen Krieg entfesseln möch-
ten. Dabei wissen sie, daß, wenn ein neuer Krieg ausbricht, zwar alle Länder ein 
großer Schade treffen wird, Frankreich und Deutschland aber überhaupt nicht mehr 
existieren werden, sie würden einen Atomkrieg nicht überleben. Jeder vernünftige 
Mensch muß das einsehen. Aber vielleicht hat de Gaulle immer das Bild Napoleons 
vor sich und glaubt, daß er größer als Napoleon ist. Und so etwas ist sehr gefähr-
lich. Sehen Sie, so sehen wir die internationale Lage.
England vertritt eine Politik, die nicht seine eigene ist. England glaubt nicht an 
einen militärischen Konflikt und ist gegen Militärstützpunkte auf seinem Gebiet. 
Die englische Labour Party hat für unsere Deutschlandpolitik sogar großes Ver-
ständnis. Ich habe vor kurzem einen Labour-Abgeordneten empfangen, der mir ein 
persönliches Schreiben von Hugh Gaitskell überbrachte. Gaitskell möchte sich im 
Dezember oder Anfang Jänner mit mir treffen. Ich hatte mit dem Labour-Abgeord-
neten ein ausführliches Gespräch und habe ihm unsere Politik auseinandergesetzt. 
Er sagte, es sei eine vernünftige Politik, und die Labour Party könnte dieser Politik 
zustimmen! Was ich jetzt sage, ist nicht für die Presse, aber während meines Ge-
spräches mit U Thant – ich möchte ihm keine Unannehmlichkeiten bereiten, aber er 
erzählte mir, daß er in London mehrere Gespräche mit Labour-Abgeordneten führte 
und alle in der Frage Westberlin unseren Vorschlägen voll zustimmen, die ich auf 
dem Weltfriedenskongreß dargelegt habe. Die englischen Labour-Zeitungen haben 
auch einen Aufruf gebracht, daß man meine Vorschläge zur Lösung der Berlinfrage 
aufgreifen soll.
Trotzdem glaube ich, daß dieser Zustand der Ungewißheit noch bis zu den ame-
rikanischen Kongreßwahlen dauern wird. Momentan würde Kennedy schwerlich 
eine entschiedene Haltung einnehmen. Er würde zwar damit viel Unterstützung 
beim amerikanischen Volk finden, wird es aber trotzdem nicht wagen. Das ist eben 
das Wesen des Kapitalismus, und bestätigt die Prognose von Marx, daß sich der 
Kapitalismus überleben wird. Die amerikanischen Kapitalisten spielen mit dem 
Feuer, die Frage von Krieg und Frieden wird bei ihnen zum Spielball des Parteien-
schachers.
Vizekanzler Pittermann: Wir leben in einem gemischten System. Trotzdem ist 
es möglich, daß gerade bei diesem System, in dem wir auch zwei gleich starke 
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Parteien haben, die in wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Fragen große Differenzen ha-
ben, eine gemeinsame Außenpolitik geführt wird. Auch wir haben in zwei Mona-
ten Wahlen, und bei uns ist das Kräfteverhältnis noch viel ausgeglichener als in 
Amerika, wo Kennedy bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen eine Mehrheit von 100.000 
Stimmen hatte. Aber in der Frage des Festhaltens an Neutralität und Loyalität zu 
beschlossenen Verträgen gibt es zwischen den österreichischen Regierungspartei-
en keine Differenz, so heftig sie sich auch im Wahlkampf gegen seitig bekämpfen 
werden.
Ministerpräsident Chruschtschow: Ich glaube, daß man das auch mit der be-
sonderen Lage Österreichs, seiner wirtschaftlichen Stärke und Bevölkerungszahl 
erklären kann. Sie in Österreich können nicht die Rolle einnehmen, die die USA 
einzunehmen entschlossen sind, nämlich die Rolle eines Führers und Verteidigers 
des Kapitalismus. Deshalb spielen sich auch bei Ihnen Wahlen mehr um innere 
Fragen ab. Was aber die außenpolitischen Fragen und die Neutralität anlangt, haben 
die beiden Parteien bei Ihnen die gleiche Position. Bei Ihnen erhitzen sich während 
der Vorwahlzeit Leidenschaft über Fragen der Innenpolitik. In Amerika jedoch sind 
die Verhältnisse ganz anders und dort ist das oberste Ziel die Zurückwerfung des 
Kommunismus und der Kampf gegen den Kommunismus. Diese Fragen stehen dort 
im Vordergrund, und das ist sehr gefährlich. So eine Politik ist bezeichnend für die 
USA, selbst in England könnte sie nicht geführt werden. England hat heute keine 
solche Stellung mehr in der Welt. Und daraus erklärt sich die ganze amerikani sche 
Politik der Ungewißheit, der Labilität, die Politik der Schreihälse. Und darin liegt 
die große Gefahr. Aber nicht wir waren es, die sich Amerika als unseren Gegen-
spieler ausgesucht haben. Das hat uns der liebe Gott gegeben, wie man bei Ihnen 
sagt. Darum müssen wir, wenn die Vernunft nicht mehr ausreicht, uns auf Raketen 
und Bomben stützen. Wir machen unsere Explosionen, die Amerikaner ha ben be-
reits angekündigt, daß sie auch ihrerseits wieder welche machen werden. Das ist 
kein lustiges Leben, aber das ist die Politik der Koexistenz. Wenn es nicht möglich 
sein wird, daß wir uns über die Abrüstung einigen, dann werden wir eben weiter in 
diesen Verhältnissen des Wettbewerbes leben müssen und versuchen müssen, ein 
Gleichge wicht, eine Balance zu halten, so sinnlos dies auch ist, aber was können wir 
tun? Amerika will sich zu keiner Einigung über die Abrüstung bereitfinden, Kenne-
dy unterschreibt nichts, weil er weiß, daß der Kongreß kein Abrüstungsabkommen 
genehmigen wird. Erst wenn einmal die Völker den Kapitalismus wegjagen und 
überall die Arbeitermacht aufrichten werden, dann wird vielleicht ewiger Friede auf 
Erden herrschen. Inzwischen warten und arbeiten wir, wir haben keine andere Wahl. 
[…]2 
Source: ÖStA, AdR, BMAA, II-Pol., GZ. 73.544–6pol/62, Z. GZ. 73.544–6pol/62.
 2 Six pages on the economic development of the USSR, the weather, and an invitation to Austria 
omitted.
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Document 6: The Democratic Lawyers Association’s Theses on Neutrality, Sofia, 
14 October 1962
After consideration of the problems presented in Item 3 on the agenda, the Con-
gress is of the opinion that the time is ripe for a fresh approach to the problem of 
neutrality. It considers that a definition of neutrality in terms of modern needs and 
realities is now possible, but that this demands a further study of the definition of 
aggression. 
As a result of its discussions, the Congress has passed the following Resolution, 
that
At the end of this Congress the Council of the International Association of Dem-
ocratic Lawyers be instructed to appoint a commission or commissions to prepare 
reliable definitions of neutrality and aggression. 
The Congress considers that in dealing with the very important question of the 
definitions of neutrality and aggression, the commission or commissions to be set up 
under the terms of the Resolution should bear the following considerations in mind.
I . 
The modern concept of neutrality differs profoundly from the traditional concept.
The traditional concept first and foremost defined the position of a country in 
wartime. In those days neutrality was based on the desire of certain countries to 
stand aloof from power politics and not be involved in wars between the great pow-
ers. 
The contemporary legal concept of neutrality, on the other hand, is based essen-
tially on the need to maintain peace and national sovereignty. 
The policy of neutrality represents a positive attitude in favour of peace, peace-
ful coexistence between nations, and mutual understanding among men. It also 
enables new states to safeguard an independence which might be compromised in 
joining military blocs.
II.
Contemporary neutrality is consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN 
Charter and the general rules of modern international law. 
It can take the following forms:
1) A unilateral declaration which creates rights and obligations for the neutral 
state, as well as for states which recognize it and establish diplomatic relations with 
it.
2) A bilateral agreement.
3) A multilateral treaty.
Permanent neutrality can be established by the first or the third of these methods.
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III.
The rights and obligations of states enjoying neutral status can essentially be defi-
ned in the following manner:
1) Nonparticipation in military blocs.
2) A formal and categorical ban on present or future foreign military bases on 
their soil, in the admission of foreign troops, and on the use of the national air space 
for espionage, nuclear war or other hostile purposes.
3) A ban on the possession of nuclear weapons.
4) The duty of maintaining good relations with all states without discrimination.
5) A neutral state should neither offer nor permit on its territory any aid or sup-
port, whether direct or indirect, to an aggressor.
6) Withdrawal from all pacts creating obligations which are incompatible with 
those deriving from a neutral status.
7) A neutral state is entitled to full respect for its political and economic sover-
eign rights. It may undertake its own defense or call for the help of other states in 
the event of aggression or an infringement of its neutrality.
Source: International Association of Democratic Lawyers (ed.), Legal Aspects of Neutrality: Proceed-
ings of the Third Commission (Brussels: International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1960), 
113–114.
Document 7: Conversation A. Gromyko – K. Waldheim, Moscow, 22 March 1968 
(translated from Russian)
[…]1 25
A. A. Gromyko states that the situation in Vietnam is very complicated and 
dangerous. The Americans have not ceased their military actions in Vietnam; on 
the contrary, there is talk about sending more troops to Vietnam. Johnson makes a 
declaration from time to time about being ready for a peaceful solution in Vietnam, 
but the reality shows how hypocritical such declarations are. This is corroborated 
by the fact that the Americans disrupt even the slightest contacts in Vietnam.
The number of states that condemn the policy of the US grows. Vietnam re-
ceives a growing amount of help from other states, in particular from the USSR, 
which is determined to help Vietnam also in the future, because it is convinced 
 1 In a conversation on 19 March, the Austrian minister of foreign affairs classifi ed the Soviet-Aus-
trian relationship as “problem-free” and invited his Soviet colleague to visit Austria. Waldheim 
stressed that Austria “is not taking any steps in its relations with the EEC that might run counter 
to the state treaty or contradict the status of a neutral country.” He repeated the earlier Austrian 
desire to be granted permission to buy defense missiles. Gromyko declared the state treaty and 
the law on Austria’s neutrality “a very good basis for the further development of Soviet-Austrian 
relations,” but warned against Austria’s rapprochement with the EEC. Both sides underlined their 
interest in developing bilateral trade. AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 23–26. 
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that the case of the Vietnamese people is the right one, and victory will be on their 
side. The proposals of the Vietnamese government that were made, in particular 
by the minister of foreign affairs of the DRV, open the way for negotiations. How-
ever, to begin there must be an unconditional cessation of the bombardments of 
the DRV. 
K. Waldheim declared that [people] in Austria are following the situation in Vi-
etnam with concern and are ready to do everything they can for the cessation of the 
Vietnam War. The minister reported that he has established contact with the DRV’s 
ambassador in Budapest. In a conversation with him he declared that Austria advo-
cates a solution of the Vietnam problem on the basis of the Geneva agreements of 
1954, and that Austria is ready to offer its good services for regulating the conflict 
if both sides were to express a desire for this. It has been agreed to continue direct 
contacts with the DRV’s ambassador. 
K. Waldheim posed the question whether and how a small country might con-
tribute to the solution of the Vietnamese Question. The neutral states Austria, Swe-
den and Switzerland have offered their good services for a solution of the Vietnam 
problem. Austria is sending aid to Vietnam through the Red Cross. 
A. A. Gromyko answered by stating that the question of mediation must be de-
cided by the sides involved in the conflict. The Soviet Union calls on Austria to fol-
low the example of a number of states and to raise its voice in favor of a cessation 
of aggression in Vietnam, in support of the just case of Vietnam. The Vietnamese 
people must be given the right to decide their own internal questions. 
Regarding the problem of European security, A. A. Gromyko raised the issue 
of the FRG’s policies and declared that, although the coalition government of the 
FRG has spoken following a new policy course, the facts do not corroborate this. 
The course of West Germany has become more subtle in its tactics. However, by its 
character, [the West German chancellor] Kiesinger repeats the model of the Ade-
nauer era, albeit in a more even-handed way. The government of the FRG maintains 
its previous revanchist line regarding its borders, the GDR, and West Berlin. The 
posture of West Germany towards European security has also not changed. As be-
fore, the FRG is reaching out for nuclear arms and claims to represent all Germans. 
As before the war, Kiesinger even speaks of a “people without space,” and Goeb-
bels’ propaganda motifs are heard again. In West Germany, this kind of forces are 
raising their head higher and higher, do not conceal that they follow Hitler’s course, 
and openly speak about it at their meetings and conferences. 
[…]2 26
When discussing security issues in Europe, some political leaders, tellingly, 
operate with general formulations and speak out for European security and all-
European cooperation. However, as soon as concrete measures for preparing an all-
European conference are discussed, nothing comes out of it [sluchaiutsia osechki] 
 2 One paragraph on the danger of neo-Nazism omitted. 
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and discord starts. Some politicians, unfortunately, do not speak out clearly for re-
specting the inviolability of European borders, although, in confidential conversa-
tions, they declare their support for this issue. Strong declarations about recogniz-
ing the borders in Europe, as they emerged after World War II, would correspond 
with Austria’s interests too. 
Some words about West Berlin. The British, French, and American representa-
tives have signed a declaration that West Berlin is not part of the FRG. In practice, 
however, the US and Britain are encouraging the FRG to lay claims on West Berlin. 
K. Waldheim stated that [people] in Austria recognize the danger of a return of 
Nazism, and are prepared to do everything necessary for not letting this happen. 
The Austrian government recognizes the importance of all-European coopera-
tion and the call for an all-European conference. It has studied the Soviet delib-
erations on this issue and agrees to continue to discuss these questions through 
diplomatic channels. 
A. A. Gromyko agreed to continuing the exchange of opinions regarding these 
topics after the Austrian memorandum, dedicated to the problems of all-European 
cooperation, has been studied. 
[…]3 27
Source: Zapis’ besed A. A. Gromyko s ministrom inostrannykh del Avstriiskoi respubliki, K. 
Val’dkhaimom, 30 April 1968, in AVPRF, 66/47/101/11, 23–29, here 26–29.
Document 8: Conversation L. Brezhnev – B. Kreisky, Moscow, 8 February 1978 
Arbeitsübersetzung aus dem Russischen
BILATERALE BEZIEHUNGEN
Gut, daß wir mit der österreichischen Seite eine gemeinsame Sprache sprechen, 
sowohl über Fragen der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit als auch über einen weiten 
Bogen internationaler zwischenstaatlicher Probleme. Unser Handel, der kulturel-
le, wissenschaftliche und sportliche Austausch weiten sich aus. Die vertragliche 
Grundlage unserer Beziehungen wird immer breiter. All dies bewirkt eine Genugtu-
ung, die – wie ich glaube – auch der Herr Bundeskanzler teilt. Unsere gemeinsame 
Aufgabe, wie wir sie verstehen, besteht darin, das angesammelte Gut des Vertrau-
ens und der guten Nachbarschaft zu mehren. Die Sowjetunion ist und wird für eine 
weitere konstruktive Zusammenarbeit mit dem neutralen Österreich eintreten. Dies 
ist unsere prinzipielle und langfristige Linie.
Wir bringen den Bemühungen der österreichischen Seite zur Auffindung neuer 
Wege für eine Belebung der österreichisch-sowjetischen wirtschaftlichen Zusam-
menarbeit Verständnis entgegen. Dabei wird die Aufmerksamkeit richtig auf die 
Anwendung solcher bewährten Formen gerichtet, wie es die langfristigen Vorhaben 
 3 Four paragraphs concerning the Soviet condemnation of the position of Israel in the aftermath of 
the Six-Day War omitted. 
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auf Kompensationsbasis, die Entwicklung der Kooperation, die Zusammenarbeit 
auf den Märkten dritter Länder darstellen. Unsere Stellen werden Weisungen er-
halten, die entsprechenden Möglichkeiten unter Berücksichtigung von Vorschlägen 
der österreichischen Seite eingehend zu prüfen.
Was das Defizit im sowjetisch-österreichischen Handel betrifft, so steht es nicht 
dafür, dieses zu übertreiben. Heute ist es vorhanden, morgen vielleicht nicht mehr.
Handel ist eine dynamische Angelegenheit. Dabei ist dieses Defizit nicht groß. 
Jedenfalls ist es in keiner Weise mit dem Negativsaldo im österreichischen Handel, 
z. B. mit der BRD (50 Milliarden Schilling), zu vergleichen.
Wir glauben, daß es das wichtigste ist, eine kontinuierliche und zielstrebige 
Ausweitung der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Sowjetunion und 
Österreich auf der Basis des gegenseitigen Vorteils zu gewährleisten. In dieser Hin-
sicht mußten wir gemeinsam etwas tun.
STAATSVERTRAG
Dieses Vertragswerk zusammen mit dem Beschluß über die immerwährende 
Neutralität Österreich ist das wesentliche Element der Stabilität der Lage in Euro-
pa. Dies ist die beste Garantie für die Existenz eines unabhängigen selbständigen 
Österreichs, für das Wohlergehen seines Volkes. Die gesamte Nachkriegserfahrung 
beweist, daß die Einhaltung des Staatsvertrages, eine konsequente Verwirklichung 
der Neutralitätspolitik den Grundinteressen Österreichs, den Interessen seiner nor-
malen Zusammenarbeit mit allen Staaten entsprechen.
Ich möchte betonen, daß es in bezug auf die Erfüllung der Bestimmungen des 
Staatsvertrages keine wie immer gearteten Verzerrungen geben sollte. Von unserer 
Seite wird den auf die Festigung der Unabhängigkeit des Landes und seiner inter-
nationalen Stellung gerichteten Bemühungen der österreichischen Regierung stets 
Verständnis und Unterstützung entgegengebracht werden.
Wir waren und bleiben Gegner jeglicher Versuche, dem neutralen Status und 
der Souveränität des österreichischen Staates einen Schaden zuzufügen, egal von 
welcher Seite sie ausgehen mögen.
DIE ENTSPANNUNG UND DIE ROLLE DER NEUTRALEN STAATEN
Wir kennen im allgemeinen die positive Rolle, welche Österreich in der Grup-
pe der europäischen neutralen Staaten spielt. Ich möchte der Hoffnung Ausdruck 
verleihen, daß es seinen Einfluß und seine Möglichkeiten für die Beseitigung von 
Schwierigkeiten auf dem Wege zu einer dauerhaften Entspannung, für eine Annä-
herung der Standpunkte in strittigen Fragen geltend machen und Versuchen einer 
Wiederbelebung der Politik „des kalten Krieges“ entgegenwirken wird. Wohl nie-
mand anderer als die kleinen Staaten ist an der strengen Einhaltung ausnahmslos 
aller in Helsinki abgesprochenen Prinzipien der Beziehungen zwischen den Staa-
ten, an der Behauptung der Gesetzlichkeit und Gerechtigkeit in internationalen An-
gelegenheiten interessiert. Um dieses Ziel zu erreichen, unternehmen wir alles, was 
in unserer Macht steht.
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FRAGEN DER ABRÜSTUNG
Sicherlich müssen wir in bezug auf die Festigung der Entspannung und des 
Friedens noch vieles tun. Unserer Meinung nach ist hier das Wichtigste – weniger 
allgemeine Debatten denn mehr praktische Schritte in der Abrüstung. Es wäre sehr 
wichtig, eine Unterbindung der Erzeugung von Nuklearwaffen zu vereinbaren und 
die Frage des Verbotes von Versuchen mit dieser Waffe zu Ende zu führen. Um 
die Frage in Gang zu bringen, haben wir – wie bekannt – sogar vorgeschlagen, ein 
Moratorium für Atomexplosionen auch für friedliche Zwecke zu beschließen. Im 
allgemeinen sind wir dafür, daß Kernwaffen und alle ihre Abarten für immer aus 
unserem Leben verbannt werden, und wir sind breit, alles dafür Notwenige zu tun. 
Ich freue mich feststellen zu können, daß die prinzipiellen Standpunkte der Sowje-
tunion und Österreichs in dieser Frage übereinstimmen.
ÜBER DIE NEUTRONENBOMBE
Ihr Erscheinen in Europa würde eine neue Situation schaffen und würde von 
uns verlangen, Gegenmaßnahmen zu ergreifen. Wahrscheinlich ist jemand daran 
interessiert, daß die Welt in ein neues Stadium des Rüstungswettlaufes mit allen 
daraus folgenden Konsequenzen hereingezogen wird. Über diese Bombe sagt man, 
sie zerstöre nicht, sie vernichte nur das Leben. Wem könnte eine derartige Aussicht 
recht sein? Immer mehr Menschen im Westen und auch in den USA erheben Pro-
teste gegen Pläne der Erzeugung einer Neutronenbombe.
Ich habe in Botschaften meine Gedanken in Verbindung mit der Neutronenbom-
be an alle Staatsoberhäupter, die an der Europäischen Konferenz teilgenommen ha-
ben, darunter auch Ihnen, Herr Bundeskanzler, direkt und offen dargelegt. Dies ist 
keineswegs ein Schritt der Propaganda. Wir appellieren an die Vernunft. Es ist noch 
nicht zu spät, diesen Neutronenwahnsinn zu stoppen. Wir schlagen ehrlich vor zu 
vereinbaren, gegenseitig auf die Herstellung dieser für alles Lebende unserer Erde 
unheilbringenden Waffe zu verzichten. Es liegt nun am Wort des Westens.
Ist es nicht klar, daß die Gefahr eines Atomkonfliktes in Europa im Falle der 
Verteilung einer neuen Abart von Kernwaffen in bedeutendem Maße ansteigen 
würde. Selbst die Befürworter einer Neutronenwaffe verheimlichen nicht, daß da-
bei die Schwelle eines Kernkonfliktes sicherlich nicht herabgesetzt werden würde. 
Es fragt sich nun, wer braucht so etwas und wozu soll es dienen.
Unsere gesamte Führung hofft, daß Österreich im Kampfe gegen die Verteilung 
von Neutronenwaffen in Europa nicht beiseite stehen wird.
Egal was wir heute besprechen mögen – die Aussichten des internationalen 
Handels oder die Möglichkeit der Ausweitung des kulturellen Austausches – all 
dies tritt in den Hintergrund im Vergleich mit der Frage der Sicherung des Friedens. 
Dieses Problem war für uns und wird auch weiterhin von erstrangiger Bedeutung 
sein.
ÜBER BELGRAD
Bevor wir die Frage besprechen, was nach dem Zusammentreffen in Belgrad zu 
tun ist, muß diese Begegnung zuerst ein gutes Ende erfahren; es darf eine weitere 
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Verschleppung nicht zugelassen werden. Leider sind die Vertreter der USA und 
diejenigen, die mit ihnen gehen, mit allen Kräften bestrebt, diese Begegnung von 
der Annahme konstruktiver Verschlüsse abzuhalten und ihr eine Polemik zu rein 
propagandistischen Zwecken aufzuzwingen. All dies steht in einem krassen Wi-
derspruch zu Sinn und Wort der Schlußakte. Es ist Zeit, mit derartigen Praktiken 
Schluß zu machen.
Es scheint, daß es ein allgemeines Einverständnis darüber gibt, 1980 in Madrid 
eine zweite Begegnung nach Art der von Belgrad durchzuführen. Über das Niveau 
dieser Begegnung müßte man noch Überlegungen anstellen. Ich würde nicht sagen, 
daß das gegenwärtige Vertreterniveau an der Begegnung in Belgrad nicht gerecht-
fertigt wäre. Wichtig sind die Endergebnisse. Dies hängt vor allem von der Politik 
der an der Begegnung teilnehmenden Länder ab. Was die Begegnung in Madrid 
betrifft, so wird uns das Leben selbst einen Wink geben, auf welcher Ebene dies 
durchzuführen wäre.
Sowohl jetzt, als auch nach der Begegnung in Belgrad ist es notwendig, alle 
Kräfte auf die Verwirklichung der Entspannung zu konzentrieren, insbesondere auf 
militärischem Gebiet.
Hier gibt es noch viele ungenützte Möglichkeiten und politische Reserven. Und 
es versteht sich von selbst, daß wir alle konsequent an der Verwirklichung sämtli-
cher Bestimmungen und Vereinbarungen der Schlußakte arbeiten müssen.
ÜBER DEN BESUCH IN ÖSTERREICH
Ich danke nochmals für die mir vom Bundespräsidenten Kirchschläger und von 
Ihnen zugekommene Einladung, Österreich einen freundschaftlichen Besuch ab-
zustatten. Ich werde sicherlich mit großem Vergnügen in Österreich weilen. Ich 
sage das mit Sicherheit. Zur Frage der Festlegung des Termines jedoch wird man 
aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach später zurückkommen müssen. Heute dazu etwas 
Bestimmtes zu sagen ist schwierig.
Source: SBKA, Länderboxen, UdSSR 4.
Document 9: Report Ambassador H. Liedermann – Austrian MFA, On Austrian-
Soviet Relations, 23 November 1985
Herrn Bundesminister für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, WIEN
Die Beziehungen Österreichs zur kommunistischen Weltmacht UdSSR, deren 
Unterschrift unter jenem Vertragswerk steht, das als Fundament der von Österreich 
1955 wiedererlangten außenpolitischen Unabhängigkeit gilt, sind für Österreich 
zweifellos von eminenter sicherheitspolitischer und existentieller Bedeutung. Die 
konsequente sachkundige Pflege und Weiterentwicklung dieser Beziehungen ist 
daher eine zentrale Aufgabe der österreichischen Außenpolitik.
In den letzten Jahren waren die österreichisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen durch 
das Paradoxon charakterisiert, daß sie sich zwar – an der Zahl der Besuchskon-
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takte gemessen – stark intensiviert haben; daß jedoch gleichzeitig das Verständ-
nis der UdSSR für österreichische Interessen, die ungeachtet der Konstanten der 
österreichischen Außenpolitik einem Wandel unterliegen können, kaum zuge-
nommen haben dürfte, weil man österreichischerseits in vielen Fällen von ihrer 
Artikulierung Abstand nahm. Nicht zuletzt deshalb sind die politischen Vorstel-
lungen, die man im sowjetischen Führungsapparat von Österreich hat, noch im-
mer von den Begriffen der 50er Jahre geprägt. Österreich ist für die Sowjets ein 
Element der „Deutschen Frage“, für das 1955 eine positive und dauerhafte Lö-
sung gefunden wurde. Obwohl Österreich in den vergangenen 30 Jahren als im-
merwährend neutraler Staat in Mitteleuropa seine Probe bestanden hat und längst 
nicht mehr im Schatten „Deutschlands“ steht, werden die außen-, sicherheits- und 
wirtschaftspolitischen Aktivitäten Österreichs von der UdSSR noch immer zu sehr 
aus diesem Blickwinkel betrachtet, der Flexibilität gegenüber sich wandelnden 
österreichischen Interessen weitgehend ausschließt. Politische Kontakte, wie sie 
zwischen Österreich und der UdSSR gepflegt werden, sollten jedoch der Vermeh-
rung des Verständnisses für die Interessen der jeweils anderen Seite dienen. Es 
wäre auch opportun, sowjetischen Bestrebungen, Staatsvertrag und Neutralitäts- 
p o l i t i k als ein untrennbares Ganzes zu betrachten, das – wie Staatspräsident 
Gromyko unlängst gegenüber einer österreichischen Parlamentarierdelegation er-
klärt hat – einer „dynamischem Weiterentwicklung“ bedürfe, in geeigneter Form 
konsequent entgegenzutreten. Eine Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen völker-
rechtlichen Verpflichtungen und autonomen außenpolitischen Entscheidungen, die 
den sich wandelnden österreichischen Interessen Rechnung tragen, wäre österrei-
chischen Interessen abträglich.
Um die österreichischen Interessen gegenüber der UdSSR wirksam geltend ma-
chen zu können, bedarf es zunächst einmal einer gründlichen innerösterreichischen 
Bestandsaufnahme sowie der Abstimmung und verbindlichen Festlegung österrei-
chischer Positionen. Widersprüchliche oder gar konträre Erklärungen österreichi-
scher Repräsentanten böten der UdSSR die Möglichkeit, faktisch den österreichi-
schen Handlungsspielraum einzuengen.
Ein Besuchsaustausch mit der UdSSR erfordert besonders gründliche Vorberei-
tung, um österreichische Anliegen klar artikulieren und sowjetische Vorstöße, die 
österreichischen Positionen zuwiderlaufen, parieren zu können. Sowjetischerseits 
wird jedem Satz in Kommuniqués, Tischreden und Presseerklärungen viel größere 
Bedeutung, als es im Westen üblich ist, beigemessen. Mündliche und schriftliche 
Enunziationen dieser Art dienen der UdSSR zu einem langsamen, oft unmerklichen 
Ausbau ihrer Positionen; auf sie wird bei gegebenem Anlaß Bezug genommen.
Wenn in der Vergangenheit die österreichisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen von 
offizieller Seite stets als „herzlich“ bis „ausgezeichnet“ qualifiziert wurden, so re-
sultiert dies weitgehend aus der Praxis, differierende politische Einschätzungen auf 
beiden Seiten unerwähnt zu lassen. Nicht immer fragt man sich vor Antritt einer 
Reise in die UdSSR, was man hier politisch konkret erreichen will. In den österrei-
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chisch-sowjetischen Beziehungen ist seit längerem die Tendenz zu verspüren, die 
Erörterung heikler Fragen wie etwa 
– die Bedeutung einer wirksamen Landesverteidigung zur Sicherung der Neu-
tralität und Souveränität Österreichs, die wohl auch die Verfügbarkeit moderner 
Verteidigungswaffen einschließt (z.B. Flieger- und Panzerabwehrraketen) und 
– die Frage einer allfälligen künftigen Neugestaltung der Beziehungen Öster-
reichs zu einer sich wandelnden Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG)
auszuklammern. Prima vista sind sowohl eine „Raketenbewaffnung“ des Bun-
desheeres als auch eine österreichische Mitgliedschaft bei der EG für die UdSSR 
tabu, weil sie der gängigen sowjetischen Staatsvertragsinterpretation widerspre-
chen. Gleichzeitig bedingt jedoch die technologische, politische und wirtschafts-
politische Entwicklung der letzten 3 Jahrzehnte eine künftige Auseinandersetzung 
mit diesen Themen. Prognosen abzugeben, wie die sowjetische Haltung im Falle 
einer österreichischen Relevierung dieser Fragen aussehen wird, wären zum gegen-
wärtigen Zeitpunkt verfrüht. Die innerösterreichische Diskussion zur Vorbereitung 
der österreichischen Positionen gegenüber der UdSSR sollte hinter verschlossenen 
Türen stattfinden. Es wäre unrichtig, die Erörterung heikler Fragen mit der UdSSR 
nur deshalb weiter auszuklammern, um „die Beziehungen nicht zu belasten“. Es 
ist zwar eine Tatsache, daß die UdSSR als Signatarmacht des Staatsvertrages über 
potentielle Mechanismen verfügt, um militär- und außenpolitisch wichtige Schritte 
Österreichs zu erschweren und allenfalls zu blockieren. Diesen Umstand jedoch 
stillschweigend hinzunehmen, würde auf die Dauer einem Akzeptieren sowjeti-
scher Standpunkte gleichkommen
Im wirtschaftlichen Bereich sollte Österreich erkennen, daß es sich gegenüber 
der UdSSR keineswegs immer und überall in einer „Demandeur“-Position befindet. 
Österreich ist für die UdSSR ein westlicher Wirtschaftspartner, mit dem sie wert-
volle Devisen erwirtschaftet. In den Jahren 1980 bis 1984 waren dies auf Grund 
des bedeutenden Handelsbilanzaktivums zugunsten der UdSSR immerhin 37 Mrd 
öS. Beim offiziellen Besuchsaustausch mit der UdSSR steht Österreich meist unter 
dem Erwartungsdruck, daß bedeutende Geschäftsvereinbarungen für die österrei-
chische Exportwirtschaft abgeschlossen werden. Sowjetischerseits könnte dadurch 
der Eindruck erweckt werden, daß Österreich bei offiziellen Besuchen mit wirt-
schaftlichen Aufträgen seitens des Sowjetstaates belohnt werden möchte. So reiste 
beispielsweise Ministerpräsident Tichonow im April 1981 mit einem Großauftrag 
für Nahtlosröhren nach Österreich, welche die Errichtung des seit seiner Inbetrieb-
nahme bis heuer defizitären VOEST-Werkes in Kindberg zur Folge hatte. Ob die 
Gewinnspannen im Handel mit der UdSSR stets dem politischen Einsatz entspre-
chen, sollte einmal eingehend geprüft werden. Die Schiffswerft Korneuburg-Linz 
produziert fast ausschließlich für den sowjetischen Markt. Neuerdings ist zu beob-
achten, daß die UdSSR an ausgewählte österreichische Klein- und Mittelbetriebe, 
die um ihr Überleben kämpfen, Aufträge erteilen. Die UdSSR schafft sich damit 
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in immer mehr Bereichen der österreichischen Wirtschaft ein Netz abhängiger Fir-
men.
Auf dem Energiesektor erreichten die österreichischen Importe aus der UdSSR 
im Jahre 1984 mit 16,3 Mrd öS eine Rekordhöhe. Im Vergleich zu 1983 stiegen 
die österreichischen Erdgaseinfuhren, wertmäßig um 71 %. Auch im 1. Halbjahr 
1985 nahmen die sowjetischen Erdgaslieferungen nach Österreich um 23,6 % zu. 
Gleichzeitig gingen allerdings die Erdöl- und Kohleimporte aus der UdSSR im 1. 
Halbjahr 1985 teilweise drastisch zurück. Langfristig wird jedoch auch mit öster-
reichischen Strombezügen aus der UdSSR zu rechnen sein (Stromaustauschver-
trag aus 1983). Welche Entwicklungen die österreichischen Energieimporte aus der 
UdSSR in Zukunft nehmen werden, ist noch nicht klar abzusehen. Es sollte jedoch 
rechtzeitig an Importplafonds gedacht werden, zumindest dort, wo eine vernünftige 
alternative Bezugsquelle vorhanden ist.
Die Perspektiven für eine Ausweitung des Außenhandels mit der UdSSR schei-
nen deshalb begrenzt zu sein, weil nach sowjetischer Außenhandelsstatistik bereits 
ein Aktivum für Österreich vorliegt. Langfristig könnte nur unter der Vorausset-
zung mehr in die Sowjetunion exportiert werden, wenn auch Österreich mehr sow-
jetische Waren importiert. Dies könnte mangels geeigneten Warenangebots nur auf 
dem Energie- und Rohstoffsektor möglich sein. Ob dies aber wirklich den österrei-
chischen Interessen und dem Bedarf entspricht, sollte Gegenstand grundsätzlicher 
Überlegungen sein.
Unverändert bemüht sich Österreich um humanitäre Fälle. Soweit bekannt, sind 
wir das einzige westliche Land, dem die Sowjetunion auch Reaktionen auf die bei 
offiziellen Besuchen übergebenen Interventionslisten für politisch Verfolgte offi-
ziell mitteilt. Obwohl diese fast ausschließlich negativ sind, bleibt die erfreuliche 
Tatsache an sich, daß man Österreichs Eintreten sowjetischerseits ernst nimmt. Die 
Entwicklung im bilateralen und humanitären Bereich ist zwiespältig. Größtenteils 
gibt es bei Eheschließungen und Familienzusammenführungen keine Probleme, es 
sei denn, es handelt sich um Fälle in Österreich eingebürgerter ehem. jüdischer So-
wjetemigranten. Die Botschaft war und ist ständig – mit oft erfreulichem Erfolg – 
bemüht, auftretende Härtefälle durch Interventionen einer Lösung zuzuführen. Im 
Bereich der Besuchsreisen hingegen werden seit mehreren Jahren österreichischer-
seits Fälle anhängig gemacht, welche bei den sowjetischen Behörden aus meist 
nicht bekannten Gründen immer wieder auf taube Ohren stoßen.
Alles in allem kann aber unter Berücksichtigung der gegebenen Verhältnisse 
die Bilanz auf dem bilateralen konsularischen Sektor als im wesentlichen positiv 
angesehen werden.
Was den österreichisch-sowjetischen Kulturaustausch betrifft, der grundsätzlich 
nur in vertraglich abgesteckten Grenzen und Bahnen abgewickelt werden kann, 
geht die UdSSR mit größter Selbstverständlichkeit davon aus, daß ihr in Österreich 
alle Möglichkeiten zur Präsentation ihrer Kultur offenstehen. Umgekehrt ist Öster-
reich bei seinen Bemühungen, in der UdSSR jene kulturellen Leistungen zu zeigen 
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auf die unser Land stolz ist, ständig auf den verschiedensten Ebenen bis hin zu den 
kleinen praktischen Dingen mit Schwierigkeiten und Barrieren konfrontiert. Was 
in der UdSSR an österreichischer Kultur zugelassen wird, suchen sich die sowjeti-
schen Stellen selbst aus. Dies gilt in besonderem Maße auch für die „Gesellschaften 
für Freundschaft und kulturelle Beziehungen“ (ÖSG/SGÖ).
In allen Bereichen seiner Beziehungen zur UdSSR müßte sich Österreich wie-
der in vermehrtem Maße bewußt werden, daß österreichische Interessen verteidigt 
und Erfolge im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes schwer erarbeitet werden müssen. Ös-
terreich darf sich nicht durch Leerformeln, die im täglichen diplomatischen Ver-
kehr mit kommunistischen Staaten gebraucht werden, beirren lassen, sondern sollte 
wieder jenen Mut fassen, der ihm in den 50er Jahren unter viel schwierigeren inter-
nationalen Bedingungen die Bewunderung der Weltöffentlichkeit eingebracht hat.
Tut man das nicht, so könnte Österreichs Politik, gegenüber den Oststaaten, 
vor allem gegenüber der UdSSR, bei anderen westlichen Ländern missverstanden 
werden. Der Westen könnte sich die Frage stellen, welches Ziel denn Österreich 
eigentlich mit so großem Einsatz gegenüber dem Osten verfolgt. Kann darauf kei-
ne Antwort gegeben werden, so könnte Österreichs Ansehen bei seinen westlichen 
Freunden Schaden leiden. Die österreichische Botschaft Washington vermittelte in 
ihrem Bericht Zl. 7-POL/85 ein umfassendes Bild über die Problematik der bilate-
ralen Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und den USA und nannte in diesem Zusam-
menhang einige negative Züge des österreichischen Image in den USA. Die dort 
erwähnten Negativa stehen im Zusammenhang mit unserem Verhältnis zum Osten. 
In Österreich sollte man sich bei der Gestaltung der Politik gegenüber der UdSSR 
wieder vermehrt Gedanken über ein ausgewogenes „give and take“ machen. Das 
österreichisch-sowjetische Verhältnis beruht auf einem gesunden Vertrauenspols-
ter, der durchaus in vernünftigen Grenzen strapazierbar ist. Es wäre jedoch eine trü-
gerische Hoffnung, angesichts bestehender sowjetischer Sympathien für Österreich 
zu glauben, nur durch „österreichischen Charme“ Erfolge in Verhandlungen mit der 
UdSSR erreichen zu können. Der „Reblaus-Effekt“ bei der Vorbereitung des öster-
reichischen Staatsvertrages, soferne dieser überhaupt wissenschaftlich fundierbar 
ist, kommt heute sicher nicht mehr zum Tragen.
Abschließend dürfen noch folgende organisatorische Maßnahmen konkret an-
geregt werden:
Schaffung eines eigenen UdSSR-Desk im BMAA analog zum Koordinator für 
das USA-Konzept. Nur die Zusammenfassung aller Bereiche der österreichisch-
sowjetischen Beziehungen in der Hand eines UdSSR-Experten ermöglicht eine 
sorgfältige Prüfung österreichischer Interessen und einen konsequenten Aufbau 
österreichischer Positionen gegenüber der UdSSR. Sämtliche offiziellen und halb-
offiziellen Rußlandreisenden sollten möglichst vor und nach ihrer Reise zwecks 
Briefings und Debriefings mit dem BMAA Kontakt aufnehmen.
Erstellung eines längerfristigen Konzeptes zur Gestaltung unserer Beziehungen 
zur UdSSR, das in ein umfassendes Ost-West-Konzept, welches die Beziehungen 
338 Documents 
Österreichs zu Westeuropa und den USA einschließt, einzuordnen wäre. Zum Un-
terschied vom USA-Konzept sollte es sich jedoch i.G. um interne vertrauliche au-
ßenpolitische Richtlinien handeln.
Der Botschafter
Source: ÖStA, AVA, NL E-1736: Bielka, Folder 115.
Soviet Ambassadors to Austria, Austrian Ambassadors 
to the USSR
Ivan I. Il’ichev
13 June 1953–31 March 1956
Norbert Bischoff
3 July 1953–31 March 1960
Andrei A. Smirnov
31 March 1956–14 October 1956
Heinrich Haymerle
17 June 1960–2 June 1964
Sergei G. Lapin
19 October 1956–16 June 1960
Walter Wodak
7 July 1964–6 October 1970
Viktor I. Avilov
16 June 1960–13 June 1965
Heinrich Haymerle
3 December 1970–17 June 1974
Boris F. Podtserob
30 June 1965–20 September 1971
Heinrich Standenat
2 October 1974–17 May 1978
Averkii B. Aristov
20 September 1971–11 July 1973 [sic]
Gerald Hinteregger
8 September 1978–11 July 1981
Mikhail T. Efremov
10 March 1975–24 October 1986
Helmut Liedermann
1 October 1981–25 November 1985
Gennadii S. Shikin
24 October 1986–24 May 1990
Herbert Grubmayr
27 November 1985–29 September 1990
Valerii I. Popov
10 August 1990–30 August 1996
Friedrich Bauer
15 October 1990–31 July 1995
Source: Russian Embassy in Vienna, www.rusemb.at/botschaft/diebotschafter (2010); Information by 




AdR Archiv der Republik [Archive of the Republic, Vienna, Austria]
APA Austria Presse Agentur [Austrian Press Agency]
APN Agentstvo Pechati Novosti [Novosti Press Agency]
AVPRF Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii [The Russian Federation’s Archive of For-
eign Policy, Moscow, Russia]
BA Bundesarchiv [Federal Archives, Berlin, Germany]
BMAA Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vien-
na, Austria]
BMLV Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung [Ministry of Defense, Vienna, Austria]
CC Central Committee
CDSP Current Digest of the Soviet Press
CMEA Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
COCOM Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSBM Confidence and Security Building Measures
CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CWIHP Cold War International History Project
EA Europa-Archiv
EC European Community
ECSC European Coal and Steel Community
EEC European Economic Community
EFTA European Free Trade Association
ERP European Recovery Program
EU European Union
FO Foreign Office
FPÖ Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs [Austrian Freedom Party]
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
FTA Free Trade Area
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR German Democratic Republic
GF Gorbachev Foundation, Moscow, Russian Federation
GNP Gross national product
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IMEMO Institut mirovoi ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii [Institute of World Economics 
and International Relations]
INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
KPÖ Kommunistische Partei Österreichs [Communist Party of Austria]
MBFR Mutual balanced force reductions
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MÖSTA Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs
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MRP Ministerratsprotokolle [Cabinet Protocols]
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NL Nachlass
N+N neutral and nonaligned states
NSC National Security Council
NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei [National Socialist German Workers Par-
ty]
NYT New York Times
ÖAW Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften [Austrian Academy of Sciences]
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation
ÖGB Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund [Austrian Federation of Trade Unions]
ORF Österreichischer Rundfunk [Austrian Broadcasting Corporation]
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
ÖSG Österreichisch-Sowjetische Gesellschaft [Austrian-Soviet Society]
ÖStA Österreichisches Staatsarchiv [Austrian State Archives, Vienna, Austria]
ÖVP Österreichische Volkspartei [Austrian People’s Party]
ÖZA Österreichische Zeitschrift für Außenpolitik
PHP Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact
RGANI Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishei istorii [Russian State Archives of Contempo-
rary History, Moscow, Russia]
RGASPI Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial’no- politicheskoi istorii [Russian State Archives 
of Social and Political History, Moscow, Russia]
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks / Treaty
SAPMO Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR [The GDR Political Par-
ties’ and Organizations’ Archives, Berlin, Germany]
SBKA Stiftung Bruno-Kreisky-Archiv [Bruno Kreisky Archive, Vienna, Austria]
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SPÖ Sozialistische (since 1991: Sozialdemokratische) Partei Österreichs [Socialist (since 
1991: Social democratic) Party of Austria]
SS Schutzstaffel
UN(O) United Nations (Organization)
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
US(A) United States (of America)
USIA Upravlenie Sovetskim imushchestvom v Avstrii [Administration of Soviet Enterprises in 
Austria]
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VdU Verband der Unabhängigen [Union of Independents]
VÖEST Vereinigte Österreichische Eisen- und Stahlwerke [Austrian Steel Corporation]
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